Threat group profile

Volt Typhoon

Also known as Vanguard Panda, Voltzite, Insidious Taurus

Attributed by the US government and its Five Eyes partners to a People's Republic of China state-sponsored actor, Volt Typhoon is described in US advisories as pre-positioning inside critical infrastructure IT networks to be able to disrupt operations in a crisis.

In short

Attributed by the US government and its Five Eyes partners to a People's Republic of China state-sponsored actor, Volt Typhoon is described in US advisories as pre-positioning inside critical infrastructure IT networks to be able to disrupt operations in a crisis. MITRE says it has been active since at least 2021.

Profile MapThreat Group
  1. Attributed OriginChina
  2. Names8names in public reportsVolt Typhoon · Vanguard Panda · BRONZE SILHOUETTE
  3. Sectors10named as targetsCritical infrastructure sector · Region · Victim type
  4. Techniques14in the attack chainReconnaissance · Resource Development · Initial Access
  5. Tools7tools and malware listedKV Botnet malware · VersaMem · FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy)

In one minute

Who they are
The US government and its Five Eyes partners (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK) attribute this activity to a People's Republic of China state-sponsored actor called Volt Typhoon. MITRE says it has been active since at least 2021.
Who they target
US agencies say they confirmed compromises mainly in communications, energy, transportation, and water and wastewater organizations, including in Guam. Some victims were smaller organizations that serve larger ones.
How they usually get in
US agencies say it typically exploits known or zero-day flaws in internet-facing devices such as routers, VPNs and firewalls, then uses VPN, valid accounts and built-in Windows tools.
What stands out
US agencies assess with high confidence it is pre-positioning to reach operational technology and disrupt services, not just spy. They also say they saw signs of access kept in some victims for at least five years.
What to do first
Patch and shut off internet exposure of firewalls, VPNs and routers, keep credentials off edge devices, require phishing-resistant multi-factor sign-in, and turn on central logging.

Names

Public reports use several names for this activity.

Names used for Volt Typhoon
NameWhere it appears
Volt Typhoon MITRE ATT&CK G1017 (group name); CISA advisories AA23-144A and AA24-038A[1, 6, 7]
Vanguard Panda MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups; CISA advisory AA24-038A[1, 7]
BRONZE SILHOUETTE MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups; CISA advisory AA24-038A[1, 7]
DEV-0391 MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups; CISA advisory AA24-038A; FBI affidavit of December 2023 (a/k/a DEV-0391)[1, 7, 16]
UNC3236 MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups; CISA advisory AA24-038A[1, 7]
Voltzite MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups; CISA advisory AA24-038A[1, 7]
Insidious Taurus MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups; CISA advisory AA24-038A[1, 7]
DazedToad MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups only[1]

Who says so

Attribution is a judgment by the body named. It is shown here as attributed, not as proven fact.

  • CISA, NSA, FBI with Australian, Canadian, New Zealand and UK agencies 24 May 2023

    Issued a joint advisory on a PRC state-sponsored cyber actor "also known as Volt Typhoon". Said the actor relies on living off the land and the agencies believe the same techniques could be used against other sectors worldwide.[6]

  • US District Court, Southern District of Texas (FBI affidavit) 6 December 2023

    In a sworn FBI affidavit for a search warrant, the FBI described the KV Botnet as one form of infrastructure used by Volt Typhoon. The court issued the warrant.[16]

  • CISA and FBI 31 January 2024

    Said the PRC-sponsored Volt Typhoon group was behind recent activity against small office and home office routers, in a Secure by Design alert to router makers.[15]

  • CISA, NSA, FBI (AA24-038A) 7 February 2024

    Assessed with high confidence that Volt Typhoon is pre-positioning on IT networks to allow movement to operational technology and disruption. Said it had compromised the IT environments of several critical infrastructure organizations.[7]

  • UK National Cyber Security Centre 7 February 2024

    Said a joint advisory gave details of China state-sponsored actor Volt Typhoon, seen using living off the land techniques against US critical infrastructure. Assessed that this kind of activity is likely a threat to UK critical national infrastructure.[11]

  • CISA, NSA, FBI and partners 19 March 2024

    Published a fact sheet for leaders saying the US agencies assess the PRC-sponsored group "Volt Typhoon" is seeking to pre-position for disruptive or destructive activity.[12]

  • Canadian Centre for Cyber Security 19 March 2024

    Joined the US agencies and partners in the fact sheet for leaders on PRC state-sponsored activity such as Volt Typhoon.[14]

  • NCSC New Zealand 20 March 2024

    Said Volt Typhoon has been pre-positioning to enable disruption or destruction of critical services in a time of geopolitical tension or military conflict involving the US and its allies.[13]

  • FBI Director Christopher Wray 24 July 2024

    Told the House Judiciary Committee that the FBI and partners had identified a network of hundreds of compromised routers used by the PRC-sponsored hacking group known as Volt Typhoon, and ran a court-authorized operation against it.[17]

  • CISA Director 15 January 2025

    Wrote that the "Volt Typhoon" campaign was designed to disrupt or destroy critical infrastructure, and that CISA teams had deployed to find and remove PRC activity.[18]

  • CISA (China threat page, undated, read 9 October 2026) Page read 9 October 2026

    Names Volt Typhoon with Salt Typhoon and says CISA, NSA and FBI assess Chinese government-linked actors are positioning inside IT networks to allow movement to operational technology.[19]

  • MITRE ATT&CK Page last modified 31 July 2026

    Describes Volt Typhoon as a PRC state-sponsored actor, active since at least 2021, that mainly targets US critical infrastructure including Guam.[1]

Where sources differ

Sources differ on a few details. On the router botnet, the court warrant was issued on 6 December 2023, the FBI Director says the FBI announced the operation in January 2024, and MITRE says US law enforcement disrupted it in "early 2024". On router makers, the FBI affidavit and advisory AA24-038A name Cisco and NETGEAR, while MITRE also lists DrayTek. None of the opened sources names a PRC agency or unit behind the group.

Who they target

Sectors

  • Critical infrastructure sectorUS agencies say they confirmed compromises of IT environments mainly in the Communications sector.[7]
  • Critical infrastructure sectorUS agencies list Energy among the main sectors where compromises were seen. MITRE says the KV botnet hid links to energy and telecommunication companies.[7, 2]
  • Critical infrastructure sectorUS agencies list Transportation Systems among the main sectors where compromises were seen.[7]
  • Critical infrastructure sectorUS agencies list Water and Wastewater Systems among the main sectors where compromises were seen.[7]
  • RegionUS agencies say victims are in the continental and non-continental US and its territories, including Guam. MITRE also names victims in Guam.[7, 2]
  • Victim typeUS agencies say some victims are smaller organizations with limited cyber capability that serve larger organizations or key locations.[7]
  • Managed service and internet service providersMITRE says the June to August 2024 Versa Director campaign went after credentials on servers at these providers to reach their clients.[3, 5]
  • Network devicesThe FBI affidavit and advisory AA24-038A describe infected end-of-life routers used as relays, mainly from Cisco and NETGEAR.[16, 7]
  • PeopleUS agencies say the group studies key network and IT staff and has targeted their personal email and browser data.[7, 1]
  • RegionCanada's agency assesses the direct threat there is likely lower than to the US. Australia and New Zealand assess their infrastructure could be vulnerable. The UK NCSC assesses living off the land activity is likely a threat to UK infrastructure.[7, 11]

Regions

  • United StatesPRC state-sponsored actors pre-position on IT networks of US critical infrastructure (communications, energy, transportation, water), including in Guam. Authoring agencies confirmed compromises.[7]

Operations timeline

Each entry is attributed to the group by the sources cited.

  1. At least 2021

    Activity period starts

    MITRE describes the group as active since at least 2021.[1]

  2. October 2022

    KV botnet activity first seen

    MITRE gives October 2022 as the first sighting of the KV botnet campaign, which used end-of-life routers to hide the group's connections.[2]

  3. 24 May 2023

    First joint advisory

    US, Australian, Canadian, New Zealand and UK agencies publish AA23-144A on the actor known as Volt Typhoon and its use of built-in Windows tools.[6]

  4. 6 December 2023

    Warrant for the router operation

    A US court issues a search and seizure warrant so the FBI can remotely delete KV botnet malware from infected US routers.[16]

  5. January 2024

    Botnet operation announced

    The FBI Director later says the FBI announced the operation in January 2024. MITRE gives January 2024 as the last sighting of the KV botnet campaign.[17, 2]

  6. 31 January 2024

    Alert to router makers

    CISA and FBI urge makers of small office and home office routers to build in better security, citing Volt Typhoon.[15]

  7. 7 February 2024

    Second joint advisory

    AA24-038A says US agencies assess with high confidence the group is pre-positioning on IT networks, and that they saw signs of access kept in some victims for at least five years.[7]

  8. 7 February 2024

    Living off the land guidance

    Joint guidance on spotting built-in tool abuse is released with the advisory.[10]

  9. 19 and 20 March 2024

    Fact sheet for leaders

    CISA, the FBI, NSA and partners including Canada and New Zealand publish advice for executives of critical infrastructure organizations.[12, 14, 13]

  10. June to August 2024

    Versa Director zero-day

    MITRE records exploitation of a zero-day flaw in Versa Director servers, followed by the VersaMem web shell.[3, 5]

  11. 24 July 2024

    FBI Director statement

    The FBI Director describes the router botnet operation to the House Judiciary Committee.[17]

  12. 15 January 2025

    CISA Director blog

    CISA describes the Volt Typhoon campaign as designed to disrupt or destroy critical infrastructure and says its teams are helping victims.[18]

  13. 2026

    CISA names the group again

    CISA's China threat page cites the 2026 ODNI Annual Threat Assessment and names Volt Typhoon with Salt Typhoon.[19]

Government actions

Indictments, sanctions and advisories that name the group or its alleged members.

Government actions about Volt Typhoon
DateWhoWhat
24 May 2023 CISA, NSA, FBI, ACSC, Canadian Cyber Centre, NCSC-NZ, NCSC-UK Joint advisoryAA23-144A on the PRC state-sponsored actor known as Volt Typhoon, with hunting and logging advice.[6]
6 December 2023 US District Court, Southern District of Texas Search and seizure warrantIssued on an FBI application so the FBI could remotely search infected US routers, delete KV botnet malware and take limited steps to stop re-infection.[16]
January 2024 FBI Court-authorized operation announcedThe FBI Director says the operation significantly disrupted the Volt Typhoon botnet and the access it gave.[17]
31 January 2024 CISA and FBI Secure by Design alertAsks router makers to improve product security, citing Volt Typhoon.[15]
7 February 2024 CISA, NSA, FBI with DOE, EPA, TSA and partners from Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK Joint advisory and guidanceAA24-038A and the living off the land guide.[7, 10]
7 February 2024 UK National Cyber Security Centre Public warningUrges UK critical infrastructure operators to follow the advice.[11]
19 March 2024 CISA, NSA, FBI and partners including the Canadian Cyber Centre Fact sheet for leadersSets out actions for executives of critical infrastructure organizations.[12, 14]
20 March 2024 NCSC New Zealand Publication of the fact sheetNCSC-NZ announces the fact sheet with ten international partners.[13]
15 January 2025 CISA Public statement on response workCISA Director says hunt and incident response teams deployed to find and remove PRC activity across sectors.[18]

How they get in

Techniques reported for this group, by MITRE ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

  • Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses T1589.002

    MITRE says the group targeted the personal emails of key network and IT staff at victims.[1, 7]

  • Gather Victim Network Information T1590

    MITRE says the group did extensive checks to learn the target's network, including its layout and security tools.[1, 7]

Resource Development

  • Compromise Infrastructure: Network Devices T1584.008

    MITRE and the advisories say compromised small office and home office routers were used to relay traffic, often near the victim.[1, 6, 7]

  • Develop Capabilities: Exploits T1587.004

    MITRE says the group has exploited zero-day flaws for initial access.[1, 3]

Initial Access

  • Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190

    The advisory says the group commonly exploits flaws in network appliances such as Fortinet, Ivanti Connect Secure, NETGEAR, Citrix and Cisco devices.[1, 7]

Execution

  • Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1059.003

    MITRE says the group used the Windows command line for hands-on-keyboard work such as discovery.[1, 7]

Persistence

  • External Remote Services T1133

    The advisory says the group often uses VPN sessions to connect to victim environments.[1, 7]

  • Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts T1078.002

    MITRE says the group relies mainly on valid credentials for persistence and has used compromised domain accounts.[1, 7]

  • Server Software Component: Web Shell T1505.003

    MITRE says the group has used web shells, including in the Versa Director campaign.[1, 3, 6]

Credential Access

  • OS Credential Dumping: NTDS T1003.003

    The advisory says the group extracts the Active Directory database from the domain controller to get password hashes.[1, 6, 7]

Lateral Movement

  • Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol T1021.001

    MITRE says the group moved to the domain controller over RDP with a compromised administrator account.[1, 7]

Command and Control

  • Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy T1090.003

    MITRE says the group used multi-hop proxies for command and control.[1, 7]

Stealth

  • System Binary Proxy Execution T1218

    MITRE says the group used built-in tools (living off the land) to keep and widen access.[1, 6, 7]

Defense Impairment

  • Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Windows Event Logs T1685.005

    MITRE says the group selectively cleared event logs to remove evidence of intrusion.[1, 6]

Tools and malware

  • KV Botnet malware Router malware

    MITRE and the FBI describe malware on infected end-of-life routers that links them into a relay network the group used to hide its connections.[2, 16]

  • VersaMem Web shell

    MITRE says it was deployed on Versa Director servers to capture credentials and run further code in the 2024 campaign.[5, 3]

  • FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy) Proxy tool

    MITRE describes FRP as an openly available tool, and the May 2023 advisory says the actor used a custom FRP client.[4, 6, 1]

  • Earthworm Proxy tool

    The May 2023 advisory and MITRE say the group used Earthworm with FRP to proxy network traffic.[6, 1]

  • Awen web shell Web shell

    MITRE says the group used a version of the Awen web shell with encrypted command traffic. The 2023 advisory says some web shells came from it.[1, 6]

  • Impacket Open-source toolkit

    MITRE lists the group as using customized versions of open-source tools such as Impacket to proxy traffic.[1]

  • Built-in Windows tools (wmic, ntdsutil, netsh, PowerShell) Living off the land

    The 2023 advisory lists these built-in tools as ones the actor uses to blend in with normal activity.[6]

Detection and defense

  1. Patch internet-facing devices first

    Patch firewalls, VPNs and routers on a risk-informed schedule. Put known exploited flaws and appliances the advisory names first.

    Counters T1190 T1133

  2. Close management pages and plan for old kit

    Do not expose management pages to the internet. Make a plan to replace devices that are past their support date.

    Counters T1190 T1584.008

  3. Keep credentials off edge devices

    Do not store credentials on edge appliances, and make sure those devices hold no accounts with domain admin rights.

    Counters T1078.002 T1003.003

  4. Use phishing-resistant multi-factor sign-in

    Require phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication for access, and use 15 character minimum passwords.

    Counters T1078.002 T1133

  5. Turn on logging and keep it off the device

    Log process creation with command lines, forward logs to a hardened central server, and investigate Event ID 1102 (log cleared).

    Counters T1685.005 T1059.003 T1218

  6. Learn what normal looks like

    Keep a baseline of installed tools, account behavior and network traffic so built-in tool abuse stands out.

    Counters T1218 T1059.003

  7. Separate operational technology from IT

    Deny all connections into the OT network by default and route needed links through a monitored firewall or jump host. Change default OT passwords.

    Counters T1021.001 T1078.002

  8. Protect IT staff and domain controllers

    Brief IT staff that their personal email is a target. Watch for ntdsutil use and audit administrator actions on domain controllers.

    Counters T1589.002 T1003.003

What Brandefense can do

  • External Attack Surface Management

    See which firewalls, VPNs, routers and management pages face the internet, the exposure the advisories ask you to reduce.

  • Cyber Threat Intelligence

    Follow what governments and MITRE report about this group and compare its listed techniques with your own controls.

  • Dark Web Monitoring

    Watch for leaked or sold company credentials, since the advisories describe the group relying on valid accounts.

  • Executive Protection

    Check for exposed personal details of IT and security staff, since the advisory says their personal email is targeted.

  • Platform

    Bring exposure, intelligence and monitoring findings into one place for your security team.

Questions

Who is Volt Typhoon?

MITRE ATT&CK describes it as a PRC state-sponsored actor active since at least 2021. The US government and its Five Eyes partners have attributed the activity to it, as shown in the 2023 and 2024 joint advisories.

What does Volt Typhoon want?

CISA, NSA and FBI assessed in February 2024, with high confidence, that the group is pre-positioning on IT networks to be able to reach operational technology and disrupt services in a crisis or conflict with the US.

Which sectors have been hit?

US agencies say they confirmed compromises mainly in Communications, Energy, Transportation Systems, and Water and Wastewater Systems, including in Guam.

How does it get in?

The advisory says it typically exploits known or zero-day flaws in public-facing network devices such as routers, VPNs and firewalls, then connects over VPN and uses valid accounts and built-in tools.

What was the KV botnet?

The FBI describes it as a network of infected end-of-life small office and home office routers, mostly Cisco and NETGEAR, used as relays to hide the group's activity. A court issued a warrant on 6 December 2023, and the FBI Director says the FBI announced the operation in January 2024.

What should we do first?

Patch and close off internet-facing devices, stop storing credentials on edge devices, require phishing-resistant multi-factor sign-in, and turn on central logging, as the February 2024 advisory advises.

In our research

  1. Akira ransomware advisory AA24-109A: stages and tools October 2026
  2. Volt Typhoon advisory AA24-038A: what CISA says October 2026
  3. ATT&CK groups by attributed origin: what is mapped October 2026
  4. Vulnerability Exploitation Trends: H1 2026: What Threat Actors Are Actually Using June 2026
  5. Living off the Land: The Cyberattack You’ll Never See Coming June 2025

Sources

  1. Volt Typhoon, Group G1017 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Group description, associated groups, active since at least 2021, techniques, software, campaigns
  2. KV Botnet Activity, Campaign C0035 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: KV botnet dates (October 2022 to January 2024), end-of-life router makers, Guam, disruption in early 2024
  3. Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation, Campaign C0039 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: June to August 2024 campaign against Versa Director servers at service providers
  4. FRP, Software S1144 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: What the Fast Reverse Proxy tool is
  5. VersaMem, Software S1154 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: VersaMem web shell used in the Versa Director campaign
  6. People's Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actor Living off the Land to Evade Detection (AA23-144A) CISA, NSA, FBI, ACSC, Canadian Cyber Centre, NCSC-NZ, NCSC-UK Supports: First joint advisory of 24 May 2023, living off the land, router relays, hunting and logging advice
  7. PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (AA24-038A) CISA, NSA, FBI with DOE, EPA, TSA, ACSC, Canadian Cyber Centre, NCSC-UK, NCSC-NZ Supports: 7 February 2024 assessment, aliases, sectors, entry methods, techniques, mitigations
  8. CISA and Partners Release Advisory on PRC-sponsored Volt Typhoon Activity and Supplemental Living Off the Land Guidance CISA Supports: 7 February 2024 release of the advisory and the guidance
  9. U.S. and International Partners Publish Cybersecurity Advisory on People's Republic of China State-Sponsored Hacking of U.S. Critical Infrastructure CISA Supports: CISA Director statement on intrusions found and removed, 7 February 2024
  10. Identifying and Mitigating Living Off the Land Techniques CISA, NSA, FBI, DOE, EPA, TSA, ACSC, Canadian Cyber Centre, NCSC-UK, NCSC-NZ Supports: Joint guidance published 7 February 2024 that draws on Volt Typhoon intrusions
  11. NCSC and partners issue warning about state-sponsored cyber attackers hiding on critical infrastructure networks UK National Cyber Security Centre Supports: UK statement of 7 February 2024
  12. CISA and Partners Release Joint Fact Sheet for Leaders on PRC-sponsored Volt Typhoon Cyber Activity CISA Supports: 19 March 2024 fact sheet for leaders
  13. Volt Typhoon activity NCSC New Zealand Supports: 20 March 2024 statement and the fact sheet with ten partners
  14. Joint guidance for executives and leaders of critical infrastructure organizations on protecting infrastructure and essential functions against PRC cyber activity Canadian Centre for Cyber Security Supports: Canadian copy of the March 2024 fact sheet
  15. Secure by Design Alert: Security Design Improvements for SOHO Device Manufacturers CISA and FBI Supports: 31 January 2024 alert on router security prompted by Volt Typhoon
  16. Affidavit in support of a search and seizure warrant, In the matter of the search of specified routers in the United States infected with KV Botnet malware (4:23-MC-5432) US District Court, Southern District of Texas, via US Department of Justice Supports: FBI account of the KV botnet, router types, planned removal of malware, warrant issued 6 December 2023
  17. Statement of Christopher A. Wray, Director, FBI, before the House Judiciary Committee, Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (24 July 2024) FBI, published by US Department of Justice Supports: FBI account of the January 2024 botnet disruption
  18. Strengthening America's Resilience Against the PRC Cyber Threats CISA Supports: CISA Director blog of 15 January 2025 on Volt Typhoon and eviction work
  19. China Threat Overview and Advisories CISA Supports: Current CISA page naming Volt Typhoon, citing the 2026 ODNI assessment
  20. System Binary Proxy Execution, Technique T1218 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Technique names and tactic wording used in the attack chain table (each technique page opened)