Threat group profile

Dragonfly

Also known as Energetic Bear, Berserk Bear, Crouching Yeti

Attributed by the US and UK governments to Russia's FSB Center 16 (Military Unit 71330), this group is tied to supply chain, phishing and website attacks on energy and industrial control system companies, and to the abuse of weak routers.

In short

Attributed by the US and UK governments to Russia's FSB Center 16 (Military Unit 71330), this group is tied to supply chain, phishing and website attacks on energy and industrial control system companies, and to the abuse of weak routers. Its work is espionage and lasting access to networks.

Profile MapThreat Group
  1. Attributed OriginRussia
  2. Names17names in public reportsDragonfly · TEMP.Isotope · DYMALLOY
  3. Sectors10named as targetsWorldwide · Europe · United States
  4. Techniques14in the attack chainReconnaissance · Resource Development · Initial Access
  5. Tools7tools and malware listedBackdoor.Oldrea (Havex) · Trojan.Karagany · MCMD

In one minute

Who they are
Governments attribute the group to Russia's FSB, Center 16 (Military Unit 71330). The US Department of Justice charged three Center 16 officers in an indictment of 26 August 2021, made public on 24 March 2022. MITRE says the group has been active since at least 2010.
Who they target
Energy companies and the makers of industrial control systems worldwide, US state and local government and aviation networks, and, in 2025 and 2026, network devices across critical infrastructure sectors such as energy, communications, finance, government and healthcare.
How they usually get in
Poisoned software updates on vendor websites, phishing emails, compromised websites that engineers visit, known flaws in internet-facing systems, and routers with weak or default management settings.
What stands out
The sources stress energy and industrial control systems. In the 2020 campaign the FBI and CISA say they had no information of intentional disruption, but that the actor may be seeking access for future disruption options. The FBI says Berserk Bear and Dragonfly are separate but related clusters.
What to do first
Close router and switch management to the internet. Turn off Cisco Smart Install, move from old SNMP versions to SNMPv3, patch internet-facing systems, and require multi-factor authentication for remote access.

Names

Public reports use several names for this activity.

Names used for Dragonfly
NameWhere it appears
Dragonfly MITRE ATT&CK G0035 (group name); US Department of Justice, 24 March 2022; Rewards for Justice; UK factsheet; CISA advisories AA20-296A and AA22-083A; joint advisory of July 2026[1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10]
TEMP.Isotope MITRE ATT&CK, associated groups[1]
DYMALLOY MITRE ATT&CK, associated groups; UK factsheet[1, 6]
Berserk Bear MITRE ATT&CK; UK release of 24 March 2022; CISA advisories; UK factsheet; joint advisory of July 2026[1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10]
Berzerk Bear Spelling used by the US Department of Justice, 24 March 2022[2]
TG-4192 MITRE ATT&CK, associated groups; UK factsheet[1, 6]
Crouching Yeti MITRE ATT&CK; US Department of Justice; Rewards for Justice; UK release; CISA advisories; UK factsheet[1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8]
IRON LIBERTY MITRE ATT&CK, associated groups; UK factsheet[1, 6]
Energetic Bear MITRE ATT&CK; US Department of Justice; Rewards for Justice; UK release; CISA advisories; UK factsheet[1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8]
Ghost Blizzard MITRE ATT&CK, associated groups; UK NCSC release of 13 July 2026[1, 11]
BROMINE MITRE ATT&CK, associated groups[1]
TeamSpy CISA advisories AA20-296A and AA22-083A[3, 4]
Koala CISA advisories AA20-296A and AA22-083A[3, 4]
Havex Listed as a name for the actor in CISA advisories AA20-296A and AA22-083A. The US Department of Justice uses it for malware and for phase one of the campaign[2, 3, 4]
Dragonfly 2.0 US Department of Justice name for the 2014 to 2017 phase of the energy campaign[2]
CASSTLE UK factsheet, in its list of public names for Center 16[6]
Static Tundra Joint advisory of July 2026 and UK NCSC release, in lists of names used for Center 16 activity. The advisory says the list may not match the agencies' view 1 to 1[10, 11]

Who says so

Attribution is a judgment by the body named. It is shown here as attributed, not as proven fact.

  • MITRE ATT&CK 31 July 2026

    Describes Dragonfly as a cyber espionage group attributed to Russia's FSB Center 16. Page last modified 31 July 2026.[1]

  • US CISA and FBI 1 December 2020 (last revised)

    Advisory AA20-296A: a Russian state-sponsored actor, known in open-source reporting as Berserk Bear, Energetic Bear, TeamSpy, Dragonfly, Havex, Crouching Yeti and Koala, has targeted US state and local government and aviation networks since at least September 2020. The advisory does not name the FSB.[4]

  • US Department of Justice Returned 26 August 2021, made public 24 March 2022

    Indictment in Kansas charges three officers of FSB Center 16 (Military Unit 71330), Akulov, Gavrilov and Tyukov, over energy sector intrusions between 2012 and 2017. The department says they were members of a unit known as Dragonfly, Berzerk Bear, Energetic Bear and Crouching Yeti.[2]

  • CISA, FBI and Department of Energy 24 March 2022

    Advisory AA22-083A names the FSB, also known as Berserk Bear, Energetic Bear, TeamSpy, Dragonfly, Havex, Crouching Yeti and Koala, for an energy sector intrusion campaign from at least 2011 through 2018.[3]

  • UK Foreign Office and NCSC 24 March 2022

    The NCSC assesses it is almost certain that FSB Center 16 is also known as Energetic Bear, Berserk Bear and Crouching Yeti, and ran a cyber program against critical systems in Europe, the Americas and Asia.[7]

  • UK Government April 2022 (date per MITRE reference list)

    Factsheet names Center 16 (Military Unit 71330) and lists Dragonfly among its public names. It says Center 16 has been observed since at least 2010.[1, 6]

  • US State Department, Rewards for Justice Page undated

    Names Tyukov as a member of a Center 16 operational group, Military Unit 71330, recognized as Dragonfly, Energetic Bear and Crouching Yeti, and offers up to 10 million dollars for information.[8]

  • FBI August 2025

    Public service announcement: cyber actors attributed to FSB Center 16 exploit network devices. It says Berserk Bear and Dragonfly refer to separate but related activity clusters.[9]

  • NSA, CISA, FBI, NCSC and partner agencies July 2026

    Joint advisory says FSB Center 16 cyber actors continue to exploit poorly configured networking devices, and lists Dragonfly among industry names for the activity.[10]

  • UK NCSC 13 July 2026

    Release names Center 16 as also known as Berserk Bear, Energetic Bear, Crouching Yeti, Dragonfly, Ghost Blizzard and Static Tundra.[11]

Where sources differ

Sources differ on whether Dragonfly and Berserk Bear are one group. The US Department of Justice (24 March 2022) and the UK treat the names as one Center 16 unit, while the FBI (August 2025) says they refer to separate but related clusters, and the joint advisory of July 2026 says its list of names may not match the agencies' view 1 to 1. Sources also differ on dates: MITRE and the UK say since at least 2010, the Justice Department dates the Kansas indictment period 2012 to 2017, and CISA advisory AA22-083A says 2011 through 2018.

On the nuclear plant, the UK release says the FBI indicted the group for targeting the systems controlling the plant in 2017, while the Justice Department says the business network was compromised. The UK factsheet also lists Snake, Venomous Bear and Turla among Center 16 names, and the EU names Turla as one of the groups Center 16 controls (statement of 13 July 2026). MITRE does not list those names for Dragonfly, so this page does not treat them as Dragonfly.

Who they target

Sectors

  • WorldwideThe US Department of Justice says the Kansas indictment covers oil and gas firms, nuclear power plants, and utility and power transmission companies. It says the Kansas campaign targeted victims in the United States and more than 135 other countries.[2]
  • EuropeThe UK lists a European maker of programmable logic controllers (June to July 2013) and a European developer of wind turbines and other energy infrastructure (April 2014).[6]
  • United StatesThe Justice Department says the business network of a nuclear power operator in Kansas was compromised, and that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was among those phished.[2]
  • United StatesTA18-074A describes Russian government cyber actors targeting these sectors since at least March 2016. The UK links the March 2018 activity to Center 16.[5, 6]
  • United StatesCISA and the FBI say dozens of state, local, tribal and territorial government networks and aviation networks were targeted from at least September 2020.[4]
  • United KingdomThe UK lists UK energy companies (April 2017) and UK engineering and industrial control companies (April 2018).[6]
  • WorldwideMITRE says defense and aviation companies, government entities, industrial control system companies and critical infrastructure sectors.[1]
  • WorldwideThe joint advisory of July 2026 names these sectors as most at risk from Center 16 actors exploiting routers.[10]
  • United StatesThe FBI says it saw configuration files collected for thousands of devices linked to US entities across critical infrastructure sectors in the year before August 2025.[9]
  • RussiaThe UK says Center 16 actors targeted people including an associate of Aleksey Navalny (September 2017) and Russian nationals through tax service impersonation. This is stated for Center 16, not for Dragonfly by name.[6]

Regions

  • PolandCERT Polska found a high degree of infrastructure overlap between the 29 December 2025 attacks on Polish energy entities and a cluster publicly known as Dragonfly, and called it the first publicly described destructive activity of that cluster.[21]

Operations timeline

Each entry is attributed to the group by the sources cited.

  1. At least 2010

    Activity first seen

    MITRE says Dragonfly has been active since at least 2010. The UK says Center 16 has been observed in cyber operations since at least 2010.[1, 6]

  2. 2011

    Energy campaign begins

    CISA advisory AA22-083A dates the FSB energy sector intrusion campaign from at least 2011 through 2018.[3]

  3. 2012 to 2014

    Phase one, "Dragonfly" or "Havex"

    The Justice Department says the conspirators hid Havex malware in legitimate software updates from industrial control system makers, and installed malware on more than 17,000 unique devices.[2]

  4. June to July 2013

    Trojanised software at a European maker

    The UK lists a compromised software package turned into a Trojan at a European maker of programmable logic controllers.[6]

  5. 2013 to 2014

    Havex on energy networks

    CISA, the FBI and the Department of Energy say Havex arrived through phishing, compromised websites and poisoned updates on at least three vendor sites.[3, 15]

  6. 2014 to 2017

    Phase two, "Dragonfly 2.0"

    The Justice Department says the conspirators moved to targeted attacks, with phishing of more than 3,300 users at more than 500 companies and entities.[2]

  7. 2016

    Wide targeting of US energy networks

    CISA, the FBI and the Department of Energy say the actor first targeted vendors and suppliers, then energy organizations, and took ICS-related data.[3]

  8. October 2017

    Energy sector phishing

    The UK lists spear phishing and compromise of networks in the European and North American energy sector.[6]

  9. March 2018

    US infrastructure alert

    TA18-074A describes a multi-stage campaign by Russian government cyber actors against energy and other sectors since at least March 2016.[5, 6]

  10. April 2018

    UK engineering firms

    The UK lists compromise of UK engineering and industrial control companies.[6]

  11. February to August 2020

    Aviation scanning

    The UK lists sustained scanning and probing of US aviation networks.[6]

  12. Since at least September 2020

    State, local and aviation targets

    CISA and the FBI say data was exfiltrated from at least two victim servers as of 1 October 2020.[4]

  13. Past year to August 2025

    Router configuration theft

    The FBI says it detected collection of configuration files for thousands of networking devices.[9]

  14. 13 July 2026

    Joint router advisory

    Agencies from several countries say Center 16 actors continue to exploit poorly configured networking devices.[10, 11]

Government actions

Indictments, sanctions and advisories that name the group or its alleged members.

Government actions about Dragonfly
DateWhoWhat
25 June 2014 US ICS-CERT (CISA) ICS alert on HavexFirst alert on malware in vendor software installers. It names no group.[15]
16 March 2018 US DHS and FBI Technical alert TA18-074ADescribed a multi-stage campaign by Russian government cyber actors, without naming an FSB unit.[5]
1 December 2020 US CISA and FBI Joint advisory AA20-296A (last revised)Described the campaign against state and local government and aviation, with indicators and mitigations.[4]
26 August 2021 US Department of Justice Indictment returned in KansasThree Center 16 officers charged with conspiracy to damage an energy facility, computer fraud and wire fraud. Akulov and Gavrilov also face identity theft counts.[2]
24 March 2022 US Department of Justice Indictment made publicAnnounced the Kansas charges together with a separate case (Gladkikh) that this page does not attribute to Dragonfly.[2]
24 March 2022 CISA, FBI, Department of Energy Joint advisory AA22-083AGave techniques and mitigations for the FSB energy campaign of 2011 to 2018.[3]
24 March 2022 UK Foreign Office and NCSC Public attributionExposed Center 16 and assessed it is almost certain it is also known as Energetic Bear, Berserk Bear and Crouching Yeti.[7]
5 April 2022 UK Government Factsheet on FSB cyber activityDescribed Center 16, its names and operations. Date as given in MITRE reference list.[1, 6]
Undated US State Department Rewards for Justice offerUp to 10 million dollars for information on a person acting for a foreign government in cyber activity against US critical infrastructure. Tyukov page.[8]
August 2025 FBI Public service announcementWarned that FSB Center 16 actors exploit SNMP and Cisco Smart Install flaw CVE-2018-0171.[9]
13 July 2026 NSA, CISA, FBI and partners Joint advisoryGave router defense steps against Center 16 activity. Co-sealed by agencies in several countries.[10, 11]
13 July 2026 UK Government with EU member states Attribution of Poland grid attackAttributed the December 2025 attack on Poland's energy grid to FSB Center 16. The release does not name Dragonfly.[11, 12]
13 July 2026 EU High Representative Statement exposing the 16th CenterSaid the 16th Center controls cyber threat groups including Turla and carried out sabotage in Poland. It does not name Dragonfly.[13, 14]

How they get in

Techniques reported for this group, by MITRE ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

  • Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning T1595.002

    Scans for vulnerable Citrix and Microsoft Exchange services, and for routers with default SNMP settings.[1, 4, 10]

Resource Development

  • Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server T1583.003

    Rents servers to run campaigns and to receive stolen router configuration files.[1, 10]

Initial Access

  • Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain T1195.002

    Placed trojanized installers for control system software on vendor sites, spreading Havex.[1, 2, 3]

  • Drive-by Compromise T1189

    Compromised websites that energy sector engineers visit, to plant credential-stealing scripts.[1, 2]

  • Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1566.001

    Sent emails with malicious attachments to staff at energy and government targets.[1, 2]

  • Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190

    Used SQL injection and known flaws in Citrix, Exchange, Fortinet VPN and Cisco Smart Install.[1, 4, 9]

  • Valid Accounts T1078

    Used stolen user and administrator credentials to log in and move around.[1, 4]

Persistence

  • Server Software Component: Web Shell T1505.003

    Placed web shells on public email and web servers to keep access.[1]

Credential Access

  • Forced Authentication T1187

    Made documents pull files over SMB so that password hashes were sent to the attacker.[1, 4]

  • OS Credential Dumping: NTDS T1003.003

    Copied the Active Directory database (ntds.dit) from domain controllers.[1]

Lateral Movement

  • Exploitation of Remote Services T1210

    Used the Netlogon flaw CVE-2020-1472 to reach Active Directory servers.[1, 4]

Collection

  • Data from Configuration Repository: Network Device Configuration Dump T1602.002

    Told routers to copy their configuration files out, which can hold weak stored passwords.[10]

Exfiltration

  • Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol T1048

    Sent stolen router configurations out over TFTP, a different protocol from its control channel.[10]

Defense Impairment

  • Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Windows Event Logs T1685.005

    Cleared Windows event logs and logs from its own tools to hide its tracks.[1]

Tools and malware

  • Backdoor.Oldrea (Havex) Malware

    MITRE says it was used by Dragonfly against energy companies since at least 2013. CISA describes Havex as a remote access Trojan that gathers data on control system devices.[3, 16]

  • Trojan.Karagany Malware

    MITRE describes a modular remote access tool used for recon and linked to Dragonfly.[17]

  • MCMD Tool

    MITRE describes a remote access tool that gives a remote command shell.[18]

  • CrackMapExec Tool

    MITRE lists it among tools obtained and used. It is a post-exploitation tool that collects Active Directory information.[1, 19]

  • Mimikatz Tool

    MITRE lists it among tools obtained and used. It is a credential dumper.[1, 20]

  • PsExec Tool

    MITRE lists it among tools obtained and used.[1]

  • SYNful Knock Malware

    The FBI says the unit deployed custom tools to certain Cisco devices, such as the malware publicly identified as SYNful Knock in 2015.[9]

Detection and defense

  1. Shut router management to the internet

    Disable Cisco Smart Install, use SNMPv3 instead of SNMPv1 and v2, and deny external TFTP, Smart Install and SNMP ports on edge devices.

    Counters T1190 T1602.002 T1048

  2. Lock down who can manage network devices

    Use access control lists so only management devices can reach SNMP, and watch for SNMP requests that tell a device to copy its configuration.

    Counters T1602.001 T1602.002

  3. Use strong, unique device passwords

    Use strong, unique local passwords on network devices, avoid weak stored password types, and alert on local account logins.

    Counters T1078 T1003

  4. Patch internet-facing systems first

    Update remote access and externally facing applications, including Citrix, Exchange, Fortinet VPN and Exim, plus the Netlogon flaw, and replace end-of-life network devices.

    Counters T1190 T1210

  5. Keep control systems apart

    Separate IT from industrial control networks, use a DMZ for internet-facing services, and do not let vendors plug their devices into control networks.

    Counters T1195.002 T1210

  6. Stop password hash leaks

    Disable NTLM or restrict outgoing NTLM, and block SMB ports 139 and 445 at the network edge.

    Counters T1187

  7. After a compromise, reset widely

    Reset passwords twice where hashes or tickets may be stolen, and treat Active Directory as untrusted where Netlogon abuse is seen. Look for web shells on public servers.

    Counters T1078 T1003.003 T1505.003

  8. Block risky remote access and train staff

    Block RDP from untrusted addresses, require multi-factor authentication for remote access, and train users to report odd emails.

    Counters T1566.001 T1189

What Brandefense can do

  • External Attack Surface Management

    See which routers, VPNs, mail servers and management pages face the internet, the exposures that the 2026 advisory asks defenders to find and secure.

  • Cyber Threat Intelligence

    Follow what governments and MITRE report about this group and compare its listed techniques with your own controls.

  • Phishing Monitoring & Domain Abuse

    Find look-alike domains and fake sign-in pages aimed at your staff, since CISA describes malicious domains used against targets and the Justice Department describes phishing.

  • Dark Web Monitoring

    Watch for leaked or sold company credentials, since MITRE lists use of stolen credentials and valid accounts.

Questions

Who is Dragonfly?

MITRE describes it as a cyber espionage group attributed to Russia's FSB Center 16. The US Department of Justice charged three Center 16 officers in an indictment of 26 August 2021, made public on 24 March 2022, and said they belonged to a unit known as Dragonfly, Berzerk Bear, Energetic Bear and Crouching Yeti.

Are Dragonfly and Berserk Bear the same group?

Sources differ. The Justice Department and the UK name them as parts of one Center 16 unit. In August 2025 the FBI said Berserk Bear and Dragonfly refer to separate but related activity clusters, and the July 2026 joint advisory says its list of names may not match 1 to 1.

What did the Justice Department say they did?

It says that between 2012 and 2017 the charged officers ran supply chain attacks and targeted phishing against the energy sector, aimed at industrial control systems, and that malware was installed on more than 17,000 unique devices.

Are they still active?

MITRE updated its page on 31 July 2026. The FBI (August 2025) and a joint advisory (July 2026) say Center 16 actors exploit weak or unpatched network devices, and the advisory says they continue to do so.

Did they attack Poland's power grid?

The UK, with EU member states, attributed the December 2025 attack on Poland's energy grid to FSB Center 16 on 13 July 2026. The sources opened do not say Dragonfly did it by name.

What should we do first?

Close router and switch management pages to the internet, turn off Cisco Smart Install, move to SNMPv3, and patch internet-facing systems, as the July 2026 advisory and CISA advise.

In our research

  1. EASM Best Practices for the Energy Sector October 2025
  2. Customizing Threat Intelligence Services for the Energy Sector January 2024

Sources

  1. Dragonfly, Group G0035 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Group description, names, techniques, software, attribution to FSB Center 16, active since at least 2010
  2. Four Russian Government Employees Charged in Two Historical Hacking Campaigns Targeting Critical Infrastructure Worldwide US Department of Justice Supports: Kansas indictment, three Center 16 officers, names, phases, Havex, targets, charges
  3. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted State-Sponsored Russian Cyber Actors Targeting the Energy Sector (AA22-083A) CISA, FBI and Department of Energy Supports: Energy campaign 2011 to 2018, Havex, names, mitigations
  4. Russian State-Sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat Actor Compromises U.S. Government Targets (AA20-296A) CISA and FBI Supports: 2020 campaign against state and local government and aviation, names, CVEs, mitigations
  5. Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors (TA18-074A) US DHS and FBI Supports: Multi-stage campaign since at least March 2016, sectors
  6. Russia's FSB malign activity: factsheet UK Government Supports: Centre 16 description, names, operations table, since at least 2010
  7. UK exposes Russian spy agency behind cyber incidents UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and NCSC Supports: NCSC assessment, 24 March 2022
  8. Marat Valeryevich Tyukov US State Department Rewards for Justice Supports: Reward offer, Center 16, names
  9. Russian Government Cyber Actors Targeting Networking Devices, Critical Infrastructure (PSA I-082025-PSA) FBI Supports: Router exploitation, Berserk Bear and Dragonfly as separate but related clusters
  10. Improve Router Hygiene to Protect Against Russian State-Sponsored Targeting (joint advisory) NSA, CISA, FBI, DC3 and partner agencies Supports: Center 16 router exploitation, names, sectors, mitigations, July 2026
  11. UK and Allies urge critical sectors to improve defences against Russian intelligence targeting UK National Cyber Security Centre Supports: Names, 13 July 2026 advisory, Poland attribution
  12. UK and EU strike Russian cyber networks with new sanctions UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Supports: Attribution of Poland energy grid attack to Centre 16, 13 July 2026
  13. Cyber / Russia: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union European Union External Action Service Supports: EU exposes the 16th Centre, Turla, Poland
  14. Exposing Russia's malicious cyber ecosystem: the EU adopts its biggest cyber sanctions package European Union External Action Service Supports: EU action of 13 July 2026
  15. ICS Focused Malware (ICS-ALERT-14-176-02A) CISA ICS-CERT Supports: Havex trojanized installers on ICS vendor sites, first alert June 2014
  16. Backdoor.Oldrea (S0093) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Havex as associated software, used against energy companies
  17. Trojan.Karagany (S0094) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Modular remote access tool linked to Dragonfly
  18. MCMD (S0500) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Remote command shell tool
  19. CrackMapExec (S0488) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Post-exploitation tool
  20. Mimikatz (S0002) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Credential dumper
  21. Energy Sector Incident Report, 29 December 2025 CERT Polska Supports: Names Poland as a target