Rapid7 showed that a user with view-only access to a DOCX could obtain a reconstructed copy despite disabled download and form-filling permissions. That copy can contain custom XML, custom document properties and field instruction text absent from the displayed view.Rapid7 reproduced the flaw in the official Document Server container with package 9.4.0-129. This finding concerns document export and a callback request. A separate vulnerability in the same disclosure concerns reading files from the Document Server itself.
What it allows
How Does CVE-2026-113631 Expose Hidden Document Data?
A viewer first opens an authorized DOCX and receives a session token for reconnecting. Rapid7 found that the token did not bind the original callback destination. On reconnect, the server accepted a replacement destination while retaining the view-only role.
The view-only restriction also left the form export action available. The server then rebuilt the DOCX and sent its output location to the replacement destination. Rapid7 recovered custom XML, custom properties and field instructions that were not displayed to the viewer. This is a form of data exfiltration from an authorized document view.
The callback behavior can also create a blind server-side request to an internal address under the tested defaults. Rapid7 verified delivery to a controlled private address but did not claim the viewer could read the response body. This is separate from the server-file read covered by CVE-2026-113627.
What Does the Public Proof of Concept Change?
Rapid7 published proof-of-concept code with its 16 November 2026 disclosure. Its test demonstrates the export path from a view-only account on the tested build. Treat public code as a reason to accelerate review, not as evidence of attacks against your deployment.
Who is affected
Which ONLYOFFICE Docs Builds Need Review?
Rapid7 reproduced CVE-2026-113631 in the official ONLYOFFICE Document Server container running package 9.4.0-129. The viewer needs access to the target DOCX and a normal session token. The server must reach the replacement callback, and hidden data must exist for disclosure beyond the visible document.
The Rapid7 CNA record marks 9.4.0-129 up to, but excluding, 10.0.0 as affected. Rapid7 says its exploit test covered only 9.4.0-129, so the exposure of other builds in that recorded range was not demonstrated. It verified that view-only export failed on 10.0.0-169. ONLYOFFICE confirmed version 10.0 addressed the five findings.
Check the package and container version actually running in each deployment. Prioritize servers holding sensitive DOCX files with view-only access, especially where download is disabled as a confidentiality control. Record the inventory and update status in your patch management process. Teams can also review the vulnerability intelligence platform when planning their broader vulnerability workflow.
Timeline
- 2026-08-28
Rapid7 reported five ONLYOFFICE Docs findings to the vendor.
- 2026-10-23
ONLYOFFICE confirmed to Rapid7 that Document Server 10.0 fixed all five findings.
- 2026-11-16
Rapid7 published its analysis and public proof-of-concept code; NVD published the CVE record.
What to do
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Inventory Document Server instances
Record each running ONLYOFFICE Docs package and container version. Identify deployments that grant view-only access to DOCX files containing confidential metadata or hidden fields.
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Upgrade and verify the running build
Upgrade Document Server to a supported 10.0 or later release using the vendor procedure. Confirm the active package and container version after rollout; Rapid7 verified the fix on 10.0.0-169.
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Review suspicious exports and callbacks
For previously exposed instances, compare view-only sessions with export events and outbound callback destinations. Investigate unexpected destinations and retain relevant logs; these checks are defensive inferences from Rapid7’s mechanism.
What Brandefense can do
- Watch your stack for exploited flaws
Name the vendors and products you run, and Brandefense alerts you when a CVE in them is exploited.
- See CVE-2026-113631 in Brandefense Atlas
The Atlas record of CVE-2026-113631: severity, exploitation status and the sources behind it.
- Vulnerability intelligence platform
Brandefense Vulnerability Intelligence follows which vulnerabilities attackers are using, so your team can patch what is under attack first.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can a view-only user exploit CVE-2026-113631 when download is disabled?
Yes, in Rapid7’s test on 9.4.0-129. The user could trigger a reconstructed DOCX export through a callback despite disabled download and form-filling permissions.
Does CVE-2026-113631 read files from the Document Server host?
This CVE covers document export and callback behavior. Rapid7 assigned the separate server-file read and session-token forgery path to CVE-2026-113627.
Which ONLYOFFICE Docs version fixes this flaw?
ONLYOFFICE confirmed version 10.0 fixed the disclosed findings. Rapid7 tested package 10.0.0-169 and found the view-only export rejected.
Does a view-only account always receive hidden data?
No. Rapid7 says the target DOCX must contain non-rendered data for the export to disclose more than the viewer sees.
Sources
- From View-Only Access to Container Root: Five Vulnerabilities in ONLYOFFICE DocsRapid7
- CVE-2026-113631 CNA RecordRapid7 via CVE Program
- CVE-2026-113631 RecordNVD / Rapid7 CNA
- Document Server 10.0.0 Change LogONLYOFFICE