Threat group profile

APT39

Also known as Chafer, ITG07, Remix Kitten

The US Treasury, FBI and Department of Justice attributed APT39, also called Chafer, to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), working through the front company Rana Intelligence Computing Company, in September 2020.

In short

The US Treasury, FBI and Department of Justice attributed APT39, also called Chafer, to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), working through the front company Rana Intelligence Computing Company, in September 2020. The US sanctioned the company and 45 people.

Profile MapThreat Group
  1. Attributed OriginIran
  2. Names8names in public reportsAPT39 · Advanced Persistent Threat 39 · Chafer
  3. Sectors7named as targetsTelecommunications industry · Iranian citizens · Companies inside Iran
  4. Techniques14in the attack chainInitial Access · Execution · Persistence
  5. Tools12tools and malware listedRemexi · Cadelspy · MechaFlounder

In one minute

Who they are
The US Treasury, FBI and Department of Justice attributed APT39 to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) on 17 September 2020, saying it worked through a front company, Rana Intelligence Computing Company. MITRE ATT&CK also describes it this way. Chafer, ITG07 and Remix Kitten are names MITRE lists for the same activity.
Who they target
MITRE says APT39 has mainly targeted travel, hospitality, academic and telecommunications firms in Iran and across Asia, Africa, Europe and North America. Treasury says it also went after Iranian dissidents and journalists, and about 15 US companies, mostly in travel.
How they usually get in
The FBI says its malware came in Office documents sent by spear phishing (targeted emails). MITRE also lists malicious links, stolen web mail credentials and SQL injection against public web servers.
What stands out
The US named the front company and sanctioned 45 people it said worked there as managers, programmers and hacking experts. The FBI says the access was used to track people the MOIS considers a threat.
What to do first
Check your systems against the FBI indicators and YARA rules (pattern files for finding malware) from FLASH ME-000134-MW. Look for odd scheduled tasks and Windows background transfer jobs, and harden and patch your public web servers and web mail.

Names

Public reports use several names for this activity.

Names used for APT39
NameWhere it appears
APT39 Name used by MITRE ATT&CK (G0087), the FBI alert, the US Treasury and the US Department of Justice[1, 2, 3, 4]
Advanced Persistent Threat 39 Full form of the name in the Treasury press release and the OFAC list entry[3, 5]
Chafer MITRE Associated Groups list, which says APT39 activity largely aligns with a group publicly called Chafer; also named in the FBI alert, DOJ release and OFAC entry[1, 2, 4, 5]
ITG07 MITRE Associated Groups list; also named in the FBI alert, DOJ release and OFAC entry[1, 2, 4, 5]
Remix Kitten MITRE Associated Groups list[1]
Cadelspy Listed as a name for the actor in the FBI alert, DOJ release and OFAC entry; MITRE lists it as a separate backdoor (S0454)[2, 4, 5, 8]
Remexi Listed as a name for the actor in the FBI alert, DOJ release and OFAC entry; MITRE lists it as a separate Trojan (S0375)[2, 4, 5, 7]
Rana Intelligence Computing Company Front company named by the FBI, Treasury and DOJ; also called Rana Corp (FBI) and Rana Institute (OFAC)[2, 3, 4, 5]

Who says so

Attribution is a judgment by the body named. It is shown here as attributed, not as proven fact.

  • US Department of the Treasury (OFAC) 17 September 2020

    Sanctioned APT39, 45 individuals and one front company. Said Rana advances the aims of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and that APT39 was designated for being owned or controlled by the MOIS.[3, 5]

  • US Department of the Treasury 17 September 2020

    Said the 45 individuals were designated for having materially assisted or supported the MOIS, and that their identification came from a long-term FBI Boston Division investigation.[3]

  • FBI 17 September 2020

    Published an alert saying Rana Intelligence Computing Company is a MOIS front company in Tehran that conducts malicious cyber activity, known publicly as APT39, Chafer, Cadelspy, Remexi and ITG07. Coordinated with DHS/CISA and US Treasury.[2]

  • FBI Director Christopher Wray, quoted by Treasury 17 September 2020

    Said Iran's MOIS, through its front company Rana, recruited highly educated people and turned their cyber talents into tools to exploit, harass and repress their fellow citizens and others deemed a threat to the regime.[3]

  • US Department of Justice 17 September 2020

    Described the Treasury sanctions on 45 individuals and one front company associated with the MOIS who comprised the group known publicly as APT39, Chafer, Remexi, Cadelspy or ITG07, as part of a coordinated action on Iranian cyber activity.[4]

  • US Treasury (OFAC sanctions list) 17 September 2020

    Lists APT39 (also Cadelspy, Chafer, ITG07, Remexi) and Rana Intelligence Computing Company (also Rana Institute), each marked as linked to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security.[5]

  • US Department of the Treasury 9 September 2022

    Said APT39 has engaged in widespread theft of personal identifying information, probably to support surveillance operations, when it sanctioned the MOIS itself.[6]

  • MITRE ATT&CK 31 July 2026

    Describes APT39 as one of several names for cyber espionage activity conducted by the MOIS through the front company Rana Intelligence Computing since at least 2014. Page version 3.2, last modified 31 July 2026.[1]

Where sources differ

Sources differ on how the group and the people relate. Treasury says APT39 was designated for being owned or controlled by the MOIS and that the 45 individuals were designated for having materially assisted or supported the MOIS. The Department of Justice release says the 45 individuals and the front company "comprised" the group. Sources also differ on tool names. The FBI alert, the DOJ release and the OFAC list give Cadelspy and Remexi as names of the actor, while MITRE ATT&CK lists them as software used by APT39. Counts of US victims are worded differently: Treasury says approximately 15 US companies, the FBI says more than 15.

Who they target

Sectors

  • Airlines, air carriers and travel firmsMITRE lists travel and hospitality among the main targets. Treasury says about 15 US companies were targeted or compromised, mostly in travel, and names global airlines among victims. The FBI says access was used to track people the MOIS considers a threat.[1, 2, 3]
  • Telecommunications industryMITRE and the FBI both name telecommunications among the main industries targeted.[1, 2]
  • Universities and Persian language and cultural centersMITRE and the FBI name academic targets. Treasury says Iranian academic institutions and Persian language and cultural centers in Iran and abroad were victimised.[1, 2, 3]
  • Iranian citizensTreasury and the FBI say tools were used to monitor Iranian dissidents, journalists, former government employees, environmentalists, refugees, students, faculty and staff of international non-governmental organizations.[2, 3]
  • Government networks and foreign intelligence servicesThe FBI says foreign governments were targeted. Treasury lists foreign intelligence services among victims. The DOJ release says the government networks of Iran's neighboring countries were targeted.[2, 3, 4]
  • Companies inside IranTreasury and the FBI say Iranian private sector companies were targeted.[2, 3]
  • More than 30 countriesTreasury and the FBI say hundreds of individuals and entities from more than 30 countries across these regions were targeted. Treasury also says at least 15 countries in the Middle East and North Africa.[2, 3]

Operations timeline

Each entry is attributed to the group by the sources cited.

  1. 16 February 2012

    MOIS designated by the US

    Treasury said the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), which it names as the owner of APT39, was previously designated on 16 February 2012.[3]

  2. since at least 2014

    Activity period MITRE gives

    MITRE ATT&CK describes APT39 as cyber espionage activity run by the MOIS through Rana Intelligence Computing since at least 2014.[1]

  3. 19 February 2019

    MITRE creates its APT39 group page

    MITRE ATT&CK lists 19 February 2019 as the date it created the APT39 group entry (G0087).[1]

  4. 14 September 2020

    US coordinated effort begins

    The Department of Justice said that from 14 September 2020 the Justice, FBI, Homeland Security and Treasury departments ran a coordinated effort against cyber activity by actors linked to the MOIS and the IRGC.[4]

  5. 17 September 2020

    FBI alert ME-000134-MW

    The FBI published indicators and detection rules for malware it attributes to Rana, including scripts in Office documents, AutoIt malware, two BITS-based executables, a fake Firefox program, Python malware, an Android app and a file called depot.dat. Treasury called it eight separate sets of malware.[2, 3]

  6. 17 September 2020

    US sanctions on APT39, Rana and 45 individuals

    OFAC imposed sanctions on APT39, 45 associated individuals and one front company. Treasury said they served at Rana as managers, programmers and hacking experts, and named a long-term FBI Boston Division investigation as the source of the identification.[3]

  7. 17 September 2020

    Sanctions list entries published

    OFAC's list entries for APT39 (also Cadelspy, Chafer, ITG07, Remexi) and Rana Intelligence Computing Company (also Rana Institute) are each marked as linked to the MOIS.[5]

  8. 17 September 2020

    Coordinated US action

    The Department of Justice described the sanctions and FBI alert as part of coordinated actions against Iranian cyber activity by the MOIS and the IRGC.[4]

  9. 9 September 2022

    Treasury statement on APT39

    When sanctioning the MOIS and its minister, Treasury said APT39 has engaged in widespread theft of personal identifying information, and that the FBI had exposed a years-long MOIS malware campaign that included at least 15 US companies.[6]

  10. 31 July 2026

    MITRE updates its APT39 page

    MITRE ATT&CK shows version 3.2 of the APT39 page, last modified 31 July 2026.[1]

Government actions

Indictments, sanctions and advisories that name the group or its alleged members.

Government actions about APT39
DateWhoWhat
17 September 2020 US Department of the Treasury (OFAC) SanctionsDesignated APT39, 45 individuals and Rana Intelligence Computing Company under Executive Order 13553. All property and interests in property in the US are blocked and must be reported.[3, 5]
17 September 2020 FBI Public alertFLASH ME-000134-MW with indicators of compromise and YARA rules for eight sets of malware tied to Rana.[2, 3]
17 September 2020 US Department of Justice Coordinated announcementDescribed the sanctions and the FBI alert as part of coordinated actions with the FBI, DHS and Treasury against Iranian malicious cyber activity.[4]
17 September 2020 US Treasury (OFAC) Sanctions list updateAdded entries for APT39 (also Cadelspy, Chafer, ITG07, Remexi) and Rana Intelligence Computing Company (also Rana Institute) to the sanctions list, each marked as linked to the MOIS and subject to secondary sanctions.[5]
9 September 2022 US Department of the Treasury (OFAC) Sanctions on the MOISDesignated the MOIS and its minister, and recalled the 2020 APT39 designation.[6]

How they get in

Techniques reported for this group, by MITRE ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

  • Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1566.001

    MITRE says APT39 sent emails with malicious attachments. The FBI says its scripts were hidden in Office documents sent by spear phishing.[1, 2]

  • Phishing: Spearphishing Link T1566.002

    MITRE says APT39 sent emails with malicious links.[1]

  • Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190

    MITRE says APT39 used SQL injection for initial compromise.[1]

  • Valid Accounts T1078

    MITRE says APT39 used stolen credentials to get into Outlook Web Access.[1]

Execution

  • User Execution: Malicious File T1204.002

    MITRE says APT39 lured users to open a malicious attachment.[1]

  • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.001

    MITRE says APT39 used PowerShell to run malicious code. The FBI describes a PowerShell script run by its VBS malware.[1, 2]

Persistence

  • Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task T1053.005

    MITRE says APT39 created scheduled tasks for persistence. The FBI lists task names it saw.[1, 2]

  • Server Software Component: Web Shell T1505.003

    MITRE says APT39 installed ANTAK and ASPXSPY web shells.[1]

Defense Evasion

  • Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location T1036.005

    MITRE says APT39 used malware disguised as Mozilla Firefox. The FBI describes the same fake Firefox program.[1, 2]

Credential Access

  • OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory T1003.001

    MITRE says APT39 used Mimikatz, Windows Credential Editor and ProcDump to dump credentials.[1]

Lateral Movement

  • Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol T1021.001

    MITRE says APT39 used remote desktop for lateral movement and persistence.[1]

  • Remote Services: SSH T1021.004

    MITRE says APT39 used secure shell to move between targets.[1]

Collection

  • Input Capture: Keylogging T1056.001

    MITRE says APT39 used tools that capture keystrokes. The FBI says depot.dat collected screenshots and keylogger data.[1, 2]

Exfiltration

  • BITS Jobs T1197

    MITRE says APT39 used the BITS protocol (a Windows background file transfer service) to send out stolen data.[1]

Tools and malware

  • Remexi Windows Trojan

    MITRE describes it as a Windows Trojan written in C and used by APT39. The FBI, DOJ and OFAC also list Remexi as a name of the actor.[2, 4, 5, 7]

  • Cadelspy Backdoor

    MITRE describes it as a backdoor used by APT39. The FBI, DOJ and OFAC also list Cadelspy as a name of the actor.[2, 4, 5, 8]

  • MechaFlounder Remote access tool

    MITRE describes a Python-based remote access tool used by APT39.[9]

  • VBS and PowerShell malware Script malware

    The FBI says malicious VBS scripts were embedded in Office documents and sent by spear phishing.[2]

  • AutoIt malware Script malware

    The FBI identified several AutoIt malware scripts that it says Rana used.[2]

  • BITS 1.0 and BITS 2.0 Malware using Windows background transfers

    The FBI says the BITS 1.0 malware was pulled down by the VBS or AutoIt malware for further victimisation.[2]

  • Fake Firefox program Malware disguised as software

    The FBI identified malware masquerading as legitimate Mozilla Firefox.[2]

  • Python malware Script malware

    The FBI identified Python-based malware that it says Rana used.[2]

  • Optimizer.apk Android malware

    The FBI identified Android malware named optimizer.apk that it says Rana used.[2]

  • depot.dat Spyware component

    The FBI says depot.dat could collect screenshots, keylogger information and other data.[2]

  • Mimikatz Credential theft tool

    MITRE says APT39 used different versions of Mimikatz to obtain credentials.[1]

  • CrackMapExec Network scanning tool

    MITRE says APT39 used CrackMapExec to enumerate network shares.[1]

Detection and defense

  1. Load the FBI indicators

    Check mail, endpoint and network logs against the indicators and YARA rules in FBI FLASH ME-000134-MW, and report hits to the FBI.

    Counters T1566.001 T1059.001

  2. Hunt for odd scheduled tasks

    The FBI lists tasks named UpdatMachine, UpdateMachineG and "Update Windows" that ran its scripts. Review tasks that run scripts every few minutes.

    Counters T1053.005

  3. Watch Windows background transfers

    The FBI lists BITS jobs named SecurityCenterUpdate and HelpCenterUpload. Alert on unexpected BITS upload jobs.

    Counters T1197

  4. Look for fake Firefox folders

    The FBI lists a MozillaFirefox folder in the user AppData folder holding screenshots and keystroke logs. Search for it.

    Counters T1036.005 T1056.001

  5. Patch applications and the operating system

    The FBI says to apply regular updates to protect against known vulnerabilities.

    Counters T1190

  6. Lock down public web servers

    The FBI advises a least-privilege setup, a DMZ, blocked admin panels, no default logins and a web application firewall.

    Counters T1190 T1505.003

  7. Keep a clean copy of web servers

    The FBI advises an offline known-good copy and file integrity monitoring so changes to served content show up.

    Counters T1505.003

  8. Run regular vulnerability scans

    The FBI advises regular scans of systems and applications to find weak points before attackers do.

    Counters T1190

What Brandefense can do

Questions

Who is APT39?

The US Treasury, FBI and Department of Justice attributed APT39, also called Chafer, to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) on 17 September 2020, saying it worked through the front company Rana Intelligence Computing Company. MITRE ATT&CK describes it the same way.

What did the US do about APT39?

On 17 September 2020 the US Treasury sanctioned APT39, 45 individuals and Rana. The same day the FBI published an alert with malware indicators, and the Department of Justice described it as part of coordinated action.

Who does APT39 target?

MITRE says mainly travel, hospitality, academic and telecommunications firms. Treasury and the FBI add Iranian dissidents and journalists, foreign governments, and about 15 US companies, mostly in travel.

Are Chafer and APT39 the same group?

MITRE says APT39 activity largely aligns with a group publicly called Chafer. The FBI, DOJ and OFAC list Chafer among the names for the same actor.

How does APT39 get in?

The FBI says its malware came in Office documents sent by spear phishing. MITRE also lists malicious links, stolen web mail credentials and SQL injection.

How can I check if I was hit?

The FBI published indicators and YARA rules in FLASH ME-000134-MW. Check logs against them and report matches to the FBI's CyWatch.

In our research

  1. APT33 (Elfin / Refined Kitten): Iran’s Longstanding Cyber-Espionage Arm November 2025

Sources

  1. APT39, ITG07, Chafer, Remix Kitten, Group G0087 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Group name, associated names, since at least 2014, targets, techniques, software, MOIS and Rana attribution
  2. Indicators of Compromise Associated with Rana Intelligence Computing, also known as Advanced Persistent Threat 39, Chafer, Cadelspy, Remexi, and ITG07 (FLASH ME-000134-MW, 17 September 2020) FBI, coordinated with DHS/CISA and US Treasury Supports: Rana as MOIS front company, targets, malware sets, indicators, best practices
  3. Treasury Sanctions Cyber Actors Backed by Iranian Intelligence Ministry US Department of the Treasury Supports: Sanctions on APT39, 45 individuals and Rana, 17 September 2020, targets and victims
  4. Department of Justice and Partner Departments and Agencies Conduct Coordinated Actions to Disrupt and Deter Iranian Malicious Cyber Activities Targeting the United States and the Broader International Community US Department of Justice Supports: Coordinated action of 17 September 2020, aliases, wording on the 45 individuals
  5. Counter Terrorism Designations; Iran/Cyber-related Designations (17 September 2020) US Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control Supports: Sanctions list entries for APT39 and Rana, listed aliases
  6. Treasury Sanctions Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Minister for Malign Cyber Activities US Department of the Treasury Supports: 9 September 2022 statement on APT39 and MOIS
  7. Remexi, Software S0375 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Remexi described as a Windows Trojan used by APT39
  8. Cadelspy, Software S0454 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Cadelspy described as a backdoor used by APT39
  9. MechaFlounder, Software S0459 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: MechaFlounder described as a Python-based remote access tool used by APT39
  10. BITS Jobs, Technique T1197 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: APT39 use of the BITS protocol to exfiltrate stolen data
  11. Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment, Sub-technique T1566.001 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: APT39 spearphishing emails with malicious attachments for initial compromise
  12. Exploit Public-Facing Application, Technique T1190 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: APT39 use of SQL injection for initial compromise