This post summarizes what three US government pages say about post-quantum cryptography (PQC): the NIST project page, updated 5 August 2026, the NIST IR 8547 draft page and the CISA PQC Initiative page. It covers the standards NIST released, the migration plan NIST describes and what CISA says it does. It is a summary of those pages, not compliance advice.
What are the NIST post-quantum standards?
The NIST project page says that in August 2024 NIST released its principal PQC standards as Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS). They are FIPS 203 (ML-KEM, a key-encapsulation mechanism standard), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA, a digital signature standard) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA, a stateless hash-based digital signature standard). The CISA page adds that NIST approved the three on August 13, 2024.
NIST expects these three to provide the foundation for most deployments of post-quantum cryptography, and the page says they can and should be put into use now. It also says the Falcon digital signature algorithm and the HQC key encapsulation mechanism were selected for ongoing standardization, and that this process is underway.
What does NIST say about migration and the 2035 date?
The NIST page says organizations should begin migrating their systems to quantum-resistant cryptography. It adds that cybersecurity products, services and protocols will need updates, and that organizations must identify where vulnerable algorithms are used and plan to replace or update them. Under the transition timeline in NIST IR 8547, NIST says it will deprecate and ultimately remove quantum-vulnerable algorithms from its standards by 2035, with high-risk systems transitioning much earlier.
- August 2024NIST releases its principal PQC standardsFIPS 203, 204 and 205.
- November 12, 2024NIST IR 8547 initial public draft publishedThe page labels it an Initial Public Draft.
- January 10, 2025Comment period on the draft closesThe page says the public comment period is CLOSED.
- August 5, 2026Last update of the NIST PQC project pageThe page shows this as its updated date.
- By 2035NIST says it will deprecate and ultimately remove quantum-vulnerable algorithmsHigh-risk systems much earlier.
Is NIST IR 8547 a final rule?
No. The NIST page for IR 8547 lists it as an Initial Public Draft, published November 12, 2024, with comments due January 10, 2025. It says the report describes NIST’s expected approach to moving from quantum-vulnerable algorithms to post-quantum digital signature algorithms and key-establishment schemes. It also says the report should inform the efforts and timelines of federal agencies, industry and standards organizations.
The page says comments received on the draft will be used to revise the transition plan. So the 2035 date above is NIST’s stated plan in a draft, not a final requirement. Read the current version of the report before you rely on any date.
What does CISA say organizations should do?
As of 9 October 2026, the CISA page says its PQC Initiative brings government and industry partners together to address quantum computing risks and to help critical infrastructure and government networks during the transition. It says CISA has worked on these threats since July 2022 and that government agencies and critical infrastructure entities must begin preparing now.
The page lists CISA’s tasks. Under 6 U.S.C. § 1526, the guidance requires each federal agency to establish and maintain a current inventory of IT vulnerable to quantum decryption. CISA also develops and regularly updates a list of product categories that support or plan to support PQC standard algorithms, and works with NIST’s National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence to demonstrate and evaluate automated cryptographic discovery and inventory (ACDI) tools. The page also links to a DHS roadmap, produced with NIST, that guides organizations through inventory, planning and risk-based modernization.
For the financial sector, the page links a G7 Cyber Expert Group roadmap focusing on system inventory, risk-based planning, migration, testing and ongoing checks. For the European view, see our post on post-quantum migration milestones from the NCSC and the EU.
Do quantum computers that break encryption exist today?
The CISA page says quantum computing technology capable of breaking modern public-key encryption does not yet exist. The NIST page describes quantum computers as machines that may be years or decades away but could eventually break many of today’s widely used cryptographic systems. Both pages still say preparation should start now.
What can a team check now?
The steps below come from the recommendations on the NIST and CISA pages, not from a forecast of our own.
- Find vulnerable algorithmsNIST says organizations must identify where they are used.
- Plan the replacementNIST says organizations must plan to replace or update them.
- Build an inventoryCISA’s guidance requires each federal agency to keep a current inventory of IT vulnerable to quantum decryption.
- Look at product categoriesCISA keeps a list of product categories that support PQC standard algorithms.
A question that follows from the CISA page: which of your stored data would matter if it were copied out of your network through data exfiltration while protected by an algorithm NIST plans to remove? Knowing what you run is also part of basic cyber hygiene. For planning dates in context, see our 2027 security program plan with NIST CSF 2.0, our 2027 threat intelligence priorities from agency outlooks and our cyber compliance calendar for 2026 and 2027.
Last checked against the official pages on 9 October 2026. Dates and status can change, so confirm on the pages listed under Sources before acting.
For background on how threats are cataloged, see the Brandefense knowledge hub pages on threat groups, malware families, ATT&CK techniques and significant incidents, and the glossary. The cyber threat intelligence page describes the related service.