



APT28

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APT28 (Fancy Bear) is a Russian GRU-linked APT active since 2004, conducting high-risk cyber espionage, election interference, and influence operations. It targets government, defense, military, and critical infrastructure in Europe, North America, and globally, using phishing, supply chain attacks, zero-day exploits, and disinformation.

IDENTITY



Attribution	: Russian military intelligence (GRU, Unit 26165).
Active Since	: At least 2004.
Aliases	: Fancy Bear, Sofacy, STRONTIUM, Sednit, Tsar Team, Pawn Storm.
Motivation	: Political and military cyber espionage, election interference, and influence operations in support of Russian state objectives.

TTPs

Initial Access	: Spear-phishing campaigns, exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities, and credential theft.
Persistence	: Custom implants, scheduled tasks, compromised credentials, and backdoors for long-term access.
Command & Control (C2)	: Uses custom malware families, compromised infrastructure, and dynamic DNS for covert communications.
Malware & Tools	: X-Agent, Sednit, Sofacy implants, Zebrocy, Chopstick, GameFish, and exploitation of Microsoft Outlook vulnerabilities.
Techniques	: Credential harvesting, lateral movement, supply chain compromise, data exfiltration, and coordinated disinformation campaigns.

TARGET PROFILE

Target Sectors	: Government, defense, military, transportation, NGOs, critical infrastructure, and media.
Geographies Targeted	: Primarily Europe (NATO, Ukraine, EU states), North America, and international organizations opposing Russian interests.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

Risk Level	: Very High – highly capable and persistent global espionage actor.
Most Recent Activity	: Active during 2024–2025, exploiting Microsoft Outlook vulnerabilities to target Czech, German, and NATO government institutions.
Evolution	: Transitioned from simple credential theft and phishing campaigns to advanced operations involving zero-day exploitation, large-scale influence campaigns, and critical infrastructure targeting.

NOTABLE OPERATIONS

2016: Interference in the U.S. presidential election through hacking and leaking operations.

2017: Targeted French election campaigns and German political organizations.

2018: Conducted cyber espionage against organizations investigating Russia’s state-sponsored doping program.

2020: Phishing and intrusion attempts against COVID-19 vaccine research facilities in Europe and North America.

2022: Aggressive campaigns supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, targeting NATO defense ministries and Ukrainian infrastructure.

2023: Exploited vulnerabilities in email platforms for espionage against European governments.

2024–2025: Used Outlook exploits to target NATO members and EU government agencies, continuing long-term espionage campaigns.