



SCATTERED SPIDER



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Scattered Spider began with phishing and SIM swapping (2022), partnered with ALPHV/BlackCat then RansomHub, and by 2025 was deploying DragonForce ransomware on virtualized environments using fake SSO portals, dynamic DNS, and short-lived phishing kits.

IDENTITY



Attribution	: Cybercriminal collective of English-speaking actors (U.S., U.K., Canada, Europe), linked to underground network “The Community / The Comm.”
Active Since	: At least 2022.
Aliases	: UNC3944, Octo Tempest, Oktapus, Muddled Libra, Scatter Swine.
Motivation	: Financially driven – extortion, ransomware, SIM swapping, credential theft, and fraud.

TTPs

Initial Access	Phishing & Smishing: Fake Okta/SSO portals, short-lived phishing domains (5–30 min), dynamic DNS-based domains (e.g., mailchimp-sso[.]com, klv1.it[.]com). Social Engineering: Vishing, impersonating IT staff, MFA fatigue attacks. SIM Swapping: Hijacking numbers to intercept MFA tokens.
Execution	Living-off-the-Land (LotL): Abuse of RMM tools like AnyDesk, TeamViewer, ScreenConnect, Splashtop, TacticalRMM, Tailscale VPN. Commercial RATs: Spectre RAT (latest variant with XOR encoding, HTTP C2), WarZone RAT, Raccoon Stealer, Vidar.
Persistence	Abuse of SSO/Federation: Adding malicious IdPs to maintain cloud persistence. Creation of Privileged Accounts: Local/domain admin accounts. VPN & RMM Persistence: Long-term access via commercial tools.
Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion	Credential Dumping: Using Mimikatz, ADEplorer to harvest credentials and NTDS.dit. Hypervisor Attacks: VMware ESXi access, resetting root passwords. LotL & Proxy Networks: Blending in with PowerShell, PsExec; rotating IPs and device names.
Command & Control (C2)	Dynamic DNS Domains: For callback and rapid infrastructure changes. Third-Party Services: Abuse of Slack, Teams, Exchange, and social media as covert C2. Cloud-based Exfil: Use of MEGA.nz, AWS S3 for exfiltration.
Discovery / Lateral Movement / Collection	Cloud Recon: AWS inventory abuse, Snowflake database scans. Lateral Movement: Exploiting federated identities; VPN/RMM pivoting. Collection: Mass data access from SharePoint, cloud storage, network shares.
Exfiltration & Impact	Exfiltration: Cloud services (MEGA, AWS S3), custom C2 channels. Impact: Data theft, extortion, DragonForce ransomware (hypervisor-level encryption of VMware ESXi and backups). Ransom Strategy: Double extortion – encryption + data leak threats.
Malware & Tools	- Spectre RAT (2025 variant – advanced obfuscation, expanded commands). - WarZone RAT / AveMaria RAT. - Raccoon & Vidar Stealers. - DragonForce Ransomware (2025). - Past RaaS Affiliations: ALPHV/BlackCat (2023), RansomHub (2024).

TARGET PROFILE

Target Sectors	Airlines & Transportation: Qantas (6M records), Hawaiian Airlines, WestJet. Cloud & SaaS Providers: Okta, Klaviyo, HubSpot, Pure Storage. Retail & Luxury: Nike, Louis Vuitton, Audemars Piguet. Financial & Insurance: Credit Karma, Paxos, Morningstar, T-Mobile, Vodafone. Media & Tech: Twitter/X, Forbes, News Corp. Critical Infrastructure: Telecom, insurance, and government contractors.
Geographies Targeted	: Primary: U.S., U.K., Canada, Europe. Global Reach: Opportunistic targeting across retail, aviation, SaaS, and finance.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

Risk Level	: Critical o Aviation attacks: Qantas, Hawaiian Airlines, WestJet breaches.
Most Recent Activity	- Business services compromised: Klaviyo, HubSpot, Pure Storage. - Spectre RAT updated variant deployed in global campaigns. - Troy Hunt phishing case: Mailchimp-sso[.]com attack linked to Scattered Spider. - DragonForce ransomware used against VMware ESXi. - One of the most dangerous and adaptive groups in 2025.
Evolution	2022 – SIM swapping & phishing (Okta portals). 2023 – RaaS affiliation with ALPHV/BlackCat, MGM Resorts breach. 2024 – RansomHub partnership, U.S. indictments/arrests but resilient operations. 2025 – Hypervisor-level ransomware (DragonForce), Spectre RAT upgrades, aviation + SaaS sector expansion.

NOTABLE OPERATIONS

- 2025 (Jul):** Qantas data breach – 6M customers impacted; also Hawaiian Airlines & WestJet targeted.
- 2025 (Mar):** Phishing attack on Troy Hunt (Have I Been Pwned) – Mailchimp-sso domain.
- 2025 (Feb–Apr):** Campaigns targeting Klaviyo, HubSpot, Pure Storage; Spectre RAT deployed.
- 2025 (Ongoing):** Adoption of DragonForce ransomware, hypervisor-level attacks on VMware ESXi.
- 2024:** Transition from ALPHV to RansomHub RaaS after law enforcement disruption.
- 2023 (Sep):** MGM Resorts & Caesars Entertainment breaches; \$100M+ losses.
- 2022 (Aug):** Early Okta/SSO phishing & SIM swapping campaigns.

ANALYST NOTES (Defensive Takeaways)

- Monitor for short-lived phishing domains (Okta/SSO lookalikes).
- Harden MFA defenses against fatigue/vishing/SIM swapping.
- Review VMware ESXi security posture for ransomware resilience.
- Restrict RMM tool usage (AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Tailscale) and log for anomalies.