MITRE ATT&CK describes APT32 (OceanLotus) as a suspected Vietnam-based threat group active since at least 2014 that targets governments, dissidents, journalists and companies, mainly in Southeast Asia.
MITRE ATT&CK describes APT32 (OceanLotus) as a suspected Vietnam-based threat group active since at least 2014 that targets governments, dissidents, journalists and companies, mainly in Southeast Asia. CERT-EU calls it Vietnam-linked, but no government indictment or sanction names it. The latest dated activity in these sources is January 2025.
Last updated 10 October 2026
Profile MapThreat Group
Attributed OriginVietnam
Names6names in public reportsAPT32 · OceanLotus · SeaLotus
Sectors8named as targetsMultiple industries · Mainly Southeast Asia · Vietnam and region
Techniques14in the attack chainResource Development · Initial Access · Execution
Tools9tools and malware listedDenis · Goopy · OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D
In one minute
Who they are
MITRE ATT&CK describes APT32 (also OceanLotus) as a suspected Vietnam-based group active since at least 2014. CERT-EU calls it Vietnam-linked. No government indictment, sanction or advisory was found, so no sponsor is named.
Who they target
MITRE lists private sector industries, foreign governments, dissidents and journalists, mostly in Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos and Cambodia. The BSI 2017 report lists it under government, opposition and media. CERT-EU records a 2025 report of attacks on Chinese cybersecurity professionals.
How they usually get in
Spearphishing emails with attachments or links, and compromised websites that targets visit, as MITRE describes. Backdoors are then run through DLL side-loading, Office macros and scheduled tasks.
What stands out
MITRE describes heavy use of strategic web compromises and backdoors for Windows, macOS and Linux. Evidence here comes from MITRE and two European bodies only, so it is thinner than for groups with government indictments.
What to do first
Train staff to treat links and attachments with care, set up SPF, DKIM and DMARC, disable Office macros and add-ins, block unneeded web content, and use application control against DLL side-loading.
Names
Public reports use several names for this activity.
Names used for APT32
Name
Where it appears
APT32
Main name on the MITRE ATT&CK group page G0050; also used by the BSI 2017 report and CERT-EU[1, 2, 3]
Attribution is a judgment by the body named. It is shown here as attributed, not as proven fact.
MITRE ATT&CK31 July 2026 (page last modified)
Describes APT32 as a suspected Vietnam-based threat group active since at least 2014.[1]
MITRE ATT&CK31 July 2026 (page last modified)
Says the group has targeted private sector industries, foreign governments, dissidents and journalists, with a strong focus on Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos and Cambodia.[1]
MITRE ATT&CK31 July 2026 (page last modified)
Says the group has used strategic web compromises, meaning it breaks into websites its targets visit.[1]
MITRE ATT&CK31 July 2026 (page last modified)
Lists SeaLotus, OceanLotus, APT-C-00, Canvas Cyclone and BISMUTH as associated groups.[1]
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)2017 report
Lists APT32/OceanLotus in a figure of cyber espionage groups active worldwide, under government institutions, opposition and media. It does not name a country in that figure.[2]
CERT-EU1 December 2022
Calls APT32 a Vietnam-linked threat actor and records a report that it compromised a digital certificate authority in an Asian country.[3]
CERT-EU3 February 2025
Calls OceanLotus (APT32) a Vietnam-linked APT group and records a 9 January 2025 report that it targeted Chinese cybersecurity professionals and large enterprises through a poisoned GitHub repository.[4]
Where sources differ
Only MITRE ATT&CK and CERT-EU give a country, and both are cautious. MITRE says "suspected Vietnam-based". CERT-EU says "Vietnam-linked" and passes on reports from private firms. No government advisory, indictment or sanction naming the group was found, so no government names a sponsoring body. The BSI lists the group but names no country in that figure.
Who they target
Sectors
Multiple industriesMITRE says the group has targeted multiple private sector industries.[1]
Mainly Southeast AsiaMITRE lists governments, with a strong focus on Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos and Cambodia. The BSI 2017 report lists the group under government institutions.[1, 2]
Vietnam and regionMITRE says dissidents were targeted. The BSI 2017 report lists the group under opposition.[1, 2]
Vietnam and regionMITRE says journalists were targeted. The BSI 2017 report lists the group under media.[1, 2]
Not statedMITRE says the group collected email addresses of activists and bloggers to target them with spyware.[1]
An Asian countryCERT-EU records a report that APT32 reportedly compromised a certificate authority.[3]
ChinaCERT-EU records a 9 January 2025 report of a poisoned GitHub repository aimed at them.[4]
Not statedMITRE says the group infected visitors by compromising websites they use, and set up fake websites with scraped content.[1]
Operations timeline
Each entry is attributed to the group by the sources cited.
At least 2014
Earliest activity
MITRE says APT32 has been active since at least 2014.[1]
2015
macOS backdoor first discovered
MITRE says OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D, a macOS backdoor used by APT32, was first discovered in 2015.[7]
2017
Named in German state report
The BSI report The State of IT Security in Germany 2017 lists APT32/OceanLotus among espionage groups active worldwide.[2]
MITRE says RotaJakiro, a Linux backdoor used by APT32, was first seen in 2018, and the Kerrdown downloader has been used since at least 2018.[8, 9]
1 December 2022
CERT-EU records certificate authority report
CERT-EU lists a report that APT32 compromised a digital certificate authority in an Asian country.[3]
9 January 2025
Report of GitHub poisoning
A report recorded by CERT-EU says OceanLotus (APT32) targeted Chinese cybersecurity professionals and large enterprises with a poisoned GitHub repository.[4]
31 July 2026
MITRE page updated
MITRE ATT&CK last modified its APT32 page, version 3.0.[1]
Government actions
Indictments, sanctions and advisories that name the group or its alleged members.
Government actions about APT32
Date
Who
What
2017
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
Situation reportThe State of IT Security in Germany 2017 lists APT32/OceanLotus among cyber espionage groups active worldwide.[2]
1 December 2022
CERT-EU
Threat intelligence briefCyber Security Brief of November 2022 records a report that APT32, a Vietnam-linked actor, compromised a digital certificate authority in an Asian country.[3]
3 February 2025
CERT-EU
Threat intelligence briefCyber Brief 25-02 records a 9 January 2025 report of OceanLotus (APT32) activity against Chinese cybersecurity professionals.[4]
How they get in
Techniques reported for this group, by MITRE ATT&CK tactic.
Customers can look for exposure of senior staff and public figures that could be used to target them.
Questions
What is APT32?
MITRE ATT&CK describes APT32 as a suspected Vietnam-based threat group active since at least 2014. CERT-EU calls it Vietnam-linked. No government indictment or sanction was found.
Is APT32 the same as OceanLotus?
MITRE ATT&CK lists OceanLotus, SeaLotus, APT-C-00, Canvas Cyclone and BISMUTH as associated groups. The BSI and CERT-EU also use the OceanLotus name next to APT32.
Who does APT32 target?
MITRE says private sector industries, foreign governments, dissidents and journalists, with a focus on Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos and Cambodia. The BSI 2017 report lists it under government, opposition and media.
How does APT32 get in?
MITRE says it uses spearphishing emails with attachments or links, and compromised websites that its targets visit. It then installs backdoors, often by DLL side-loading.
Which government names APT32?
Only the German BSI (2017 report) and CERT-EU (2022 and 2025 briefs) were found, and neither gives a sponsoring body. Sources are thin, so treat attribution as unconfirmed.
APT32, Group G0050 ↗MITRE ATT&CKSupports: Description, associated names, techniques, software, version and dates
The State of IT Security in Germany 2017 ↗German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)Supports: Figure 5 lists APT32/OceanLotus among espionage groups active against government, opposition and media
CERT-EU Cyber Brief 25-02, January 2025 ↗CERT-EUSupports: Brief of 3 February 2025 records a 9 January report of APT32 targeting Chinese cybersecurity professionals
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Attributed by the US, UK and South Korean governments, and MITRE ATT&CK
APT-C-60 is the name JPCERT/CC uses for a threat group it says likely carried out spear-phishing attacks on organizations in Japan from August 2024, using fake job-applicant emails and a backdoor called SpyGlace. No government or MITRE source opened for this page says who is behind it.
Also known as Comment Crew · Comment Panda · Comment Group
Attributed by MITRE ATT&CK to PLA Unit 61398 in China, APT1 is the subject of a US indictment of 19 May 2014 charging five Unit 61398 officers with hacking six US organizations. The Department of Justice alleges the aim was commercial gain for China's state-owned firms.
Attributed by the US Department of Justice (indictment of 19 May 2014) and MITRE ATT&CK