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Sandworm’s New Arsenal: Kapeka Backdoor Technical Analysis
Kapeka backdoor explained: a C++ backdoor used in Eastern Europe since mid-2022 and linked by researchers to Sandworm. See what the report covers.
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Malware profile
Infamous Chisel is a collection of components that targets Android devices.
In short
Infamous Chisel is a collection of components that targets Android devices. A joint report of 31 August 2023 says it was used by the actor Sandworm in a campaign against Android devices used by the Ukrainian military. It gives lasting remote access over the Tor network and regularly collects and sends out information from the device.
The joint report says the information taken is a mix of system details, commercial application data and data from applications specific to the Ukrainian military. The report calls the components low to medium sophistication, built with little regard for hiding their activity.
Components the report describes include the following. netd does automated device information collection and exfiltration. killer stops the malicious netd process. blob is run by netd and sets up and starts the Tor utility. td is Tor with no obvious modifications. db is a multi-call binary that bundles an SSH server and client, SCP, a network scanner and custom utilities.
For persistence, the malware replaces the legitimate netd binary in the system folder. When the system starts it, the malicious program forks and runs a backup of the genuine process so the device keeps working normally. Every 86,400 seconds (once a day) it searches set folders for files with extensions such as .dat, .bak, .xml, .txt, .ovpn, .pdf, .xlsx, .csv, .zip and images. It also gathers device identifiers, installed packages, network configuration, location data and data from military-related applications.
Remote access runs through a Tor hidden service on port 34371 that relays connections to a modified Dropbear SSH server. netd also has a built-in network scanner that checks local subnets and logs responsive hosts.
Public sources use several names for this malware.
| Name | Where it appears |
|---|---|
| Infamous Chisel | Name used in the joint Malware Analysis Report AR23-243A of 31 August 2023[1, 2] |
What MITRE ATT&CK lists this malware as doing, by tactic. Each id opens our technique page where one exists, otherwise MITRE.
The order of steps in a typical infection, as the sources describe it.
The malware replaces the legitimate netd binary, keeping a backup copy of the original that it also runs. This swap is not done by the malware itself and needs raised privileges.[1, 2]
init runs the malicious netd with root privileges.[2]
Every 86,400 seconds netd searches set folders for files of interest and gathers device and application data.[2]
netd runs blob, which configures and starts Tor and the SSH server, giving the actor a hidden service on port 34371.[2]
netd can scan the local network and sends collected data out at regular intervals.[2]
CISA says the campaign was publicly uncovered by Ukraine's security agency, the SBU, earlier in the month of its 31 August release, and attributed to Sandworm.[4]
The UK NCSC, US NSA, CISA and FBI, New Zealand's NCSC, Canada's CCCS and Australia's ASD report that Sandworm used a new mobile malware against Android devices used by the Ukrainian military.[1]
CISA publishes the report as analysis report AR23-243A with downloadable indicator files in STIX format.[2]
CISA and its partners urge defenders to review the report for indicators of compromise, detection rules and signatures to determine whether a system is compromised.[3]
NCSC New Zealand asks organizations that find malicious activity after reading the advisory to contact it by email.[5]
A collection of components targeting Android devices, described in a joint Malware Analysis Report of 31 August 2023.
The report authors, including CISA and the UK NCSC, attribute it to Sandworm. CISA says the UK and US have previously attributed Sandworm to the Russian GRU's GTsST.
The report says Android devices used by the Ukrainian military. NCSC New Zealand says it was not aware of New Zealand organizations being affected.
System device information, commercial application information and data from applications specific to the Ukrainian military.
The report has YARA rules and indicators. CISA also offers the indicators as STIX files.
By replacing the legitimate netd binary and running a backup of the original process alongside it. This needs raised privileges.
The report calls the components low to medium sophistication, built with little regard for evading defenses or hiding activity.
netd searches its set folders every 86,400 seconds, which is once a day.
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