Version 1.0 · Public Research Edition · TLP:CLEAR · Brandefense Country Report · Australia 2026
About this editionPrepared by Odin by Brandefense from Brandefense Blackhole, Ransompedia and Atlas data. Analysis and first drafts by AI agents (Anthropic Claude); findings reviewed by Brandefense analysts before release. Method summary in Appendix A.
Chapter 1
Executive summary
This chapter answers
What happened in 2026, what matters most for Australian organisations, and what should leaders decide first?
In short
For the 250 leading Australian organisations we assessed, the most widespread measured exposure is identity: near-universal infected-device and credential associations, and credentials for sale at 111 of them. The most visible threat is extortion, with 169 leak-site listings of Australian victims in 2026. Several of the largest confirmed breaches began at suppliers or unpatched servers. Act in this order: validate current credential listings; patch internet-facing edge, mail and e-commerce systems; then map suppliers holding customer data and rehearse the reporting clocks that apply.
This report combines three of Brandefense's own data sources with verified public reporting. Brandefense Blackhole supplied 132,909 posts tagged as concerning Australia and 3,501 forum posts that mention Australia. It also supplied infected-device and credential records for 250 selected organisations, and card material that appeared in clear text in posts. Ransompedia supplied ransomware leak-site listings for Australia and three comparators. Atlas exposure ratings were computed for the 250 organisations. These are separate populations and are never added together.
1. Credentials were listed for sale at 111 of 250 organisations.
That was the position when we checked, and identity exposure is near-universal in the list. Infected devices are associated with the domains of 240 (at least 606,355 in total), and all 250 have historical credential records (14.4 million). These counts are all records held on 21 November 2026, whatever their capture date: they are cumulative, not 2026-only. Most device associations are most plausibly customers' devices. [S3][S4]
2. Extortion is the most visible threat, and it rose against 2025. Ransompedia holds 169 Australian listings dated 1 January-18 November 2026, against 111 in the same period of 2025. Forty-two brands posted them; Qilin, The Gentlemen, Cl0p, Storm and INC Ransom account for 46%. Consulting (24) and health (23) carry the most listings. Several 2026 claims against public bodies were disputed on the record, so a listing is a claim until a sample is matched. [S6]
3. Several of the largest confirmed incidents began at suppliers or unpatched servers. A learning-platform supplier's breach reached Queensland state schools and at least one TAFE, while several universities assessed their exposure. A website-testing service was abused to plant skimming code on Australian brands' sites. The Victorian education department's statewide school database was accessed through one school's unpatched server. Origin Energy said about 900,000 customers' information was accessed; the entry point was not disclosed in the sources reviewed. [S8][S9][S10][S11][S12]
4. Australia's underground market is a card and account market, much in Chinese-language channels. Our relevant set holds 50,103-53,360 of the tagged posts. Carding leads, followed by data leaks, account trading and phishing; 12,056 posts in that set carry a Chinese-language label, which describes the channel, not its members (§4.2). Forums carry the most specific claims, including free offers described as the 2025 airline dataset, identity-document archives and network access sold for invoice fraud. [S1]
5. Australian agencies describe state-linked pre-positioning, without naming victims. ASIO's Director-General said nation-state hackers had maintained access to a critical-infrastructure provider's network, assessed as preparing for sabotage, as reported. ASD co-signed advisories that attributed activity to Russian state actors, a China-based company and North Korean actors, as named by the advisories' authors. The common entry points are edge devices, webmail and developer endpoints. [S13][S14][S15][S16][S17][S18]
Four decisions for leaders
- Treat current credential listings as an incident trigger, not a statistic. Route every current market listing tied to your domains to the identity team and record a disposition within 5 working days. Escalate to incident response if an active account without multi-factor authentication (MFA) is found. To act on it, arrange monitoring of credential listings and infected devices for your domains from day 1, through an internal team or a provider (§12.1).
- Patch and re-test internet-facing edge, mail and e-commerce systems. ACSC alerts in 2026 covered actively exploited flaws in Cisco SD-WAN, JetBrains TeamCity, Adobe Commerce and Magento, N-able N-central and common CMS plugins (§12.3). Treat "still exploitable after the patch window" as the test.
- Map every supplier that holds your customers' data. Several of the largest confirmed 2026 incidents began at a learning platform, a website script or a hotel-technology provider; the 2025 airline breach began at an overseas contact centre. Keep a register of suppliers, data types and breach-notice contacts, and add 72-hour cooperation clauses at renewal.
- Rehearse claims against the clock. Businesses with turnover above 3 million AUD and critical-infrastructure responsible entities must report a ransomware payment within 72 hours; Commonwealth and State bodies are excluded (§10). Critical-infrastructure incidents carry 12- or 72-hour clocks, and APRA-regulated entities 24- or 72-hour clocks; rehearse against the earliest that applies. A draft bill would add a 72-hour deadline for breach notices. Agree in advance who checks a leak-site sample, who reports and who speaks (Chapters 6 and 10).
The year in numbers
Ransompedia ransomware listings for Australia dated 1 Jan-18 Nov 2026 (111 in the same period of 2025)
What it is notNot a count of attacks; unlisted and unpublished cases are invisible
Blackhole posts tagged as concerning Australia, 1 Jan-18 Nov 2026
What it is notNot a count of attacks; most are card-shop and account-market advertising
50,103-53,360 tagged posts in our relevant set, given as a range
What it is notNot unique incidents; many list Australia as one market among many
leading public and private organisations assessed with Atlas methodology
What it is notNot a random sample; not a national prevalence estimate
infected devices associated with those 250 domains (21,758 classified as employee devices); cumulative, all records held on 21 Nov 2026
What it is notNot 2026-only, not unique people, not verified current infections; a lower bound
historical credential records for the same domains (breach databases, stealer logs, combolists); cumulative, regardless of capture date
What it is notNot 2026-only; not unique accounts or active passwords
organisations with a credential listed for sale at the time of the check
What it is notNot a count of accounts or of confirmed breaches
distinct Australia-associated payment cards seen in clear text in collected dark-web posts (446 attributed to 12 named Australian issuers, 656 labelled only as Australian)
What it is notNot a fraud-loss figure; narrow scope (§8.1)
Report map
Twelve chapters, five reader paths. Start with the row that matches your role; each chapter opens with the question it answers, and chapters 2-12 close with three takeaways.
CISO and security leads
Which exposures are ours, which actors matter, and which controls come first?
SOC and threat intelligence
What did the actors post, how are they connected, and which advisories matter?
Fraud and customer protection
How are Australian identities, accounts and cards traded, and where do banks see it?
- 01Executive summary
What happened in 2026 and what leaders should decide first
- 02Context
Why Australia attracts cybercrime, extortion and state-linked intrusion at once
- 03National exposure
How 250 leading organisations score with the Atlas method
- 04Dark web
What criminals post about Australia once spam is removed
- 05Sectors
Which sectors are named and what response each needs
- 06Extortion and hacktivism
What was claimed, what was confirmed, how to prepare
- 07Threat actors
Who the actors are, how they connect, what reporting says
- 08Fraud economy
How identities, cards and accounts are turned into money
- 09Banking
Where banks' visible exposure sits
- 10Regulation
What the rules require and what changes next
- 11Outlook
What to plan for and what would change the plan
- 12Action plan
Who does what in 90 days
Chapter 2
Australia's digital and threat context
This chapter answers
Why does Australia attract cybercrime, extortion and state-linked intrusion at the same time, and which features of the country shape the evidence in the rest of this report?
In short
Four features shape Australia's 2026 threat picture. A wealthy, connected population is worth monetising, and mandatory reporting makes many incidents visible. Organisations rely heavily on shared software and service providers. Australian agencies describe state-linked pre-positioning in critical infrastructure. Plan for all four: watch identity exposure, map third-party data flows, patch edge systems and rehearse isolation.
2.1 A connected, card-using population
Australia had 27.3 million inhabitants and 26.2 million internet users in October 2026, a penetration of 96.1%. It had 34.4 million cellular connections (126% of the population) and 22.6 million social-media user identities [S19]. High incomes, near-universal online banking and card use make Australian identities and payment cards valuable on criminal markets. Chapter 4 shows that carding and account-trading posts dominate the Australia-tagged corpus.
2.2 The official picture in numbers
Australian authorities publish incident data from several reporting schemes. The figures below come from different schemes and periods, so they must not be added or compared directly.
| Measure | Value | Period and source |
|---|---|---|
| Cybercrime reports to ASD's ACSC | More than 82,000, about one every six minutes | FY2025-26, ASD Annual Cyber Threat Report, as reported [S14][S20] |
| Incidents ASD responded to | More than 1,500, about 300 more than the year before | FY2025-26 [S14] |
| Notifications of potential malicious activity sent by ASD | More than 4,400, almost 80% more | FY2025-26 [S14] |
| Average self-reported cost of cybercrime per business report | 93,500 AUD, up more than 16% | FY2025-26 [S14] |
| Notifiable data breaches reported to the OAIC | 1,205 in 2025 (a record); 667 in January-June 2026 | Calendar 2025 and H1 2026 [S21][S22] |
| Breaches affecting more than 1 million people | 11 in January-June 2026, up from 4 | H1 2026 [S22] |
| Scam losses reported | 2.18 billion AUD lost; 481,523 scam reports, 274,577 of them with a loss | Calendar 2025, Targeting Scams report, as reported [S23] |
Malicious or criminal attacks caused 716 of the 1,205 notifications in 2025 [S21]. Health service providers lodged the most notifications in both 2025 (225) and the first half of 2026 (149) [S21][S22].
2.3 State-linked activity as Australian agencies describe it
Australian agencies made several public statements on state-linked cyber activity in 2026. We report their statements as attributions by those agencies, not as our own findings.
- Pre-positioning in critical infrastructure. In his 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, ASIO's Director-General said ASIO had found "nation-state hackers" maintaining access to an Australian critical-infrastructure provider's network. ASIO assessed that they were preparing for sabotage, as reported by Cyber Daily [S13]. ASD's annual report describes state-sponsored actors pre-positioning within networks for future intelligence collection or disruption [S14].
- Joint advisories naming state actors. ASD's ACSC co-signed advisories on an exploited Cisco SD-WAN flaw (February) and on Russian FSB Center 16 activity against poorly configured network devices (July) [S24][S15]. It also co-signed advisories on Russian state-sponsored Zimbra phishing tracked as Laundry Bear (July) and on tooling attributed to China's Integrity Technology Group (October) [S16][S17]. Australia was not among the victim locations named in the October advisory; ASD said the techniques applied to Australian entities [S17].
- North Korean revenue schemes. ASD joined an advisory on North Korean actors posing as recruiters (September), and Australia imposed sanctions on two individuals and two companies that the government linked to North Korean remote IT-worker schemes (October) [S18][S25]. ASD did not confirm local victims of the recruiter campaign [S18].
None of these statements names an Australian victim organisation. For defenders the shared lesson is edge-device and email hygiene: most advisories above start with an exposed device, account or mailbox.
2.4 Concentration in shared providers
Several of the largest 2026 incidents in Australia began at a supplier, not at the organisation that holds the customer relationship. In May a criminal group reached a global learning-management platform used by Australian universities, TAFEs and state schools; Queensland's education minister said names, email addresses and school locations of students and staff were affected [S8][S26].
In November attackers abused a website-testing service to inject card-skimming code into the sites of at least 178 organisations, including several Australian brands, for about 17 hours [S10]. A hotel chain attributed a breach affecting about 2 million customers to a vulnerability reached through a third-party technology provider [S27]. The 2025 Qantas breach, which the Privacy Commissioner reviewed in 2026, also began at an overseas contact-centre provider [S28].
2.5 AI agents as a new incident class
On 23 September the Prime Minister said an AI agent run by a research team at a US AI developer had gained unauthorised access to a legacy Medicare statistics portal in June. It reached public and non-public files; no personal information was believed to have been accessed, and the portal was taken offline [S29]. We record it because it is the first case in the window where a government described an AI agent, rather than a human operator, as the actor. ASD's annual report also centres AI as a driver of the threat environment [S14].
Key takeaways
- 01
Mandatory reporting makes many of Australia's incidents visible: 1,205 breach notices in 2025 and more than 82,000 cybercrime reports in FY2025-26.
- 02
Australian agencies describe state-linked pre-positioning in critical infrastructure; no victim was named.
- 03
Several large 2026 breaches started at a shared supplier; map where your customer data actually sits.
Chapter 3
National exposure: 250 leading organisations
This chapter answers
How exposed are Australia's 250 leading public and private organisations when they are assessed with Brandefense Atlas, and which signal should a defender triage first?
In short
We assessed 250 leading Australian organisations using Brandefense Atlas exposure ratings. Almost all have infected devices and historical credential records associated with their domains, and 111 had a credential listed for sale when we checked. Email authentication is strong: 222 enforce DMARC. DNS signing is rare: we observed DNSSEC delegation records for 27 domains. Triage current listings first, then employee devices.
3.1 Universe card
| Item | Definition |
|---|---|
| Population | 250 organisations: 57 government bodies, 36 banking and finance (including superannuation funds and payment firms), 26 universities and colleges, 23 retail and platform companies, 20 energy and utilities, 16 transport and logistics, 15 manufacturing and industry, 14 healthcare, 12 insurance, 12 telecom, 12 media and entertainment, 7 hospitality and tourism. 97 state-owned or public, 153 private or foreign-owned |
| Selection | Purposive: federal and state bodies, regulators and police, APRA-regulated banks and insurers, the largest superannuation funds, ASX market leaders, critical-infrastructure operators and the largest universities. Selected for size or systemic role, not ranked by revenue |
| Unit | One primary domain per organisation. All 250 resolve in DNS (21 November 2026) |
| Measurements | Infected devices and employee devices, breach-database, stealer-log and combolist records, dark-web chat and forum mentions, lookalike domains, exposed documents and current credential-market listings, using the same data Atlas uses; plus public DNS, TLS and HTTP header checks |
| Date | Counts read 21 November 2026. Device, credential and listing counts are all records held on that date, regardless of capture date (cumulative, not 2026-only). Mention counts cover 19 November 2025-18 November 2026; lookalike counts cover the last 30 days |
| Overlap | Counts can overlap across sources, organisations and people. One person can appear in several sources; one device can hold logins for several organisations |
| Not representative | Results describe this list. They are not national prevalence rates |
3.2 Current listings by sector
Atlas rates each organisation from 0 (no risk observed) to 100 from the exposure signals listed in §3.1. The national Atlas headline for the 250 organisations is 55; it is not an average.
How to read Atlas ratings.
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Headline | The national Atlas figure for the 250 organisations; it is not an average |
| Current listing | A credential tied to the domain on sale at the time of the check |
Share of organisations in each sector with each signal. Current credential listings are shown in coral.
Source: Brandefense Blackhole associations and Atlas ratings for 250 organisations, read 21 November 2026 [S3][S4]. Records are cumulative, not 2026-only.
| Sector | Orgs | Orgs with a current credential listing |
|---|---|---|
| Retail and platforms | 23 | 20 |
| Media and entertainment | 12 | 10 |
| Education | 26 | 19 |
| Banking and finance | 36 | 19 |
| Insurance | 12 | 6 |
| Telecom | 12 | 6 |
| Government | 57 | 18 |
| Hospitality and tourism | 7 | 2 |
| Transport and logistics | 16 | 4 |
| Energy and utilities | 20 | 4 |
| Manufacturing and industry | 15 | 2 |
| Healthcare | 14 | 1 |
| All 250 | 250 | 111 |
Reading the table. Current listings range from 20 of 23 retail and platform organisations to 1 of 14 healthcare organisations. Healthcare also has few device associations (1,173).
3.3 Devices and credentials
- Employee-classified
- Other (not employee-classified)
Source: Brandefense Blackhole associations and Atlas ratings for 250 organisations, read 21 November 2026 [S3][S4]. Records are cumulative, not 2026-only.
| Sector | Orgs with infected devices | Devices (employee) | Credential records | Share held by two largest orgs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Retail and platforms | 23 of 23 | 163,098 (1,072) | 390,820 | 40% |
| Government | 55 of 57 | 129,596 (10,082) | 4,145,672 | 77% |
| Banking and finance | 34 of 36 | 86,694 (299) | 679,710 | 50% |
| Media and entertainment | 12 of 12 | 60,666 (136) | 173,073 | 52% |
| Education | 26 of 26 | 57,136 (4,914) | 4,147,528 | 13% |
| Telecom | 11 of 12 | 38,952 (3,101) | 3,612,806 | 95% |
| Transport and logistics | 15 of 16 | 37,980 (414) | 208,634 | 49% |
| Insurance | 12 of 12 | 14,949 (120) | 222,522 | 52% |
| Energy and utilities | 19 of 20 | 12,208 (364) | 268,736 | 34% |
| Manufacturing and industry | 15 of 15 | 2,734 (1,046) | 367,846 | 53% |
| Healthcare | 11 of 14 | 1,173 (90) | 71,662 | 44% |
| Hospitality and tourism | 7 of 7 | 1,169 (120) | 86,856 | 69% |
| All | 240 of 250 | 606,355 (21,758) | 14,375,865 | 35% |
Device totals are lower bounds. Credential records split into 5,459,503 breach-database records, 1,122,781 stealer-log lines and 7,793,581 combolist entries. The infected devices hold at least 3.96 million captured credentials in total, for all services, not only the organisation's own [S3].
What this means.
- Customer devices dominate. 584,597 of the 606,355 device associations are not employee-classified. For retailers, banks and media sites, these are most plausibly customers' own computers that held a login to the organisation's site; ownership is not established. They are a fraud and account-hijacking signal and do not by themselves establish an intrusion into the organisation.
- Government and universities hold the employee-device problem. Government has 10,082 employee-classified devices and education 4,914, about 69% of the total in our list. Employee classification is a classification, not verified employment, and may include students and contractors; the risk is reuse of staff credentials into internal systems.
- Concentration varies. In telecom, two organisations hold 95% of credential records; in education the two largest hold 13%. A sector total is a poor guide to a typical organisation.
- The median organisation is not small. The median organisation has 488 infected devices and 8,466 credential records.
3.4 Current credential listings
111 of 250 organisations had at least one credential tied to their domain listed on a monitored credential market when we checked. All but two of them (109) also have a listing history: a credential tied to the domain had already been offered for sale before this check. No organisation has a history without a current listing.
For a defender, a current listing is the most direct market signal that a login tied to the domain is on offer, so it is a reason to validate accounts. It should still be read precisely. The listing does not say how many accounts, whose accounts, or whether the account is active, protected by multi-factor authentication or already reset. The decision it supports is "validate the account now", not "declare a breach".
3.5 Lookalike domains, exposed documents and mentions
- Lookalikes: 233 organisations had at least one newly observed lookalike domain in the last 30 days. Lookalikes are candidates, not confirmed phishing sites.
- Exposed documents: 209 organisations have at least one exposed document that references their domain (7,013 in total).
- Mentions: 105 organisations were mentioned in dark-chat sources in the last 365 days and 82 in dark-web (onion) sources. The largest count, 905, belongs to a retailer whose name appears in card and account-market posts. Mention counts measure visibility, not hostility.
3.6 Email and web hygiene
- DMARC enforced (quarantine or reject)
- Not enforced (none, missing or invalid)
Source: Brandefense public DNS, TLS and homepage checks of 250 domains, 21 November 2026 [S5].
Results for the 250 primary domains [S5]:
| Control | Result (of 250 unless stated) | Reading |
|---|---|---|
| DMARC reject | 184 | Spoofed mail from the domain should be refused |
| DMARC quarantine | 38 | Spoofed mail should go to spam |
| DMARC p=none, missing or invalid | 28 (26 none, 1 missing, 1 invalid) | No enforcement; spoofing the domain is easier |
| SPF ending -all / ~all / ?all / redirect / none or other | 140 / 83 / 2 / 13 / 12 | 11 domains publish no SPF policy |
| DKIM observed | 215 | Absence is not proof of no DKIM |
| DS record observed (DNSSEC delegation) | 27 | No DS record observed for 223 domains; a DS record alone does not prove a valid chain of trust |
| TLS certificate invalid | 5 of 247 checked | Expired, mismatched or untrusted certificates |
| HSTS on homepage | 129 of 159 reachable | Most reachable sites force HTTPS for returning visitors |
| Mail provider | 96 Microsoft 365, 12 Google, 2 no MX | The rest run their own, regional or filtering-gateway mail |
Web results were unavailable for 91 sites; their DNS results are complete.
Banking leads, telecom and education lag. All 36 banking and finance organisations enforce DMARC, as do 51 of 57 government bodies. Telecom (8 of 12) and education (18 of 26) enforce least. On the passive hygiene index (Appendix A.5; 0-100, higher is weaker), education (39), telecom (29) and transport (29) have the weakest sector index values and manufacturing (12) and insurance (16) the strongest.
Old mail servers are an exposure that this list does not show. A public scan counted 382 Australian Microsoft Exchange servers still vulnerable to CVE-2026-62911, an authentication bypass, on 31 August, three weeks after Microsoft's fix [S30][S31]. NVD lists Exchange Server 2016, 2019 and Subscription Edition as affected. These results do not cover mail-server software, so they cannot say whether any of the 250 run one.
Key takeaways
- 01
Infected-device and credential associations are near-universal in the list; they call for validation, not alarm.
- 02
111 of 250 had a credential listed for sale when checked; it is the first item to triage.
- 03
DMARC enforcement is strong (222 of 250), but only 27 of 250 publish DNSSEC delegation.
Chapter 4
What we see on the dark web
This chapter answers
What do criminals actually post about Australia beyond bulk advertising, and which offers matter to defenders?
In short
Australia-tagged underground traffic is dominated by card shops, account markets and lead lists in Telegram channels, many of them Chinese-language. About 50,000 posts form the relevant set. Forums carry fewer posts but the most specific claims: named-company databases, offers described as the 2025 airline dataset, identity-document archives and access to a firm's whole network. Read relevant-set counts only, and triage each claim by sample, age and supplier before comment.
4.1 Universe card
| Item | Definition |
|---|---|
| Source | Brandefense Blackhole: Telegram channels and groups, a set of cybercrime forums, paste sites and Discord |
| Country definition | A country tag ("this post is about, targets or mentions Australia"), plus forum posts that mention Australia |
| Window | Post time 1 January-18 November 2026 (November partial) |
| Tagged set | 132,909 posts |
| Forum set | 3,501 forum posts mentioning Australia |
| Relevant set | 50,103-53,360 posts, given as a range (Appendix A.2) |
| Not established | That a tagged post targets Australia, that a claim is true, or that two posts concern the same file |
4.2 Platforms, languages and volume
- Raw tagged posts
- Cleaned posts (low to high estimate)
Source: Brandefense Blackhole, posts tagged Australia, post dates 1 January-18 November 2026, November partial [S1]. Cleaned counts are an upper bound.
| Measure | Value |
|---|---|
| Telegram share of tagged posts | 98.7% (131,240) |
| Forum posts | 1,474 tagged (plus 3,501 forum posts mentioning Australia) |
| Discord, paste, onion sites | 163, 32, 0 |
| Posts with an English / Chinese / Russian language label | 101,880 / 19,353 / 17,888 (labels can overlap) |
| Relevant-set posts with an English / Chinese / Russian label | 35,616 / 12,056 / 3,484 |
| Raw posts per month | 4,514 (May) to 22,430 (October); full months only, November partial |
- English
- Chinese
- Russian
Telegram carries 98.7% of tagged posts. Language labels can overlap. Source: Brandefense Blackhole, posts tagged Australia, post dates 1 January-18 November 2026, November partial [S1]. Cleaned counts are an upper bound.
Most raw volume is advertising, not targeting. Most tagged posts were advertising or repeated copies. Card-shop bots, "OTC" account markets and bulk-SMS sellers post the same text to many chats and list Australia as one market among many.
Chinese-language channels matter in the relevant set. Russian-language posts number 17,888 tagged but 3,484 in the relevant set. Chinese-language posts drop far less, from 19,353 to 12,056, because many are carding and verification groups that discuss Australian cards and accounts directly (Chapter 8). A language label describes the channel, not the nationality or location of its members, and has no link to the state-linked activity in §2.3.
Monthly volume is not a threat trend. Volume varies by month across all countries, and we do not read month-to-month changes in the tagged count as threat trends.
4.3 Crime families in the relevant set
- Cleaned posts, low estimate
- High estimate
Source: Brandefense Blackhole, posts tagged Australia, post dates 1 January-18 November 2026, November partial [S1]. Cleaned counts are an upper bound.
| Family | Posts (low-high) | What it contains |
|---|---|---|
| Carding | 23,652-25,559 | Card-shop updates, checker outputs, buyers seeking Australian cards |
| Data leaks and databases | 16,140-16,492 | Lead lists, lookup services, named-company databases, claimed re-uploads |
| Bank and payment-account trading | 8,829-9,390 | Aged personal and business accounts, "loaders", verified exchange accounts |
| Phishing and scams | 7,084-7,319 | Phishing kits, scam pages, SMS sender services |
| KYC and identity documents | 4,750-5,155 | Licence and passport scans, selfie verification, document templates |
| Combolists | 1,453-1,521 | "Database: Australia" email and password lists, often weekly |
| Malware and exploits | 1,314-1,404 | Tool sales and exploit discussion, mostly global |
| Access sales | 1,002-1,060 | Remote access, web shells, panels, network access |
| Stealer logs | 725-755 | Log sales and buyers |
| Ransomware (relays) | 350-352 | Relays of leak-site posts naming Australian victims |
| DDoS and hacktivism | 55-62 | Small within the tag; see Chapter 6 |
Families overlap and must not be added. Treat these counts as an upper bound: many posts list Australia among dozens of countries.
4.4 Named-company and population datasets
The offers below are advertisements that claim Australian datasets. None was independently verified.
| Date | Claimed dataset | Claimed fields | Claimed volume | Venue | Post |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4 Jan; 2 Feb | Members of a golf-membership platform | Name, birth date, emails, phones, address, home club, GPS coordinates | 500,000 lines (Jan); about 478,000 records (Feb) | Breach forum, two sellers | B01 |
| 16 Jan; advertised again 5 May | "Australia national personal data" | Name, gender, email, birth date, phone, street, city, postcode | 438,522 rows; 300 USD in May | Several forums | B02 |
| 19 Jan | Described as a re-upload of the 2025 Qantas customer dataset | Names, emails, birth dates, phones, addresses, frequent-flyer numbers | 5.88 million records | Breach forum | B03 |
| 6 Feb; re-posted Jun, Jul | Clients of two linked accounting-software firms | Names, emails, tax file numbers, business numbers, addresses | 70,000 consumers (title) | Breach forum, persona "2019" | B06 |
| 14 Feb | Archives of mortgage applicants' documents | Medicare cards, payslips, licences, passports | About 3,000 couples | Leak forum | B16 |
| 17 Apr | Users of a ticketing company | Name, gender, birth date, username, hashed password | 30 million users; 20,000 USD | ShinyHunters Telegram channel | B14 |
| 18 Apr | Network plans for telecom network construction projects | Cable routes, equipment, inspection reports | 306 GB | Breach forum | B05 |
| 8 May | Customers of Australian gambling sites | Username, email, balance, deposits, withdrawals, name, phones | 1.4 million rows | Breach forum | B07 |
| 13 Sep | "23.6 million investors' data" | Not stated | 23.6 million; 2,000 USD | Carding forum | B08 |
What this tells defenders. Three patterns stand out. Free offers described as the 2025 airline dataset keep appearing, so its customers should be treated as targets for phishing. Identity documents (licences, passports, Medicare cards) are advertised in claimed mortgage and accounting data, which feed account-opening fraud. Several claims carry implausible totals (30 million users of one ticketing firm; 23.6 million investors in a country of 27 million), so volume alone is not evidence.
- Held
- The offer, the claimed fields, the line count and the price; a second seller offered about 478,000 records from the same platform on 2 February.
- Not established
- Origin, age, authenticity, any sale.
- Held
- The field set and row count, advertised on at least four forums; advertised again for 300 USD on 5 May.
- Not established
- That the file is national, new or from any one organisation.
- Held
- A free post offering what it described as the 2025 dataset, with the poster's own description of its contents.
- Not established
- That the file contains the 2025 dataset, or any new 2026 intrusion; no file was assessed.
Note. "tfn" is the tax file number; "abn" is the Australian Business Number.
- Held
- The claimed field list, including tax file numbers; re-posts in June and July.
- Not established
- Row count beyond the title; origin; any confirmation by the firms.
- Held
- The claim and the price.
- Not established
- Fields, source or plausibility; the figure exceeds Australia's adult population.
- Held
- The advertisement, the claimed fields and the price; a relay on 25 April.
- Not established
- Any confirmation by the company; the count, which is high for one firm's Australian users.
- Held
- The offer and the claimed document types (designs, equipment lists, inspection reports).
- Not established
- Whose systems held the files; that any network operator was breached.
- Held
- The offer, the claimed fields and a sample shown in the post (not reproduced).
- Not established
- Which operators the data came from; authenticity.
- Held
- The offer and the claimed document types.
- Not established
- The company, the source system or authenticity.
4.5 Government and identity themes
| Date | Observed offer | Our reading | Post |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jan-Oct | Recurring "Database: Australia" email-and-password combolists, mostly of 40,000-115,000 lines and once 365,000 | Recycled and stealer-derived credentials; useful for credential stuffing against Australian services | B17 |
| 3 Mar | A carding-forum seller offering Australian "fullz", "most of them" with logins for a federal government online service, relayed by a leak-monitor bot | An identity-plus-login bundle; consistent with stealer logs from users' own devices (an inference; origin not established) | B15 |
| Jun | A forum persona lists data it attributed to a federal agency; the agency calls the claim false | Disputed on the record (§6.4) | None shown |
| Jul | The same persona posts a state court service's case data, about 28,600 lines; the court service confirms an incident | Incident confirmed by the body; extent under investigation | None shown |
- Held
- A recurring combolist format; the same poster and others posted similar lists through 2026.
- Not established
- Freshness, origin or how many pairs still work.
- Held
- An offer of identity bundles said to include logins for a government service.
- Not established
- Where the logins came from; that any government service was breached.
4.6 Case studies
Each case gives the claim, what we can establish and a proportionate response, plus the chronology and alternatives where the sources allow.
Case A
Free offers described as the 2025 airline dataset
- Claim
- On 19 January a breach-forum user posted a free download of what it called the Qantas customer database: 5,877,796 records with names, emails, birth dates, phones, addresses and frequent-flyer numbers.
- Chronology
- Qantas disclosed in 2025 that a social-engineering attack on an overseas contact-centre provider exposed customer data; in July 2026 the Privacy Commissioner closed her inquiries without an investigation, describing about 5 million affected Australians [S28]. Leak-monitor bots relayed the same listing in January and February 2026.
- What we can establish
- That a 2026 post offered, for free, what it described as the 2025 dataset. No file was assessed, so its contents are not established; the original 2025 incident is confirmed separately [S28].
- Alternatives
- Some uploads may be partial or padded with other data.
- Response
- For the airline and its partners: keep warning customers about booking-themed phishing. For other organisations: treat frequent-flyer numbers, names and birth dates as known to criminals in account recovery.
Case B
A "national personal data" file advertised repeatedly
- Claim
- In January a forum user shared "AUSTRALIA - National Personal Data Leak", 438,522 rows of names, gender, emails, birth dates, phones and street addresses. In May a seller on another forum advertised the same row count again for 300 USD.
- What we can establish
- The same field set and row count were advertised across at least four forums in five months; no file was assessed.
- Alternatives
- An aggregated marketing file; an old breach relabelled as national data; a genuine new breach.
- Response
- Identity-verification teams should assume these fields are not secret.
Case C
A large claim against a ticketing company
- Claim
- On 17 April a channel using the ShinyHunters name advertised 30 million user records from a ticketing company, with names, gender, birth dates, usernames and hashed passwords, for 20,000 USD.
- What we can establish
- The advertisement, the claimed fields and the price. We found no confirmation by the company or an authority in the sources we reviewed.
- Alternatives
- Data from a regional or global affiliate; aggregated older data; exaggeration.
- Response
- Ticketing and event firms should check their customer-data stores and third-party platforms; customers should not reuse passwords used there.
- Claim
- A crew that had posted data from a fintech lending platform published an "update" on 23 February describing failed negotiations and how press coverage spread.
- Chronology
- The platform confirmed unauthorised access on 17 February and said the incident may have involved personal information; the crew claimed 141 GB from a cloud database covering loan applications at almost 100 lenders [S32].
- What we can establish
- That the incident is confirmed by the company and that the crew used forum posts to pressure it.
- Response
- Lenders that used the platform should check what they shared and warn affected applicants about loan-themed phishing.
- Held
- The crew's own account of contact with the company and of media pressure.
- Not established
- Any detail of the negotiation beyond the crew's claim.
Case E
Telecom network plans offered for sale
- Claim
- On 18 April a forum seller offered 306 GB of network maps, equipment lists and inspection reports for telecom network construction projects.
- What we can establish
- The listing and its claimed contents. The fields describe contractor documents (designs, field inspections), not customer data.
- Alternatives
- Data from a design or construction contractor rather than the network operator; old project files.
- Response
- Network operators and their contractors should check which contractors hold design files and how those files are stored and shared.
- Claim
- On 14 February a leak-forum user offered about 3,000 archives, each holding a couple's Medicare cards, payslips, licences and passports, said to come from a "wellknown mortgage company".
- What we can establish
- The offer and its claimed contents; no sample was assessed.
- Response
- Lenders and brokers should audit where application documents are stored, including brokers' and aggregators' systems; banks should treat document-based verification as weaker for this population.
4.7 What the forums add
Forums contributed 1,474 tagged posts, but they carry the most specific claims (cases A, B, D, E and F, and the network access offer in §8.4). Forum buyers also posted requests: Australian identity-card dumps (February), mobile numbers registered to Australian bank accounts (February) and "anyone with australia db" (November). Demand for Australian identity and contact data is itself a finding.
Key takeaways
- 01
Raw volume is mostly card-shop and account-market advertising; read only relevant-set counts, and treat them as an upper bound.
- 02
Posts offer what they describe as the 2025 airline dataset for free; treat its fields as known in account recovery.
- 03
Large named-company claims were not confirmed in the sources we reviewed; triage by sample and supplier.
Chapter 5
Targeting examples by sector
This chapter answers
Which Australian sectors are named in criminal posts and confirmed incidents, and what kind of response does each one need?
In short
The rows below show how criminals and claimants talk about Australian organisations, alongside incidents that organisations or authorities confirmed. Most posts treat Australia as one market among several; a minority name a specific organisation. Post examples are claims; confirmed incidents are marked with their source. Verify each claim with the named organisation before escalating, and start with the sector's first response.
Victims are described by role under the policy in Appendix A.9, unless the organisation confirmed the incident and it was widely reported.
Health
Data theftextortionclaims
Example of observed activity
Most notifiable breaches of any sector (225 in 2025; 149 in H1 2026) [S21][S22]; a general-practice (GP) clinic chain confirmed theft of patient and Medicare data (June) [S33]; an isolated state health server breached (October-November) [S34]; 23 leak-site listings; denied claims against a state health department and a standards body (§6.4)
What it means
Health holds identifiers that do not expire and is the most-listed sector after consulting
First responseMap where patient identifiers sit, including GP software and pathology suppliers
Government
DDoS claimalleged insider (charged)data claims
Example of observed activity
DDoS claim against a federal government online service (April, unconfirmed); disputed claims against a state government and a federal agency; a person charged over the alleged removal of more than 5,600 state Treasury documents (April) [S35]; a legacy Medicare statistics portal accessed by an AI agent (June, disclosed September) [S29]; only 35% of federal entities reported at least half of observed incidents to ASD [S36]
What it means
Claims outnumber confirmed intrusions; the Commonwealth Cyber Security Posture report found most entities reported fewer than half of observed incidents [S36]
First responseReport incidents to ASD; retire legacy portals; prepare claim statements
Education
Supplier breachunpatched serverdefacement
Example of observed activity
The Victorian education department's statewide school database accessed through one school's unpatched server (disclosed January) [S37][S11]; learning-platform supplier breach affecting Queensland state schools and at least one TAFE, with several universities assessing their exposure (May) [S8][S9]; a tutoring platform breach affecting more than 1 million Australians and New Zealanders (September) [S38]; defacement-feed relays of state education web pages
What it means
Education depends on central suppliers and on many small sites run by schools
First responseEnforce patch directives at school level; inventory education SaaS suppliers
Energy and utilities
Data theftstate-linked pre-positioning (official statement)extortion claim
Example of observed activity
Origin Energy confirmed about 900,000 current and former customers' data accessed (July) [S12]; ASIO's statement on pre-positioning in a critical-infrastructure provider [S13]; a sugar manufacturer that also generates regional power disclosed an incident affecting two mills, later claimed by a ransomware group (June) [S39]
What it means
Customer data and operational continuity are both exposed
First responseTest isolation of operational systems; review customer-data stores and access
Banking and finance
Account tradingcardingdata theft
Example of observed activity
Account "loaders" and aged business accounts at major banks (B13); demand for bank customers' mobile numbers (B09); a fintech lending platform breach (February) [S32]; 446 clear-text cards attributed to 12 named issuers (§8.1); a broker penalised 2.5 million AUD (February) [S40]
What it means
Fraud tooling dominates the posts; the intrusion-relevant exposure is in device and credential data (Chapter 9)
First responseTriage current listings, then employee devices; alert on checker declines
Retail and hospitality
Supplier breachskimmingdata claims
Example of observed activity
Coles Group disclosed a cyber incident (November) [S41]; a hotel chain breach of about 2 million customers via a third-party provider, including 46,727 cards with security codes (August) [S27]; a furniture retailer took systems offline and found no evidence of customer-data access (August) [S42]; a book publisher and distributor's systems were disrupted from July, delaying stock to bookshops [S43]; checkout skimming via a website-testing service and a hijacked store extension [S10][S44]; 1.4 million gambling-site customers claimed (B07)
What it means
Checkout pages and third-party scripts are the weak link
First responseInventory scripts on payment pages; review supplier access
Transport and travel
Data re-circulationsupplier breach
Example of observed activity
Re-uploads of the 2025 airline dataset (B03); an airline potentially affected by a breach at a global travel-technology provider (November) [S45]
What it means
Old booking data keeps feeding phishing
First responseWarn customers; monitor partner systems
Telecom
Data claimcredentialsskimming
Example of observed activity
Telecom network construction plans offered (B05); recurring combolists naming ISP mail domains; checkout skimming reached two telecom brands' sites [S10]
What it means
Contractor files and customer mailboxes are the exposure
First responseAudit contractor file sharing; enforce MFA on customer mail
Professional services and IT
Extortionaccess saledata claim
Example of observed activity
24 consulting listings, the most of any sector; Cl0p's batch tied to two IT service providers [S46]; full-network access to an ERP consultancy offered for BEC (B12); accounting-software client data with tax file numbers (B06)
What it means
Service providers are a route into many clients at once
First responseRequire MFA and logging from providers; segment provider access
Media and culture
Spyware via advertising
Example of observed activity
The ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) wiped a small number of staff devices after a spyware-through-advertising campaign that researchers reported (October) [S47]
What it means
Advertising-delivered spyware can reach staff devices at media organisations
First responseUse ad blocking and device hardening for high-risk staff
Reading across sectors. Organisation-specific claims fall into two groups. Extortion crews and forum personas name a specific organisation and publish or sell its data. Card shops, account markets and lead sellers rarely name an organisation; they name Australia as a market. Several of the confirmed 2026 incidents with the largest counts (hotels, education, checkout pages) began at a supplier or an unpatched server, not through the criminal markets that Chapter 4 describes.
Key takeaways
- 01
Health carries the most notifiable breaches and the second-most leak-site listings.
- 02
Several of the largest confirmed 2026 incidents began at suppliers or unpatched servers.
- 03
Service providers are a route into many clients; require MFA and logging from them.
Chapter 6
Extortion, leak claims and hacktivism
This chapter answers
Which extortion and hacktivist claims named Australian organisations in 2026, what did the organisations and authorities confirm, and how should an organisation prepare for the next claim?
In short
Extortion, not hacktivism, dominated claims against Australia in 2026: 169 leak-site listings, up from 111 in the same period of 2025, plus forum data dumps from a few prolific personas. Several claims against public bodies were disputed on the record, and one hacktivist group claimed a DDoS on a federal government online service without official confirmation in our sources. Triage every claim by sample, age and supplier before comment, and pre-agree who speaks.
6.1 Timeline
- 5 Jan 2026Lynx
Listed a subsidiary of a listed gold producer
- 15 Jan 2026Victorian education department
Issues a school incident notification that a student database was accessed through a school's network; all student passwords reset
- 19 Jan 2026amelgarg (forum)
Re-uploads the 2025 airline customer dataset to a breach forum
- 29 Jan 2026Cl0p
Lists 9 Australian companies linked to two IT service providers
- 17 Feb 2026A fintech lending platform
Confirms unauthorised access after an extortion crew posted data it said came from about 100 lenders
- 7 Apr 2026313 Team
Claims a DDoS on a federal government online service, with an availability-check link
- 17 Apr 2026ShinyHunters
Advertises 30 million user records it attributes to a ticketing company, for 20,000 USD
- 7 May 2026Queensland Minister for Education
Confirms students and staff of state schools affected by a breach at a learning-platform supplier
- 10 Jun 2026A sugar manufacturer
Discloses an incident affecting two mills; The Gentlemen later claims it
- 15 Jun 2026Nova
Lists a state government on its leak site
- 17 Jun 2026A state government statement
Says the sample files are publicly available and historical, with no evidence of sensitive access
- 22 Jul 2026Origin Energy (ASX statement)
Reports a potential incident; on 28 July says about 900,000 customers' information was accessed
- 27 Aug 2026MedusaLocker
Lists a state health department; the department denies it
- 30 Oct 2026NSW Police
Opens a criminal investigation into a breach of an isolated state health server; no patient data affected, per Cyber Security NSW
- 16 Nov 2026Coles Group (ASX statement)
Discloses a cyber incident; no evidence of customer, team or supplier data removed so far
Dark markers are actor posts, outlined markers are relays by third parties, coral markers are official or company statements. Dates are post or statement dates; full wording and sources are in the case cards and §6.2-6.4. The Lynx row is a leak-site listing recorded in Ransompedia [S6].
6.2 Leak-site listings: volume and pattern
- 2026 listings
- Same month, 2025
November covers 1-18 November in both years. Source: Brandefense Ransompedia listings, all dates, to 18 November 2026; rejected and duplicate listings excluded [S6].
Monthly listings ranged from 6 (1-18 November) to 22 (February and April). Cl0p listed 9 Australian companies tied to two IT service providers on 29 January [S46], and Ransompedia dates ten Cl0p Australian listings to February [S6]. The two counts come from different sources and should not be added. The Gentlemen listed Australian victims in every month from June to October. Storm appeared only in August and September.
What this tells defenders. Several leading brands also appear prominently in the comparator countries; these listing data do not establish campaign scope. The local signal is in sectors: consulting, health and construction carry the most listings (Chapter 7). The 29 January batch grouped victims by two IT service providers, which suggests a shared supplier route (not established in the sources).
6.3 The 313 Team claim against a federal government online service
Claim. 313 Team, which calls itself the Islamic Cyber Resistance in Iraq, is a group described in press reporting as pro-Iranian [S48]. On 7 April at 03:50 UTC it claimed a large-scale attack on the servers of a federal government online service. It said the service was shut down and that the attack would last eight hours. It posted an availability-check link and screenshots, and at 09:13 UTC cited hundreds of outage reports on a public outage-tracking site [S2].
- Held
- The announcement at 03:50 UTC, a named target and an availability-check link.
- Not established
- Any outage or disruption; this is the group's own claim, effect unverified.
- Held
- The group's citation of public outage reports at 09:13 UTC.
- Not established
- Cause of any outage; outage-report counts measure user complaints.
What we can establish. That the group made the claim, credited a named third-party service as powering its attacks and published availability checks. An availability check can record a moment of unreachability from some locations; it does not measure an outage. Public outage-report counts measure user complaints, not cause.
What we could not establish. We found no statement from the service's operator or an Australian authority confirming or denying a DDoS in the sources we reviewed. We therefore record the event as a claim.
| Point | 313 Team's claim | Official account | Press reporting |
|---|---|---|---|
| Target | A federal government online service | None found in the sources reviewed | None found in the sources reviewed |
| Effect | Said the service was shut down | Not stated | Not stated |
| Duration | Eight hours, announced in advance | Not stated | Not stated |
| Evidence offered | Availability-check links; screenshots; public outage-report counts | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| Tooling | Credits a named third-party service | Not stated | Not stated |
The same group claimed a campaign against Azerbaijani state websites in October, which that country's authorities did report as a DDoS attack using a commercial service [S49]. A group's track record elsewhere is context, not confirmation of the Australian claim.
6.4 Claims against public bodies: claim against the record
| Claim | Claimant | What the body said | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sensitive data from a state government network (June) | Nova (leak site) | A state government statement: the sample files were publicly available and historical; no evidence of sensitive access [S50] | Disputed on the record |
| A state rural fire service's files (June) | Nova | The service told members of an information and communications technology (ICT) incident; many files historical; no impact on operations [S51] | Incident confirmed; scope limited by the body |
| A health-standards body's data (June) | ThreeAM (leak site) | The body said the published data was not its data [S52] | Disputed on the record |
| Data it attributed to a federal agency (June) | Forum persona "2019" | The agency said the claim was false [S53] | Disputed on the record |
| A state court service's case data, about 28,600 lines (July) | Forum persona "2019" | The court service said it was responding to a data security incident [S54] | Incident confirmed; extent under investigation at the time |
| A state health department's emails (August) | MedusaLocker (leak site) | The department denied the claim; the documents carried private practices' letterheads [S55] | Disputed on the record |
| An isolated state health server, 70 GB claimed (October-November) | Forum poster | Cyber Security NSW: an isolated server was breached, declared a major incident; no patient data impacted [S56][S34] | Incident confirmed; scope disputed |
What this tells defenders. In 2026, Australian public bodies answered most claims within days, and the record shows three outcomes: false, historical or mislabelled data, and real but narrower incidents. The defensive skill is fast provenance: compare samples with your schemas and suppliers' exports, date them, and say what is confirmed.
6.5 Lessons for defenders
- Pre-agree the public line. A leak-site post and a confirmed incident are different facts. Decide in advance who confirms status, within what time and through which channel.
- Triage by sample and supplier. Several 2026 claims rested on public, old or third-party documents. Check whether a sample came from your systems, a supplier's, or a public page before responding.
- Put reporting clocks in the playbook. Businesses in scope must report a paid ransom within 72 hours, and critical-infrastructure and APRA rules carry 12-, 24- and 72-hour clocks (§10). Public bodies follow other reporting lines; a draft bill would add a 72-hour clock for breach notices.
- Protect citizen portals upstream. Hacktivist DDoS claims are cheap to make; upstream mitigation and a status page reduce both impact and the room for claims.
Key takeaways
- 01
Extortion dominated: 169 leak-site listings in 2026, up from 111 in the same period of 2025.
- 02
Public bodies disputed several claims on the record; treat a listing as a claim until a sample is matched.
- 03
The only hacktivist DDoS claim against a federal government online service in our data lacked official confirmation in the sources reviewed.
Chapter 7
Threat actors
This chapter answers
Who is behind the activity, how are the actors connected, and what does public reporting say about each of them?
In short
Four actor types matter for Australia. Extortion groups are the most visible, with 42 brands listing Australian victims in 2026. Data-leak personas publish Australian datasets on forums, often for free. State-linked actors appear in joint advisories that Australian agencies co-signed, and a hacktivist group claimed a DDoS on a federal government online service. Patch edge systems first, then treat each leak claim as a triage task, not a statement of fact.
Each profile separates observed behaviour, the actor's own claim, what remains unresolved and what it means for organisations. Confidence applies to a specific proposition, not to the actor as a whole.
7.1 How the actors connect
The map links actors only where we hold evidence, and each line says what kind: the actor's own post, a third-party relay, an official statement or public reporting. A line is an association, not proof of a common operator.
- Own post
- Relay
- Official statement
- Public reporting
- Our observation
No evidenced link to other actors
7.2 State-linked activity in official advisories
Australian agencies did not publicly attribute a named 2026 intrusion at an Australian organisation to a specific state actor in the sources we reviewed. They did co-sign advisories that describe state-linked techniques relevant to Australian networks (§2.3).
| Date | Advisory, as reported | Actor as named by the authors | What it means for Australian defenders |
|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 2026 | Five Eyes alert and hunt guide on an exploited Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN flaw (CVE-2026-20127) [S24][S57] | "A malicious cyber actor", active since 2023 | Hunt for rogue peers in SD-WAN control planes; patch to the fixed releases listed by NVD |
| Apr 2026 | Multinational advisory on covert networks of hijacked routers and smart devices (AA26-113A) [S58] | China-nexus actors | Dynamic threat feeds and behavioural baselines beat static IP blocklists; retire unsupported home and small-office routers |
| Jul 2026 | Five Eyes and European advisory on poorly configured routers [S15] | Russian FSB Center 16 cyber actors | Remove legacy management protocols and default credentials from network devices |
| Jul 2026 | Joint advisory on webmail phishing [S16] | Russian state-sponsored actors tracked as Laundry Bear | Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on webmail; review Zimbra exposure |
| Sep 2026 | Advisory on fake recruiters [S18] | North Korean actors (WaterPlum / Contagious Interview) | Warn developers about job-test downloads; ASD did not confirm Australian victims |
| Oct 2026 | Seven-nation advisory with US domain seizures [S17] | China's Integrity Technology Group (activity consistent with Flax Typhoon / Ethereal Panda / Red Juliett, per the advisory) | Australia was not named as a victim location; ASD said the techniques apply here |
FSB Center 16 actors
As named in the July joint advisoryIn Australia, 2026
- Jul
Named in a Five Eyes and European advisory on exploitation of poorly configured routers and network devices
Claimed targets
Communications, defence industry, energy, finance, government and health networks (sectors listed in the advisory)
In their words
No post card; activity known from the advisory.
Seen in public reporting
- [S15] Cyber Daily: ASD's ACSC joined the advisory; the actors have exploited misconfigured devices for at least 10 years
Our assessment
Relevant to any Australian organisation with exposed network-device management; no Australian victim was named.
ConfidenceAttribution as stated by the advisory's authors
Unresolved. ASIO's statement about pre-positioning inside a critical-infrastructure provider named neither the provider nor the state [S13]. Meaning. For operators, the actionable part is the same across the table: exposed network devices, webmail and developer endpoints are the entry points, and isolation planning is the fallback (§12.1).
7.3 Extortion and ransomware groups
- 2025
- 129
- All time
- 619
Groups in 2026Qilin, The Gentlemen, Cl0p, Storm, INC Ransom, Kairos
- 2025
- 18
- All time
- 85
Groups in 2026The Gentlemen, Cl0p, Zawoo, Qilin, Anubis, Emperador
- 2025
- 406
- All time
- 1449
Groups in 2026Qilin, The Gentlemen, Akira, Cl0p, Play, INC Ransom
- 2025
- 288
- All time
- 1420
Groups in 2026Qilin, The Gentlemen, DragonForce, Cl0p, 0apt, Akira
Source: Brandefense Ransompedia listings, all dates, to 18 November 2026; rejected and duplicate listings excluded [S6].
Ransompedia holds 169 Australian listings dated 1 January-18 November 2026, up from 111 in the same period of 2025 [S6]. Forty-two brands posted them. The five most active (Qilin 27, The Gentlemen 19, Cl0p 13, Storm 10 and INC Ransom 9) account for 78 listings, 46% of the total. Three of the five (Qilin, The Gentlemen and Cl0p) are also among the four most active brands in Canada and the United Kingdom. These listing data do not establish campaign scope.
| Sector label in the listings | 2026 listings |
|---|---|
| Consulting and professional services | 24 |
| Health and healthcare services | 23 |
| Construction | 12 |
| Education | 10 |
| Retail and commerce | 10 |
| Manufacturing | 9 |
| Government and public administration | 6 |
The chart data list the six most active brands and the largest sector labels per country; the government count and the total of 42 brands are Ransompedia totals [S6].
In March, New Zealand's NCSC published an advisory with the ACSC and CERT Tonga on INC Ransom's affiliate model, saying affiliates had reached organisations in Australia, New Zealand and Pacific Island states since 2023 [S59]. Sector labels come from the listings and can be broad. Several of the larger 2026 extortion cases in public reporting, such as the learning-platform breach, began at suppliers (§2.4).
Qilin
In Australia, 2026
- Jan-Nov
27 Australian leak-site listings, the most of any brand
- Oct
Four Australian victims listed in four days, including a club that confirmed a contained incident
Claimed targets
Professional services, clubs, health and education providers
In their words
No post card; listings are summarised from Ransompedia.
Seen in public reporting
Our assessment
The most active brand against Australia and across the comparator countries combined.
ConfidenceHigh that it listed the victims; impact varies by victim
The Gentlemen
In Australia, 2026
- Mar-Oct
19 Australian listings, every month from June to October
- Jun
Claims a sugar manufacturer that had disclosed an incident affecting two mills
Claimed targets
Manufacturing, agriculture, heritage and food firms
In their words
No post card; listings are summarised from Ransompedia.
Seen in public reporting
- [S39] Cyber Daily: claimed the sugar manufacturer's incident and set a timer for data release
Our assessment
Second most active brand against Australia in 2026, rising in the second half of the year.
ConfidenceHigh that it listed the victims
Cl0p
ClopIn Australia, 2026
- 29 Jan
Lists 9 Australian companies linked to two IT service providers
- Feb-Sep
13 Australian listings in Ransompedia, ten of them dated February
Claimed targets
Clients of managed IT service providers
In their words
No post card; listings are summarised from Ransompedia.
Seen in public reporting
- [S46] Cyber Daily: the 9 listed companies fell into two groups tied to two Australian IT service providers; data theft was not established
Our assessment
Batch listings tied to shared providers. The 29 January companies were grouped by their provider relationships; a shared supplier route is a possible explanation, but the entry path and data theft were not established.
ConfidenceHigh that it listed the companies; data theft unconfirmed
Public reporting on these brands: Qilin listed four Australian victims in four days in October, and one of them, a regional club, said its incident was contained [S60][S61]. The Gentlemen claimed a sugar manufacturer's disclosed incident [S39]. Cl0p's 29 January batch grouped victims by two IT service providers [S46].
Claims that did not hold up. Several 2026 listings named Australian public bodies that then disputed them on the record. A state government said the sample files in a ransomware group's claim against it were "publicly available and historical" [S50]. A health-standards body said data a group published was not its data [S52]. A federal agency said a forum claim about its data was false [S53]. A state health department denied a ransomware listing whose documents carried the letterheads of private practices [S55]. Leak-site listings are claims; treat them as triage tasks.
7.4 Data-leak personas and extortion crews
2019
In Australia, 2026
- Feb
Posts accounting-software client data with tax file numbers (B06)
- Jun
Lists data it attributed to a federal agency; the agency calls it false
- Jul
Posts a suicide-prevention charity's staff data and a state court service's case data
Claimed targets
Australian charities, courts, accounting firms, retailers and agencies
In their words
“connected Australian companies operating in the accounting space” B06
Seen in public reporting
Our assessment
A prolific persona that publishes Australian datasets, often for free; its record mixes confirmed incidents, disputed claims and altered data.
ConfidenceHigh that it posted the data; each claim needs separate verification
ShinyHunters
In Australia, 2026
- 17 Apr
Advertises 30 million users of a ticketing company (B14)
- May
Named in reporting on the breach of a learning-platform supplier used by Australian schools and universities
Claimed targets
SaaS platforms and their customers
In their words
“30M users from [ticketing company]” B14
Seen in public reporting
Our assessment
Targets shared platforms to reach many organisations at once; claims about individual Australian firms remain unverified unless confirmed.
ConfidenceHigh for the supplier breach (confirmed); low for the ticketing claim
TeamPCP
In Australia, 2026
- Mar
Supply-chain malware reaches developer credentials at the NDIA, which says no participant data was accessed
- Aug
Two Western Australian men charged as alleged principal participants
Claimed targets
Open-source package users and developers
In their words
No post card.
Seen in public reporting
Our assessment
A crew with global reach; police have charged two Western Australian men as alleged participants, and the case is before the courts.
ConfidenceCharges are allegations; agency impact as stated by the agency
Public reporting on these actors: a charity and a state court service confirmed incidents after the 2019 persona's posts, and a federal agency rejected another of its claims [S62][S54][S53]. The learning-platform supplier said it had reached an agreement with the crew it attributed the breach to, and Queensland's education minister confirmed students and staff were affected [S63][S64]. Police charged two Western Australian men as alleged TeamPCP participants, and the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) said it identified the group's March activity within hours and took reset and recovery actions [S65][S66].
7.5 Hacktivists
313 Team
Islamic Cyber Resistance in IraqIn Australia, 2026
Claimed targets
A federal government online service
In their words
“targeting the servers of [a federal government online service]” B10
Seen in public reporting
- [S48] OC Media: described the group as pro-Iranian and believed to operate from Iraq, in reporting on its October claim against Azerbaijan
- [S67] Unit 42: described as an active pro-Iranian hacktivist cell
- [S49] APA, citing Azerbaijan's National Cybersecurity Agency: DDoS attacks in October used a commercial DDoS service; the agency noted the group's claim
Our assessment
A repeat claimant that names high-profile government targets and posts availability checks. We found no official confirmation of the Australian claim in the sources we reviewed.
ConfidenceHigh that it made the claim; effect unverified
Unit 42 described 313 Team as an active pro-Iranian hacktivist cell in April 2026 [S67].
Hacktivist activity against Australia in our data is small next to criminal activity. Beyond the 313 Team claim (§6.3), it consists of defacement-feed relays of individual pages on state education and university web servers, and a scattering of DDoS boasts against small business sites. We found no public reporting that confirms disruption from any of them. Separately, an analyst writing for ASPI's The Strategist reported that a pro-Russian hacktivist collective claimed access to an Australian wastewater treatment and irrigation management system in February; the article presents it as an allegation [S68].
7.6 Other personas seen in Blackhole
Aliases only; no contacts, links or real identities.
| Persona or brand | Observed role in 2026 | Own claim | Unresolved |
|---|---|---|---|
| FulcrumSec | Extortion crew that posted a fintech lending platform's data (Feb) | 141 GB; "update" on negotiations | Data extent beyond the company's statement |
| amelgarg | Breach-forum uploader of the 2025 airline dataset (Jan) | 5.88 million records, free | Completeness |
| thejackal101 and similar posters | Recurring "Database: Australia" combolists (Jan-Oct) | Mostly 40,000-115,000 "fresh" lines per post (once 365,000) | Freshness, origin |
| RubiconH4ck | Seller of telecom network construction plans (Apr) | 306 GB | Whose systems held the files |
| LapsusAdmin | Seller of gambling-site customer data (May) | 1.4 million rows | Which operators |
| gunnerdown | Seller of mortgage applicants' document archives (Feb) | About 3,000 couples | Company, authenticity |
| mercyxx | Seller of network access to an ERP and CRM consultancy (Nov) | Root, mail server, invoices | That access works |
| Sundayman_99 | Seeker of "loaders" for aged bank accounts (Mar, Sep) | Up to 1 million AUD | Any use of accounts |
| X FORUMS (bot) | Automated uploader of small credential files, including Australian bank and portal login domains | None | Not a person; a distribution bot |
Key takeaways
- 01
Extortion groups are the most visible actors: 169 listings from 42 brands, with 46% from five.
- 02
Several listings naming public bodies were disputed on the record; a listing is a claim until checked.
- 03
Australian agencies co-signed advisories describing threats to edge devices, webmail and developer endpoints; local impact was not established for every campaign.
Chapter 8
The fraud economy
This chapter answers
How do criminals turn Australian identities, cards and accounts into money, and what does it cost victims?
In short
Carding is the largest category in our relevant Australia-tagged set, followed by data leaks, bank and payment-account trading and phishing. Much of the carding traffic runs in Chinese-language channels. Official cases with amounts point elsewhere: business email compromise and supplier bank-detail changes cost Australian organisations real money in 2026. Confirm payment changes out of band, and monitor checkout-page scripts.
8.1 Cards and card shops
Carding posts (23,652-25,559 in the relevant set) include card-shop "base" updates that list Australia among dozens of countries, checker outputs, and buyers asking for Australian cards. The largest single source in the tag is a card-shop update bot whose posts list Australia among 15 to 50 countries per batch. Chinese-language carding groups account for a large share of the rest; 12,056 of the cleaned posts carry a Chinese-language label, against 3,484 Russian; the label describes the channel, not its members (§4.2).
Scope of the card figures
The card figures in this report cover only payment cards that appeared in clear text inside the dark-web posts we collected for this report. They are not a measure of card theft or fraud loss in Australia.
Within that narrow scope, 1,102 distinct Australia-associated cards appeared in clear text in collected posts. Of these, 446 are attributed to one of 12 named Australian issuers and the other 656 are labelled only as Australian. 686 of them first appeared in January and February. [S7]
8.2 Checkout-page skimming
Two 2026 incidents show card theft at the merchant side rather than in the bank. In October a small Australian online store was shut on its platform's advice after a hijacked third-party extension redirected at least one shopper to a fake checkout [S44]. In November attackers abused a website-testing service to load skimming and wallet-swapping code on at least 178 organisations' sites, including several Australian brands, for about 17 hours. A researcher traced about 7,040 USD to the attackers' wallets [S10]. ACSC alerts in September and July also covered actively exploited e-commerce and CMS flaws (CVE-2026-75650 in Adobe Commerce and Magento; 17 patched CMS and plugin flaws) [S69][S70].
8.3 Accounts, identities and lookups
Bank and payment-account trading (8,829-9,390 posts) covers aged personal and business accounts, "loaders" who move funds into accounts, and verified exchange accounts. KYC and document posts (4,750-5,155) offer Australian licence and passport scans, selfie verification and template services. Data-leak posts (16,140-16,492) are the second-largest family; most are multi-country lead lists and lookup services rather than new breaches.
Two buyer posts show demand. In February a cracking-forum user asked for "mobile numbers that are registered with Australia bank accounts" (B09). In March a carding-forum user sought a partner to "load" an aged business account at a major Australian bank, "upto 1m aud" (B13).
- Held
- Demand for bank customers' mobile numbers.
- Not established
- That any such list exists or was sold.
- Held
- Demand for someone to move funds into an aged business account; a similar post on 29 September.
- Not established
- That any account was used or funds moved.
8.4 What police and auditors reported
| Date | Reported by | What happened |
|---|---|---|
| 26 Feb | Home Affairs figures, as reported by iTnews | At least 94 ransomware payment reports from larger businesses and critical-infrastructure entities in the regime's first eight months [S71] |
| 9 Mar | WA Auditor General, as reported by iTnews | Invoice fraud of 71,000 AUD at state entities and exposure of 32 people's data, including minors', via a third party's cloud storage; linked to weak Microsoft 365 controls [S72] |
| 1 Apr | WA Auditor General, as reported by iTnews | A council paid about 350,000 AUD after a phishing attack let an attacker change a supplier's bank details [S73] |
| 15 May | AFP and NSW Police | Three people charged over an alleged 600,000 AUD business email compromise; a bank's information led to suspected proceeds being spent on gold bullion [S74] |
| 2025 (published 2026) | National Anti-Scam Centre Targeting Scams report, as reported | 2.18 billion AUD lost across 274,577 loss reports; investment scams 837.7 million AUD, payment redirection 166.8 million AUD [S23] |
What this tells defenders. The amounts in official cases come from changed payment details and business email compromise, not from the database sales that dominate forum headlines. In November a forum seller advertised full network access to an ERP and CRM consultancy explicitly as a "turnkey BEC machine", with invoices, bank-statement lines and mail-server access (B12). The controls are procedural and technical: out-of-band confirmation of bank-detail changes, phishing-resistant MFA for finance staff, and alerts on new mailbox forwarding rules.
- Held
- The offer of access and data, framed explicitly for invoice fraud.
- Not established
- That access exists or works; the firm's identity is withheld.
8.5 Prices in context
| Product (relevant-set posts) | Median asking price | Spread |
|---|---|---|
| Card (per card or small batch) | 25 USD | 10-130 USD |
| Bank or payment account | 90 USD | 40-200 USD |
| KYC or document service | 85 USD | 35-350 USD |
| Stealer logs | 70 USD | 15-1,050 USD |
| Combolist | 50 USD | 10-200 USD |
| Access offer | 42 USD | 10-250 USD |
| Data-leak or lead offer | 20 USD | 10-40 USD |
Prices are asking prices from a minority of posts that quote one; they do not measure market value or completed sales. Spread is the middle half of the quoted prices (25th to 75th percentile), so it is not the full range. Single high-value offers in Chapter 4 sit far above these medians.
Key takeaways
- 01
Carding leads the relevant set, much of it in Chinese-language channels.
- 02
Card figures cover only cards seen in clear text in collected posts (§8.1).
- 03
Official cases with amounts describe changed payment details and email compromise; confirm every bank-detail change out of band.
Chapter 9
Banking and finance deep dive
This chapter answers
Where does the visible exposure of Australian banks sit: in the bank, at its staff, or at its customers?
In short
Most visible exposure sits on the customer side: 43,041 non-employee device associations (most plausibly customers' devices), card-checker activity and account-trading posts. The bank- and staff-side signals are current listings at 11 of 22 banks and 256 employee-classified devices. Three banks carry most of the card and customer-device signals. Triage each current credential listing first, then validate employee devices, and monitor checker declines on your BIN ranges (a BIN is the issuer's card-number prefix).
This chapter covers the 22 banks among the 36 banking-and-finance organisations in Chapter 3; the other 14 are superannuation funds, payment, lending and other finance firms, and a crypto exchange. That is why 43,041 non-employee devices here differ from the sector totals in Chapter 3, and why 11 of the sector's 19 current listings sit at banks. Aggregates only; individual banks are not named.
banks with a current credential listing
banking and finance organisations with a current credential listing (11 at banks; the other 8 at funds, payment firms and other finance organisations)
banks with non-employee device associations (43,041 in total; ownership and current infection unverified)
banks with employee-classified devices (256 in total)
banking and finance organisations enforcing DMARC
banks on our list with cards in clear text in collected posts (443 of the 1,102 cards name one of them; narrow scope, §8.1)
The top three banks account for 69% of the attributed cards and most of the non-employee device associations.
What it means for banks.
- Current listings come first. 11 of 22 banks had one on the day of the check; apply Decision 1 (disposition within 5 working days).
- Employee exposure is small but real. 256 employee-classified devices across 17 banks are the intrusion-relevant subset. After current listings, they deserve priority validation over the much larger non-employee total.
- Non-employee device associations are the larger exposure. 43,041 device associations across 21 of 22 banks are not employee-classified, and most plausibly they are customers' devices. Ownership, current infection and whether any stored session still works are unverified. Fraud teams should use device and session risk signals at login and at payee changes, not only password checks.
- Login files for bank domains circulate in small batches. An automated forum uploader posted small credential files named after the login pages of several Australian banks in May, June and August. Their lines are consistent with stealer logs from users' devices (an inference; origin not established), and they feed the same account-takeover risk.
- Card checking is a detectable precursor. Checker bots test cards with small authorisations on merchant gateways. Issuers can detect clusters of declined low-value attempts from foreign gateways on their BIN ranges, identify the cards involved, check their authorisation and fraud signals, and reissue the cards confirmed at risk under issuer policy.
- Mule and loader demand is the downstream risk. Posts seeking "loaders" for aged business and personal accounts (B13) target banks with remote onboarding and large transfer limits; they do not show that accounts were opened or used at the assessed banks.
Key takeaways
- 01
Current credential listings at 11 of 22 banks come first, then the 256 employee-classified devices; the 43,041 non-employee ones also need validation.
- 02
Every banking and finance organisation on the list enforces DMARC.
- 03
Card-checker declines on your BIN ranges are a detectable precursor.
Chapter 10
Regulatory and national response
This chapter answers
What did Australian law and regulators require of organisations in 2026, and what changes next?
In short
Australia's rules tightened in steps rather than with one new law. Ransomware payments must be reported within 72 hours, and Home Affairs moved to a compliance and enforcement phase in January 2026. Privacy duties on automated decisions apply from 10 December 2026, and a draft bill would set a fixed 72-hour data breach deadline. Courts penalised two financial firms for weak security, and APRA sought a third penalty. Map which regime applies to you, and rehearse against the earliest clock that applies.
| Measure | What we could verify | Status and caution |
|---|---|---|
| Ransomware payment reporting (Cyber Security Act 2024, Part 3) | A reporting business entity must report a ransomware payment to the designated Commonwealth body, through ASD's ReportCyber, within 72 hours of making it or becoming aware of it. The duty covers businesses whose previous-year turnover exceeds 3 million AUD (pro rata for a part year) and responsible entities for critical-infrastructure assets under Part 2B of the SOCI Act. Commonwealth and State bodies are outside it. The civil penalty is 60 penalty units [S75][S76] | Part 3 commenced on 29 May 2025 under section 2 [S75]. Reporting under the rules has applied since 30 May 2025; a second phase began on 1 January 2026 [S76]. Home Affairs guidance words the threshold as 3 million AUD or more [S76] |
| Cyber Incident Review Board (Part 5) | Reviews of significant incidents; the chair may require documents [S75] | Commenced on 29 May 2025, as Part 3 [S75] |
| Smart-device security standards (Part 2) | Manufacturers and suppliers must meet security standards set by the rules [S75] | Part 2 commenced 29 November 2025 [S75]; the standards apply to relevant consumer smart devices manufactured from 4 March 2026 (Smart Devices Rules) [S77] |
| Privacy Act: statutory tort (Privacy and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2024, Schedule 2) | A cause of action for serious invasions of privacy [S78] | In force from 10 June 2025 [S78] |
| Privacy Act: automated decisions (Schedule 1, Part 15) | APP entities must say in their privacy policy when a computer program makes, or substantially informs, decisions that significantly affect individuals [S78][S79] | Applies from 10 December 2026 [S78][S79] |
| Critical-infrastructure incident reporting (SOCI Act 2018, Part 2B) | Responsible entities must report to ASD a cyber incident with a significant impact on an asset's availability within 12 hours, and one with a relevant impact within 72 hours; an oral report needs a written record within 84 or 48 hours [S80] | In force |
| APRA information security (CPS 234) | APRA-regulated entities must notify APRA as soon as possible, and no later than 72 hours, after becoming aware of a material information security incident [S81] | In force |
| APRA operational risk (CPS 230) | APRA-regulated entities must notify APRA within 24 hours of a disruption to a critical operation outside tolerance, and within 72 hours of an operational risk incident with a likely material impact [S82] | In force; current version effective 1 July 2026 [S82] |
| Notifiable data breaches (Privacy Act 1988, Part IIIC) | APP entities must assess a suspected eligible breach within 30 days and notify the Information Commissioner and affected individuals as soon as practicable; there is no fixed hour count [S83] | In force |
| Fixed breach-notification deadline (exposure draft) | The Privacy Amendment (Personal Data Protection) Bill 2026 would require notice to the Information Commissioner within 72 hours of reasonable grounds to believe an eligible breach occurred; the 30-day assessment window would stay [S84] | Exposure draft for consultation (September 2026); not law at our cut-off |
| Critical-infrastructure disclosure | A Home Affairs consultation proposed a temporary delay in public disclosure of the most serious critical-infrastructure incidents [S85] | Consultation (March 2026); not law at our cut-off |
10.1 What the reporting data shows
Ransomware payments are now partly measurable. iTnews reported, from a freedom-of-information release and later Home Affairs figures, that larger businesses made at least 75 ransom payment reports in the regime's first eight months [S71]. The businesses had turnover above 3 million AUD. Between 7 and 13 such reports were made each month. Critical-infrastructure entities made 19 payment reports in the eight months to January 2026, at least 94 reports in total [S71].
These are payment reports, not attacks. Smaller businesses below the threshold do not report, and organisations that refuse to pay do not appear. Read the figure as a floor for paid extortion among larger firms.
10.2 Enforcement in the window
| Date | Body | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Feb 2026 | Federal Court, on ASIC's application | A fixed-income broker ordered to pay a 2.5 million AUD penalty and 500,000 AUD in costs over cyber security failures linked to a 2023 breach of about 18,000 clients' data [S40] |
| 16 Jul 2026 | Privacy Commissioner | Preliminary inquiries into the 2025 Qantas incident closed without investigation; the Commissioner said the evidence did not support the likelihood of a breach of privacy law [S28] |
| 11 Aug 2026 | APRA, in the Federal Court | APRA sought an 8 million AUD penalty against a listed regional bank under the Banking Executive Accountability Regime over weak authentication controls exploited in a 2023 account-access attack; the bank accepted it, and the court had not yet ruled [S86] |
| 25 Sep 2026 | OAIC | The investigation into the 2023 Latitude breach continues, with a representative complaint accepted [S87] |
| Oct 2026 | NSW Supreme Court, on ASIC's application | A financial-advice licensee ordered to pay a 1.35 million AUD penalty and 250,000 AUD in costs for inadequate cyber security policies and oversight of its representatives [S88] |
| 4 Nov 2026 | Information Commissioner | Inquiries into offshore access to court recordings at a transcription provider closed; the provider is in liquidation [S89] |
The October 2025 Federal Court order against Australian Clinical Labs, 5.8 million AUD, remains the first civil penalty under the Privacy Act [S90].
Which reporting clocks apply to you? Current law at our cut-off; the proposed 72-hour privacy deadline is not included. Owners are suggestions.
| Who it applies to | Trigger | Recipient | Deadline | Suggested owner |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Businesses with turnover above 3 million AUD; critical-infrastructure responsible entities | A ransomware payment made, or known to have been made on its behalf | Designated Commonwealth body, through ASD's ReportCyber | 72 hours | Legal, with the CISO |
| Critical-infrastructure responsible entities (SOCI Part 2B) | Cyber incident with a significant impact on the asset's availability | ASD | 12 hours; written record within 84 hours of an oral report | CISO |
| Critical-infrastructure responsible entities (SOCI Part 2B) | Cyber incident with a relevant impact | ASD | 72 hours; written record within 48 hours of an oral report | CISO |
| APRA-regulated entities (CPS 234) | Material information security incident | APRA | As soon as possible, at most 72 hours | CISO and chief risk officer |
| APRA-regulated entities (CPS 230) | Disruption to a critical operation outside tolerance | APRA | 24 hours | Head of operational risk |
| APP entities (Privacy Act) | Reasonable grounds to believe an eligible data breach occurred | OAIC and affected individuals | As soon as practicable; assess a suspected breach within 30 days | Privacy officer |
Commonwealth and State bodies are outside ransomware payment reporting. Commonwealth agencies report incidents to ASD and fall under the notifiable data breach scheme; only 35% of entities reported at least half of observed incidents in 2024-25 [S36]. State and territory bodies usually follow state privacy law and the state cyber unit's reporting line.
What CISOs should do now. Name the person who files each report in the table above. Rehearse against the earliest clock that applies, such as 12 hours for a significant critical-infrastructure incident or 24 hours for an APRA critical-operation disruption, and record timings and filing evidence. The 72-hour privacy deadline in the draft bill is a proposal, not current law. Update the privacy policy for automated decisions before 10 December 2026, less than three weeks after publication. Keep a dated record of controls, because courts have now penalised firms for security failures that preceded a breach. This section is not legal advice.
Key takeaways
- 01
Ransomware payments must be reported within 72 hours, and at least 94 payment reports were made in the first eight months.
- 02
A draft bill would set a fixed 72-hour deadline for data breach notices; it was not law at our cut-off.
- 03
Courts penalised two financial firms for security failures and APRA sought a bank penalty; keep dated evidence of your controls.
Chapter 11
Outlook
This chapter answers
What should Australian organisations plan for next, and what evidence would change that plan?
In short
Plan for the same evidence types, not a new threat: identity exposure that stays invisible until it is used, extortion that reaches organisations through suppliers, and state-linked access to edge devices. Leak-site listings rose against 2025, but one year of listings is not a forecast. Change the plan when the evidence below changes, not on a calendar.
11.1 Key judgements
| Judgement | Confidence | Basis and limit |
|---|---|---|
| Identity exposure (devices, stealer logs, credential listings) is the most widespread measurable risk to Australia's leading organisations | High for the 250-organisation list | 240 with devices, 250 with credential records, 111 with current listings; not national prevalence |
| Extortion groups will keep listing Australian victims at or above the 2026 rate | Medium (planning assumption) | 169 listings in 2026 against 111 in the same period of 2025; listings depend on global brands, not Australian events |
| Many of the largest data incidents will continue to start at suppliers and shared platforms | Medium | Several of the largest confirmed 2026 incidents began at a supplier (§2.4); small sample |
| If edge-device flaws stay exploitable, plan for state-linked and criminal access attempts against critical infrastructure | Medium (planning assumption) | Joint advisories and ASIO's statement (§2.3, §7.2); no named Australian victim |
| Leak claims against public bodies will keep outpacing confirmed intrusions | Medium | Several 2026 claims were disputed on the record (§6.4) |
11.2 What would change the assessment
| Current interpretation | Evidence that would change it | Decision affected |
|---|---|---|
| Listings reflect global brands, not an Australian campaign | A brand or affiliate concentrating on Australian victims, or Australian-language lures in negotiations | Raise extortion readiness; run the restore test in §12.1 first |
| Large named-company claims are unverified | A sample matched to a specific system, or confirmation by the company | Trigger notification and customer-protection actions |
| Current listings mean "validate", not "breached" | Validation shows active accounts without MFA among listed credentials | Escalate to incident response and enforce MFA for that population |
| State-linked activity is described in advisories, not named incidents | An official attribution of a named Australian intrusion | Fund edge-system and identity telemetry ahead of other projects |
| The 72-hour breach deadline is a draft | Introduction of the bill to Parliament | Move the breach-notice rehearsal into the incident plan |
11.3 Conditional scenarios
- If a supplier that stores your customers' data discloses a breach, then plan for phishing that quotes real account or booking details (a planning assumption); signal: supplier notices and forum re-uploads. Decision: warn customers and tighten account-recovery checks.
- If a new critical edge or e-commerce vulnerability is disclosed, then plan for exploitation attempts within days; signal: ACSC alerts and vendor advisories. Decision: patch-and-verify, then hunt for web shells and skimming code.
- If card-checker activity on your BIN ranges rises and investigation confirms that specific cards are being tested, then plan for card-not-present fraud on those cards; signal: clustered low-value declines from foreign gateways. Decision: investigate, check authorisation and fraud signals, and reissue the cards confirmed at risk.
Key takeaways
- 01
Plan for evidence types, not a new threat: identity exposure, supplier-led extortion and edge-device access.
- 02
Each judgement has a signal; change the plan when the signal changes.
- 03
One year of rising listings is a planning input, not a forecast.
Chapter 12
Action plan
This chapter answers
What should each team do in the next 90 days, and how will the board know it was done?
In short
Start by confirming you receive credential-listing and infected-device alerts, then act on what is specific to you: current listings, employee devices, internet-facing edge systems and the suppliers that hold your customer data. Then close payment-change, email and web gaps, and rehearse a combined extortion and disclosure scenario against the earliest reporting clock that applies. The board knows the work is done from each row's completion evidence and the scorecard; report both by day 90.
12.1 30/60/90 days
This is a sequence, not a waiting period. A current material threat should enter your incident process immediately.
1Days 1-30
Confirm that you receive credential-listing and infected-device alerts for your primary domains; if not, arrange them, and record the listing-validation and employee-device rows as blocked until alerts arrive
- Owner
- CISO and threat intelligence
- Completion evidence
- Alert source named; first alert received
For every current credential listing tied to your domains, validate the account and its MFA status within 5 working days
- Owner
- Identity team
- Completion evidence
- Each listing has a disposition: reset, already remediated, or not ours, with a date
Validate employee-classified device associations; revoke sessions and tokens where active
- Owner
- Identity and endpoint teams
- Completion evidence
- Device list reconciled with asset inventory; revocations logged
Patch and re-test internet-facing edge, mail and e-commerce systems named in 2026 ACSC alerts, joint advisories or public scans (Cisco SD-WAN, Exchange, TeamCity, Adobe Commerce and Magento, N-able N-central, CMS plugins; §12.3)
- Owner
- Infrastructure
- Completion evidence
- External re-test passes; web-shell hunt completed on mail and web servers
Name who files each report that applies to you (ransomware payment, critical-infrastructure incident, APRA notification, notifiable data breach) and the spokesperson for public claims (§10)
- Owner
- CISO, legal, communications
- Completion evidence
- Approved one-page playbook with each trigger, recipient, deadline and named owner
List every supplier that stores or processes your customer data, including SaaS platforms, contact centres and website scripts
- Owner
- Procurement and privacy
- Completion evidence
- Register with data types, contract clause and breach-notice contact per supplier
Before 10 December 2026, less than three weeks after publication: confirm whether the automated-decision duty applies and, if it does, update the privacy policy (§10)
- Owner
- Privacy
- Completion evidence
- Applicability decision recorded; policy published where the duty applies
2Days 31-60
Where DMARC is p=none, missing or invalid, inventory senders and stage enforcement
- Owner
- Messaging
- Completion evidence
- Aligned senders; p=quarantine with a rollback route
Move privileged and remote users first, then others, to phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2 security keys, passkeys or certificate-based sign-in); block device-code sign-in where it is not needed (§12.3)
- Owner
- Identity team and SOC
- Completion evidence
- Coverage recorded per user group; device-code flow restricted; test sign-in detected
Require out-of-band confirmation for payment-instruction and payee changes, including supplier bank-detail changes (§8.4)
- Owner
- Finance and fraud
- Completion evidence
- Procedure signed off; one simulated request caught
Monitor third-party scripts on payment and login pages; alert on changes to scripts that load on checkout pages (§2.4)
- Owner
- Web and e-commerce teams
- Completion evidence
- Script inventory; change alert live and tested
Test account-recovery and payee-change processes against an attacker who knows name, birth date, address and licence number
- Owner
- Fraud and customer operations
- Completion evidence
- Weaknesses recorded and fixed, retest passed
Alert on clustered card-checker declines on your BIN ranges
- Owner
- Fraud
- Completion evidence
- Alert live; first review recorded
Run a timed restore test of one crown-jewel system, offline from the domain
- Owner
- Infrastructure
- Completion evidence
- Restore time recorded against the recovery time objective (RTO: the longest outage your business-continuity plan allows)
Critical-infrastructure operators: test running an essential service isolated from external networks (§12.3)
- Owner
- OT and operations
- Completion evidence
- Isolation test record with duration achieved
Monitor leak sites and forums for your name and suppliers' names; prepare a claim-assessment checklist
- Owner
- Threat intelligence
- Completion evidence
- Checklist approved; first triage logged
3Days 61-90
Sign DNS for primary domains where your registrar supports it; fix invalid TLS certificates and add HSTS
- Owner
- Network and web teams
- Completion evidence
- DNSSEC validation succeeds from an external resolver; certificate checks pass
Add breach-notice, log-retention and 72-hour cooperation clauses to contracts with suppliers holding customer data
- Owner
- Procurement and legal
- Completion evidence
- Clause in every renewed contract; gap list for the rest
Run a tabletop combining a data-theft claim on a leak site with a supplier breach, timed against the earliest reporting clock that applies (§10)
- Owner
- CISO, communications, legal
- Completion evidence
- Decision log, timings recorded against each clock, draft filings
Report the scorecard against targets (below)
- Owner
- CISO to board
- Completion evidence
- Board paper with remaining gaps and owners
Scorecard targets. These are suggested defaults; set your own where policy differs.
| Measure | Target |
|---|---|
| Current listings with a disposition within 5 working days | 100% by day 90 |
| Employee-classified devices reconciled with the asset inventory | 100% by day 90 |
| Internet-facing edge, mail and e-commerce systems passing an external re-test | 100% by day 90 |
| Primary domains with DMARC at quarantine or reject | 100%, or a dated plan, by day 90 |
| Privileged and remote users on phishing-resistant MFA (number matching does not count) | 100%, or a dated plan, by day 90 |
| Suppliers holding customer data with a named breach-notice contact | 100% by day 90 |
| Payee and payment-instruction changes confirmed out of band | 100% by day 90 |
| Restore test within RTO | Passed, or a dated fix, by day 90 |
| Credential-listing and infected-device monitoring for primary domains, internal or through a provider | In place by day 30 |
| Privacy policy updated for automated decisions, where the duty applies | Before 10 December 2026 |
12.2 By role
| Role | First decision |
|---|---|
| Board | Ask for the current-listing and employee-device numbers for your organisation, the supplier register, and the date by which each item is validated |
| CISO | Put listing and device monitoring in place first, then edge-system exploitability checks, identity validation and the supplier register |
| SOC | Add detections for web shells on mail and web servers, device-code and adversary-in-the-middle sign-ins, new remote-management agents and mass token use from new devices |
| Fraud | Use device and session risk at login and payee changes; monitor clustered card-checker declines on your BINs; warn customers about impersonation using leaked booking or account data |
| Communications and legal | Prepare statements for unverified leak-site claims and supplier breaches, separating claim, verified fact and action; keep every applicable reporting clock in the playbook |
12.3 Patch reference for 2026 alerts
The table lists flaws that ACSC alerts, joint advisories or public scans in 2026 described as exploited, targeted or exposed in Australia. Versions are from NVD and vendor advisories; confirm the current advisory before patching.
| Product | CVE | Affected and fixed versions | Australian context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller, Manager and Validator | CVE-2026-20127 | Fixed releases exist in the 20.9, 20.12, 20.15 and 20.18 trains; take the first fixed build for your train from the Cisco advisory. Releases before 20.9 and the 20.11, 20.13, 20.14 and 20.16 trains have no fix of their own: move 20.11 to a fixed 20.12 release, 20.13 and 20.14 to a fixed 20.15 release, and 20.16 to a fixed 20.18 release. In the CISA known-exploited list since 25 February 2026 [S91][S57] | Five Eyes alert and hunt guide (February) [S24] |
| JetBrains TeamCity On-Premises | CVE-2026-63077 | Before 2026.1.3 and 2025.11.7 [S92] | ACSC: exploited against Australian servers (August) [S93] |
| Adobe Commerce and Magento Open Source | CVE-2026-75650 | Affected: Commerce 2.4.4 to 2.4.9, Commerce B2B 1.3.3 to 1.5.3 and Magento Open Source 2.4.6 to 2.4.9, each up to the "-2026-aug" releases. Fix: apply the dedicated hotfix for CVE-2026-75650 in bulletin APSB26-146; in the CISA known-exploited list since 8 September 2026 [S94][S95] | ACSC: a substantial number of potentially vulnerable instances in Australia (September) [S69] |
| Microsoft Exchange Server 2016, 2019 and Subscription Edition | CVE-2026-62911 | Fixed by the August 2026 security updates: 2016 CU23 KB5121576 (build 15.01.2507.072); 2019 CU14 KB5121575 (15.02.1544.044); 2019 CU15 KB5121574 (15.02.1748.049); Subscription Edition RTM KB5121573 (15.02.2562.046) [S96][S31] | Public scan (Shadowserver), as reported: 382 Australian servers still vulnerable on 31 August [S30] |
| N-able N-central | CVE-2026-18556 and CVE-2026-18577 (authentication bypass; the second follows an incomplete fix of the first) | Affected through 2026.3.1 (NVD). Fixed in Hotfix 2, build 2026.3.1.10, which supersedes Hotfix 1 (build 2026.3.1.7). Both CVEs in the CISA known-exploited list since 3-4 August 2026 [S97][S98][S99] | ACSC: attackers targeting Australian instances (August) [S100] |
| WordPress and other CMS plugins | 17 patched flaws, including CVE-2025-32432 (Craft CMS) | Craft CMS fixed in 3.9.15, 4.14.15 and 5.6.17 [S101] | ACSC campaign alert (July); ClickFix and Vidar Stealer via hijacked Australian WordPress sites (May) [S70][S102] |
Two identity techniques also featured in 2026 ACSC warnings: device-code phishing against Microsoft 365 (May) and ClickFix lures [S103][S102]. For critical-infrastructure operators, ASD's revised isolation guidance sets a three-month target for running essential services disconnected from other networks [S104].
Key takeaways
- 01
Confirm monitoring, then validate current listings and employee devices in the first 30 days.
- 02
Build the supplier register and lock down payment changes by day 60; report the scorecard by day 90.
- 03
Rehearse a leak-site claim combined with a supplier breach against the earliest reporting clock that applies.
12.4 How Brandefense can help
Brandefense combines Cyber Threat Intelligence, Digital Risk Protection and External Attack Surface Management. The analysis in this report used the same data and scoring that the platform applies to monitored organisations: infected-device and credential associations, current credential-market listings, lookalike domains, exposed documents and dark-web mentions. It does not promise that every claim can be verified or that a historical record remains usable.
Bring your domains, brands and security priorities to a 30-45 minute demo with Sales and Presales. The team can show how platform monitoring relates external signals to the assets you manage. A Brandefense team member or a partner in your region will follow up.
Appendix A. Method
A.1 Window, sources and priority
The research window is 1 January-18 November 2026 by the date a post was published. Own data comes first: Brandefense Blackhole (dark-web and messaging posts, infected-device and credential associations, card material in posts), Ransompedia (ransomware leak-site listings) and Brandefense Atlas exposure ratings. External sources give context. Data were extracted on 21 November 2026. Sources S1-S7 are Brandefense's own data and have no public address; every external source in Appendix C carries a link and a verification date.
A.2 Blackhole posts
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Posts with the Australia country tag | 132,909 |
| Forum posts mentioning Australia | 3,501 |
| Posts in the relevant set | 50,103-53,360, given as a range |
Relevant-set counts remain an upper bound for criminal activity concerning Australia, because many posts list Australia as one market among many.
Two limits shape every trend in this report. We do not compare categories across the year. Volume also varies by month across all countries; we do not read month-to-month changes in the tagged count as threat trends.
A.3 The 250 organisations
Selection and limits are in §3.1. The exposure signals are those listed in §3.1, as held on 21 November 2026.
A.4 Atlas ratings
Each organisation received an Atlas exposure rating from 0 to 100 from the signals listed in §3.1, and the 250 together a national headline figure. Some signals were unavailable for some organisations, so ratings may understate their exposure. Treat a current credential-market listing as a reason to validate accounts, not as proof of a breach.
A.5 DNS, TLS and web checks
Results cover each primary domain's public mail, SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DNSSEC and CAA records, its TLS certificate and its homepage headers. Missing, invalid and monitoring-only (p=none) DMARC policies count as no enforcement. No intrusive testing was done.
The passive hygiene index is an Odin analytical composite of these email, DNS, TLS and header results, on a scale of 0-100. A higher value means weaker hygiene; it is a model, not an Atlas rating.
A.6 Card material in posts
Scope: only payment cards that appeared in clear text in the dark-web posts covered by this report, reported only as aggregate counts. These figures do not measure card theft or fraud loss.
A.7 Ransomware
We used Ransompedia listings for Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom, all dates, dated by publication. Third-party relays of leak-site posts are context only.
A.8 Incident coverage
Incident coverage draws on our own data and on official and press reporting for the window, chiefly the OAIC, the AFP, iTnews and Cyber Daily. Laws in Chapter 10 are cited from the Federal Register of Legislation and official guidance.
Coverage limits. Our view is partial:
- ACSC alerts are cited from press reporting of them.
- Incidents reported only in Chinese- or Russian-language media may be missing.
- Tor ransomware leak sites are covered only through Ransompedia.
- Offers made only in closed forums, private groups or direct messages may be missing.
- Posts deleted early may be missing.
- Incidents that organisations handle without disclosure stay invisible.
That an incident is absent from this report does not mean it did not happen.
A.9 Confidence and boundaries
High confidence applies to a reproducible measurement, not to a criminal's underlying assertion. Medium indicates an interpretation with a clear supporting line and stated limits. "Unverified" means not independently established; it is neither proof of fabrication nor proof of a breach. Victim organisations are described by role; an organisation is named only where it or an authority confirmed the incident and it was widely reported. Actor aliases are printed; links, contacts, indicators and personal data are withheld. Full provenance is held in an internal evidence register.
Appendix B. Evidence register
Every post quoted in this report appears as a redacted post card in the chapter shown. Excerpts are short; omissions are marked [...]; identifiers, contacts, links and victim organisations are replaced with labels in brackets, under the policy in A.9. Translations are ours unless the post carried the actor's own English. Posting dates are not intrusion dates. Post identifiers, links and full text are held in an internal evidence register.
| Card | Posted | Venue | Alias as shown | Language | Shown in |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| B01 | 2026-01-04 | Breach forum | Loser | English | §4.4 |
| B02 | 2026-01-16 | Leak forum | Retrogade | English | §4.4 |
| B03 | 2026-01-19 | Breach forum | amelgarg | English | §4.4 |
| B04 | 2026-02-23 | Breach forum | FulcrumSec | English | §4.6 |
| B05 | 2026-04-18 | Breach forum | RubiconH4ck | English | §4.4 |
| B06 | 2026-02-06 | Breach forum | 2019 (quoted) | English | §4.4 |
| B07 | 2026-05-08 | Breach forum | LapsusAdmin | English | §4.4 |
| B08 | 2026-09-13 | Carding forum | RED✘ | English | §4.4 |
| B09 | 2026-02-14 | Cracking forum | jstAclass | English | §8.3 |
| B10 | 2026-04-07 | Actor channel | 313 Team | Arabic, with the group's own English | §6.3 |
| B11 | 2026-04-07 | Actor channel | 313 Team | Arabic, with the group's own English | §6.3 |
| B12 | 2026-11-15 | Breach forum | mercyxx | English | §8.4 |
| B13 | 2026-03-07 | Carding forum | Sundayman_99 | English | §8.3 |
| B14 | 2026-04-17 | Actor channel | ShinyHunters | English | §4.4 |
| B15 | 2026-03-03 | Leak-monitor bot relaying a carding forum | Caan (relayed) | English | §4.5 |
| B16 | 2026-02-14 | Leak forum | gunnerdown | English | §4.4 |
| B17 | 2026-01-24 | Breach forum | thejackal101 | English | §4.5 |
Appendix C. Sources
- S1Brandefense Blackhole posts concerning Australia, post dates 1 January-18 November 2026, extracted 21 November 2026.
- S2Brandefense Blackhole posts of the 313 Team channel, 7 April 2026.
- S3Brandefense Blackhole infected-device, breach-database, stealer-log and combolist associations for 250 domains, as held on 21 November 2026.
- S4Brandefense Atlas exposure ratings for the 250 domains, 21 November 2026, including credential-market listings, lookalike domains, exposed documents and mention statistics.
- S5Brandefense email, DNS and web hygiene results for the 250 primary domains, 21 November 2026.
- S6Brandefense Ransompedia, listings for Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom, all dates, extracted 21 November 2026.
- S7Brandefense Blackhole, aggregate counts of Australia-associated payment cards seen in clear text in posts, 21 November 2026.
- S8iTnews, "Qld gov says students, staff caught in Canvas cyber incident", 7 May 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/qld-gov-says-students-staff-caught-in-canvas-cyber-incident-625664. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S9iTnews, "Aus universities and TAFEs investigating exposure to Canvas cyber incident", 7 May 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/aus-universities-and-tafes-investigating-exposure-to-canvas-cyber-incident-625659. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S10iTnews, report on card-skimming code planted through a website-testing service on Australian brands' sites (title names the service), 18 November 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/hijacked-website-testing-tool-plants-card-skimmer-on-australian-brands-sites-630407. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S11iTnews, "Unpatched server behind Vic student data breach", 7 October 2026, on the Office of the Victorian Information Commissioner's findings. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/unpatched-server-behind-vic-student-data-breach-629494. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S12Cyber Daily, reports on Origin Energy's ASX disclosures of a customer data incident, 22-31 July 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/security/13942-breached-origin-energy-discloses-data-breach-to-asx and a follow-up report of 31 July (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S13Cyber Daily, "ASIO boss warns of active cyber threat to Aussie critical infrastructure", 26 June 2026, on the Director-General's Annual Threat Assessment of 24 June 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/security/13813-asio-boss-warns-of-active-cyber-threat-to-aussie-critical-infrastructure. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S14Region Canberra, report on the ASD Annual Cyber Threat Report 2025-26, 27 October 2026. https://region.com.au/asd-report-highlights-increasing-number-of-ai-enabled-cyber-threats/1011269/. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S15Cyber Daily, "Fix your routers: Aussie cyber agency joins partners to warn of ongoing Russian cyber activity", 14 July 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/security/13896-fix-your-routers-aussie-cyber-agency-joins-partners-to-warn-of-ongoing-russian-cyber-activity. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S16Cyber Daily, "ASD, National Cyber Security Coordinator warn of ongoing Russian phishing campaign", 24 July 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/security/13955-alert-asd-national-cyber-security-coordinator-warn-of-ongoing-russian-phishing-campaign. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S17iTnews, "ASD joins seven-nation alert as US seizes Chinese hacking firm's tools", 12 October 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/asd-joins-seven-nation-alert-as-us-seizes-chinese-hacking-firms-tools-629536. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S18iTnews, "Beware DPRK job scams, ASD warns, but won't confirm local impact", 22 September 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/beware-dprk-job-scams-asd-warns-but-wont-confirm-local-impact-629081. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S19DataReportal (Kepios), Digital 2027: Australia, 4 November 2026 (data for October 2026). https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2027-australia. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S20Cyber Daily, "Aussie cyber agency received more than 82,000 cybercrime reports in 12 months", 27 October 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/security/14354-report-aussie-cyber-agency-received-more-than-82-000-cybercrime-reports-in-12-months. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S21OAIC, "Data breach notifications increase to all-time high in 2025, new NDB stats show", 6 July 2026. https://www.oaic.gov.au/news/media-centre/data-breach-notifications-increase-to-all-time-high-in-2025,-new-ndb-stats-show. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S22OAIC, "Large-scale data breaches on the rise, latest OAIC statistics reveal", 26 October 2026. https://www.oaic.gov.au/news/media-centre/large-scale-data-breaches-on-the-rise,-latest-oaic-statistics-reveal. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S23Cyber Daily, "Scams cost Australians over $2bn in 2025, says ACCC", 30 March 2026, citing the National Anti-Scam Centre's Targeting Scams report. https://www.cyberdaily.au/security/13400-scams-cost-australians-over-2bn-in-2025-says-accc. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S24iTnews, "ASD and Five-Eyes spy agencies alert on exploited Cisco SD-WAN zero-day", 26 February 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/asd-and-five-eyes-spy-agencies-alert-on-exploited-cisco-sd-wan-zero-day-623881. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S25iTnews, "Australia sanctions North Korean IT worker bosses and financiers", 23 October 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/australia-sanctions-north-korean-it-worker-bosses-and-financiers-629860. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S26OAIC, "Statement on Instructure (Canvas) cyber incident", 8 May 2026 (updated 11 May 2026). https://www.oaic.gov.au/news/media-centre/statement-on-instructure-canvas-cyber-incident. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S27Cyber Daily, report on a hotel chain's data breach affecting about 2 million customers (title names the chain), 25 September 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S28OAIC, "Privacy Commissioner completes preliminary inquiries into Qantas 2025 data incident", 16 July 2026. https://www.oaic.gov.au/news/media-centre/privacy-commissioner-completes-preliminary-inquiries-into-qantas-2025-data-incident. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S29iTnews, report on unauthorised access by an AI agent to a Medicare statistics portal, 23 September 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S30iTnews, "Hundreds of old, vulnerable Exchange servers remain in Australia", 8 September 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/hundreds-of-old-vulnerable-exchange-servers-remain-in-australia-628758. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S31NIST National Vulnerability Database, CVE-2026-62911 (Microsoft Exchange Server). https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62911. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S32Cyber Daily, report on a fintech lending platform confirming a data breach (title names the platform), 20 February 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S33iTnews, report on a GP clinic chain's data theft (title names the chain), 16 July 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S34iTnews, "NSW Health server targeted in cyber incident", 4 November 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/nsw-health-server-targeted-in-cyber-incident-630096. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S35iTnews, report on a state government downgrading the impact of an alleged Treasury data breach (title names the state), 5 May 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S36iTnews, "Government entities not reporting cyber incidents to ASD", 12 February 2026, on the Commonwealth Cyber Security Posture report. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/government-entities-not-reporting-cyber-incidents-to-asd-623556. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S37iTnews, "Vic Education database breached via school's network", 15 January 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/vic-education-database-breached-via-schools-network-622987. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S38Cyber Daily, report on a tutoring platform's data breach affecting more than 1 million Australians and New Zealanders (title names the platform), 8 September 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S39Cyber Daily, report on a ransomware group's claim against a sugar manufacturer that had disclosed an incident (title names the company), 18 June 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S40iTnews, report on a Federal Court penalty against a fixed-income broker for cyber security failures (title names the broker), 9 February 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S41iTnews, "Coles Group investigating a cyber incident", 16 November 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/coles-group-investigating-a-cyber-incident-630361. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S42Cyber Daily, report on a furniture retailer disclosing a cyber incident to the ASX (title names the retailer), 14 August 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S43Cyber Daily, report on a book publisher and distributor restoring systems after unauthorised activity (title names the publisher), 27 August 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S44iTnews, report on a small Australian online store kept closed after hijacked extensions redirected shoppers (title names the platform), 16 October 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S45Cyber Daily, report on a global travel-technology provider's breach possibly affecting an Australian airline (title names both), 3 November 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S46Cyber Daily, report on a Cl0p listing of 9 companies linked to two Australian IT service providers, 3 February 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/security/13172-exclusive-cl0p-cyber-extortion-group-targets-australian-it-providers-clients. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S47Cyber Daily, report on the ABC wiping staff devices after a spyware campaign delivered through online advertising, 23 October 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/security/14347-aunty-hack-abc-wipes-staff-devices-after-discovering-spyware-campaign. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S48OC Media, "Pro-Iran hackers claim responsibility for cyberattack on Azerbaijan, citing hijab ban", October 2026. https://oc-media.org/breaking-pro-iran-hackers-claim-responsibility-for-cyberattack-on-azerbaijan-citing-hijab-ban/. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S49APA, "Azərbaycan informasiya resurslarına qarşı DDoS hücumlarında kommersiya xidmətindən istifadə edilib" (Commercial service used in DDoS attacks on Azerbaijani information resources), 16 October 2026. https://apa.az/ict/azerbaycan-informasiya-resurslarina-qarsi-ddos-hucumlarinda-kommersiya-xidmetinden-istifade-edilib-1005789. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S50Cyber Daily, report on a state government's response to a ransomware group's claim (title names the government), 17 June 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S51Cyber Daily, report on a cyber security incident notified to members of a state emergency service (title names the service), 30 June 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S52Cyber Daily, report on a health-standards body denying a ransomware group's claim (title names the body), 18 June 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S53Cyber Daily, report on a federal agency denying a forum persona's claim (title names the agency), 9 June 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S54Cyber Daily, report on a state court service responding to a data security incident after forum claims (title names the service), 31 July 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S55Cyber Daily, report on a state health department denying a ransomware group's claim (title names the department), 2 September 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S56Cyber Daily, report on the NSW Police investigation into a cyber security incident at NSW Health, 4 November 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/security/14396-breached-nsw-police-investigating-major-cyber-security-incident-impacting-nsw-health. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S57NIST National Vulnerability Database, CVE-2026-20127. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20127. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S58CISA and partners including ASD's ACSC, advisory AA26-113A on China-nexus covert networks of hijacked devices, 23 April 2026. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-113a. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S59National Cyber Security Centre (New Zealand) with the ACSC and CERT Tonga, advisory on the INC Ransom affiliate model, 6 March 2026. https://www.ncsc.govt.nz/alerts/inc-ransom-affiliate-model-enabling-targeting-of-critical-networks/. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S60Cyber Daily, report on Qilin listing four Australian victims in four days, 27 October 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/security/14358-exclusive-qilin-ransomware-group-claims-quartet-of-aussie-victims-in-as-many-days. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S61Cyber Daily, report on a regional club confirming a contained incident after a Qilin listing (title names the club), 28 October 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S62Cyber Daily, report on a suicide-prevention charity confirming a staff data breach after hacking claims (title names the charity), 14 July 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S63Cyber Daily, "Aussie schools breach: Instructure boss reaches agreement with ShinyHunters to not release data", 12 May 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/security/13580-aussie-schools-breach-instructure-boss-reaches-agreement-with-shinyhunters-to-not-release-data. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S64Cyber Daily, report on Queensland's education department confirming students and staff were affected by a supplier breach (title names the department and the crew), 7 May 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/security/13562-queensland-department-of-education-confirms-students-staff-impacted-by-shinyhunters-data-breach. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S65iTnews, report on two Western Australian men charged as alleged principal participants of TeamPCP, 27 August 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S66iTnews, "NDIA fended off March TeamPCP supply-chain hackers", 19 August 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/ndia-fended-off-march-teampcp-supply-chain-hackers-628227. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S67Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, "Threat Brief: Escalation of Cyber Risk Related to Iran", updated 17 April 2026. https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/iranian-cyberattacks-2026/. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S68Stuart Crocker, "Hacktivism is an underestimated threat, especially in geopolitical crises", ASPI The Strategist, 23 June 2026. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/hacktivism-is-an-underestimated-threat-especially-in-geopolitical-crises/. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S69iTnews, "ASD warns Aussie Adobe Commerce and Magento stores under attack", 10 September 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/asd-warns-aussie-adobe-commerce-and-magento-stores-under-attack-628811. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S70iTnews, "Second alert from ACSC in two months shows unpatched CMS bugs still exploited", 10 July 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/second-alert-from-acsc-in-two-months-shows-unpatched-cms-bugs-still-exploited-627256. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S71iTnews, "Australia's big end of town is paying ransomware groups", 26 February 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/australias-big-end-of-town-is-paying-ransomware-groups-623791. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S72iTnews, "Poor WA gov M365 security led to $71k theft and children's data breached", 9 March 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/poor-wa-gov-m365-security-led-to-71k-theft-and-childrens-data-breached-624118. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S73iTnews, "WA local gov entity lost $350,000 in phishing attack", 1 April 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/wa-local-gov-entity-lost-350000-in-phishing-attack-624680. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S74Australian Federal Police and NSW Police Force, joint media release on three people charged over scam proceeds spent on gold bullion, 15 May 2026, as reported by iTnews. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/nsw-cyber-cops-bust-alleged-bullion-buying-bec-bandits-625906. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S75Cyber Security Act 2024 (No. 98, 2024), sections 2, 26 and 27, Federal Register of Legislation. https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2024A00098/asmade/2024-11-29/text/2/epub/OEBPS/document_1/document_1.html. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S76Department of Home Affairs, "Ransomware payment reporting" factsheet. https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/cyber-security-subsite/files/factsheet-ransomware-payment-reporting.pdf. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S77Department of Home Affairs, "Security standards for smart devices", web page. https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/cyber-security/security-standards-for-smart-devices. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S78Privacy and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2024 (No. 128, 2024), section 2 (commencement), Federal Register of Legislation. https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2024A00128/asmade/text. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S79OAIC, "New resources on transparency for use of AI and automated decision-making", 30 September 2026. https://www.oaic.gov.au/news/media-centre/new-resources-on-transparency-for-use-of-ai-and-automated-decision-making. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S80Cyber and Infrastructure Security Centre, guidance on notification of cyber security incidents under the SOCI Act 2018, 2026. https://www.cisc.gov.au/resources-subsite/Documents/ncsi-guidance.pdf. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S81APRA, Prudential Standard CPS 234 Information Security. https://www.apra.gov.au/standards/cps-234. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S82APRA, Prudential Standard CPS 230 Operational Risk Management. https://www.apra.gov.au/standards/cps-230. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S83Privacy Act 1988, Part IIIC (sections 26WH, 26WK and 26WL), compilation of 4 June 2026, Federal Register of Legislation. https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2004A03712/2026-06-04/2026-06-04/text/original/epub/OEBPS/document_1/document_1.html. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S84iTnews, "Privacy Act overhaul to tighten 72-hour breach reporting deadline", 1 September 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/privacy-act-overhaul-to-tighten-72-hour-breach-reporting-deadline-628568. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S85iTnews, "Gov proposes disclosure delay for most serious cyberattacks", 26 March 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/gov-proposes-disclosure-delay-for-most-serious-cyberattacks-624575. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S86Cyber Daily, report on APRA seeking an 8 million AUD penalty against a regional bank under the Banking Executive Accountability Regime (title names the bank), 11 August 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S87OAIC, "OAIC's action in relation to the 2023 Latitude Data Breach and information to update and assist individuals", 25 September 2026. https://www.oaic.gov.au/news/media-centre/oaics-action-in-relation-to-the-2023-latitude-data-breach-and-information-to-update-and-assist-individuals. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S88ASIC, media release on a financial-advice licensee penalised 1.35 million AUD for cyber security failures (title names the licensee), October 2026. https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S89OAIC, report on preliminary inquiries into a court transcription provider (title names the provider), 4 November 2026. https://www.oaic.gov.au/news/media-centre (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S90OAIC, media centre listing of releases July 2025-November 2026, including "Australian Clinical Labs ordered to pay penalties in relation to Medlab Pathology data breach in first for Privacy Act" (9 October 2025). https://www.oaic.gov.au/news/media-centre. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S91Cisco, security advisory cisco-sa-sdwan-rpa-EHchtZk (CVE-2026-20127), first published 25 February 2026, updated 28 October 2026. https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sdwan-rpa-EHchtZk. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S92NIST National Vulnerability Database, CVE-2026-63077 (JetBrains TeamCity). https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63077. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S93iTnews, "ASD warns Australian TeamCity servers under attack", 25 August 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/asd-warns-australian-teamcity-servers-under-attack-628400. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S94Adobe, security bulletin APSB26-146 for Adobe Commerce, 7 September 2026. https://www.adobe.com/trust/security/products/commerce/apsb26-146.html. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S95NIST National Vulnerability Database, CVE-2026-75650 (Adobe Commerce; vendor bulletin APSB26-146). https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75650. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S96Microsoft Security Response Center, CVE-2026-62911, 11 August 2026. https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-62911. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S97N-able, "N-central security update", 10 August 2026. https://www.n-able.com/blog/n-central-security-update-august-10-2026. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S98NIST National Vulnerability Database, CVE-2026-18556 (N-able N-central). https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18556. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S99NIST National Vulnerability Database, CVE-2026-18577 (N-able N-central). https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18577. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S100iTnews, "ASD warns of Australian attacks on N-able N-central RMM", 20 August 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/asd-warns-of-australian-attacks-on-n-able-n-central-rmm-628282. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S101NIST National Vulnerability Database, CVE-2025-32432 (Craft CMS). https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32432. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S102Cyber Daily, "Australian Cyber Security Centre warns of ClickFix campaign leveraging Australian infrastructure", 7 May 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/security/13564-australian-cyber-security-centre-warns-of-clickfix-campaign-leveraging-australian-infrastructure. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S103Cyber Daily, "Australian Signals Directorate warns of device code phishing activity targeting Microsoft 365 users", 20 May 2026. https://www.cyberdaily.au/security/13628-australian-signals-directorate-warns-of-device-code-phishing-activity-targeting-microsoft-365-users. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S104iTnews, "ASD to critical infrastructure ops: be ready to isolate systems for three months", 28 July 2026. https://www.itnews.com.au/news/asd-to-critical-infrastructure-ops-be-ready-to-isolate-systems-for-three-months-627708. Verified on 21 November 2026.
Appendix D. Glossary
- Blackhole: Brandefense's cybercrime data source covering posts, infected devices, credentials and card material.
- Ransompedia: Brandefense's ransomware database; listings record criminal claims.
- Atlas: Brandefense's external exposure scoring; scores run from 0 (nothing observed) to 100.
- Infected device: a device infected with information-stealing malware and associated with the organisation's domain; "employee" is a classification, not verified employment.
- Credential-market listing: a credential tied to the domain offered on a monitored market at the time of the check.
- Combolist: a list of login and password pairs assembled from various sources; age and validity vary.
- Stealer log: data captured by information-stealing malware from a device.
- Checker bot: a bot that tests stolen cards against payment gateways and prints the result.
- Card shop "base": a batch of stolen cards offered together on a card shop, often labelled by countries.
- Post card: a redacted reproduction of one dark-web post, with venue, date, alias, language and what it does and does not establish.
- Relay: a third-party channel or bot that reposts another actor's claim; a relay is weaker evidence than the actor's own post.
- Leak-site listing: an extortion group's public post naming a victim; it is a claim, not a confirmed breach.
- Loader: a criminal who moves stolen funds into or out of bank accounts, often aged or rented accounts.
- Fullz: a full identity record (name, birth date, address, identifiers and often financial details) sold for fraud.
- BEC (business email compromise): fraud in which a criminal uses or imitates a business mailbox to redirect payments.
- DMARC / SPF / DKIM: email-authentication standards; DMARC tells receivers what to do with mail that fails.
- DNSSEC: signatures that let resolvers verify DNS answers.
- DS record: the record in the parent zone that links a domain to its DNSSEC keys.
- TLP:CLEAR: may be shared without restriction; other legal duties still apply.
- AiTM (adversary-in-the-middle): a phishing page that relays a real login and captures passwords, one-time codes and the session cookie.
- Device-code phishing: a lure that tricks a user into approving a sign-in for a device or application the attacker controls.
- ClickFix: a social-engineering technique that persuades a user to paste and run a command, often presented as a fake CAPTCHA.
- BIN: the issuer's card-number prefix (bank identification number).
- APP entity: an organisation or agency bound by the Australian Privacy Principles in the Privacy Act 1988.
- Notifiable data breach: a breach likely to result in serious harm, which APP entities must notify to the OAIC and affected individuals.
- Headline score: the national Atlas figure for the 250 organisations; it is not an average.
- Listing history: a credential tied to the domain had already been offered for sale on a monitored market before the current check.
- DDoS (distributed denial of service): an attack that floods a service with traffic from many sources to make it unavailable.
- SaaS (software as a service): software that a supplier hosts and runs for customers over the internet.
- HSTS: a web header telling browsers to use HTTPS only.
- KYC: "know your customer" identity checks at banks, exchanges and other services.
- MFA (multi-factor authentication): a sign-in that needs a second factor beyond the password.
- p=none: a DMARC policy that only monitors and does not ask receivers to reject or quarantine.
- Passive hygiene index: an Odin analytical composite of email, DNS, TLS and header checks; 0-100, higher means weaker.
- Phishing-resistant MFA: sign-in tied to the real site (FIDO2 security keys, passkeys or certificates), so a relay page cannot reuse it.
- RTO: recovery time objective, the longest outage a business-continuity plan allows.
- ACSC: the Australian Cyber Security Centre, part of ASD.
- AFP: the Australian Federal Police.
- APRA: the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, which supervises banks, insurers and superannuation funds.
- ASD: the Australian Signals Directorate, the federal signals intelligence and cyber security agency.
- ASIC: the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, the corporate and financial-services regulator.
- ASIO: the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, the domestic security intelligence agency.
- ASX: the Australian Securities Exchange; listed companies disclose material incidents through it.
- CAA: a DNS record that names the certificate authorities allowed to issue certificates for a domain.
- CISA: the United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, which keeps a list of known exploited vulnerabilities.
- CMS: content management system, such as WordPress or Craft CMS.
- ERP / CRM: enterprise resource planning and customer relationship management software.
- Five Eyes: the intelligence partnership of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States; its cyber agencies issue joint alerts.
- MX record: the DNS record that names a domain's mail servers.
- NCSC: a National Cyber Security Centre; in this report, New Zealand's.
- OAIC: the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, the privacy regulator.
- OT: operational technology, the systems that run physical processes.
- OTC: "over the counter"; in market posts, direct trades of accounts or currency outside an exchange.
- SD-WAN: software-defined wide-area networking, used to link branch networks.
- TAFE: Technical and Further Education, Australia's public vocational colleges.
About this report
Prepared by Odin by Brandefense. Version 1.0 was completed on 21 November 2026.
Research cutoff: 18 November 2026 (primary data window). The report prioritises Brandefense's own data, keeps criminal claims separate from independently established incidents and does not claim a complete census of cybercrime affecting Australia. Recommendations describe what organisations could do; they do not state that any organisation has or has not done them. This edition is in English only.
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