Malware profile

Infamous Chisel

Infamous Chisel is a collection of components that targets Android devices.

In short

Infamous Chisel is a collection of components that targets Android devices. A joint report of 31 August 2023 says it was used by the actor Sandworm in a campaign against Android devices used by the Ukrainian military. It gives lasting remote access over the Tor network and regularly collects and sends out information from the device.

Profile MapMalware
  1. Names1names in public reportsInfamous Chisel
  2. Techniques6ATT&CK techniques listedPersistence · Credential Access · Discovery
  3. Infection Steps5in the delivery chainReplace the system file · Start at boot
  4. Linked Groups1groups that use itSandworm

In one minute

What it is
A collection of components for Android devices that gives lasting remote access over Tor and collects information from the device.
What it does
Scans the device for files of interest, scans the local network, and gives the actor a hidden Tor service with SSH access. It also includes network monitoring and file transfer tools.
Who uses it
Attributed by CISA and its partner agencies, in a joint report of 31 August 2023, to Sandworm. CISA says the UK and the US have previously attributed Sandworm to the Russian GRU's Main Centre for Special Technologies (GTsST).
How it gets in
The sources do not say how the malware first reaches a device. The report says the swap of a system file it relies on is not done by the malware itself and would need raised privileges.
What to do first
Read the joint report, run its YARA rules against device data and check devices against its indicators.

What it does

The joint report says the information taken is a mix of system details, commercial application data and data from applications specific to the Ukrainian military. The report calls the components low to medium sophistication, built with little regard for hiding their activity.

Components the report describes include the following. netd does automated device information collection and exfiltration. killer stops the malicious netd process. blob is run by netd and sets up and starts the Tor utility. td is Tor with no obvious modifications. db is a multi-call binary that bundles an SSH server and client, SCP, a network scanner and custom utilities.

For persistence, the malware replaces the legitimate netd binary in the system folder. When the system starts it, the malicious program forks and runs a backup of the genuine process so the device keeps working normally. Every 86,400 seconds (once a day) it searches set folders for files with extensions such as .dat, .bak, .xml, .txt, .ovpn, .pdf, .xlsx, .csv, .zip and images. It also gathers device identifiers, installed packages, network configuration, location data and data from military-related applications.

Remote access runs through a Tor hidden service on port 34371 that relays connections to a modified Dropbear SSH server. netd also has a built-in network scanner that checks local subnets and logs responsive hosts.

Names

Public sources use several names for this malware.

Names
NameWhere it appears
Infamous ChiselName used in the joint Malware Analysis Report AR23-243A of 31 August 2023[1, 2]

What it can do

What MITRE ATT&CK lists this malware as doing, by tactic. Each id opens our technique page where one exists, otherwise MITRE.

Persistence

  • Hijack Execution Flow T1625

    netd replaces the legitimate netd and is run by init with root privileges.[1, 2]

Credential Access

  • Credentials from Password Store T1634

    netd scrapes credential files, as the report's table lists it.[2]

Discovery

  • System Information Discovery T1426

    netd collects the Android ID and hardware information.[2]

Collection

  • Data from Local System T1533

    netd automatically collects files by extension from set folders.[2]

Command and Control

  • Encrypted Channel T1521

    td deploys a Tor hidden service that relays to SSH.[2]

Exfiltration

  • Automated Exfiltration T1020

    netd sends out collected data at regular intervals.[2]

How an infection runs

The order of steps in a typical infection, as the sources describe it.

  1. Replace the system file

    The malware replaces the legitimate netd binary, keeping a backup copy of the original that it also runs. This swap is not done by the malware itself and needs raised privileges.[1, 2]

  2. Start at boot

    init runs the malicious netd with root privileges.[2]

  3. Collect

    Every 86,400 seconds netd searches set folders for files of interest and gathers device and application data.[2]

  4. Open a hidden door

    netd runs blob, which configures and starts Tor and the SSH server, giving the actor a hidden service on port 34371.[2]

  5. Scan and send out

    netd can scan the local network and sends collected data out at regular intervals.[2]

Timeline

  1. August 2023

    Campaign uncovered by Ukraine's SBU

    CISA says the campaign was publicly uncovered by Ukraine's security agency, the SBU, earlier in the month of its 31 August release, and attributed to Sandworm.[4]

  2. 31 August 2023

    Joint Malware Analysis Report published

    The UK NCSC, US NSA, CISA and FBI, New Zealand's NCSC, Canada's CCCS and Australia's ASD report that Sandworm used a new mobile malware against Android devices used by the Ukrainian military.[1]

  3. 31 August 2023

    CISA releases AR23-243A

    CISA publishes the report as analysis report AR23-243A with downloadable indicator files in STIX format.[2]

  4. 31 August 2023

    CISA alert and press release

    CISA urges defenders to review the report for indicators, detection rules and signatures.[3, 4]

Detection and defense

  1. Use the official detection resources

    The joint Malware Analysis Report carries YARA rules written by the NCSC and a list of indicators. CISA's copy, AR23-243A, also offers the indicators as STIX JSON and XML files.[1, 2]

    Counters: T1533 T1020

  2. Review the report to check for compromise

    CISA and its partners urge defenders to review the report for indicators of compromise, detection rules and signatures to determine whether a system is compromised.[3]

  3. Study the techniques described

    NCSC New Zealand encourages security teams to read the techniques described and decide how they inform their network defense. The report maps the malware to MITRE ATT&CK techniques such as T1398 and T1625.[1, 5]

    Counters: T1398 T1625

  4. Report what you find

    NCSC New Zealand asks organizations that find malicious activity after reading the advisory to contact it by email.[5]

Questions

What is Infamous Chisel?

A collection of components targeting Android devices, described in a joint Malware Analysis Report of 31 August 2023.

Who is behind it?

The report authors, including CISA and the UK NCSC, attribute it to Sandworm. CISA says the UK and US have previously attributed Sandworm to the Russian GRU's GTsST.

Who was targeted?

The report says Android devices used by the Ukrainian military. NCSC New Zealand says it was not aware of New Zealand organizations being affected.

What does it take from a device?

System device information, commercial application information and data from applications specific to the Ukrainian military.

How do defenders look for it?

The report has YARA rules and indicators. CISA also offers the indicators as STIX files.

How does Infamous Chisel stay on a device?

By replacing the legitimate netd binary and running a backup of the original process alongside it. This needs raised privileges.

How sophisticated is it?

The report calls the components low to medium sophistication, built with little regard for evading defenses or hiding activity.

How often does it collect data?

netd searches its set folders every 86,400 seconds, which is once a day.

In our research

  1. Sandworm’s New Arsenal: Kapeka Backdoor Technical Analysis October 2024
  2. SandWorm APT Group Cyber Intelligence Report September 2023
  3. Sandworm Threat group

Sources

  1. Infamous Chisel Malware Analysis Report UK NCSC with NSA, CISA, FBI, NCSC-NZ, CCCS and ASDSupports: Components, behaviour, Sandworm association, persistence, YARA rules and indicators.
  2. Infamous Chisel Malware Analysis Report, AR23-243A CISASupports: Same report with STIX indicator files, released 31 August 2023.
  3. CISA and International Partners Release Malware Analysis Report on Infamous Chisel Mobile Malware CISASupports: Attribution by the authoring organisations and the call to review indicators and detection rules.
  4. U.S. and International Partners Release Report on Russian Cyber Actors Using "Infamous Chisel" Malware CISASupports: SBU uncovered the campaign, Sandworm attribution, earlier UK and US attribution to GTsST.
  5. Support for Ukraine calling out Russia's GRU for new malware campaign NCSC New ZealandSupports: Joint issuers, no known New Zealand impact, advice to review the techniques and report activity.