Anyone who installed an unpinned copy during the window had to treat their secrets as stolen. LiteLLM believes a compromised Trivy scanner was the entry point, but this is not confirmed.
What happened
On 24 March 2026, LiteLLM versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 appeared on PyPI. LiteLLM says they were not released through its normal build process. They contained code that steals credentials.
A second compromise, by a different route, hit LiteLLM 1.107.0 on 21 October 2026. See the LiteLLM October 2026 compromise profile.
The packages were live from 10:39 UTC. LiteLLM says they were up for about 40 minutes, but the same post also defines the affected window as 10:39 to 16:00 UTC. PyPI reports a total exposure of 2 hours 32 minutes. Sources differ.
LiteLLM and PyPI both say the attacker got a publishing token after an exploited Trivy dependency. LiteLLM describes this as its belief, and its investigation was still marked active when last updated. A clean version, 1.83.0, followed on 30 March 2026.
Timeline
- 24 March 2026, 10:39 UTC
LiteLLM says the malicious versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 went live on PyPI
- 24 March 2026
A user opens a public GitHub issue reporting a malicious litellm_init.pth in 1.82.8
- 24 March 2026, 15:35 UTC
The PyPA advisory record PYSEC-2026-2 is last modified at this time
- 24 March 2026
LiteLLM publishes its security update; PyPI quarantines the packages (LiteLLM: about 40 minutes live; PyPI: 2h 32m total exposure)
- 24 March 2026
LiteLLM says the affected install window ends at 16:00 UTC
- 25 March 2026
GitHub publishes advisory GHSA-5mg7-485q-xm76, rated critical, with no CVE
- 26 March 2026
CISA adds the Trivy embedded malicious code flaw (CVE-2026-33634) to its KEV Catalog
- 27 March 2026
LiteLLM adds SHA-256 checksums for audited clean releases
- 30 March 2026
LiteLLM releases clean version 1.83.0 from a new CI/CD pipeline
- 1 April 2026
CERT-EU's March Cyber Brief names TeamPCP as the actor behind the LiteLLM compromise
- 2 April 2026
PyPI publishes its incident report on LiteLLM and telnyx
- 22 July 2026
PyPI announces it rejects new files on releases older than 14 days
How the attack worked
Getting in
PyPI and the GitHub advisory say a publishing token was exposed through an exploited Trivy dependency. LiteLLM says it believes the compromise began with Trivy in its CI/CD security scanning. It also says the attacker bypassed its official workflows and uploaded straight to PyPI. This link to Trivy is LiteLLM’s belief and is not confirmed.
Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain (T1195.002) is the technique CERT-EU lists for the connected Trivy compromise.
Two different payloads
Version 1.82.7 hid a malicious payload in proxy_server.py. Version 1.82.8 did that and also added a file called litellm_init.pth, a Python startup hook (T1546.018). The PyPA advisory says the code runs when any module of the package is imported. A public issue reporter said the .pth file runs on any Python start and that 1.82.7 looked clean to them. LiteLLM says both versions were affected, so sources differ on 1.82.7.
What it stole
The code looked for environment variables, SSH keys, cloud provider credentials, Kubernetes tokens and database passwords. The PyPA advisory adds Git and Docker credentials, dotenv files, LDAP configuration, shell history and cryptowallet keys. It also tried to get cloud tokens from metadata servers and secrets from AWS Secrets Manager.
Sending and staying
Data was encrypted and sent by POST to models.litellm[.]cloud, which is not a LiteLLM domain. The advisory describes a systemd service named “System Telemetry Service” for persistence, and a new pod in Kubernetes. The persistence script contacts a second attacker domain, listed in the advisory, for further instructions.
Who says who was behind it
Who attributed it, and how firm it is
Attributed by CERT-EU, 1 April 2026 (Cyber Brief 26-04): the cybercrime actor TeamPCP compromised LiteLLM, Trivy and Telnyx packages. CERT-EU words the LiteLLM entry as "reportedly".
Attributed by CERT-EU, in its European Commission breach write-up: the Trivy compromise was "publicly attributed" to TeamPCP.
LiteLLM's own post does not name an actor. The GitHub advisory and PyPI do not name an actor in the pages opened.
The link between Trivy and LiteLLM is LiteLLM's belief and is not confirmed in its post.
Malware and vulnerabilities used
Impact
LiteLLM: versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI were affected. Official Docker proxy image users, LiteLLM Cloud users and users on 1.82.6 or earlier who did not upgrade in the window were not affected, per LiteLLM.
PyPI: the exploited versions were downloaded over 119k times. PyPI also estimates roughly 40-50% of LiteLLM installs were unpinned.
CERT-EU: approximately 500,000 devices were reportedly affected globally. This is a reported figure, and sources differ on scale.
Exposure time: LiteLLM says about 40 minutes (and also gives 10:39 to 16:00 UTC as the affected window). PyPI says 2h 32m. Sources differ.
No source opened gives named victims of stolen credentials beyond this. The advisory says anyone who installed and ran the package should assume credentials may be exposed.
Government and regulator response
- 24 March 2026, LiteLLM: removed the packages from PyPI, rotated maintainer credentials, named new maintainers and engaged an outside forensic firm. It paused all new releases.
- 24-25 March 2026, GitHub and PyPA: PYSEC-2026-2 and advisory GHSA-5mg7-485q-xm76 (critical, no CVE) were published.
- 26 March 2026, CISA: added the Trivy embedded malicious code flaw (CVE-2026-33634) to the KEV Catalog.
- 27-30 March 2026, LiteLLM: published checksums for audited clean releases, released clean 1.83.0 from a new CI/CD pipeline, and began signing Docker images with cosign.
- 2 April 2026, PyPI: published an incident report and worked with the maintainers on token rotation and Trusted Publishers. It recommends dependency cooldowns and lock files.
- 22 July 2026, PyPI: now rejects new files on releases older than 14 days. PyPI says the discussion restarted after this incident.
- 8 June 2026, CISA: added CVE-2026-42271, a LiteLLM command injection flaw, to KEV. This is a separate software flaw, not the supply chain compromise. The GitHub advisory for this incident states there is no CVE.
Lessons
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Unpinned installs spread bad releases fast
PyPI estimates roughly 40-50% of LiteLLM installs fetched the latest version each time, so a bad release reached many systems before it was caught.
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Build tools can be the way in
LiteLLM believes a compromised security scanner in its pipeline led to the break-in. A tool meant to protect the build had access to a publishing token.
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Long-lived tokens are a risk
PyPI says API tokens can be used later even if the first compromise goes unnoticed, and recommends Trusted Publishers with short-lived tokens.
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Pin references to exact versions
PyPI says the releases followed an API token exposure from an exploited Trivy dependency, and advises pinning workflow dependencies to Git commit SHAs because tags are writeable. CERT-EU also advises pinning GitHub Actions to full SHA hashes.
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Official numbers can differ
LiteLLM says about 40 minutes, PyPI says 2h 32m. Check every system that installed in a wide window, not a narrow one.
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Treat a run as full exposure
The advisory says anyone who installed and ran the package should assume credentials in that environment may be exposed and rotate them.
What to check in your own organization
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Find the versions
Search laptops, servers, containers and CI logs for litellm 1.82.7 or 1.82.8, including indirect installs pulled in by other AI tools.
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Look for the file
Check site-packages for litellm_init.pth and for a systemd service called "System Telemetry Service".
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Check network logs
Search for traffic to the attacker domains listed in the LiteLLM and PyPA advisories on 24 March 2026 and after.
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Rotate secrets
If either version ran, rotate SSH keys, cloud keys, Kubernetes tokens, database passwords and anything in environment variables.
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Pin and lock
Use lock files with hashes, and consider a cooldown before taking brand new releases, as PyPI recommends.
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Review your pipeline
Pin GitHub Actions to full SHA hashes, and replace long-lived publishing tokens with Trusted Publishers where possible.
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Early warning
Threat intelligence monitoring could watch for exposed credentials tied to your company, alerts about compromised packages you depend on, and reports naming groups like TeamPCP. Any of these might have prompted an earlier secret rotation or install freeze. This is not a promise of detection.
Where it happened
Frequently Asked Questions
Which LiteLLM versions were malicious?
Versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 on PyPI, per LiteLLM, the GitHub advisory and PyPI. One public issue reporter said 1.82.7 looked clean, so sources differ on that version.
How long were they online?
Sources differ. LiteLLM says about 40 minutes and also gives a window of 10:39 to 16:00 UTC. PyPI reports 2h 32m from upload to quarantine.
Was the official Docker image affected?
LiteLLM says customers running the official LiteLLM Proxy Docker image were not impacted, because it pins its dependencies.
Was Trivy really the cause?
LiteLLM says it believes so. PyPI and the GitHub advisory also describe an API token exposed through an exploited Trivy dependency. LiteLLM presents its own link as a belief, not a confirmed finding.
Who did it?
CERT-EU attributes the LiteLLM compromise to the cybercrime actor TeamPCP, using the word "reportedly". LiteLLM's own post names no actor.
Is there a CVE for this incident?
No. The GitHub advisory says no known CVE. CISA's June 2026 LiteLLM KEV entry (CVE-2026-42271) is a separate command injection flaw.
Sources
- Security Update: Suspected Supply Chain IncidentLiteLLM (BerriAI)
- Two LiteLLM versions published containing credential harvesting malware (GHSA-5mg7-485q-xm76)GitHub Advisory Database
- Incident Report: LiteLLM/Telnyx supply-chain attacks, with guidanceThe Python Package Index Blog (PSF)
- Releases now reject new files after 14 daysThe Python Package Index Blog (PSF)
- Cyber Brief 26-04 - March 2026CERT-EU
- European Commission cloud breach: a supply-chain compromiseCERT-EU
- CISA Adds One Known Exploited Vulnerability to Catalog (26 March 2026)CISA
- CISA Adds Two Known Exploited Vulnerabilities to Catalog (8 June 2026)CISA
