MITRE ATT&CK describes APT33 as a suspected Iranian threat group active since at least 2013, with a particular interest in aviation and energy in the United States, Saudi Arabia and South Korea.
MITRE ATT&CK describes APT33 as a suspected Iranian threat group active since at least 2013, with a particular interest in aviation and energy in the United States, Saudi Arabia and South Korea. CERT-EU's March 2024 brief calls it an Iranian-linked cyberespionage group; no government indictment or sanction naming it was found.
Last updated 9 October 2026
Profile MapThreat Group
Attributed OriginIran
Names5names in public reportsAPT33 · HOLMIUM · Elfin
Sectors7named as targetsAviation sector · Energy sector · Organizations in Saudi Arabia
Techniques12in the attack chainInitial Access · Credential Access · Execution
Tools8tools and malware listedPOWERTON · StoneDrill · TURNEDUP
In one minute
Who they are
MITRE ATT&CK describes APT33 as a suspected Iranian threat group active since at least 2013, and CERT-EU (March 2024) calls the actor Iranian-linked. No agency is named, and no indictment, sanction or advisory naming the group was found.
Who they target
MITRE lists organizations in several industries in the United States, Saudi Arabia and South Korea, with a particular interest in aviation and energy. CERT-EU says aerospace and energy.
How they usually get in
MITRE lists spearphishing emails with links to .hta files, password spraying, and valid accounts including compromised Office 365 accounts.
What stands out
MITRE links APT33 to wiper malware, which destroys data, as well as espionage tools. CERT-EU describes it as a cyberespionage group. Most public detail comes from MITRE, with one government brief.
What to do first
Turn on multi-factor authentication on all externally facing sign-ins, set account lockout, and train staff on links in emails. Then patch endpoints and protect LSASS.
Names
Public reports use several names for this activity.
Attribution is a judgment by the body named. It is shown here as attributed, not as proven fact.
MITRE ATT&CKpage modified 31 July 2026
Describes APT33 as a suspected Iranian threat group that has carried out operations since at least 2013. It names no sponsoring agency.[1]
MITRE ATT&CKsoftware page
Describes the StoneDrill wiper, which destroys data, as found in destructive campaigns against Middle Eastern and European targets "in association with APT33".[3]
MITRE ATT&CKsoftware page
Describes the POWERTON backdoor, first observed in 2018, as typically deployed late in an intrusion by APT33.[2]
MITRE ATT&CKsoftware page
Says the DEADWOOD wiper was previously linked to APT33 operations in 2019 and has since been incorporated into Agrius operations.[1, 5]
CERT-EUMarch 2024
Calls the actor Curious Serpens, also known as Peach Sandstorm, APT33 and Elfin, an Iranian-linked cyberespionage group that has previously targeted the aerospace and energy sectors.[10]
Where sources differ
Sources differ in wording. MITRE ATT&CK calls APT33 a "suspected" Iranian group, while CERT-EU calls the actor "Iranian-linked". Neither names an agency or unit. CERT-EU describes the group as cyberespionage, while MITRE also links it to wiper malware, which destroys data. On DEADWOOD, MITRE's group page says it was linked to APT33 operations in 2019, but the DEADWOOD software page calls the first 2019 wiping event "unattributed" and says the tool is now used by Agrius.
Who they target
Sectors
Aviation sectorMITRE describes a particular interest in the aviation sector.[1]
Energy sectorMITRE describes a particular interest in the energy sector. CERT-EU says the actor previously targeted aerospace and energy.[1, 10]
Organizations across several industriesMITRE says the group has targeted organizations across multiple industries.[1]
Organizations in the United StatesListed by MITRE as a target country.[1]
Organizations in Saudi ArabiaListed by MITRE as a target country.[1]
Organizations in South KoreaListed by MITRE as a target country.[1]
Destructive campaignsMITRE says StoneDrill was found in destructive campaigns against Middle Eastern and European targets in association with APT33.[3]
Regions
Saudi ArabiaMITRE says APT33 has targeted organizations across multiple industries in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea, with particular interest in aviation and energy.[1]
Operations timeline
Each entry is attributed to the group by the sources cited.
2013
Operations began, at least
MITRE says APT33 has carried out operations since at least 2013.[1]
18 April 2018
MITRE group record created
The MITRE page for the group was created. This dates the record, not an attack.[1]
2018
POWERTON backdoor first observed
MITRE says POWERTON, a custom PowerShell backdoor, was first observed in 2018.[2]
2019
DEADWOOD wiper linked to APT33
MITRE says DEADWOOD was previously linked to APT33 operations in 2019. Its software page calls the first wiping event, in Saudi Arabia, unattributed.[1, 5]
March 2024
Fake recruitment lure reported
CERT-EU's March 2024 brief says an Iranian-linked actor, Curious Serpens, mimicked human resources software with a fake job recruitment process to install a backdoor.[10]
31 July 2026
MITRE group record last modified
MITRE shows version 2.0 of the page, last modified on this date. This dates the record, not an attack.[1]
How they get in
Techniques reported for this group, by MITRE ATT&CK tactic.
Overlaps and differences, only as the sources state them.
Agrius
MITRE says the DEADWOOD wiper, once linked to APT33 operations in 2019, has since been incorporated into Agrius operations. This is a shared tool only; no source says the groups are the same.[1, 5]
Detection and defense
Multi-factor sign-in and lockout
Turn on multi-factor authentication for all accounts, especially externally facing services, and set account lockout after repeated failed sign-ins. This counters password spraying.
Follow new government advisories and MITRE updates on APT33 and its listed names (HOLMIUM, Elfin, Peach Sandstorm, Curious Serpens), and check whether your aviation, aerospace or energy business matches the targeting they describe.
Spot fake sites and lookalike domains that imitate your brand, since MITRE lists spearphishing links among the entry methods.
Questions
Who is APT33?
MITRE ATT&CK describes it as a suspected Iranian threat group that has carried out operations since at least 2013. It names no sponsoring agency.
Who does it target?
MITRE lists organizations across several industries in the United States, Saudi Arabia and South Korea, with a particular interest in aviation and energy. CERT-EU says the actor previously targeted aerospace and energy.
How does it get in?
MITRE lists spearphishing emails with links to .hta files, password spraying, and valid accounts including compromised Office 365 accounts.
Is it still active?
The only dated government report found is a CERT-EU brief of March 2024. MITRE last modified its page on 31 July 2026, but that is a record date, not a report of activity.
Does it use destructive malware?
MITRE describes the StoneDrill wiper as found in destructive campaigns in association with APT33. Sources differ on the DEADWOOD wiper, so no link is claimed beyond MITRE's wording.
What should we do first?
Turn on multi-factor authentication, especially on externally facing services, and train staff on spearphishing links (MITRE mitigations for T1110.003 and T1566.002).
Attributed by the US, UK and South Korean governments to North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau, Andariel is described in a July 2024 joint advisory as stealing defense, aerospace and nuclear secrets and funding that work with ransomware against US healthcare. MITRE ATT&CK describes it as a sub-set of Lazarus Group; the advisory does not use that term.
Attributed by the US, UK and South Korean governments, and MITRE ATT&CK
APT-C-60 is the name JPCERT/CC uses for a threat group it says likely carried out spear-phishing attacks on organizations in Japan from August 2024, using fake job-applicant emails and a backdoor called SpyGlace. No government or MITRE source opened for this page says who is behind it.
Also known as Comment Crew · Comment Panda · Comment Group
Attributed by MITRE ATT&CK to PLA Unit 61398 in China, APT1 is the subject of a US indictment of 19 May 2014 charging five Unit 61398 officers with hacking six US organizations. The Department of Justice alleges the aim was commercial gain for China's state-owned firms.
Attributed by the US Department of Justice (indictment of 19 May 2014) and MITRE ATT&CK