title: Ligolo-ng Linux Agent Execution or Legacy Relay TUN Provisioning id: 96a1c410-1f23-4b88-9d01-202611160601 status: experimental description: > Detects Linux execution of the unprivileged Ligolo-ng Go socket agent dialing an external relay (-connect, --connect, or -connect= with host:port or https:// / wss:// URL, anchored so curl --connect-timeout and openssl s_client never match) across default agent binary names or flag/URL-bearing renamed binaries, plus manual ip tuntap ligolo virtual TUN setup. author: Odin by Brandefense date: 2026-11-16 logsource: category: process_creation product: linux detection: selection_agent_image: Image|endswith: - '/agent' - '/ligolo-agent' - '/ligolo-ng' CommandLine|re: '(?:^|\s)--?connect(?:\s+|=)(?:(?:https?|wss?)://[A-Za-z0-9_.\[\]:/-]+|[A-Za-z0-9_.\[\]-]+:\d{2,5})(?:\s|$)' selection_agent_cli_name: CommandLine|re: '(?:^|[\s/])(?:ligolo-)?agent\s+.*--?connect(?:\s+|=)(?:(?:https?|wss?)://[A-Za-z0-9_.\[\]:/-]+|[A-Za-z0-9_.\[\]-]+:\d{2,5})(?:\s|$)' selection_agent_connect: CommandLine|re: '(?:^|\s)--?connect(?:\s+|=)(?:(?:https?|wss?)://[A-Za-z0-9_.\[\]:/-]+|[A-Za-z0-9_.\[\]-]+:\d{2,5})(?:\s|$)' CommandLine|contains: - '-ignore-cert' - '-accept-fingerprint' - '-retry' - ':1160' - 'ligolo' - 'https://' - 'wss://' - 'http://' - 'ws://' selection_relay_tun_setup: Image|endswith: '/ip' CommandLine|contains|all: - 'tuntap' - 'mode tun' - 'ligolo' condition: selection_agent_image or selection_agent_cli_name or selection_agent_connect or selection_relay_tun_setup falsepositives: - Authorized red-team tunneling exercises on designated Linux jump hosts or relay VMs level: high tags: - attack.command_and_control - attack.t1572 --- title: Ligolo-ng Windows Unprivileged Socket Agent Execution id: 96d4f743-4c56-4e11-8a34-202611160604 status: experimental description: > Detects Windows execution of the unprivileged Ligolo-ng Go agent (agent.exe or renamed binary) connecting to an external operator relay via host:port or https:// / wss:// URL (which terminates TUN traffic in proxy-side gVisor netstack). author: Odin by Brandefense date: 2026-11-16 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_cli_connect: CommandLine|re: '(?:^|\s)--?connect(?:\s+|=)(?:(?:https?|wss?)://[A-Za-z0-9_.\[\]:/-]+|[A-Za-z0-9_.\[\]-]+:\d{2,5})(?:\s|$)' CommandLine|contains: - '-ignore-cert' - '-accept-fingerprint' - '-retry' - ':1160' - 'ligolo' - 'https://' - 'wss://' - 'http://' - 'ws://' selection_agent_image: Image|endswith: - '\agent.exe' - '\ligolo-agent.exe' - '\ligolo-ng.exe' CommandLine|re: '(?:^|\s)--?connect(?:\s+|=)(?:(?:https?|wss?)://[A-Za-z0-9_.\[\]:/-]+|[A-Za-z0-9_.\[\]-]+:\d{2,5})(?:\s|$)' selection_agent_cli_name: CommandLine|re: '(?:^|[\s\\])(?:ligolo-)?agent(?:\.exe)?\s+.*--?connect(?:\s+|=)(?:(?:https?|wss?)://[A-Za-z0-9_.\[\]:/-]+|[A-Za-z0-9_.\[\]-]+:\d{2,5})(?:\s|$)' condition: selection_cli_connect or selection_agent_image or selection_agent_cli_name falsepositives: - Authorized adversary-simulation engagements with documented Rules of Engagement level: critical tags: - attack.command_and_control - attack.t1572 --- title: Unsanctioned Wintun Kernel Tunnel DLL Load Outside Approved VPN Paths id: 96e5a854-5d67-4f22-9b45-202611160605 status: experimental description: > Detects loading of wintun.dll by processes outside five approved enterprise VPN directories, covering Windows-hosted Ligolo-ng relay listeners, double-pivot relays, and custom TUN tools. author: Odin by Brandefense date: 2026-11-16 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection_wintun: ImageLoaded|endswith: '\wintun.dll' filter_approved_vpns: # Exact executables only; add the approved VPN clients used in your fleet. Image: - 'C:\Program Files\WireGuard\wireguard.exe' - 'C:\Program Files\Tailscale\tailscaled.exe' - 'C:\Program Files\Cloudflare\Cloudflare WARP\warp-svc.exe' condition: selection_wintun and not filter_approved_vpns falsepositives: - Portable developer VPN clients or authorized red-team relay workstations level: high tags: - attack.command_and_control - attack.t1572 --- title: Self-Hosted noVNC and Websockify Browser Workbench Execution (Cloud / VPS Telemetry) id: 96b2d521-2a34-4c99-8e12-202611160602 status: experimental description: > Cloud-workload / VPS process detection for startup of noVNC HTML5 RFB proxies or websockify bridges attached to local VNC displays on compromised Linux VMs or rogue staging servers. author: Odin by Brandefense date: 2026-11-16 logsource: category: process_creation product: linux detection: selection_novnc: CommandLine|contains: - 'novnc_proxy' - 'websockify' - '/utils/launch.sh' selection_vnc_target: CommandLine|contains: - '--vnc' - 'localhost:590' - '127.0.0.1:590' - ':3000' condition: selection_novnc and selection_vnc_target falsepositives: - Legitimate cloud VDI, Proxmox/OpenStack consoles, or containerized GUI laboratory environments level: medium tags: - attack.credential_access - attack.defense_evasion - attack.t1539 --- title: Evilginx2 Reverse-Proxy or Static Login Cloner Execution (Cloud / VPS Telemetry) id: 96c3e632-3b45-4d00-9f23-202611160603 status: experimental description: > Cloud-workload / VPS process detection for Evilginx2 phishlet servers (constrained by binary image so mkdir -p .../phishlets never fires) or static login-cloner / keystroke-sink scripts. author: Odin by Brandefense date: 2026-11-16 logsource: category: process_creation product: linux detection: selection_evilginx: Image|endswith: - '/evilginx' - '/evilginx2' CommandLine|contains|all: - '-p ' - 'phishlets' selection_cloner_specific: CommandLine|contains: - 'switch_site.sh' - '/phish/receiver.py' condition: selection_evilginx or selection_cloner_specific falsepositives: - Authorized adversary-simulation engagements on designated cloud redirector VMs level: high tags: - attack.credential_access - attack.t1557 - attack.t1539