Malware profile

HOPLIGHT

HOPLIGHT is a backdoor Trojan for Windows.

In short

HOPLIGHT is a backdoor Trojan for Windows. MITRE ATT&CK says it has reportedly been used by the North Korean government. CISA and the FBI published an analysis report on it in April 2019, and a 2020 joint advisory said the US Government had found it on victim systems, which suggested a bank-targeting group was using it.

Profile MapMalware
  1. Names1names in public reportsHOPLIGHT
  2. Techniques19ATT&CK techniques listedCredential Access · Lateral Movement · Command and Control
  3. Infection Steps4in the delivery chainHook the security process · Drop a library
  4. Linked Groups2groups that use itAPT38 · Lazarus Group

In one minute

What it is
A backdoor Trojan for Windows that MITRE says has reportedly been used by the North Korean government.
What it does
Collects system details, runs commands, injects into running processes, and uploads and downloads files. Proxy applications hide its traffic behind fake TLS sessions.
Who uses it
Described by DHS and the FBI (report AR19-100A, 10 April 2019) as used by the North Korean government. Advisory AA20-239A (August 2020) says the US Government found it on victim systems, suggesting the BeagleBoyz are using it. MITRE lists APT38 and Lazarus Group.
How it gets in
No cited government source says how it first gets onto a system.
What to do first
Check systems and network logs against the indicators and YARA rules in CISA report AR19-100A (MAR-10135536-8).

What it does

The CISA and FBI analysis report covers nine malicious files. Seven are proxy applications that mask traffic between the malware and the remote operators. They can generate fake TLS handshake sessions using valid public SSL certificates, which disguises the connections.

The 2020 advisory AA20-239A adds that HOPLIGHT has the same basic remote access functions as another tool named CROWDEDFLOUNDER. It says the fraudulent TLS sessions make the malware's communications hard to detect and track.

Names

Public sources use several names for this malware.

Names
NameWhere it appears
HOPLIGHTMITRE ATT&CK software S0376, CISA analysis report AR19-100A (MAR-10135536-8) and advisory AA20-239A[1, 2, 3]

What it can do

What MITRE ATT&CK lists this malware as doing, by tactic. Each id opens our technique page where one exists, otherwise MITRE.

Credential Access

  • OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager T1003.002

    It can harvest credentials and passwords from the SAM database.[1, 2]

Lateral Movement

  • Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash T1550.002

    It has been seen loading several APIs that are tied to Pass the Hash tools.[1, 2]

Command and Control

  • Fallback Channels T1008

    It has several command channels in place in case one fails.[1]

  • Proxy T1090

    It has several proxy options that mask traffic between the malware and its operators.[1, 2]

  • Ingress Tool Transfer T1105

    It can connect to a remote host to upload and download files.[1, 2]

  • Data Encoding: Standard Encoding T1132.001

    It has used Zlib compression to obscure the content of its communications.[1, 2]

  • Non-Standard Port T1571

    It has connected outbound over TCP port 443 using a fake TLS method.[1, 2]

Exfiltration

  • Exfiltration Over C2 Channel T1041

    It has sent data out through its command channel.[1, 3]

Execution

  • Windows Management Instrumentation T1047

    It has used WMI to recompile the Managed Object Format files in the WMI repository.[1, 2]

  • Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1059.003

    It can start cmd.exe to run commands on the system.[1, 2]

  • System Services: Service Execution T1569.002

    It has used svchost.exe to run a malicious DLL.[1, 2]

Stealth

  • Process Injection T1055

    It has injected itself into running processes.[1, 2]

Persistence

  • Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription T1546.003

    It can use WMI event subscriptions to stay on the system.[1]

  • Modify Registry T1112

    It has changed Managed Object Format files in the registry to run commands and stay on the system.[1, 2]

Defense Impairment

  • Disable or Modify System Firewall T1686

    It has changed the firewall using netsh.[1, 2]

Discovery

  • Query Registry T1012

    One variant hooks lsass.exe, which then checks the registry for the value rdpproto in the Lsa key.[1, 2]

  • System Information Discovery T1082

    It has collected victim machine details such as the OS version.[1, 2]

  • File and Directory Discovery T1083

    It has listed the system drives and partitions.[1, 2]

  • Device Driver Discovery T1652

    It can list device drivers that are stored in the registry under HKLM\Software\WBEM\WDM.[1, 2]

How it spreads

No government source cited here says how HOPLIGHT first reaches a victim. The analysis report describes the files themselves: in one 64-bit variant, an executable drops a library into the System32 folder. Advisory AA20-239A says the bank-targeting group it describes selectively exploits systems after first compromising a computer connected to a financial institution's corporate network.

How an infection runs

The order of steps in a typical infection, as the sources describe it.

  1. Hook the security process

    In one analyzed 64-bit variant, the malware hooks the Windows Local Security Authority process (lsass.exe), which checks the registry for a value and adds it if it is missing.[2]

  2. Drop a library

    The malware drops an embedded library file into the System32 folder.[2]

  3. Write a data file

    A data file is then written to C:\Windows. It holds the addresses the malware calls out to.[2]

  4. Call out

    The malware attempts outbound connections to the address pairs in that file, and the dropped library sends SSL Client Hello packets to its own embedded addresses.[2]

Timeline

  1. October 2018

    FASTCash and CROWDEDFLOUNDER

    AA20-239A says analysis of CROWDEDFLOUNDER, a tool with the same basic remote access functions as HOPLIGHT, was first released in October 2018 as part of the FASTCash campaign.[3]

  2. April 10, 2019

    CISA and FBI analysis report

    MAR-10135536-8 (AR19-100A) was released as the first version of the HOPLIGHT analysis. It covers nine files and says HOPLIGHT variants are used by the North Korean government.[2]

  3. February 2020

    Bank targeting resumes

    AA20-239A says North Korea has resumed targeting banks in multiple countries since February 2020.[3]

  4. August 26, 2020

    Joint advisory AA20-239A

    CISA, Treasury, FBI and US Cyber Command published the advisory. It says the US Government has found HOPLIGHT on victim systems, suggesting the BeagleBoyz are using it.[3]

Detection and defense

  1. Use CISA's analysis report

    Report AR19-100A (MAR-10135536-8) carries indicators in a STIX file and YARA rules. Check systems and network logs against them.[2]

    Counters: T1090 T1132.001 T1571

  2. Load the indicators into your tools

    AA20-239A says to put the indicators from CISA's malware analysis reports into intrusion detection and security alert systems, to block or report suspected activity.[3]

    Counters: T1041 T1090

  3. Isolate and require MFA

    AA20-239A says to isolate payment system infrastructure and require multi-factor authentication for any user reaching the switch application server. Tying this to credential reuse is our pairing.[3]

    Counters: T1003.002 T1550.002

  4. Split the network into enclaves

    AA20-239A says to use firewalls and access control lists to divide the environment into enclaves. Tying this to lateral movement is our pairing.[3]

    Counters: T1550.002

  5. Baseline and monitor

    AA20-239A says to build a baseline of expected software, users and logons and watch for unusual software installs and account changes. Tying this to persistence is our pairing.[3]

    Counters: T1546.003 T1112 T1047

  6. Use a host firewall and trim services

    The analysis report advises a personal firewall set to deny unsolicited connection requests, and disabling unnecessary services. Tying this to the listed techniques is our pairing.[2]

    Counters: T1686 T1569.002

  7. Limit install rights and admin accounts

    The analysis report advises restricting users' ability to install and run unwanted software, and not adding users to the local administrators group unless required. Tying this to the listed techniques is our pairing.[2]

    Counters: T1055 T1003.002

Questions

What is HOPLIGHT?

MITRE ATT&CK calls it a backdoor Trojan that has reportedly been used by the North Korean government. CISA and the FBI released an analysis report on it, MAR-10135536-8, on 10 April 2019.

Who is behind HOPLIGHT?

Sources differ in detail. DHS and the FBI say the variants were used by the North Korean government. Advisory AA20-239A says the US Government found HOPLIGHT on victim systems, suggesting the BeagleBoyz group is using it, and that this group overlaps to varying degrees with groups tracked as Lazarus and APT38. MITRE lists APT38 and Lazarus Group and warns that North Korean group definitions overlap significantly.

How does HOPLIGHT hide its traffic?

CISA says seven of the nine files it analyzed are proxy applications that can generate fake TLS handshake sessions using valid public SSL certificates, which disguises the connection to the remote operators.

Where are the official detection resources?

CISA report AR19-100A (MAR-10135536-8) includes indicators in a STIX file and YARA rules. Advisory AA20-239A points to it and to other malware analysis reports.

Do the US charges against North Korean hackers mention HOPLIGHT?

Not in the Department of Justice announcements we read, from September 2018 and February 2021. Both describe the Lazarus Group and APT38 activity but do not name HOPLIGHT.

In our research

  1. The Lazarus Group: Espionage, Sabotage, and Cybercrime Under One Umbrella October 2025
  2. APT38 Threat group

Sources

  1. HOPLIGHT, Software S0376 MITRE ATT&CKSupports: Backdoor Trojan description, Windows, techniques and the groups MITRE lists.
  2. MAR-10135536-8, North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT (AR19-100A) CISASupports: Analysis of nine files, proxy and fake TLS behaviour, capabilities, variant behaviour, indicators, YARA rules and recommendations.
  3. FASTCash 2.0: North Korea's BeagleBoyz Robbing Banks (AA20-239A) CISA, Treasury, FBI and US Cyber CommandSupports: HOPLIGHT found on victim systems, overlap with other group names, and mitigations.
  4. North Korean Regime-Backed Programmer Charged With Conspiracy to Conduct Multiple Cyber Attacks and Intrusions US Department of JusticeSupports: September 2018 complaint naming the Lazarus Group.
  5. Three North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyberattacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe US Department of JusticeSupports: February 2021 indictment and the Lazarus Group and APT38 names.
  6. APT38, Group G0082 MITRE ATT&CKSupports: MITRE lists HOPLIGHT as software of APT38; notes on group overlap.
  7. Lazarus Group, Group G0032 MITRE ATT&CKSupports: MITRE lists HOPLIGHT as software of Lazarus Group.