title: Hidden Local Account Persistence via Winlogon SpecialAccounts UserList id: 8d2f4e91-5c3a-4b10-9e77-204194532501 status: experimental description: > Detects registry DWORD values set to 0 under Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList, matching staged fin.ps1 / mkuser.py persistence () designed to hide local accounts from interactive Windows sign-in surfaces. Prerequisite: requires Sysmon Event ID 13 (RegistryEvent Value Set) supplying TargetObject and Details; native Windows Security Event 4657 uses ObjectName, ObjectValueName, and NewValue (with a registry SACL) and requires separate mapping. author: Odin by Brandefense date: 2026-11-16 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: '\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList\' Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)' condition: selection falsepositives: - Rare legacy OEM provisioning utilities level: high tags: - attack.persistence - attack.defense_evasion - attack.t1564.002 --- title: Active Directory Replication-Right Access (Event 4662) from Non-Allowlisted Principal id: 9b4a71c2-8e11-44d2-a91c-204194532502 status: experimental description: > Detects MS-DRSR directory replication extended-right checks (Event ID 4662) by principals outside an explicit Domain Controller and Entra Connect allowlist (such as temporary admin in dcsync.py). Prerequisite: requires 'Audit Directory Service Access = Success' GPO and a SACL on the Domain Naming Context root auditing Replicating Directory Changes rights. author: Odin by Brandefense date: 2026-11-16 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: 4662 AccessMask: - '0x100' - '0x00000100' - '256' Properties|contains: - '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2' - '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2' - '89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c' filter_authorized_dc_accounts: SubjectUserName: - 'DC01$' - 'DC02$' filter_entra_connect: SubjectUserName: - 'MSOL_0123456789ab' - 'AAD_9876543210fe' filter_local_system: SubjectLogonId: '0x3e7' condition: selection and not filter_authorized_dc_accounts and not filter_entra_connect and not filter_local_system falsepositives: - Populate filter_authorized_dc_accounts with actual Domain Controller computer accounts and authorized gMSA provisioning principals (e.g., provAgentgMSA$), and replace the placeholder SubjectUserName values in filter_entra_connect with the tenant's exact approved Entra Connect sync account sAMAccountName values (never exclude wildcard '*$', 'MSOL_*', or 'AAD_*' prefixes, or compromised member-server and user accounts matching those prefixes will evade detection) level: critical tags: - attack.credential_access - attack.t1003.006 --- title: Web Server Worker Spawning Chunked PowerShell or Command Stager id: 7c19b3a4-2f08-4e61-b8a2-204194532503 status: experimental description: > Detects IIS (w3wp.exe) or Apache Tomcat (tomcat*.exe / java.exe) spawning cmd.exe, PowerShell, or certutil with encoded, bypass, or chunked file-reassembly arguments matching marked staging commands from psrun.py, psbg.py, push.py, and dl.py. For unmarked cmd.exe /c execution via tjsp.jsp, correlate with Suricata wire rule sid:2026091109 (JSPOK|7C| response prefix) and YARA rule ODIN_R01_JSP_Cmd_Webshell_Markers. author: Odin by Brandefense date: 2026-11-16 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: - '\w3wp.exe' - '\tomcat8.exe' - '\tomcat9.exe' - '\tomcat10.exe' - '\tomcat11.exe' - '\java.exe' selection_child: Image|endswith: - '\cmd.exe' - '\powershell.exe' - '\pwsh.exe' - '\certutil.exe' selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - '-enc' - 'ExecutionPolicy' - 'Bypass' - 'FromBase64String' - 'Set-Content' - 'WriteAllText' - '_pushp' - 'PSBG_DONE' - '-decode' - '-urlcache' condition: selection_parent and selection_child and selection_cli falsepositives: - CI/CD build agents running under java.exe that invoke PowerShell with ExecutionPolicy Bypass level: high tags: - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.t1505.003 - attack.t1059.001 - attack.t1059.003