Attributed by MITRE ATT&CK as a suspected Indian threat actor group active since at least 2012, SideWinder is reported by the national CERTs of Pakistan and Bangladesh, CERT-EU and ENISA to send spearphishing emails to government, military and diplomatic bodies, mainly in South Asia.
Attributed by MITRE ATT&CK as a suspected Indian threat actor group active since at least 2012, SideWinder is reported by the national CERTs of Pakistan and Bangladesh, CERT-EU and ENISA to send spearphishing emails to government, military and diplomatic bodies, mainly in South Asia. Sources differ on how sure they are about the India link, and none names a sponsor.
Last updated 9 October 2026
Profile MapThreat Group
Attributed OriginIndia
Names6names in public reportsSidewinder · T-APT-04 · Rattlesnake
Sectors10named as targetsHighest executive offices · Mediterranean and Indian Ocean · EU embassies
Techniques12in the attack chainReconnaissance · Initial Access · Execution
Tools10tools and malware listedKoadic · WarHaw · Script loaders
In one minute
Who they are
MITRE ATT&CK describes SideWinder as a suspected Indian threat actor group, active since at least 2012. Where sources hedge (MITRE, the Bangladesh CERT, CERT-EU) India is named only as suspected or linked; Pakistan's NTISB states it plainly. No source names an agency, unit or person.
Who they target
Government, military and diplomatic bodies, mainly in Pakistan and Bangladesh, also Sri Lanka and Nepal. CERT-EU reports ports and maritime facilities in 2024, and ENISA reports EU embassies.
How they usually get in
Spearphishing emails with attachments or links. In 2026 the Bangladesh CERT describes Word and PDF files from lookalike government domains that load remote content and use Office flaws from 2017.
What stands out
Reported lures copy the target country's own ministries, and 2017-era Office flaws are still used. Most government detail comes from Pakistan and Bangladesh, which are among the countries it is said to target, and no charges, sanctions or named sponsor were found.
What to do first
Patch old Microsoft Office, stop Office loading remote templates automatically, and check the real sending domain of government-themed emails.
Names
Public reports use several names for this activity.
Attribution is a judgment by the body named. It is shown here as attributed, not as proven fact.
MITRE ATT&CKpage last modified 31 July 2026
Describes SideWinder as a suspected Indian threat actor group, active since at least 2012.[1]
Pakistan NTISBundated (filed under 2022)
Advisory 54 calls Sidewinder an Indian APT group, present since 2012. It says APTs are usually state sponsored and gives Sidewinder as an example, but names no agency.[3]
Pakistan National CERTundated (file 24-8)
Calls a campaign against government bodies one "believed to be associated with" Sidewinder. The text names no country behind it.[4]
Bangladesh national CERT4 January 2024
Alert on a phishing campaign against Bangladeshi armed forces and police. Calls the group a "prolific nation-state group" active since at least 2012, with no country named in the text.[5]
CERT-EUOctober 2022
Cyber Security Brief counts "1 Indian (codenamed SideWinder)" among state-linked actors and calls it "India-linked".[8]
CERT-EUJuly 2024
Says SideWinder is "believed to originate from India" and aimed at espionage and intelligence gathering.[9]
BSI (Germany)14 April 2026
Lists "Sidewinder / Razor Tiger" among groups active against Germany or other European countries in the last two years. Gives no origin.[11]
ENISAOctober 2025
Counts SideWinder among "India-nexus" intrusion sets and assesses its EU lures as likely reflecting India's interest in EU policy positions.[10]
Bangladesh national CERT30 July 2026
Describes SideWinder as having "suspected India-nexus affiliations" and assesses further targeting of Bangladesh as high likelihood.[6]
Bangladesh national CERT17 September 2026
Says evidence from a newly found server "does not conclusively establish attribution to SideWinder or a state sponsor".[7]
Where sources differ
Sources differ in how sure they sound. MITRE says "suspected Indian". Pakistan's NTISB says "Indian APT group" without hedging. The Bangladesh CERT said "nation-state group" with no country in January 2024, then "suspected India-nexus affiliations" in July 2026. CERT-EU says "India-linked" in 2022 and "believed to originate from India" in 2024, ENISA says "India-nexus", and BSI gives no origin. No source names an agency, unit or person. Pakistan and Bangladesh are also among the countries the group is said to target. On 17 September 2026 the Bangladesh CERT said evidence from one newly found server did not conclusively tie it to SideWinder or a state sponsor.
Who they target
Sectors
Critical government departmentsPakistan's NTISB says its incident analysis found Sidewinder footprints in critical government departments, and that it posed as NADRA and the Pakistan Air Force.[3]
Highest executive officesA Pakistan National CERT advisory describes phishing PDFs themed around the highest executive offices and ministries.[4]
Armed Forces Division and law enforcementThe Bangladesh CERT alert of 4 January 2024 names these as targets of an ongoing phishing campaign.[5]
At least nine government bodiesThe Bangladesh CERT says the 2026 campaign impersonates at least nine government entities and assesses further targeting as high likelihood.[6]
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, PakistanThe Bangladesh CERT says 2026 lookalike domains mimic government entities in these four countries.[6]
Pakistan, China, Nepal, AfghanistanMITRE says the group targets these sectors throughout Asia, mainly in these four countries.[1]
Mediterranean and Indian OceanCERT-EU (July 2024) reports spearphishing of port and maritime facilities in early 2024 in Pakistan, Egypt, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal and the Maldives.[9]
EU embassiesENISA says SideWinder emerged in the EU in Q2 2024 with a focus on diplomatic entities and governmental organizations, notably embassies.[10]
Health, telecoms, finance, mediaThe January 2024 alert lists healthcare, telecommunication, financial institutions and news and media among target sectors.[5]
Administration of the StateBSI lists the group against the sector "Administration of the State and the economic and social policy of the community".[11]
Regions
PakistanMITRE ATT&CK says Sidewinder has been observed targeting government, military and business entities throughout Asia, primarily focusing on Pakistan, China, Nepal and Afghanistan.[1]
Operations timeline
Each entry is attributed to the group by the sources cited.
2012
Active since at least
MITRE says the group has been active since at least 2012. Pakistan's NTISB and the Bangladesh CERT give the same year.[1, 3, 5]
27 January 2021
MITRE page created
MITRE created the SideWinder group page on this date.[1]
2018
Comes to public notice
Pakistan's NTISB says the group came into limelight in 2018 when researchers identified its methods.[3]
October 2022
WarHaw malware
CERT-EU reports the India-linked SideWinder using a new malware called WarHaw against Pakistan.[8]
4 January 2024
Phishing against Bangladesh
The Bangladesh CERT warns of an ongoing campaign against the Armed Forces Division and law enforcement agencies.[5]
Early 2024
Ports and maritime targeting
CERT-EU (July 2024) says spearphishing hit port and maritime facilities in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean.[9]
Q2 2024
Appears in the EU
ENISA says SideWinder began operating in the EU in Q2 2024, mainly against embassies.[10]
2024 to 2025
Sustained interest in Bangladesh
The Bangladesh CERT cites earlier 2024 to 2025 activity against Bangladeshi defense, finance, telecoms and police bodies.[6]
October 2025
EU report
ENISA calls SideWinder a newcomer among the most active state-nexus groups in the EU.[10]
14 April 2026
Listed by BSI
BSI lists Sidewinder / Razor Tiger as active against Germany or other European countries in the last two years.[11]
21 April 2026
Lookalike domain campaign starts
The Bangladesh CERT says 11 parent domains and more than 60 subdomains mimicking government bodies were set up between this date and 28 July.[6]
28 July 2026
Campaign still running
The Bangladesh CERT says the campaign was ongoing at the time of writing; advisory published 30 July 2026.[6]
31 July 2026
MITRE page updated
MITRE shows the group page last modified on this date.[1]
15 September 2026
Exposed server found
The Bangladesh CERT reports an exposed server of suspected SideWinder-associated infrastructure, but says evidence does not conclusively establish attribution.[7]
Government actions
Indictments, sanctions and advisories that name the group or its alleged members.
Government actions about SideWinder
Date
Who
What
October 2022
CERT-EU
Threat briefCyber Security Brief names SideWinder as an India-linked actor using WarHaw against Pakistan.[8]
undated (filed under 2022)
Pakistan NTISB
AdvisoryAdvisory No. 54 profiles Sidewinder and lists prevention steps such as multi-factor authentication and checking senders by a second channel.[3]
4 January 2024
Bangladesh national CERT
AlertWarns of a phishing campaign against Bangladeshi armed forces and police.[5]
July 2024
CERT-EU
Threat briefCyber Security Brief 24-08 reports port and maritime targeting.[9]
undated (file 24-8)
Pakistan National CERT
AdvisoryAdvisory NCA-08.051324 on PDF lures themed on the highest offices, with mitigations.[4]
October 2025
ENISA
Threat reportNames SideWinder among India-nexus groups active against the EU.[10]
14 April 2026
BSI (Germany)
Public listLists Sidewinder / Razor Tiger among active APT groups relevant to Germany.[11]
30 July 2026
Bangladesh national CERT
AdvisoryDescribes the 2026 lookalike domain campaign and recommends patching Office and blocking the domains.[6]
17 September 2026
Bangladesh national CERT
AdvisoryTreats a newly found server as a hunting lead and says attribution is not established.[7]
31 July 2026
MITRE ATT&CK
Group page updateG0121 page version 1.2 shows its last modification as 31 July 2026.[1]
How they get in
Techniques reported for this group, by MITRE ATT&CK tactic.
Reconnaissance
Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Link T1598.003 ↗
MITRE lists emails with links to credential harvesting websites; the Bangladesh CERT describes fake government and webmail log-in pages.[1, 6]
Turn off automatic fetching of remote templates and linked data in Office through Group Policy, and use Protected View for documents from the internet.
Quarantine and sandbox DOCX and PDF files that reach out to outside servers, filter email attachments, and do not treat a PDF as safer than a Word file.
Alert on new domains that copy government names or use punycode (xn--), and block known lookalike domains; MITRE also lists browser protection against homograph links.
Use multi-factor authentication on mail systems and change administrator passwords regularly, since the group sends links to credential harvesting pages.
See fake pages and messages that use the names of senior officials, since Pakistan's National CERT describes lures themed on the highest offices.
Questions
Who is SideWinder?
MITRE ATT&CK describes it as a suspected Indian threat actor group, active since at least 2012. Pakistan's NTISB calls it an Indian APT group, and the Bangladesh CERT says "suspected India-nexus affiliations".
Who is behind it?
Sources differ in how sure they sound, and none names an agency, unit or person. Pakistan and Bangladesh, which issued the most detail, are among the countries it is said to target.
Who does it target?
Government, military and diplomatic bodies, mainly in Pakistan and Bangladesh, and also Sri Lanka and Nepal. MITRE adds China and Afghanistan. CERT-EU reports ports and maritime facilities, and ENISA reports EU embassies.
How does it get in?
Spearphishing emails with attachments or links. In 2026 the Bangladesh CERT describes Word and PDF files that load remote content and old Office flaws, sent from lookalike government domains.
Has anyone been charged or sanctioned?
None of the sources opened reports an indictment, sanction or reward.
What should I do first?
Patch old Microsoft Office, stop Office loading remote templates automatically, and check the real sending domain of government-themed emails.
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