Threat group profile

Kimsuky

Also known as Black Banshee, Velvet Chollima, Emerald Sleet

Attributed by the US and South Korean governments to North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau, Kimsuky sends convincing fake emails to think tanks, researchers, media and government staff to steal documents and email.

In short

Attributed by the US and South Korean governments to North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau, Kimsuky sends convincing fake emails to think tanks, researchers, media and government staff to steal documents and email. South Korea and the US Treasury sanctioned it in 2023, and the FBI reported new QR code phishing from it in 2025.

Profile MapThreat Group
  1. Attributed OriginNorth Korea
  2. Names11names in public reportsKimsuky · Black Banshee · Velvet Chollima
  3. Sectors8named as targetsGovernment · News media · Policy experts and analysts
  4. Techniques13in the attack chainReconnaissance · Stealth · Resource Development
  5. Tools9tools and malware listedBabyShark · AppleSeed · TRANSLATEXT

In one minute

Who they are
Attributed by the US and South Korean governments to North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau, its military intelligence body. The FBI, State Department and NSA name the 63rd Research Center within it (2024). South Korea sanctioned it on 2 June 2023 and the US Treasury on 30 November 2023.
Who they target
Think tanks, researchers, universities, news media, government staff and policy experts, mostly in South Korea, the US, Japan and Europe, working on the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy and sanctions.
How they usually get in
Spearphishing: fake emails posing as real journalists, academics and officials, often starting with a harmless message to build trust. The FBI reports QR codes in 2025 emails that led to fake sign-in pages.
What stands out
The Treasury calls it primarily an intelligence collection entity, and the US advisories stress patient trust building with real people's identities and abuse of weak DMARC settings. South Korea also reports ransomware, which the US sources here do not.
What to do first
Set DMARC to quarantine or reject, require phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication on email and remote access, and have staff check unknown contacts by phone or video before opening files or scanning QR codes.

Names

Public reports use several names for this activity.

Names used for Kimsuky
NameWhere it appears
Kimsuky MITRE ATT&CK G0094 (group name); CISA advisory AA20-301A; US advisories of 2023 and 2024[1, 2, 6, 8]
Black Banshee MITRE Associated Groups; US Treasury notice of 30 November 2023; US advisories of 2023 and 2024[1, 3, 6, 8]
Velvet Chollima MITRE Associated Groups; US Treasury notice; BfV and NIS advisory; US advisories of 2023 and 2024[1, 3, 4, 6, 8]
Emerald Sleet MITRE Associated Groups; US Treasury notice; US advisory of 2024[1, 3, 8]
THALLIUM MITRE Associated Groups; BfV and NIS advisory (as Thallium); US advisory of 2023[1, 4, 6]
APT43 MITRE Associated Groups; US Treasury notice; US advisories of 2023 and 2024[1, 3, 6, 8]
TA406 US Treasury notice of 30 November 2023 only; not on the MITRE list[3]
TA427 MITRE Associated Groups only[1]
Springtail MITRE Associated Groups only[1]
Earth Kumiho MITRE Associated Groups only[1]
PatheticSlug MITRE Associated Groups only[1]

Who says so

Attribution is a judgment by the body named. It is shown here as attributed, not as proven fact.

  • MITRE ATT&CK Version 5.2, last modified 31 July 2026

    Describes Kimsuky as a DPRK-based cyber espionage group active since at least 2012, and says its operations have overlapped with other North Korean actors.[1]

  • CISA, FBI and US Cyber Command CNMF 27 October 2020

    Said Kimsuky has most likely operated since 2012 and is most likely tasked by the North Korean regime with a global intelligence gathering mission.[2]

  • German BfV and South Korean NIS 20 March 2023

    Assessed that the actor has already targeted Korean and German entities with spearphishing emails. A footnote says members of the IT security community regularly link Kimsuky to the RGB.[4, 5]

  • FBI, US State Department and NSA, with South Korea's NIS, National Police Agency and Foreign Ministry 1 June 2023

    Said Kimsuky is administratively subordinate to an element within the RGB and has run campaigns for the RGB since at least 2012.[6]

  • South Korean government (joint press release) 2 June 2023

    Said Kimsuky is a body under the RGB that has carried out cyber attacks for more than ten years, and designated it for sanctions.[7]

  • South Korean government (joint press release) 2 June 2023

    Said Kimsuky has carried out ransomware attacks and demanded ransom, and that Kimsuky and other North Korean groups stole weapons and satellite technology. The US sources in this profile do not make these two claims.[7]

  • US Department of the Treasury 30 November 2023

    Said Kimsuky is subordinate to the RGB, active since 2012, and designated it under E.O. 13687.[3]

  • FBI, US State Department and NSA 2 May 2024

    Said Kimsuky is administratively subordinate to the 63rd Research Center, an element within the RGB.[8]

  • FBI 8 January 2026

    Said that as of 2025 Kimsuky actors targeted think tanks, academic institutions and governments with malicious QR codes in spearphishing.[9]

Where sources differ

Sources differ on how Kimsuky relates to the RGB. MITRE ATT&CK calls it DPRK-based and does not name a unit. The US Treasury (30 November 2023) says it is subordinate to the RGB. The June 2023 US and South Korean advisory says it is administratively subordinate to "an element within" the RGB, and the May 2024 FBI, State Department and NSA advisory names that element as the 63rd Research Center. The BfV and NIS (March 2023) go less far: a footnote says members of the IT security community regularly link Kimsuky to the RGB. Sources also differ on one alias: the Treasury lists TA406, while MITRE lists TA427. On aims, US sources describe intelligence collection, while South Korea's June 2023 release also says Kimsuky has carried out ransomware attacks. Finally, MITRE notes that some researchers put all North Korean state-sponsored activity under Lazarus Group instead of tracking separate subgroups.

Who they target

Sectors

  • Think tanks and research centersNamed by CISA (2020), the Treasury (2023), MITRE and the 2023 and 2024 advisories. The FBI says 2025 QR code emails went to think tanks.[1, 2, 3, 6, 9]
  • GovernmentMITRE and CISA say South Korean government agencies were first. The Treasury lists government staff, and the FBI says US and foreign government entities were targeted in 2025.[1, 2, 3, 9]
  • Universities and academic institutionsNamed by the Treasury and the 2023 advisory. The FBI lists academic institutions among 2025 targets.[3, 6, 9]
  • News mediaThe Treasury and the 2023 advisory list news media organizations as targets.[3, 6]
  • Policy experts and analystsCISA says individuals identified as experts in various fields. The 2024 advisory says the group compromises policy analysts and other experts.[2, 8]
  • Cryptocurrency industryCISA says observed targets have been US think tanks and the global cryptocurrency industry.[2]
  • International organizationsMITRE lists the United Nations. A late 2023 email in the 2024 advisory went to US officials and staff of international organizations.[1, 8]
  • Business services and manufacturingMITRE says operations expanded to these sectors.[1]

Regions

  • South KoreaNamed by MITRE, CISA, the Treasury and South Korea's own release.[1, 2, 3, 7]
  • United StatesNamed by MITRE, CISA, the Treasury and the FBI (2026).[1, 2, 3, 9]
  • JapanNamed by MITRE, CISA and the Treasury.[1, 2, 3]
  • Germany, wider Europe and RussiaThe BfV and NIS say Korean and German entities were targeted. MITRE and the Treasury list Europe and Russia.[1, 3, 4]

Operations timeline

Each entry is attributed to the group by the sources cited.

  1. 2012

    Earliest activity given

    MITRE says active since at least 2012. CISA says most likely operating since 2012. The Treasury says active since 2012.[1, 2, 3]

  2. 2014

    Nuclear power company compromise

    MITRE says Kimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise.[1]

  3. May 2018

    Operation STOLEN PENCIL

    CISA says Kimsuky used the GREASE malware during this operation. MITRE lists it as a notable 2018 campaign.[1, 2]

  4. 2018

    Chrome extension

    CISA says an extension on the Google Chrome Web Store was used to infect victims and steal passwords and cookies.[2]

  5. 2019

    Kabar Cobra and Smoke Screen

    MITRE lists Operation Kabar Cobra and Operation Smoke Screen as notable 2019 campaigns.[1]

  6. 27 October 2020

    CISA, FBI and CNMF advisory

    AA20-301A describes Kimsuky's methods, targets and mitigations.[2]

  7. 20 March 2023

    Google browser and app store campaigns

    The BfV and NIS describe a Chromium extension that steals Gmail content and an Android app delivered through Google Play sync.[4, 5]

  8. 2023

    Use of language models

    MITRE says Kimsuky was observed using commercial large language models for vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.[1]

  9. 1 to 2 June 2023

    US and South Korean advisory, South Korean sanctions

    The US advisory is dated 1 June 2023. South Korea's release of 2 June 2023 announces the same advisory and its own sanctions listing.[6, 7]

  10. 30 November 2023

    US Treasury sanctions

    The Treasury designates Kimsuky under E.O. 13687.[3]

  11. Late 2023 to early 2024

    Conference invitation emails

    The 2024 advisory shows an email inviting an expert to speak at a think tank workshop, sent to US officials and others at international organizations.[8]

  12. 2 May 2024

    DMARC advisory

    The FBI, State Department and NSA say Kimsuky exploits weak DMARC policies to hide spoofed emails.[8]

  13. May 2025

    QR code emails to think tanks

    The FBI reports emails posing as a foreign advisor and an embassy employee, each with a QR code.[9]

  14. June 2025

    Fake conference invitation

    The FBI reports an email to a strategic advisory firm with a QR code that led to a fake Google sign-in page.[9]

  15. October 2025

    HTTPTroy first reported

    MITRE says HTTPTroy was first reported in October 2025 and has been seen in operations attributed to DPRK-affiliated actors including Kimsuky.[17]

  16. 8 January 2026

    FBI FLASH alert

    The FBI warns NGOs, think tanks and academia about Kimsuky's QR code spearphishing and lists mitigations.[9]

Government actions

Indictments, sanctions and advisories that name the group or its alleged members.

Government actions about Kimsuky
DateWhoWhat
27 October 2020 CISA, FBI and US Cyber Command CNMF Joint advisory (AA20-301A)Described how Kimsuky works and named safeguards against spearphishing, multi-factor authentication and user awareness training as the key mitigations.[2]
20 March 2023 German BfV and South Korean NIS Joint advisoryWarned of Kimsuky campaigns against Google browser and app store services aimed at experts on the Korean Peninsula.[4, 5]
1 June 2023 FBI, US State Department and NSA with South Korea's NIS, National Police Agency and Foreign Ministry Joint advisory (CSA-20230601-1)Set out Kimsuky's social engineering, warning signs and mitigations, and noted that information on illicit DPRK cyber activity could earn a Rewards for Justice award of up to 5 million dollars.[6]
2 June 2023 South Korean government (Financial Services Commission release) Sanctions designationDesignated Kimsuky for sanctions, which it says was a world first, and listed the virtual currency wallet addresses it identified.[7]
30 November 2023 US Department of the Treasury (OFAC) SanctionsDesignated Kimsuky under E.O. 13687. Property of the designated persons in the US is blocked.[3]
2 May 2024 FBI, US State Department and NSA Joint advisory (JCSA-20240502-001)Warned that Kimsuky exploits weak DMARC policies and advised a DMARC policy of quarantine or reject.[8]
8 January 2026 FBI FLASH alert (AC-000001-MW)Alerted NGOs, think tanks and academia to QR code spearphishing and listed mitigations.[9]

How they get in

Techniques reported for this group, by MITRE ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

  • Phishing for Information T1598

    MITRE says tailored emails were used to gather victim details, including contact lists, to find more targets.[1]

Resource Development

  • Acquire Infrastructure: Domains T1583.001

    MITRE says the group registered domains to spoof targeted organizations. The 2023 advisory warns of look-alike domain names.[1, 6]

Initial Access

  • Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1566.001

    The 2023 advisory says the first email is often harmless and that attached malicious documents are often password-protected.[1, 6]

  • Phishing: Spearphishing Link T1566.002

    MITRE says emails linked to macro documents or actor-controlled domains. The FBI reports 2025 QR code emails that led to a fake sign-in page.[1, 9]

  • Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190

    MITRE says the group exploited flaws for initial access, including the Microsoft Exchange flaw CVE-2020-0688.[1]

Persistence

  • Software Extensions: Browser Extensions T1176.001

    MITRE says Chrome extensions were used to steal passwords. The BfV and NIS describe an extension that steals Gmail content.[1, 5]

Credential Access

  • OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory T1003.001

    MITRE says the group gathered credentials using Mimikatz and ProcDump.[1, 18]

  • Multi-Factor Authentication Interception T1111

    MITRE says the group used its own tool to intercept one-time passwords for two-factor sign-in.[1]

Collection

  • Email Collection: Remote Email Collection T1114.002

    MITRE says tools such as the MailFetch mail crawler were used to collect victim emails.[1]

Command and Control

  • Remote Access Tools: Remote Desktop Software T1219.002

    MITRE says a modified TeamViewer client served as a command channel.[1]

Exfiltration

  • Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage T1567.002

    MITRE says stolen files were sent to actor-controlled Blogspot and other cloud storage.[1]

Stealth

  • Social Engineering: Impersonation T1684.001

    MITRE says the group impersonated a foreign advisor, an embassy employee and a think tank employee.[1]

  • System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta T1218.005

    MITRE says the group used mshta.exe, a built-in Windows tool, to run malicious scripts.[1]

Tools and malware

  • BabyShark Script-based malware

    MITRE describes a Visual Basic script malware family believed to be associated with several North Korean campaigns.[1, 10]

  • AppleSeed Backdoor

    MITRE says Kimsuky used it against South Korean government, academic and commercial targets since at least 2021.[1, 11]

  • TRANSLATEXT Malicious browser extension

    MITRE says it posed as a Google Translate extension for Chrome and is four malicious JavaScript files.[1, 12]

  • KGH_SPY Modular tool suite

    MITRE says Kimsuky used it for reconnaissance, information stealing and backdoor access.[1, 13]

  • Troll Stealer Information stealer

    MITRE describes a stealer written in Go that is associated with Kimsuky operations.[1, 14]

  • GoBear Backdoor

    MITRE describes a Go-based backdoor that abuses stolen certificates to avoid detection.[1, 15]

  • Gomir Linux backdoor

    MITRE describes a Linux version of GoBear associated with Kimsuky operations.[1, 16]

  • HTTPTroy Backdoor

    MITRE describes an obfuscated backdoor first reported in October 2025 and seen in operations including Kimsuky.[1, 17]

  • Mimikatz Credential dumping tool

    MITRE says Kimsuky gathered credentials using Mimikatz and ProcDump.[1, 18]

Detection and defense

  1. Set a strict DMARC policy

    Publish a DMARC policy of quarantine or reject so mail that spoofs your domain is not delivered, as the FBI, State Department and NSA advise.

    Counters T1684.001 T1566.001 T1566.002

  2. Use phishing-resistant sign-in

    Require phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication for webmail, VPN, remote access and privileged accounts. The FBI says QR code campaigns often end with session token theft and replay.

    Counters T1111 T1566.002

  3. Do not enable macros

    Do not enable macros in documents received by email unless the source is verified, and allow only known and permitted programs to run.

    Counters T1566.001 T1218.005

  4. Verify unknown contacts by phone or video

    Check new contacts through known contact details or a phone or video call before engaging. Watch for look-alike domains and a harmless first email.

    Counters T1684.001 T1598 T1583.001

  5. Train staff on phishing and QR codes

    Run phishing training and exercises, and teach staff the risks of scanning unsolicited QR codes and to verify the sender another way.

    Counters T1566.001 T1566.002

  6. Inspect QR links and watch sign-ins

    Use mobile device or endpoint tools that analyze QR-linked web addresses, and log credential entry after QR scans.

    Counters T1566.002

  7. Secure and monitor remote access

    Secure and closely monitor Remote Desktop Protocol and other remote services, and check for unexpected remote access tools.

    Counters T1219.002

  8. Patch known exploited flaws

    Install updates for operating systems, software and firmware promptly, and put known exploited flaws first.

    Counters T1190

What Brandefense can do

  • Phishing Monitoring & Domain Abuse

    Spot look-alike domains and fake sign-in pages that copy your organization or your partners, the kind the advisories describe.

  • Executive Protection

    Check for fake profiles and accounts that imitate your senior staff and public experts, since the advisories describe posing as real journalists, academics and think tank staff.

  • Dark Web Monitoring

    Watch for leaked or sold company credentials and mailbox data, since the 2023 advisory says compromised accounts help the group write convincing emails.

  • Cyber Threat Intelligence

    Follow what governments publish about this group and compare its listed techniques with your own controls.

  • External Attack Surface Management

    See which mail and remote access services face the internet so known flaws, such as the Exchange flaw MITRE names, can be fixed.

Questions

Who is Kimsuky?

MITRE ATT&CK describes Kimsuky as a DPRK-based cyber espionage group active since at least 2012. The US Treasury (30 November 2023) says it is subordinate to North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau, and the FBI, State Department and NSA (2 May 2024) name the 63rd Research Center within it.

Who does Kimsuky go after?

The Treasury lists government, research centers, think tanks, academic institutions and news media in Europe, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the US. MITRE adds the United Nations, business services and manufacturing, and CISA adds the cryptocurrency industry.

How does Kimsuky get in?

Mainly by spearphishing. The FBI, State Department and NSA describe emails posing as journalists, academics and experts, often starting with a harmless message to build trust. The FBI reported QR code emails in 2025.

Is Kimsuky still active?

The FBI FLASH of 8 January 2026 reports Kimsuky campaigns in May and June 2025, and MITRE last updated its group page on 31 July 2026.

What should we do first?

Set DMARC to quarantine or reject, require phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication on email and remote access, and tell staff to check unknown contacts by phone or video before opening files or scanning QR codes.

How do we report suspected targeting?

The FBI asks for a report at ic3.gov using #KimsukyCSA. South Korean organizations can contact the NIS (111), the police (182) or KISA (118).

In our research

  1. ATT&CK groups by attributed origin: what is mapped October 2026
  2. ATT&CK techniques most used across threat groups October 2026
  3. Konni (Vedalia / TA406 / Opal Sleet): North Korea’s Steady Hand in Espionage Operations March 2026
  4. How Nation-State Cyber Threats Are Evolving – Part I August 2025

Sources

  1. Kimsuky, Group G0094 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Group description, active since at least 2012, associated names, techniques, software, targets
  2. North Korean Advanced Persistent Threat Focus: Kimsuky (AA20-301A) CISA, FBI and US Cyber Command Cyber National Mission Force Supports: 27 October 2020 advisory: operating since 2012, global intelligence gathering, spearphishing, targets, mitigations
  3. Treasury Targets DPRK's International Agents and Illicit Cyber Intrusion Group US Department of the Treasury Supports: 30 November 2023 sanctions on Kimsuky, subordinate to the RGB, names, targets
  4. Joint Cyber Security Advisory on Kimsuky (web page) German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) Supports: 20 March 2023 advisory with South Korea's NIS: browser and app store campaigns, Korean and German entities
  5. Warning on KIMSUKY Cyber Actor's Recent Cyber Campaigns against Google's Browser and App Store Services BfV and South Korea's National Intelligence Service Supports: Extension and Android app methods, RGB footnote, mitigations, how to report
  6. North Korea Using Social Engineering to Enable Hacking of Think Tanks, Academia, and Media (CSA-20230601-1) FBI, US State Department and NSA with South Korea's NIS, National Police Agency and Foreign Ministry Supports: 1 June 2023 advisory: RGB, names, spearphishing methods, mitigations, reward offer
  7. [Joint press release] Targeting the hacking group Kimsuky that stole information and technology for the North Korean regime Financial Services Commission of South Korea, with other ministries Supports: 2 June 2023 South Korean sanctions designation and joint advisory
  8. North Korean Actors Exploit Weak DMARC Security Policies to Mask Spearphishing Efforts (JCSA-20240502-001) FBI, US State Department and NSA Supports: 2 May 2024 advisory: 63rd Research Center, DMARC, red flags, mitigations
  9. FBI FLASH AC-000001-MW: North Korean Kimsuky actors and malicious QR codes in spearphishing campaigns FBI Supports: 8 January 2026 alert: 2025 QR code campaigns, mitigations
  10. BabyShark (S0414) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Script-based malware linked to North Korean campaigns
  11. AppleSeed (S0622) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Backdoor used by Kimsuky against South Korean targets
  12. TRANSLATEXT (S1201) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Malicious browser extension believed used by Kimsuky
  13. KGH_SPY (S0526) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Modular reconnaissance and information stealing suite
  14. Troll Stealer (S1196) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Go-based information stealer
  15. GoBear (S1197) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Go-based backdoor with stolen certificates
  16. Gomir (S1198) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Linux backdoor variant of GoBear
  17. HTTPTroy (S9007) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Obfuscated backdoor first reported October 2025
  18. Mimikatz (S0002) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Credential dumping tool listed for the group