FULL REPORT · OPERATIONS · MONOGRAPH 57 / 58 · 19 MIN READ

Operation SapperSync: Agent Skill Staging, ImageMagick Risks, and Container Persistence

Inside a TCP 9099 workbench staging local-upload AI agent skill packages, ImageMagick MSL scripts, layered Alpine Linux archives, and an ownCloud 10.13.0.4 diagnostic capture

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1. Executive Summary

IN SHORT

Operation SapperSync ran on an East Asian cloud server on TCP 9099 recorded on 13–20 November 2026. Odin by Brandefense analyzed 400 deduplicated entries totaling 435.30 MB across 199 sized files. The workbench holds staged AI skill packs, 11 ImageMagick MSL scripts, eight Alpine layers, and one 6 November ownCloud 10.13.0.4 diagnostic report. Block MSL coders in policy.xml, update ownCloud Graph API to 0.2.1 or 0.3.1, sign agent skills, and enforce read-only containers.

Enterprise stacks now place AI agent skill loaders beside image converters and containerized file shares. Each service accepts user archives or media uploads inside Linux containers. Weak upload rules, open ImageMagick policies, or writable container roots give attackers room to test several paths at once.

Between 13 and 20 November 2026, Odin by Brandefense examined an open HTTP directory on TCP port 9099. That directory sat on an East Asian virtual private server. On 20 November 2026, the listing reported 399 active files and 23 directories.

Across captures from 13 to 20 November 2026, deduplication yields 400 unique entries. Those entries include 199 sized files totaling 435,295,482 bytes (435.30 MB) and 201 unsized entries. Hashing identifies 190 unique SHA-256 digests across the sized files.

The server holds a diagnostic report from an external ownCloud host and logs third-party scanner hits. Odin by Brandefense publishes zero IPv4 addresses and zero workbench SHA-256 digests. The server

address, scanner addresses, diagnostic filename, transfer filenames, and container hostname are withheld.

1. **Local-upload AI agent skill archives sit beside a 54-skill catalogue slice.**
The root folder holds a 918,252-byte full skills JSON index and a 251,977-byte slice with 54 skills. Two identical test ZIP files unpack to 290 bytes each and mark their origin as a local upload. A 5,304-byte shell script prepares the Sapper environment. These staged files show preparation, not confirmed use against an external AI platform.

2. **Eleven ImageMagick MSL scripts pair with PNG and PHP upload tests.**
Seven sized MSL scripts total 128,802 bytes alongside four unsized MSL entries. The root folder also holds 15 PNG files across three content classes and 13 PHP-family files. These files align with known image-coder policy risks and PNG profile-chunk read flaws.

3. **Eight Alpine Linux tarballs model startup and cron persistence.**
A persistence folder holds 10 sized files totaling 3,735,731 bytes, led by eight numbered tarballs. Those layers add an Alpine BusyBox rootfs, version and hotfix markers, and a wrapper entrypoint. Two hidden scripts target PHP web cache paths and database variables on startup and every 15 minutes.

4. **One ownCloud 10.13.0.4 diagnostic report confirms external output without proving initial access.**
The root folder holds a 349,235-byte diagnostic file dated 6 November 2026 from containerized ownCloud 10.13.0.4 Community. It also holds a 1,986-line HTTP hit log. Older ownCloud builds carried vulnerable graphapi vendor files, yet this report alone does not show how access occurred.

Three Decisions for Security Leaders

1. **Require signed AI agent skill packages from internal repositories.** Disable ad-hoc local ZIP uploads on production agent gateways. Verify skill signatures in CI and run agent tools in isolated sandboxes.
2. **Lock down ImageMagick policy files and patch ownCloud appliances.** Block MSL, MVG, TEXT, HTTPS, and indirect coders in ImageMagick policy files and update past PNG profile flaws. Update ownCloud Graph API to 0.2.1 or 0.3.1 (bundled from 10.13.1), delete GetPhpInfo.php, and rotate container secrets.
3. **Enforce read-only container root filesystems and immutable digests.** Mount container root filesystems read-only so web workers cannot write startup scripts or cron jobs. Pin images by SHA-256 digest and monitor hidden binary paths.

2. Workbench Architecture, 400-Entry Inventory, and Operational Context

Operation SapperSync takes its name from two staged files on the `TCP 9099` East Asian cloud server (address withheld). Those files are `/deploy_sapper_v2.sh` (**5,304** bytes) in root and `usr/local/bin/.agent_sync` (**1,471** bytes unpacked) inside `/la/L6.tgz`. Defenders can use cyber threat intelligence to track how operators pair new AI skill tests with container persistence.

On `20 November 2026`, the open HTTP directory on `TCP 9099` reported **399 active files and 23 directories**. Across captures recorded on `13–20 November 2026`, deduplication yields **400 unique entries**. One transient entry from an earlier capture rotated out before the `20 November` listing.

Teams can also apply vulnerability intelligence when reviewing the ImageMagick and ownCloud version context tied to these files. Figure 1 maps the four workbench tracks and withholding rules.




Figure 1: Staged skill packs, MSL files, container layers, and one ownCloud report

Workspace Zone Partition and File-Class Breakdown (`n = 400`)

Within the **400 deduplicated entries**, **199** sized files total **435,295,482 bytes (435.30 MB)**. The remaining **201** entries omit byte sizes in directory listings.

The **199** sized files span **190 unique SHA-256 digests**, all withheld. Nine sized files are exact byte duplicates, including the twin `demo-skill.zip` and `demo.zip` archives. Table 1 reconciles all **400** entries across the five top-level zones.

Workspace zone	Deduplicated entries	Share (%)	Sized files	Unsized entries	Sized bytes	Operational role on TCP 9099
Root Workspace `(root)`	387	96.75%	189	198	431,559,751	Staging scripts, **11** `.msl` files, **54**-skill slice, **2** skill ZIPs, `6 Nov` ownCloud report (**349,235** B), and **1,986** hit lines.
Alpine Layers `/la`	10	2.50%	10	0	3,735,731	Holds **8** numbered `.tgz` layers (`L1.tgz`–`L8.tgz`, **3,733,376** B) plus **2** sized companion files (**2,355** B).
Task Folder `/q33`	1	0.25%	0	1	0	Subfolder holding the unsized Python script `/q33/patch33.py`.
Output Folder `/q33o`	1	0.25%	0	1	0	Companion output subfolder holding **1** unsized entry.
Multiplexer `/tmux-0`	1	0.25%	0	1	0	Terminal multiplexer folder holding **1** unsized session socket entry.
Total deduplicated set	**400**	**100.00%**	**199**	**201**	**435,295,482**	**Matches 399 active files and 23 dirs on `20 Nov 2026` (190 SHA-256s withheld).**

Most workbench activity sits directly in root. The root zone holds **96.75%** of entries (**387** of **400**) and **99.14%** of sized bytes (**431,559,751** bytes). Only `/la` holds sized subdirectory files (**10** files, **3,735,731** bytes).

Table 2 reconciles the exact same **400** deduplicated entries (**199** sized files, **201** unsized entries, **435,295,482** bytes) across six mutually exclusive content classes.

Artifact class	Deduplicated entries	Share (%)	Sized files	Unsized entries	Sized bytes	Representative extensions & contents
Text, HTML & MSL (`text`)	187	46.75 %	106	81	7,026,344	Led by 74 `.html`, 30 extensionless, 19 `.txt`, 11 `.json`, 10 `.log`, 10 `.out`, 8 `.png`, 7 sized `.msl`, 5 `.jar`, and 4 `.b64` files.
Operator Scripts (`script`)	157	39.25 %	75	82	5,103,159	Exact split: 82 `.py`, 57 `.sh`, 10 `.php`, 6 `.js`, 1 `.png`, and 1 `.phtml`.
Unsized & Polyglots (`other`)	31	7.75%	0	31	0	Exact split: 15 extensionless, 4 unsized `.msl`, 3 `.b64`, 3 `.out`, 1 `.sock`, 1 `.lock`, 1 `.hdr`, 1 `.533805`, 1 `.php5`, and 1 `.phar`.
Archives (`archive`)	14	3.50%	12	2	423,164,869	Exact split: 9 `.tgz` (including `/la/L1.tgz` – `L8.tgz`), 3 `.gz`, and 2 `.zip` (`demo-skill.zip`, `demo.zip`); 97.21% of sized bytes.
Image Fixtures (`image`)	7	1.75 %	2	5	74	Exact split: 6 `.png` and 1 `.gif` small image test files.
Keys & Secrets (`secret`)	4	1.00%	4	0	1,036	Exact split: 2 extensionless key files, 1 `.openssh` key, and 1 `.pem` key (withheld).
Total deduplicated set	**400**	**100.00 %**	**199**	**201**	**435,295,482**	**Exact byte-level parity with Table 1** (435.30 MB).

Figure 5 shows how entry counts and byte volume split across these six classes. Text outputs (**187**) and scripts (**157**) make up **86.00%** (**344** of **400**) of entries. Archives (**14** entries, **12** sized) hold **97.21%** (**423,164,869** bytes) of sized bytes.




Figure 5: Text outputs and operator scripts make up 86.0% of deduplicated entries

Iterative Script Waves (`_q34_*` and `ch*.py`) and the 1,986-Line Hit Log

File names and sizes across the **157** scripts (**82** `.py` and **57** `.sh`) show an iterative testing workflow rather than one commercial tool. Table 3 summarizes the script groups and root access log.

Script or log group	Representative files	Recorded byte range	Role on workbench
Sapper & `_q34_*` shell set	`/deploy_sapper_v2.sh`, `/_q34_recon.sh`, `/bruteforce.sh`, `/_q34_s2.sh` – `s38.sh`	687–5,304 B	Environment setup and numbered target recon tasks.
`_q34_*` Python analyzers	`/analyze_34.py`, `/_q34_diff.py`, `/_q34_rhythm.py`, `/_q34_mem2.py`, `/_q34_mem.py`	528–1,981 B	Response diffing, timing analysis, and memory checks.
`ch*.py` & helper utilities	`/ch.py` – `/ch11.py`, `/count_loki.py`, `/dbg.py`, `/q33/patch33.py`	201–2,005 B (plus unsized)	Channel tests, log counting, and state debugging.

Script or log group	Representative files	Recorded byte range	Role on workbench
Root HTTP hit log	Root HTTP access log (1,986 lines)	1,986 lines	Records inbound hits on `TCP 9099`; scanner IPs withheld.

3. AI Agent Skill Staging and ImageMagick MSL Upload Artifacts

Two staged artifact sets in root target web upload and agent ingestion workflows (`[REF-06]`, `[REF-08]`). One set prepares **local-upload AI agent skill archives**. The second set prepares **ImageMagick `.msl`, PNG, and PHP polyglot files**.

Figure 3 models how these staged sets (dashed arrows) sit beside the verified captures on `TCP 9099` (solid arrows).



Figure 3: Analytical model of staged skill, MSL, and container files with one output

AI Agent Skill Catalogue Slices (54 Skills) and `local-upload` ZIPs (290 B Unpacked)

Many AI agent platforms load skills from portable ZIP packages. Each package usually pairs a `SKILL.md` instruction file with a `_meta.json` manifest and optional scripts. When an agent gateway allows unsigned local uploads (`source=local-upload`), an untrusted ZIP can alter agent prompts or tool calls (`[REF-06]` , `[REF-09]`).

Four artifacts define the SapperSync skill-staging track:

- **Full skills catalogue (918,252 bytes).** A root JSON file stores **918,252** bytes of skill registry definitions. It provides a reference for manifest fields and package layout.
- **Filtered 54-skill slice (251,977 bytes).** A second JSON file keeps **251,977** bytes covering **54** selected skill entries.
- **Twin `local-upload` archives (`demo-skill.zip` and `demo.zip`).** Both `.zip` files in the `archive` class unpack to **290** bytes. They hold identical test content pairing `SKILL.md` with `_meta.json` (`source=local-upload`).
- **Deployment script (`/deploy_sapper_v2.sh` , 5,304 bytes).** This root shell script handles staging setup. No returned logs on the server show external ingestion of `demo-skill.zip` or `demo.zip` , so this set remains staged preparation.

Eleven ImageMagick `.msl` Scripts (128,802 Sized Bytes), 15 PNGs, and PHP Variants

Web portals and file-sharing apps often call **ImageMagick** (`magick` or `convert`) to resize avatars and build previews. Unhardened ImageMagick deployments create two well-known upload risks (`[REF-01]` , `[REF-02]` , `[REF-03]`):

1. **Enabled script coders (`CVE-2016-3714` and `MSL` , `[REF-02]` , `[REF-03]`).** ImageMagick **6.x** before `6.9.3-10` and **7.x** before `7.0.1-1` allowed unsafe delegate calls (CVE-2016-3714). Newer builds still include **Magick Scripting Language (`MSL`)**, an XML coder supporting `" ascii nocase
        $r1 = "<read " ascii nocase
        $w1 = "<write " ascii nocase
        $f1 = "filename=" ascii nocase
    condition:
        filesize < 256KB and ($x1 or $x2) and $r1 and $w1 and $f1
}

rule ODIN_SapperSync_Container_Entrypoint_AgentSync
{
    meta:
        author = "Odin by Brandefense"
        monograph = "57"
        description = "Detects staged container entrypoint, periodic cron, and hidden .agent_
sync scripts targeting web container environments"
        date = "2026-11-24"
    strings:
        $a1 = "/usr/local/bin/.agent_sync" ascii
        $p1 = "runtime-entrypoint" ascii
        $p2 = ".runtime-sync" ascii
```

```
        $e1 = "DB_HOST" ascii
        $e2 = "/var/www/html/cache" ascii
    condition:
        filesize < 64KB and $a1 and ($p1 or $p2 or ($e1 and $e2))
}

rule ODIN_SapperSync_Runtime_Hotfix_Layer_Markers
{
    meta:
        author = "Odin by Brandefense"
        monograph = "57"
        description = "Detects individual extracted container marker file contents containing
release=2.4.2 or channel=hotfix (verify /opt/runtime/VERSION or /opt/runtime/CHANNEL path sep
arately)"
        date = "2026-11-24"
    strings:
        $v2 = "release=2.4.2" ascii
        $c2 = "channel=hotfix" ascii
    condition:
        filesize < 64KB and ($v2 or $c2)
}
```

Sentinel KQL **sentinel_sappersync_container_sync_and_msl_hunt.kql** 34 lines

```
// Odin by Brandefense - Monograph 57 (Operation SapperSync)
// Hunts hidden container persistence scripts, ImageMagick MSL coder invocations, local-uploa
d skill writes, and selected process connections to TCP 9099.
let Lookback = 7d;
let ApprovedBuildHosts = dynamic(["app-ci-01.corp.example", "img-worker-01.corp.example"]);
let ContainerAndMslProcess =
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp >= ago(Lookback)
    | where not(DeviceName in~ (ApprovedBuildHosts))
    | where (
        ProcessCommandLine has_any ("/usr/local/bin/runtime-entrypoint", "/usr/local/bin/.age
nt_sync", "/etc/periodic/15min/.runtime-sync")
        or (FileName in~ ("magick", "convert", "identify") and (ProcessCommandLine has ".msl"
or ProcessCommandLine has "msl:"))
        or (FileName in~ ("unzip", "python", "python3", "tar") and ProcessCommandLine has_any
("SKILL.md", "demo-skill.zip") and ProcessCommandLine has "_meta.json")
    )
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, SignalType = "ContainerSyncOrMslProcess", D
etail = ProcessCommandLine;
let ContainerAndSkillFiles =
    DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp >= ago(Lookback)
    | where not(DeviceName in~ (ApprovedBuildHosts))
    | where (
        FolderPath in ("/usr/local/bin", "/etc/periodic/15min", "/opt/runtime")
```

```
        and FileName in ("runtime-entrypoint", ".agent_sync", ".runtime-sync", "VERSION", "CH
ANNEL")
    ) or (FileName == "_meta.json" and FolderPath has_any ("/tmp", "/var/www", "/uploads"))
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, SignalType =
"PersistenceOrSkillFileWrite", Detail = strcat(FolderPath, "/", FileName, " via ", Initiating
ProcessFileName);
let Port9099ArchiveEgress =
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where Timestamp >= ago(Lookback)
    | where not(DeviceName in~ (ApprovedBuildHosts))
    | where RemotePort == 9099
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("curl", "wget", "python", "python3", "busybox", "s
h", "ash")
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, SignalType =
"Port9099StagingEgress", Detail = strcat(InitiatingProcessFileName, " -> ", RemoteIP, ":", to
string(RemotePort));
union ContainerAndMslProcess, ContainerAndSkillFiles, Port9099ArchiveEgress
| summarize FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp), EventCount = count(), Sign
als = make_set(SignalType, 6), SampleDetails = make_set(Detail, 5) by DeviceName, AccountName
| order by LastSeen desc
```

Sigma **sigma_sappersync_container_persistence_msl_and_skills.yml** 88 lines

```
title: SapperSync Hidden Container Entrypoint and Periodic Agent Sync
id: 8c57a1e2-4b31-4d89-9a14-57c30e91a101
status: experimental
description: Detects Linux container processes invoking the staged runtime-entrypoint wrappe
r, hidden .agent_sync script, or 15-minute BusyBox periodic .runtime-sync task observed in Op
eration SapperSync.
author: Odin by Brandefense
date: 2026-11-24
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_paths:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '/usr/local/bin/runtime-entrypoint'
      - '/usr/local/bin/.agent_sync'
      - '/etc/periodic/15min/.runtime-sync'
  filter_build_hosts:
    ComputerName:
      - 'app-ci-01.corp.example'
  condition: selection_paths and not filter_build_hosts
falsepositives:
  - Custom container build validation runners on designated CI hosts
level: critical
tags:
  - attack.persistence
```

```
  - attack.defense-evasion
---
title: SapperSync ImageMagick MSL Coder Invocation on Linux
id: 8c57a1e2-4b31-4d89-9a14-57c30e91a102
status: experimental
description: Detects ImageMagick CLI utilities processing Magick Scripting Language (.msl or
msl:) inputs when policy.xml fails to block script coders.
author: Odin by Brandefense
date: 2026-11-24
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith:
      - '/magick'
      - '/convert'
      - '/identify'
      - '/mogrify'
  selection_msl:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '.msl'
      - 'msl:'
  filter_media_hosts:
    ComputerName:
      - 'img-worker-01.corp.example'
  condition: selection_img and selection_msl and not filter_media_hosts
falsepositives:
  - Approved offline batch media-conversion servers explicitly configured to use MSL template
s
level: high
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.defense-evasion
---
title: SapperSync Local-Upload AI Agent Skill Archive Unpacking
id: 8c57a1e2-4b31-4d89-9a14-57c30e91a103
status: experimental
description: Detects archive or Python utilities referencing AI agent skill archive or manife
st names (demo-skill.zip or SKILL.md) in command lines outside approved CI runners; verify _m
eta.json and source=local-upload separately in file telemetry.
author: Odin by Brandefense
date: 2026-11-24
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_tool:
    Image|endswith:
      - '/unzip'
      - '/tar'
```

```
      - '/python'
      - '/python3'
  selection_skill:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'demo-skill.zip'
      - 'SKILL.md'
  filter_ci_hosts:
    ComputerName:
      - 'skill-ci-01.corp.example'
  condition: selection_tool and selection_skill and not filter_ci_hosts
falsepositives:
  - Developer workstations or CI pipelines building internal agent skill packages
level: medium
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.persistence
```

