Threat group profile

LAPSUS$

Also known as DEV-0537, Strawberry Tempest, Lapsus Group

The US Cyber Safety Review Board describes Lapsus$ as a loosely organized, extortion-focused criminal group based mainly in the United Kingdom and Brazil, and UK and Brazilian police have made arrests in cases linked to it.

In short

The US Cyber Safety Review Board describes Lapsus$ as a loosely organized, extortion-focused criminal group based mainly in the United Kingdom and Brazil, and UK and Brazilian police have made arrests in cases linked to it. It tricked staff, used stolen logins, and stole or deleted company data.

Profile MapThreat Group
  1. Attributed OriginBased mainly in the United Kingdom and Brazil, per the US Cyber Safety Review Board
  2. Names4names in public reportsLAPSUS$ · DEV-0537 · Strawberry Tempest
  3. Sectors8named as targetsTelecommunications · Technology and software · Government
  4. Techniques14in the attack chainReconnaissance · Resource Development · Initial Access
  5. Tools7tools and malware listedMimikatz · Redline password stealer · AD Explorer

In one minute

Who they are
The US Cyber Safety Review Board (2023) describes Lapsus$ as a loosely organized, extortion-focused criminal group, based mainly in the UK and Brazil, with 8 to 10 known members as of April 2022. MITRE says it has been active since at least mid-2021.
Who they target
MITRE lists government, manufacturing, higher education, energy, healthcare, technology, telecommunications and media. The Board and a US health-sector briefing add outsourcing firms, software firms and service providers. Brazil's federal police name several federal bodies.
How they usually get in
Stolen or bought logins, calls to help desks, repeated sign-in prompts until a user approves, SIM swaps and paid insiders, as described by MITRE, the Board and the US health-sector briefing.
What stands out
The Board says Lapsus$ used no novel zero-day techniques, yet it got into well-defended firms and posted openly on Telegram. MITRE says it carried out destructive attacks without using ransomware.
What to do first
Replace SMS and phone-call sign-in codes with phishing-resistant sign-in, tighten how the help desk resets passwords, and plan for attackers who already hold valid logins.

Names

Public reports use several names for this activity.

Names used for LAPSUS$
NameWhere it appears
LAPSUS$ MITRE ATT&CK G1004 (group name); US Cyber Safety Review Board report[1, 2]
DEV-0537 MITRE ATT&CK (Associated Groups)[1]
Strawberry Tempest MITRE ATT&CK (Associated Groups)[1]
Lapsus Group Brazilian Federal Police statement of 19 October 2022[6]

Who says so

Attribution is a judgment by the body named. It is shown here as attributed, not as proven fact.

  • MITRE ATT&CK Page version 2.1, last modified 31 July 2026

    Describes LAPSUS$ as a cyber criminal threat group active since at least mid-2021, specializing in social engineering and extortion, including destructive attacks without ransomware.[1]

  • Brazilian Federal Police 16 August 2022

    Opened an inquiry on 10 December 2021 after the Ministry of Health cloud was attacked. Launched Operation Dark Cloud against a transnational criminal organization.[7]

  • Brazilian Federal Police 19 October 2022

    Arrested the main Brazilian suspect of belonging to the transnational criminal organization it calls LAPSUS GROUP, and named it as responsible for attacks on federal bodies and companies.[6]

  • US Healthcare Sector Cybersecurity Coordination Center (HHS) 7 April 2022

    Said members are believed to be from Portugal and Latin America, possibly teenagers and young adults, and that the health sector is within their scope.[4]

  • City of London Police 1 April 2022

    Charged two teenagers in connection with an investigation into a hacking group. The Cyber Safety Review Board links this to Lapsus$.[2, 5]

  • US Cyber Safety Review Board (DHS) Report dated 24 July 2023, published 10 August 2023

    Described Lapsus$ as a transnational group based mainly in the UK and Brazil with 8 to 10 known members as of April 2022, and as a loosely organized group that included several juveniles.[2, 3]

  • US Cyber Safety Review Board (DHS) 24 July 2023

    Said it did not try to attribute any attack to Lapsus$ conclusively, and focused on common techniques instead.[2]

  • FBI, as cited by the Cyber Safety Review Board 24 July 2023

    Last observed Lapsus$ activity in September 2022 and assessed that the drop in activity was likely due to the arrests.[2]

  • City of London Police Commissioner, report to the Police Authority Board 7 February 2024

    Said two teenagers convicted after a City of London Police Cyber Crime Unit investigation were key players in a hacking group known as Lapsus$.[8]

Where sources differ

Sources differ on when the group started. MITRE says since at least mid-2021, the Cyber Safety Review Board says it was first tracked as a named group between September and December 2021 with forum claims from June 2021, and the US health-sector briefing says first identified around April 2020. Sources also differ on where members were based: the Board says mainly the UK and Brazil, while the US health-sector briefing says believed to be from Portugal and Latin America. The Board gives 24 March 2022 for the announcement of seven arrests, and the US health-sector briefing gives 25 March 2022. On ransoms, the FBI told the Board it found no evidence that anyone ever paid, while other experts cited by the Board saw some victims pay. On motive, the group claimed profit only, and the Board says notoriety, amusement and ideology also appear plausible.

Who they target

Sectors

  • TelecommunicationsMITRE lists telecommunications. The Board says the groups it studied used access to telecom providers to hijack one-time passcodes, and that Lapsus$ tried to reach phone accounts of FBI and Department of Defense staff through a US provider, without success.[1, 2]
  • Technology and softwareMITRE lists technology. The Board says Lapsus$ stole about 37 GB of source code from a technology company and posted it on its Telegram channel.[1, 2]
  • Outsourcing firms and service providersThe Board says the groups it studied went after business process outsourcing firms and other third-party providers to reach their customers. The US health-sector briefing lists managed service providers and call centers.[2, 4]
  • GovernmentMITRE lists government. Brazil's federal police name the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Economy and other federal bodies as hit in late 2021.[1, 6, 7]
  • HealthcareMITRE lists healthcare. The US health-sector briefing says Lapsus$ has already compromised healthcare organizations and the sector is within its scope.[1, 4]
  • Energy, manufacturing and higher educationListed by MITRE among the sectors targeted.[1]
  • MediaMITRE lists media. Brazil's federal police name a Portuguese media group among the victims.[1, 6]
  • Cryptocurrency exchangesThe US health-sector briefing lists cryptocurrency exchanges among other targets.[4]

Regions

  • BrazilBrazil's federal police describe attacks on federal bodies, a postal service and a car rental company, and an arrest in October 2022.[6, 7]
  • United Kingdom and South AmericaThe US health-sector briefing says the group initially focused on the UK and South America and was expanding globally.[4]
  • United States, Portugal and ColombiaBrazil's federal police say the transnational criminal organization it investigated targeted public and private bodies in Brazil, the United States, Portugal and Colombia.[7]

Operations timeline

Each entry is attributed to the group by the sources cited.

  1. April 2020

    Earliest date given

    The US health-sector briefing says the group was first identified around April 2020. MITRE and the Board give later dates.[1, 2, 4]

  2. June 2021

    Name seen in forums

    The Cyber Safety Review Board says some researchers saw people using the Lapsus$ name in forums to claim attacks as early as June 2021.[2]

  3. September to December 2021

    First tracked as a named group

    The Board says the threat intelligence community first tracked Lapsus$ as a named group in this period, when it first posted on its public Telegram channel and attacked South American targets.[2]

  4. December 2021

    Brazil Ministry of Health attack

    Brazil's federal police say their inquiry opened on 10 December 2021 after the Ministry of Health cloud was attacked and the intruders deleted files, data and instances. In October 2022 they tied this investigation to Lapsus Group.[6, 7]

  5. 24 March 2022

    Seven arrests

    The Board says the City of London Police released information on 24 March 2022 about the arrest of seven individuals in connection with Lapsus$. The US health-sector briefing gives 25 March.[2, 4]

  6. 29 and 30 March 2022

    Group says it is back

    The Board says Lapsus$ announced on 29 March that it was back from vacation. The last observed message on its public Telegram channel is dated 30 March 2022.[2]

  7. 1 April 2022

    Two teenagers charged

    The City of London Police say two teenagers were charged in connection with an investigation into a hacking group. The Board links this announcement to Lapsus$.[2, 5]

  8. 7 April 2022

    US health-sector briefing

    The US Healthcare Sector Cybersecurity Coordination Center briefs that the health sector is within the group's scope.[4]

  9. Mid-2022

    Nwgen Team splits off

    The Board says the financially motivated Nwgen Team split off from Lapsus$ in mid-2022.[2]

  10. 16 August 2022

    Operation Dark Cloud

    Brazil's federal police launch Operation Dark Cloud with eight search warrants in four states, against a transnational criminal organization.[7]

  11. September 2022

    Last activity seen

    The Board says the FBI last observed Lapsus$ activity in September 2022 and that the group appears inactive after that.[2]

  12. 22 September 2022

    Arrest in the UK

    The Board says the City of London Police arrested a teenager on suspicion of hacking as part of a National Crime Agency investigation. The announcement gave no details.[2]

  13. 19 October 2022

    Arrest in Brazil

    Brazil's federal police arrest the main Brazilian suspect of belonging to the organization it calls LAPSUS GROUP, as a follow-up to Operation Dark Cloud.[6]

  14. 10 August 2023

    Review board report published

    CISA publishes the Cyber Safety Review Board report, dated 24 July 2023.[2, 3]

  15. 7 February 2024

    Convictions reported

    The City of London Police Commissioner told the Police Authority Board that two convicted teenagers were key players in a hacking group known as Lapsus$, after an investigation by its Cyber Crime Unit.[8]

Government actions

Indictments, sanctions and advisories that name the group or its alleged members.

Government actions about LAPSUS$
DateWhoWhat
24 March 2022 City of London Police ArrestsReleased information on the arrest of seven individuals in connection with Lapsus$, as reported by the Cyber Safety Review Board.[2]
1 April 2022 City of London Police ChargesTwo teenagers charged with unauthorized access to a computer and fraud by false representation, among other counts. Reporting restrictions apply to their identities.[5]
7 April 2022 US Healthcare Sector Cybersecurity Coordination Center (HHS) Threat briefingBriefed health-sector organizations on Lapsus$ and advised measures such as disallowing SMS and voice sign-in approvals.[4]
16 August 2022 Brazilian Federal Police OperationOperation Dark Cloud: eight search warrants in four states over attacks on federal bodies including the Ministry of Health.[7]
22 September 2022 City of London Police with the National Crime Agency ArrestArrested a teenager on suspicion of hacking. The Board says the announcement gave no details about the investigation.[2]
19 October 2022 Brazilian Federal Police ArrestArrested the main Brazilian suspect of belonging to the organization it calls LAPSUS GROUP. The police list organized crime and unauthorized access to computer devices among the offenses investigated.[6]
24 July 2023 US Cyber Safety Review Board (DHS) Review reportReport on the attacks associated with Lapsus$ and related groups, published by CISA on 10 August 2023.[2, 3]
7 February 2024 City of London Police, report to the Police Authority Board Convictions reportedReported that an investigation led by its Cyber Crime Unit, supported by the National Crime Agency and the FBI, led to convictions for fraud, Computer Misuse Act offenses and blackmail.[8]

How they get in

Techniques reported for this group, by MITRE ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

  • Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Voice T1598.004

    MITRE says the group called victims' help desks to persuade staff to reset a privileged account's credentials.[1]

Resource Development

  • Compromise Accounts: Email Accounts T1586.002

    MITRE says the group paid employees, suppliers and business partners of target organizations for credentials.[1, 4]

Initial Access

  • Valid Accounts T1078

    MITRE says the group used compromised credentials or session tokens to get into a victim's VPN, VDI, RDP and identity systems.[1]

  • Trusted Relationship T1199

    MITRE says the group accessed internet-facing identity providers to target specific organizations.[1]

  • SIM Card Swap T1451

    MITRE lists SIM swapping against victims' mobile devices. The Board says SIM swaps gave attackers initial access in several instances among the groups it studied.[1, 2]

Persistence

  • Create Account: Cloud Account T1136.003

    MITRE says the group created global admin accounts in the victim's cloud to keep access.[1]

Privilege Escalation

  • Exploitation for Privilege Escalation T1068

    MITRE says the group exploited unpatched JIRA, GitLab and Confluence servers inside the network.[1]

Credential Access

  • Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation T1621

    MITRE says the group spammed users with sign-in prompts hoping one would approve.[1, 4]

  • OS Credential Dumping: NTDS T1003.003

    MITRE says the group used the built-in Windows tool ntdsutil to extract the Active Directory database.[1]

Collection

  • Data from Information Repositories: Code Repositories T1213.003

    MITRE says the group searched code repositories such as GitLab and GitHub for high-privilege credentials.[1]

Impact

  • Data Destruction T1485

    MITRE says the group deleted the target's systems and resources, on premises and in the cloud.[1]

  • Account Access Removal T1531

    MITRE says the group removed a victim's global admin accounts to lock the organization out.[1]

Stealth

  • Social Engineering: Impersonation T1684.001

    MITRE says the group called help desks and impersonated real users with information it had gathered.[1]

Defense Impairment

  • Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Delete Cloud Instance T1578.003

    MITRE says the group deleted cloud systems to trigger the victim's incident response.[1, 4]

Tools and malware

  • Mimikatz Credential dumper

    Listed in MITRE's software table for the group. MITRE describes it as a tool that can obtain plaintext Windows logins and passwords.[1, 4, 9]

  • Redline password stealer Information-stealing malware

    MITRE says the group acquired and used it to obtain passwords and session tokens.[1, 4]

  • AD Explorer Active Directory browsing tool

    MITRE says the group used it to list users and groups on a victim's network.[1, 4]

  • RVTools Virtual machine inventory tool

    MITRE says the group obtained it for its operations.[1]

  • ntdsutil Built-in Windows utility

    MITRE says the group used it to extract the Active Directory database.[1]

  • Remote management software Legitimate remote access tools

    MITRE says insiders were recruited to install remote management software so the group could control an authenticated system.[1]

  • Commercial VPN services Anonymizing service

    The Board says the groups it studied used commercial VPN services to appear close to their targets and avoid impossible-travel alerts.[2]

Detection and defense

  1. Move off SMS and voice sign-in codes

    The Board recommends moving away from voice and SMS based multi-factor authentication. The US health-sector briefing says to disallow text, SMS push, secondary email and voice approvals.

    Counters T1451 T1621 T1111

  2. Use app or token based, phishing-resistant sign-in

    The Board found organizations using application or token based multi-factor authentication were especially resilient.

    Counters T1078 T1621

  3. Train and test staff, including the help desk

    The US health-sector briefing advises adequate training and testing programs. The Board describes attackers calling support desks to get credentials reset.

    Counters T1598.004 T1684.001

  4. Include outsourcing firms and suppliers in your plans

    The Board says planning must extend to third-party suppliers, including outsourcing firms, and that attackers went after them to reach customers.

    Counters T1199 T1586.002

  5. Keep passwords and keys out of wikis, chat and code

    The Board lists improperly stored credentials as a common route to higher privileges. Remove them from code repositories and shared pages.

    Counters T1213.003 T1078

  6. Apply zero trust and watch for new admin accounts

    The US health-sector briefing advises zero trust to limit insiders. The Board found fast detection of suspicious account activity helped.

    Counters T1136.003 T1068 T1003.003

  7. Prepare out-of-band incident communications

    The Board says some victims coordinated response through channels the attackers could not watch. Lapsus$ was known to join incident response channels.

    Counters T1485 T1531 T1578.003

  8. Keep tested backups

    The US health-sector briefing advises backing up critical data using the 3-2-1 rule, since the group deleted systems.

    Counters T1485 T1578.003

What Brandefense can do

  • Dark Web Monitoring

    Watch for company logins and session tokens offered for sale, since MITRE and the Board describe the group buying credentials.

  • Cyber Threat Intelligence

    Follow what the government sources report about this group and check your sign-in, help desk and SIM-swap controls against it.

  • Executive Protection

    Help leaders and staff find exposed personal accounts and details, since MITRE says the group gathered employee personal email addresses.

  • Phishing Monitoring & Domain Abuse

    Find look-alike domains and fake sign-in pages, since the Board describes spoofed sites and text messages used to harvest logins.

Questions

Who is Lapsus$?

The US Cyber Safety Review Board describes it as a loosely organized, extortion-focused criminal group based mainly in the UK and Brazil. MITRE says it has been active since at least mid-2021.

Are they still active?

The Board says the FBI last observed activity in September 2022 and that the group appears inactive after that, but it cannot rule out members joining other groups or rebranding. We found no later government report of activity under this name.

Who do they target?

MITRE lists government, manufacturing, higher education, energy, healthcare, technology, telecommunications and media. The Board adds outsourcing firms and telecom providers.

How do they get in?

Mostly by tricking people and using logins: stolen or bought credentials, calls to help desks, repeated sign-in prompts, SIM swaps and paid insiders. The Board says Lapsus$ used no novel zero-day techniques.

Were people arrested?

The City of London Police announced arrests in March 2022 and charges against two teenagers in April 2022. Brazil's federal police arrested a suspect in October 2022. A February 2024 police report describes two convicted teenagers as key players in Lapsus$.

What should I do first?

Replace SMS and voice sign-in codes with phishing-resistant sign-in, tighten help desk password resets, and keep tested backups.

In our research

  1. The Leak Site Got Breached: What ShinyHunters’ Takeover of Clop Means for the Companies Listed on It September 2026
  2. Cybersecurity Trends in 2023: What You Need to Know April 2023
  3. Top Ransomware Groups and Monitoring Techniques July 2022

Sources

  1. LAPSUS$ (Group G1004) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Group description, associated names, since mid-2021, techniques, software
  2. Review of the Attacks Associated with Lapsus$ and Related Threat Groups US Department of Homeland Security, Cyber Safety Review Board (published by CISA) Supports: Membership, location, timeline, techniques, arrests, related groups, recommendations
  3. Review Of The Attacks Associated with Lapsus$ And Related Threat Groups Report CISA Supports: Publication date of the Board report, 10 August 2023
  4. Lapsus$ and the Health Sector US Department of Health and Human Services, Healthcare Sector Cybersecurity Coordination Center (HC3) Supports: Health-sector briefing of 7 April 2022: profile, methods, mitigations
  5. Two teenagers charged in connection with investigation into hacking group City of London Police Supports: Charges announced 1 April 2022
  6. PF prende brasileiro suspeito de integrar organização criminosa internacional Polícia Federal (Brazil) Supports: Arrest of 19 October 2022, victims, offences investigated
  7. PF realiza operação para apurar ataques a sites do Governo Federal Polícia Federal (Brazil) Supports: Operation Dark Cloud of 16 August 2022, Ministry of Health attack, targeted countries
  8. Commissioner's Update, Pol 12-24 City of London Corporation, Police Authority Board Supports: Convictions described as key players in Lapsus$, 7 February 2024
  9. Mimikatz (S0002) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Description of Mimikatz
  10. SIM Card Swap, Technique T1451 (Mobile) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Technique name and id, and MITRE's statement that LAPSUS$ used SIM swapping
  11. Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation, Technique T1621 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Technique name and id, and MITRE's statement that LAPSUS$ spammed users with MFA prompts
  12. Social Engineering: Impersonation, Sub-technique T1684.001 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Technique name and id, and MITRE's statement that LAPSUS$ impersonated users when calling help desks
  13. Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Voice, Sub-technique T1598.004 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Technique name and id, and MITRE's statement that LAPSUS$ called help desks to get credentials reset
  14. Create Account: Cloud Account, Sub-technique T1136.003 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Technique name and id, and MITRE's statement that LAPSUS$ created global admin cloud accounts