These places include system password storage, saved browser logins, password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Stolen logins can then be used to move to other systems.
How it works
Passwords are kept in several places, depending on the operating system or the application. Some tools exist just to store passwords so users can manage them more easily, such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults.
An attacker with access to a system or account searches these places for saved credentials and tries to read them.
Once they have working credentials, they can use them to move sideways to other systems and reach restricted information. Legitimate logins can also make the attacker harder to notice.
MITRE lists six sub-techniques, covering keychains, browsers, the Windows Credential Manager, password managers and cloud secrets stores.
MITRE lists six sub-techniques: T1555.001 Keychain; T1555.002 Securityd Memory; T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers; T1555.004 Windows Credential Manager; T1555.005 Password Managers; T1555.006 Cloud Secrets Management Stores.
A real example
Procedure examples listed by MITRE ATT&CK:
- Agent Tesla can steal credentials from FTP clients and wireless profiles.
- Astaroth uses an external tool named NetPass to recover passwords.
- Carberp's passw.plug plugin can gather account information from instant messaging, email and social media services, as well as FTP, VNC and VPN clients.
- CosmicDuke collects user credentials, including passwords for instant messaging applications and email clients, as well as WLAN keys.
- HEXANE is listed by MITRE ATT&CK as having run cmdkey on victim machines to find stored credentials.
Seen in incidents
How to detect
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Watch access to password stores
Look for unusual processes reading password storage, such as credential databases, system credential services or browser login data, and for odd access between processes.
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Watch keychain and keyring access
On macOS and Linux, monitor access to keychain and keyring data and unusual use of system utilities that open or dump it.
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Watch cloud secrets services
Look for abnormal listing or bulk retrieval of secrets from cloud secrets management services.
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Detection strategy MITRE lists
DET0430, Detect Credentials Access from Password Stores.
How to defend
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Limit who can query password stores
Only allow the accounts and services that truly need it to query password stores, and give them access only to the secrets they require.
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Weigh the risk of storing credentials
Consider whether saving credentials in password stores and browsers is worth the risk. Use technical controls, policy and user training to keep credentials out of improper places.
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Use a separate keychain password
On macOS the login keychain password can differ from the login password, so an attacker needs to know one more secret.
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Keep software updated
Regular updates lower the chance that a flaw is used to get at stored credentials.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Credentials from Password Stores (T1555)?
It is a technique where an attacker looks in the places where passwords are saved and takes the logins they find. These include system password storage, saved browser logins, password managers and cloud secrets vaults.
Why do attackers target password stores?
Once they have working credentials, attackers can move sideways to other systems and reach restricted information. Legitimate logins can also make the attacker harder to notice.
What sub-techniques does T1555 include?
MITRE lists six sub-techniques, covering keychains, browsers, the Windows Credential Manager, password managers and cloud secrets stores. Each one targets a different place where passwords are kept, so defenders need to watch each of those places.
How can I detect access to password stores?
Look for unusual processes reading password storage, such as credential databases, system credential services or browser login data. Monitor keychain and keyring access on macOS and Linux, and abnormal listing or bulk retrieval of secrets from cloud secrets services.
How do I defend against Credentials from Password Stores?
Only allow the accounts and services that truly need it to query password stores, with access to just the secrets they require. Consider whether saving credentials in browsers is worth the risk, keep software updated, and use training and policy to keep credentials out of improper places.
