Know What Attackers Can See Of Our Network.
Operators of energy and utility services depend on systems that must keep running. Attackers look for exposed ones first, so it helps to look for them first.
In Short
Energy and utility operators run systems that must stay up, and some of them are reachable from the internet. Attackers look for exposed network devices and remote access first, and state-backed groups have been documented in these sectors. Knowing what you expose, and who is active, lets you fix problems before they are used.
At A GlanceExposed network devices, destructive attacks, ransomware and state-backed groups that target energy and utility operators, and the rules that apply.
Main Threats
What Threatens Energy And Utility Operators.
Threat Actors
Who Targets This Sector.
CISA assesses that Volt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China state-sponsored actor that compromised critical infrastructure in the communications, energy, transport and water sectors. Sandworm's profile is linked too, with the governments that attribute it named there.
Compliance
Which Rules Apply To You.
Products
How Brandefense Helps.
- External Attack Surface Management Shows which VPNs, gateways and remote services of your group face the internet, so exposed devices are seen first.
- Cyber Threat Intelligence Tracks the groups that go after energy and critical infrastructure, and what they use.
- Ransomware Intelligence Follows ransomware groups and the victims they announce, including in your sector.
Threat Landscape
Who Targets Energy And Utilities, And Where.
FAQ
Frequently Asked Questions.
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Does this reach our control systems?
No. It looks at what is visible from the internet and at criminal sources. It does not connect to plant or control networks.
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What should we look at first?
The remote access and network edge devices of your sites. The Poland attacks and the Volt Typhoon advisory both involve internet-facing devices.
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Which rules does an energy operator face?
The NIS2 Directive covers energy. National laws differ, so check the detail with your legal team.
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Do you attribute attacks?
We link to groups only as attributed by named governments, and say who attributes them. See the profiles for detail.
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Why are exposed VPNs and firewalls a risk for energy operators?
Routers, VPNs and firewalls that face the internet are a common way in. CISA reports that Volt Typhoon got in by exploiting known or zero-day flaws in public-facing appliances like these. External Attack Surface Management shows which VPNs, gateways and remote services of your group face the internet.
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What happened in the Poland energy attacks of December 2025?
On 29 December 2025 coordinated destructive attacks hit more than 30 wind and solar farms and a combined heat and power plant in Poland. CERT Polska reports the attackers entered through internet-facing VPN and firewall devices.
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Why is open remote access a problem for utilities?
Remote services left reachable from the internet are a common first step for attackers. CISA also lists exposed remote services among the ways ransomware actors get in. Knowing what you expose lets you close it before it is used.
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What is Volt Typhoon?
CISA assesses that Volt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China state-sponsored actor. It compromised critical infrastructure in the communications, energy, transport and water sectors. US advisories describe it as pre-positioning inside critical infrastructure IT networks to be able to disrupt operations in a crisis.
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How does ransomware tracking help an energy company?
Ransomware Intelligence follows ransomware groups and the victims they announce, including in your sector. That shows you which groups are active near you. Cyber Threat Intelligence also tracks the groups that go after energy and critical infrastructure, and what they use.
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What did the 2015 Ukraine power grid attack involve?
On 23 December 2015 remote intruders opened breakers at three regional electricity distribution companies in Ukraine. In December 2016 malware called Industroyer disrupted a transmission substation outside Kyiv. Both are on record as attacks on power systems.
- EASM Best Practices for the Energy Sector →October 2025
- Customizing Threat Intelligence Services for the Energy Sector →January 2024
- Tackling Ransomware Threats in the Energy Sector: Prevention and Response →January 2024
- Phishing Campaign for Turkish Energy Sector →June 2022
- Cyber incidents of 2026: lessons from official reports →October 2026
- NIS2 and DORA Compliance: What They Require for Third-Party Risk Management →July 2026
Related Reading.
Knowledge Hub →Other Ways In.
All Roles →For Energy And Utilities
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