Also known as Earth Vetala, MERCURY, Static Kitten
Attributed by MITRE ATT&CK, the FBI, CISA, NCSC-UK and the US Treasury to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), this group is described as running cyber espionage against telecommunications, defense, local government and oil and gas organizations.
Attributed by MITRE ATT&CK, the FBI, CISA, NCSC-UK and the US Treasury to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), this group is described as running cyber espionage against telecommunications, defense, local government and oil and gas organizations. The 2022 joint advisory says it gets in by spearphishing and known software flaws, and shares access with other actors.
Last updated 9 October 2026
Profile MapThreat Group
Attributed OriginIran
Names9names in public reportsMuddyWater · Earth Vetala · MERCURY
Sectors9named as targetsEnergy organizations · Financial organizations · Email targets
Techniques13in the attack chainResource Development · Initial Access · Execution
Tools9tools and malware listedPOWERSTATS · PowGoop · Small Sieve
In one minute
Who they are
MITRE ATT&CK describes MuddyWater as a cyber espionage group assessed to be part of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). The FBI, CISA, CNMF and NCSC-UK said so in advisory AA22-055A on 24 February 2022, and the US Treasury repeated it on 9 September 2022.
Who they target
Government and private organizations in telecommunications, defense, local government, and oil and natural gas, in Asia, Africa, Europe and North America. MITRE adds finance, the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
How they usually get in
Spearphishing emails with attachments or links, including from compromised third-party accounts, and known flaws such as Exchange CVE-2020-0688 and Netlogon CVE-2020-1472.
What stands out
The advisory says the group can pass stolen data and access to the Iranian government and share them with other malicious actors, and that it deploys ransomware. MITRE says it uses legitimate remote management tools and, in late 2025 and early 2026, satellite internet for command and control.
What to do first
Patch known exploited flaws on mail and domain servers, require multifactor authentication for webmail and VPN, and train staff to report phishing, as the advisory advises.
Names
Public reports use several names for this activity.
Attribution is a judgment by the body named. It is shown here as attributed, not as proven fact.
MITRE ATT&CKGroup page last modified 31 July 2026
Describes MuddyWater as a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1]
FBI, CISA, CNMF and NCSC-UK24 February 2022
Said MuddyWater is a subordinate element within MOIS, with broad campaigns in support of MOIS objectives since approximately 2018.[2]
US National Security Agency24 February 2022
Said it agrees with the attribution and the details in advisory AA22-055A.[2]
CISA24 February 2022
Alert said MuddyWater is conducting cyber espionage and other malicious cyber operations as part of MOIS.[3]
UK and US cybersecurity agencies24 February 2022
Attribute the Small Sieve malware to MuddyWater with high confidence.[2]
CISA, FBI, CNMF, NCSC-UK and NSA24 February 2022
Released a malware report on 23 files identified as MuddyWater tools.[4, 5]
UK NCSC24 February 2022
Published the joint advisory notice and a Small Sieve malware analysis report on MuddyWater malware.[7]
US Department of the Treasury9 September 2022
Said the US identified MuddyWater earlier in 2022 as a subordinate element within MOIS.[6]
US Department of the Treasury9 September 2022
Said that as recently as November 2021 MuddyWater was assessed to be in a campaign against Turkish government entities.[6]
Where sources differ
Sources differ on when the activity began. MITRE ATT&CK says since at least 2017. Advisory AA22-055A and the US Treasury say broad campaigns since approximately 2018. Sources also differ on names: the advisory lists five other names for the group, while MITRE lists eight. On ransomware, the advisory and the Treasury say MuddyWater actors are known to deploy it, while MITRE does not describe ransomware but says the group tried to send data to cloud storage using Rclone. MITRE describes the group as "assessed to be" part of MOIS, a cautious wording, while the advisory states the link directly.
Who they target
Sectors
Government and private-sector organizationsThe advisory and MITRE list telecommunications among the sectors targeted.[1, 2]
Government and private-sector organizationsThe advisory and MITRE list defense among the sectors targeted.[1, 2]
Government and private-sector organizationsThe advisory and MITRE list local government among the sectors targeted.[1, 2]
Energy organizationsThe advisory and MITRE list oil and natural gas among the sectors targeted.[1, 2]
Financial organizationsMITRE lists finance among the sectors targeted. The advisory does not.[1]
Email targetsThe advisory table says the group specifically targeted government agency employees with spearphishing emails.[2]
Turkish government entitiesThe Treasury says MuddyWater was assessed to be in a campaign against Turkish government entities as recently as November 2021.[6]
UAE and Saudi ArabiaMITRE names the UAE and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East.[1]
RegionsThe advisory and MITRE list these regions.[1, 2]
Regions
United Arab EmiratesMITRE ATT&CK says MuddyWater has targeted government and private organizations in telecommunications, local government, finance, defense, and oil and natural gas in the Middle East, specifically the UAE and Saudi Arabia.[1]
Saudi ArabiaMITRE says MuddyWater has targeted telecommunications, local government, finance, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations in the Middle East, specifically the UAE and Saudi Arabia.[1]
Operations timeline
Each entry is attributed to the group by the sources cited.
Since at least 2017
Targeting begins
MITRE says MuddyWater has targeted government and private organizations since at least 2017.[1]
Approximately 2018
Broad campaigns for MOIS
The advisory and the Treasury say the group has run broad campaigns in support of MOIS objectives since approximately 2018.[2, 6]
November 2021
Turkish government campaign
The Treasury says MuddyWater was assessed to be involved in a campaign targeting Turkish government entities.[6]
Possibly since November 2021
STARWHALE backdoor
MITRE says STARWHALE has been used by MuddyWater, possibly since at least November 2021.[12]
12 January 2022
CNMF note on malware
MITRE lists a US Cyber Command Cyber National Mission Force note of this date on the Iranian intelligence malware suite.[1]
January 2022
Small Sieve and Mori
MITRE says MuddyWater has used the Small Sieve and Mori backdoors since at least this month.[10, 11]
24 February 2022
Joint advisory
Five US and UK agencies published advisory AA22-055A and a malware report on 23 files.[2, 4, 5]
9 September 2022
Treasury sanctions MOIS
The Treasury designated MOIS and its minister and repeated the MuddyWater identification.[6]
Mid-2025
Tsundere botnet reported
MITRE says the botnet was first reported in mid-2025 and that its DinDoor variant has been linked to MuddyWater.[16]
October 2025
Reused domains
MITRE says MuddyWater has reused domains dating back to this month.[1]
Late 2025 to early 2026
Starlink for command and control
MITRE says the group used satellite internet (Starlink) for command and control.[1]
Government actions
Indictments, sanctions and advisories that name the group or its alleged members.
Government actions about MuddyWater
Date
Who
What
24 February 2022
CISA, FBI, CNMF, NCSC-UK, NSA
Joint advisory AA22-055ADescribed MuddyWater activity, tools and indicators, and listed mitigations.[2, 3]
24 February 2022
CISA, FBI, CNMF, NCSC-UK, NSA
Malware analysis reportAnalyzed 23 files identified as MuddyWater tools.[4, 5]
24 February 2022
UK NCSC
Malware analysis reportPublished a Small Sieve report with the joint advisory.[7]
9 September 2022
US Department of the Treasury
SanctionsDesignated MOIS and its minister under Executive Order 13694. MuddyWater is named as a MOIS element, not as a designated party.[6]
How they get in
Techniques reported for this group, by MITRE ATT&CK tactic.
Follow what governments and MITRE report about this group and compare its techniques with your own controls.
Questions
Who is MuddyWater?
MITRE ATT&CK describes it as a cyber espionage group assessed to be part of Iran's MOIS. The FBI, CISA, CNMF, NCSC-UK and NSA said so in advisory AA22-055A on 24 February 2022.
Are they still active?
MITRE, on a page last modified 31 July 2026, says the group used satellite internet for command and control in late 2025 and early 2026.
Who do they target?
The advisory lists telecommunications, defense, local government and oil and natural gas in Asia, Africa, Europe and North America. MITRE adds finance and the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
How do they get in?
Spearphishing emails, often from compromised accounts, and known flaws such as Exchange CVE-2020-0688 and Netlogon CVE-2020-1472.
Do they use ransomware?
The advisory and the US Treasury both say MuddyWater actors are known to deploy ransomware.
What should we do first?
Patch known exploited flaws, turn on multifactor authentication for webmail and VPN, and train staff on phishing.
Attributed by the US, UK and South Korean governments to North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau, Andariel is described in a July 2024 joint advisory as stealing defense, aerospace and nuclear secrets and funding that work with ransomware against US healthcare. MITRE ATT&CK describes it as a sub-set of Lazarus Group; the advisory does not use that term.
Attributed by the US, UK and South Korean governments, and MITRE ATT&CK
APT-C-60 is the name JPCERT/CC uses for a threat group it says likely carried out spear-phishing attacks on organizations in Japan from August 2024, using fake job-applicant emails and a backdoor called SpyGlace. No government or MITRE source opened for this page says who is behind it.
Also known as Comment Crew · Comment Panda · Comment Group
Attributed by MITRE ATT&CK to PLA Unit 61398 in China, APT1 is the subject of a US indictment of 19 May 2014 charging five Unit 61398 officers with hacking six US organizations. The Department of Justice alleges the aim was commercial gain for China's state-owned firms.
Attributed by the US Department of Justice (indictment of 19 May 2014) and MITRE ATT&CK
Explore 2025 nation-state cyber threats. Learn how APT groups like Mustang Panda, Sandworm, OilRig and Lazarus operate, and how to prepare your defenses.