title: Per-User HKCU COM CLSID InProcServer32 Hijack to Public Directory id: d4b8e312-7c94-4a5f-9e31-6c18f0294a7b status: experimental description: > Detects per-user HKCU Component Object Model (COM) InProcServer32 hijacking targeting CLSID {1f486a52-3cb1-48fd-8f50-b8dc300d9f9d} (paired with Chrome restarts in redeploy_force.ps1, CLSID owner unresolved) or pointing COM server DLL paths into user-writable directories (C:\Users\Public\ or AppData\Local\Temp\) for UAC-free persistence. Matches UsrClass.dat mounts in Sysmon (HKU\_Classes\CLSID\...) and Defender XDR (HKEY_USERS\_Classes\CLSID\...) as well as HKLM/HKCU \Software\Classes\CLSID\ paths. author: Odin by Brandefense date: 2026-11-16 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection_clsid_hive: TargetObject|contains: - '_Classes\CLSID\' - '\Classes\CLSID\' selection_inproc: TargetObject|contains: '\InProcServer32' selection_specific_clsid: TargetObject|contains: '{1f486a52-3cb1-48fd-8f50-b8dc300d9f9d}' selection_suspicious_payload: Details|contains: - 'C:\Users\Public\' - '\AppData\Local\Temp\' - 'hijack.dll' - 'hijack_standalone.dll' condition: selection_clsid_hive and selection_inproc and (selection_specific_clsid or selection_suspicious_payload) falsepositives: - Rare per-user developer COM shims explicitly registered from C:\Users\Public or Temp level: critical tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1546.015 --- title: Chromium Relaunched with Remote Debugging Port for CDP Cookie Grafting id: a7f2c904-3b61-4d8e-b152-8e47d9301c6a status: experimental description: > Detects shell interpreters, script hosts, or scheduled task launchers relaunching Chromium browsers with --remote-debugging-port= (or pairing remote debugging with --remote-allow-origins=* or a custom --user-data-dir= inside vendor browser AppData\Local directories to bypass Chrome 136+ default-profile debugging restrictions) while excluding Selenium, chromedriver, Puppeteer, Playwright, and Cypress QA automation harnesses. author: Odin by Brandefense date: 2026-11-16 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_browser: Image|endswith: - '\chrome.exe' - '\msedge.exe' - '\brave.exe' CommandLine|contains: '--remote-debugging-port=' selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: - '\powershell.exe' - '\pwsh.exe' - '\cmd.exe' - '\svchost.exe' - '\taskeng.exe' - '\taskhostw.exe' - '\wscript.exe' - '\cscript.exe' - '\mshta.exe' - '\rundll32.exe' selection_vendor_profile_sibling: CommandLine|contains: '--user-data-dir=' selection_vendor_appdata_root: CommandLine|contains: - '\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\' - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\' - '\AppData\Local\BraveSoftware\' selection_allow_origins: CommandLine|contains: '--remote-allow-origins=\*' condition: selection_browser and (selection_parent or selection_allow_origins or (selection_vendor_profile_sibling and selection_vendor_appdata_root)) falsepositives: - Custom developer scripts invoking PowerShell to attach non-headless Chrome debugging sessions against local profiles level: high tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1550.004 --- title: PowerShell Inline CSharp Low-Level Keyboard Hook Compilation id: 5e91b648-2d73-4f1c-8a94-3b05e7281d9f status: experimental description: > Detects PowerShell scripts compiling inline CSharp P/Invoke definitions via Add-Type to install low-level Windows keyboard hooks (SetWindowsHookEx with WH_KEYBOARD_LL = 13). author: Odin by Brandefense date: 2026-11-16 logsource: category: ps_script product: windows detection: selection_hook: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - 'Add-Type' - 'SetWindowsHookEx' - 'WH_KEYBOARD_LL' selection_win32: ScriptBlockText|contains: - 'GetForegroundWindow' - 'CallNextHookEx' condition: selection_hook and selection_win32 falsepositives: - Specialized accessibility or hotkey remapping scripts authored in inline PowerShell CSharp level: high tags: - attack.collection - attack.credential-access - attack.t1056.001 --- title: Masqueraded mstsc.exe Execution from User-Writable AppData Path id: 3c64a819-9f20-4e7b-a538-1d72b4906e5c status: experimental description: > Detects execution of an executable named mstsc.exe from user-writable AppData directories (such as %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\RdpService\mstsc.exe documented in /rdp/DEPLOY.txt for HVNC DLL sideloading) rather than legitimate Windows System32 or SysWOW64 paths. author: Odin by Brandefense date: 2026-11-16 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: Image|endswith: '\mstsc.exe' selection_user_appdata: Image|contains: - '\AppData\Local\' - '\AppData\Roaming\' - 'C:\Users\Public\' filter_system_dirs: Image: - 'C:\Windows\System32\mstsc.exe' - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mstsc.exe' condition: selection_img and selection_user_appdata and not filter_system_dirs falsepositives: - None expected in standard Windows enterprise environments level: high tags: - attack.defense-evasion - attack.t1036.005