Threat group profile

APT33

Also known as HOLMIUM, Elfin, Peach Sandstorm

MITRE ATT&CK describes APT33 as a suspected Iranian threat group active since at least 2013, with a particular interest in aviation and energy in the United States, Saudi Arabia and South Korea.

In short

MITRE ATT&CK describes APT33 as a suspected Iranian threat group active since at least 2013, with a particular interest in aviation and energy in the United States, Saudi Arabia and South Korea. CERT-EU's March 2024 brief calls it an Iranian-linked cyberespionage group; no government indictment or sanction naming it was found.

Profile MapThreat Group
  1. Attributed OriginIran
  2. Names5names in public reportsAPT33 · HOLMIUM · Elfin
  3. Sectors7named as targetsAviation sector · Energy sector · Organizations in Saudi Arabia
  4. Techniques12in the attack chainInitial Access · Credential Access · Execution
  5. Tools8tools and malware listedPOWERTON · StoneDrill · TURNEDUP

In one minute

Who they are
MITRE ATT&CK describes APT33 as a suspected Iranian threat group active since at least 2013, and CERT-EU (March 2024) calls the actor Iranian-linked. No agency is named, and no indictment, sanction or advisory naming the group was found.
Who they target
MITRE lists organizations in several industries in the United States, Saudi Arabia and South Korea, with a particular interest in aviation and energy. CERT-EU says aerospace and energy.
How they usually get in
MITRE lists spearphishing emails with links to .hta files, password spraying, and valid accounts including compromised Office 365 accounts.
What stands out
MITRE links APT33 to wiper malware, which destroys data, as well as espionage tools. CERT-EU describes it as a cyberespionage group. Most public detail comes from MITRE, with one government brief.
What to do first
Turn on multi-factor authentication on all externally facing sign-ins, set account lockout, and train staff on links in emails. Then patch endpoints and protect LSASS.

Names

Public reports use several names for this activity.

Names used for APT33
NameWhere it appears
APT33 MITRE ATT&CK group page G0064[1]
HOLMIUM MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups[1]
Elfin MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups; CERT-EU brief 24-04[1, 10]
Peach Sandstorm MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups; CERT-EU brief 24-04[1, 10]
Curious Serpens CERT-EU brief 24-04 (not on the MITRE list)[10]

Who says so

Attribution is a judgment by the body named. It is shown here as attributed, not as proven fact.

  • MITRE ATT&CK page modified 31 July 2026

    Describes APT33 as a suspected Iranian threat group that has carried out operations since at least 2013. It names no sponsoring agency.[1]

  • MITRE ATT&CK software page

    Describes the StoneDrill wiper, which destroys data, as found in destructive campaigns against Middle Eastern and European targets "in association with APT33".[3]

  • MITRE ATT&CK software page

    Describes the POWERTON backdoor, first observed in 2018, as typically deployed late in an intrusion by APT33.[2]

  • MITRE ATT&CK software page

    Says the DEADWOOD wiper was previously linked to APT33 operations in 2019 and has since been incorporated into Agrius operations.[1, 5]

  • CERT-EU March 2024

    Calls the actor Curious Serpens, also known as Peach Sandstorm, APT33 and Elfin, an Iranian-linked cyberespionage group that has previously targeted the aerospace and energy sectors.[10]

Where sources differ

Sources differ in wording. MITRE ATT&CK calls APT33 a "suspected" Iranian group, while CERT-EU calls the actor "Iranian-linked". Neither names an agency or unit. CERT-EU describes the group as cyberespionage, while MITRE also links it to wiper malware, which destroys data. On DEADWOOD, MITRE's group page says it was linked to APT33 operations in 2019, but the DEADWOOD software page calls the first 2019 wiping event "unattributed" and says the tool is now used by Agrius.

Who they target

Sectors

  • Aviation sectorMITRE describes a particular interest in the aviation sector.[1]
  • Energy sectorMITRE describes a particular interest in the energy sector. CERT-EU says the actor previously targeted aerospace and energy.[1, 10]
  • Organizations across several industriesMITRE says the group has targeted organizations across multiple industries.[1]
  • Organizations in the United StatesListed by MITRE as a target country.[1]
  • Organizations in Saudi ArabiaListed by MITRE as a target country.[1]
  • Organizations in South KoreaListed by MITRE as a target country.[1]
  • Destructive campaignsMITRE says StoneDrill was found in destructive campaigns against Middle Eastern and European targets in association with APT33.[3]

Regions

  • Saudi ArabiaMITRE says APT33 has targeted organizations across multiple industries in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea, with particular interest in aviation and energy.[1]

Operations timeline

Each entry is attributed to the group by the sources cited.

  1. 2013

    Operations began, at least

    MITRE says APT33 has carried out operations since at least 2013.[1]

  2. 18 April 2018

    MITRE group record created

    The MITRE page for the group was created. This dates the record, not an attack.[1]

  3. 2018

    POWERTON backdoor first observed

    MITRE says POWERTON, a custom PowerShell backdoor, was first observed in 2018.[2]

  4. 2019

    DEADWOOD wiper linked to APT33

    MITRE says DEADWOOD was previously linked to APT33 operations in 2019. Its software page calls the first wiping event, in Saudi Arabia, unattributed.[1, 5]

  5. March 2024

    Fake recruitment lure reported

    CERT-EU's March 2024 brief says an Iranian-linked actor, Curious Serpens, mimicked human resources software with a fake job recruitment process to install a backdoor.[10]

  6. 31 July 2026

    MITRE group record last modified

    MITRE shows version 2.0 of the page, last modified on this date. This dates the record, not an attack.[1]

How they get in

Techniques reported for this group, by MITRE ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

  • Phishing: Spearphishing Link T1566.002

    MITRE says APT33 sent spearphishing emails with links to .hta files, which are HTML applications that run code.[1]

  • Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts T1078.004

    MITRE says APT33 used compromised Office 365 accounts together with the Ruler tool to try to take control of endpoints.[1]

Execution

  • User Execution: Malicious Link T1204.001

    MITRE says APT33 lured users to click links to malicious HTML applications.[1]

  • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.001

    MITRE says APT33 used PowerShell to download files from its command server and run scripts.[1]

Persistence

  • Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1547.001

    MITRE says APT33 placed DarkComet in the Startup folder and used Registry run keys.[1]

Privilege Escalation

  • Exploitation for Privilege Escalation T1068

    MITRE says APT33 used a public exploit for CVE-2017-0213 to raise privileges on a local system.[1]

Credential Access

  • Brute Force: Password Spraying T1110.003

    MITRE says APT33 used password spraying, which tries a few common passwords across many accounts.[1]

  • OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory T1003.001

    MITRE says APT33 used public tools such as LaZagne, Mimikatz and ProcDump to dump credentials.[1, 7, 8]

Collection

  • Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility T1560.001

    MITRE says APT33 used WinRAR to compress data before exfiltration.[1]

Command and Control

  • Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols T1071.001

    MITRE says APT33 used HTTP for command and control.[1]

  • Non-Standard Port T1571

    MITRE says APT33 used HTTP over TCP ports 808 and 880.[1]

Exfiltration

  • Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol T1048.003

    MITRE says APT33 used FTP to exfiltrate files, separately from its command channel.[1]

Tools and malware

  • POWERTON Backdoor

    A custom PowerShell backdoor first observed in 2018, typically deployed late in an intrusion by APT33, per MITRE.[2]

  • StoneDrill Wiper

    Destroys data. MITRE says it was found in destructive campaigns in association with APT33.[3]

  • TURNEDUP Backdoor

    A non-public backdoor that MITRE says was dropped by StoneDrill.[4]

  • DEADWOOD Wiper

    MITRE says it was previously linked to APT33 operations in 2019 and is now used by Agrius, so treat the two groups as separate.[1, 5]

  • Ruler Public tool

    Abuses Microsoft Exchange services. MITRE says APT33 used it with compromised Office 365 accounts.[1, 6]

  • LaZagne Public tool

    Recovers stored passwords. MITRE lists it among the public tools APT33 used to gather credentials.[1, 7]

  • Mimikatz Public tool

    Dumps Windows credentials. MITRE lists it among the tools APT33 used.[1, 8]

  • Empire Public tool

    An open-source post-exploitation framework that MITRE lists for APT33.[1, 9]

Detection and defense

  1. Multi-factor sign-in and lockout

    Turn on multi-factor authentication for all accounts, especially externally facing services, and set account lockout after repeated failed sign-ins. This counters password spraying.

    Counters T1110.003 T1078

  2. Retire legacy sign-in

    Disable legacy authentication, which cannot use multi-factor, and require modern sign-in.

    Counters T1078

  3. Train staff on links

    Teach staff to spot spearphishing emails with malicious links.

    Counters T1566.002 T1204.001

  4. Email authentication

    Use SPF, DKIM and DMARC to filter messages from spoofed sender domains.

    Counters T1566.002

  5. Block risky downloads

    Block unknown or unused file types in transit by default and use network protection to stop malicious downloads.

    Counters T1204.001

  6. Patch regularly

    Apply patch management on endpoints and servers so public exploits for old flaws fail.

    Counters T1068

  7. Protect LSASS

    Enable Windows Attack Surface Reduction rules to secure LSASS and prevent credential stealing.

    Counters T1003.001

  8. Restrict PowerShell

    Set PowerShell to run only signed scripts and use application control where it fits.

    Counters T1059.001

What Brandefense can do

  • Cyber Threat Intelligence

    Follow new government advisories and MITRE updates on APT33 and its listed names (HOLMIUM, Elfin, Peach Sandstorm, Curious Serpens), and check whether your aviation, aerospace or energy business matches the targeting they describe.

  • External Attack Surface Management

    See which internet-facing sign-in pages and services are exposed, since MITRE lists password spraying and valid accounts as entry methods.

  • Dark Web Monitoring

    Watch for leaked or sold company credentials that could be used for valid account access.

  • Phishing Monitoring & Domain Abuse

    Spot fake sites and lookalike domains that imitate your brand, since MITRE lists spearphishing links among the entry methods.

Questions

Who is APT33?

MITRE ATT&CK describes it as a suspected Iranian threat group that has carried out operations since at least 2013. It names no sponsoring agency.

Who does it target?

MITRE lists organizations across several industries in the United States, Saudi Arabia and South Korea, with a particular interest in aviation and energy. CERT-EU says the actor previously targeted aerospace and energy.

How does it get in?

MITRE lists spearphishing emails with links to .hta files, password spraying, and valid accounts including compromised Office 365 accounts.

Is it still active?

The only dated government report found is a CERT-EU brief of March 2024. MITRE last modified its page on 31 July 2026, but that is a record date, not a report of activity.

Does it use destructive malware?

MITRE describes the StoneDrill wiper as found in destructive campaigns in association with APT33. Sources differ on the DEADWOOD wiper, so no link is claimed beyond MITRE's wording.

What should we do first?

Turn on multi-factor authentication, especially on externally facing services, and train staff on spearphishing links (MITRE mitigations for T1110.003 and T1566.002).

In our research

  1. OilRig: Iran’s Persistent Espionage Arm in Cyberspace December 2025
  2. APT33/Peach Sandstorm: Threat Forecast and Analysis of a Cloud-Focused Adversary November 2025
  3. APT33 (Elfin / Refined Kitten): Iran’s Longstanding Cyber-Espionage Arm November 2025
  4. APT Groups in the MENA Region: Key Threat Actors in Cyber Espionage October 2025
  5. APT33 Threat Actors August 2022

Sources

  1. APT33, HOLMIUM, Elfin, Peach Sandstorm, Group G0064 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Description, associated names, targets, techniques, software list, record dates
  2. POWERTON (S0371) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Custom PowerShell backdoor first observed in 2018, deployed late in intrusions
  3. StoneDrill (S0380) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Wiper found in destructive campaigns in association with APT33
  4. TURNEDUP (S0199) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Backdoor dropped by StoneDrill
  5. DEADWOOD (S1134) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Wiper linked to APT33 in 2019, since used by Agrius
  6. Ruler (S0358) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Public tool that abuses Microsoft Exchange
  7. LaZagne (S0349) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Public tool that recovers stored passwords
  8. Mimikatz (S0002) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Credential dumper
  9. Empire (S0363) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Public post-exploitation framework
  10. CERT-EU Cyber Security Brief 24-04, March 2024 CERT-EU Supports: Iranian-linked actor Curious Serpens, aka Peach Sandstorm, APT33, Elfin; fake recruitment lure
  11. Brute Force: Password Spraying (T1110.003) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Mitigations
  12. Valid Accounts (T1078) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Mitigations
  13. Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Mitigations
  14. User Execution: Malicious Link (T1204.001) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Mitigations
  15. Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Mitigations
  16. OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory (T1003.001) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Mitigations
  17. Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Mitigations