Mobile app impersonation is when an attacker publishes an app that copies your name, icon and screens. It appears on Google Play, the App Store or third-party stores. Its job is to steal logins and payment data from your customers. Brands find these apps by monitoring store listings and publisher data, then remove them with evidence-backed store reports.
Right now, while your development team is maintaining your legitimate mobile application, someone else may already be publishing a copy of it. Same logo. Same interface. Same name. Same store listing screenshots. Different developer. Different code. The purpose is different too: to steal your users’ credentials, intercept their transactions and harvest their data, while your brand takes the hit.
Mobile app impersonation is cheap and pays well for criminals. It needs no zero-day exploit and no network intrusion. The attacker only has to repackage an existing app and submit it with stolen branding. They do not need to breach your infrastructure. They only need your users to make one download mistake.
This post covers what fake mobile apps are, how attackers build and distribute them and what they steal. It also explains how organizations can detect and remove them before users become victims. For the monitoring side in practice, see our fake mobile app detection service page.
| 280+ APKs tied to one 2024 SpyAgent campaign, distributed outside Google Play (Source: BleepingComputer). |
What Is a Fake Mobile App?
A fake mobile app — also called a rogue app, clone app, or repackaged app — is a malicious application engineered to impersonate a legitimate brand. It replicates the visual identity of the original application: the icon, the name, the UI layout, the splash screen, and often even the core functionality. From the user’s perspective, downloading the fake app looks and feels exactly like downloading the real one.
The critical difference lies in what happens behind the interface. The legitimate app connects to authorized servers and follows its privacy policy. The fake app routes credentials, session tokens, financial data and personal information to attacker-controlled infrastructure. In many cases, the fake app even proxies the real app’s functionality — the user believes everything is working correctly while their data is being exfiltrated in the background.
The Three Core Types
Not all fake mobile apps are built the same way. Security researchers categorize them into three primary archetypes based on their construction and purpose:
| App Type | How It Is Built | Primary Goal |
| Repackaged App | Legitimate APK decompiled, malicious code injected, re-signed with new certificate and re-uploaded. | Credential theft, banking trojan delivery, surveillance. |
| UI Clone App | New app built from scratch to visually replicate the target — same layout, same colors, same branding. | Phishing login credentials, harvesting PII, payment data. |
| Typosquat App | Registered under near-identical name (e.g. ‘Brandefense’ vs ‘Branddefense’) with copied assets. | Organic app store discovery by confused users, brand traffic hijacking. |
📱 Both Platforms Are Targeted While Android’s open APK distribution model makes it easier to distribute malicious apps outside official stores, iOS is not immune. Attackers abuse Apple’s TestFlight beta platform, enterprise certificate provisioning profiles and PWA (Progressive Web App) delivery. These routes avoid the full App Store review and install rogue apps on iOS devices.
How Is a Fake Mobile App Built? The Technical Anatomy of a Clone Attack
Understanding how attackers construct fake apps is essential for building effective detection. The process is more industrialized than most organizations realize — and it requires significantly less technical skill than it did five years ago.
Step 1: Target Selection and Asset Harvesting
The attack begins with reconnaissance. The attacker identifies a target application — typically one with a large user base, financial functionality, or high brand trust. They then download the legitimate app and begin harvesting visual assets: the app icon, splash screen, color palette, typography, and UI component layouts. All of this is publicly visible in the app store listing and extractable from the APK or IPA binary.
Step 2: APK Decompilation and Code Injection (Repackaging Attack)
For a repackaged app, the attacker uses freely available reverse engineering tools to decompile the legitimate APK into readable source code. They inspect the code structure, identify the authentication and network communication modules, and inject malicious payloads — typically credential harvesters, keyloggers, overlay engines, or RAT (Remote Access Trojan) components.
The modified APK is then recompiled and re-signed with a new certificate. Since the original developer’s certificate is no longer attached, the app store’s verification checks treat it as a new submission from a new developer which it technically is. The malicious payload travels inside what appears to be a standard app.
⚠️ The Janus Vulnerability — APK Signatures Bypassed A vulnerability known as Janus (CVE-2017-13156) affects Android 5.1.1 to 8.0. It lets attackers prepend malicious code to a legitimate APK without invalidating the original v1 signature. The modified app installs and passes signature verification — while executing injected malicious code.
- CVE.
- CVE-2017-13156.
- Affects.
- Android versions 5.1.1 to 8.0.
- What it allows.
- Prepending malicious code to a legitimate APK without invalidating the original v1 signature.
- Result.
- The modified app installs and passes signature verification.
Step 3: Permission Abuse — The Red Flags Users Ignore
After installation, the fake app’s primary mechanism for data collection is an aggressive permission request. The legitimate app requests only the permissions its features need. The fake app asks for a broad set that opens up nearly every data source on the device.
Android’s permission model is designed to be transparent — every permission the app requests must be declared in the AndroidManifest.xml file and presented to the user before being granted. In theory, this gives users visibility and control. In practice, users confronted with a familiar interface and a trusted brand name grant permissions reflexively, without reading the implications. The fake app’s visual identity is specifically designed to neutralize this friction.
The following table breaks down the most commonly abused permissions in fake mobile app campaigns, explaining not just what each permission does but how attackers operationalize it.
| Android Permission | What It Grants | How Attackers Weaponize It |
| READ_SMS / RECEIVE_SMS | Read and intercept all incoming SMS messages in real time. | OTP and 2FA codes sent via SMS are intercepted before they reach the user. The attacker receives the code, authenticates to the target account, and the victim never sees a prompt — the code arrives and is silently consumed by the malicious app. |
| BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE | Full programmatic control over the device UI: read any on-screen text, simulate taps and gestures, navigate between apps. | The most dangerous permission in the fake app arsenal. Used for overlay attacks (fake login screens drawn over real apps). Also used to perform in-app actions such as transferring funds, to read on-screen OTPs from authenticator apps, and to bypass in-app checks for user interaction. |
| SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW | Draw UI elements (windows, dialogs) on top of any other running app. | Enables overlay phishing: renders a pixel-perfect replica of a banking or payment login screen over the legitimate app. The user believes they are interacting with the real app. Credentials and OTPs are captured at entry and transmitted to C2 before the overlay dismisses and hands control back. |
| READ_CONTACTS / READ_CALL_LOG | Full access to the device address book and complete call history. | The contact list is exfiltrated to attacker infrastructure and used as a targeting list for follow-on smishing campaigns. Because messages arrive appearing to come from a known contact’s number, victims in the contact network are significantly more likely to engage. |
| REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES | Silently prompt for and install additional APK packages without user interaction. | Enables dropper behavior: the initial fake app installs a secondary, more capable malware payload after gaining device trust. This two-stage model allows the initial app to pass automated store review while the dangerous payload is downloaded after installation. |
| READ_PHONE_STATE | Access the device’s IMEI, SIM card identifiers, phone number, and network state. | The IMEI and SIM identifiers are used to support SIM swap attacks and to create a persistent device fingerprint for tracking victims across credential rotation. Attackers with IMEI data can impersonate the device in carrier interactions. |
| CAMERA / RECORD_AUDIO | Activate the front and rear cameras and microphone at any time, including when the app is in the background. | Enables real-time covert surveillance. More common in targeted espionage than in mass-distribution fake apps. |
| WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE / READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE | Read and write to the device’s shared storage including the photo library, downloads, and document folders. | Used in combination with OCR capabilities (as observed in the SpyAgent 2024 campaign) to scan the photo library for screenshots containing passwords, seed phrases, or identity documents. Files of interest are silently copied to attacker infrastructure. |
🔎 The Dangerous Combination: BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE + READ_SMS Individually, each of these permissions is capable of significant damage. Together, they form a complete MFA bypass chain: READ_SMS intercepts OTP codes delivered via text, while BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE intercepts OTP codes delivered through on-screen authenticator apps. An attacker with both permissions can bypass every form of SMS-based and app-based two-factor authentication without any interaction from the victim.
There is no legitimate reason for a banking or finance app to require BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE, REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES, or RECORD_AUDIO. Legitimate apps document their permission requirements in their privacy policies and app store listings. Any app that requests permissions inconsistent with its stated functionality is exhibiting a high-confidence indicator of malicious intent — and should be treated as such.
📋 The Permission Audit Test Teams and users can audit permissions before installing an app. Compare the permissions it requests with those in the official store listing. Any undocumented permission — especially BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE, REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES, or READ_SMS — is a strong indicator that the app is not what it claims to be.,
Step 4: The Overlay Attack — Stealing Credentials at the Moment of Entry
The most technically sophisticated capability deployed by fake mobile apps is the overlay attack. With the BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE or SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission, the malicious app watches for targeted apps to launch. These are banking apps, payment platforms and corporate SSO. It then draws a pixel-perfect copy of their login screen on top.
The victim sees what appears to be their bank’s login page. They enter their credentials. The credentials are captured by the overlay and sent to the attacker’s command-and-control server. The overlay then dismisses itself and hands control back to the real application — which proceeds with the login normally, giving the victim no indication that anything occurred.
- Targeted app launchesThe malicious app monitors for the launch of targeted legitimate apps.
- Fake login drawn on topA pixel-perfect replica of the login screen is shown.
- Credentials capturedSent to the attacker’s command-and-control server.
- Control handed backThe real app proceeds with the login normally.
🔴 Why Overlay Attacks Bypass 2FA Overlay attacks are designed to capture credentials at the exact moment they are entered — including OTP codes delivered by SMS or authenticator apps. The attacker’s server receives both the password and the one-time code in real time, with enough time to authenticate before the OTP expires. This is a fully MFA-bypassing technique that operates entirely within the legitimate app’s own session flow.
How Is a Fake Mobile App Distributed? The 5 Primary Delivery Channels
Getting a malicious app onto a victim’s device requires distribution. Attackers have developed a multi-channel delivery ecosystem that exploits both technical weaknesses in app store review processes and the psychological trust users place in familiar brand names.
| 1 | Official App Store Submission — The Most Trusted Channel Attackers submit rogue apps directly to the Google Play Store and Apple App Store using stolen developer accounts or newly registered accounts with clean histories. They exploit gaps in automated review processes by initially submitting a clean version of the app, then updating it with malicious functionality after it passes review. App store vetting catches many but not all malicious submissions — and the trust signal of appearing in an ‘official’ store dramatically increases download rates. |
| 2 | Third-Party App Stores — Unvetted and High-Volume Dozens of third-party Android marketplaces operate with minimal or no security review. These platforms are particularly effective in regions where official store access is restricted or unreliable. A single malicious APK can be listed across multiple third-party stores simultaneously, generating thousands of installs before detection. |
| 3 | Phishing and Smishing Campaigns — Targeted Delivery Spear-phishing emails and SMS messages (smishing) direct targeted victims to fake download pages that visually replicate official app store listings. The URL contains a slight variation (brandefence.io, br4ndefense.com), the page renders perfectly on mobile browsers, and the download button delivers a direct APK install. Users who arrive via a trusted-looking link rarely check the URL carefully. |
| 4 | Paid Search Ads and Social Media Promotion — Reaching Unsuspecting Users Threat actors run paid advertising campaigns using the legitimate brand’s trademark terms as keywords. When a user searches for the app in a mobile browser, the first result is an advertisement pointing to the attacker’s download page. This technique is particularly effective against less technical users who trust search result positioning as a proxy for legitimacy. |
| 5 | QR Code Substitution — Physical World Attack Surface Where QR codes install apps, such as onboarding kiosks, printed material and packaging, attackers swap the real code for one that points to a malicious APK. The user scans what appears to be an official QR code in a trusted physical context — bank branch, retail store, conference — and installs a clone app without awareness. |
Real-World Case Study: 280 Fake Apps, One Campaign
Source: BleepingComputer
In September 2024, BleepingComputer reported a SpyAgent Android malware campaign tied to at least 280 APKs. They were distributed outside Google Play through SMS messages and malicious social media posts. The apps pretended to be South Korean and UK government services, dating sites and similar services. The campaign mainly targeted South Korea, with a tentative expansion to the UK.
The campaign’s defining feature was its use of optical character recognition (OCR) to recover cryptocurrency recovery phrases from images stored on the device. Users who kept wallet seed phrases (the backup keys for cryptocurrency wallets) as screenshots were exposed. The malware sent stolen images to a command and control server, where they were scanned for text. This turned what looked like a simple credential-harvesting campaign into a route to wallet draining.
The way the SpyAgent campaign worked is instructive for understanding how modern fake app attacks are run.
| 1 | Phishing Entry Point – Brand Impersonation Victims received SMS messages or came across malicious social media posts that linked to the fake apps, which impersonated government services, dating sites and similar brands. |
| 2 | APK Delivery — Outside Official Store Review Rather than submitting to official stores and risking review, the campaign distributed its malicious APK files outside Google Play. |
| 3 | Image Theft and Server-Side OCR The malware sent images from the device to the command and control server, where they were OCR scanned for cryptocurrency recovery phrases. Victims who had photographed their wallet seed phrases were exposed to wallet draining. |
| 280+ Fake apps deployed in a single campaign. | South Korea main target, with a tentative expansion to the UK. |
💡 What This Case Demonstrates SpyAgent illustrates that fake app campaigns can run at scale. One campaign was tied to at least 280 APKs impersonating different services, and it went after data beyond passwords, such as screenshots of wallet recovery phrases.
What Do Fake Mobile Apps Actually Steal?
The data exfiltrated by a fake mobile app depends on the permissions granted, the capabilities injected into the malicious code, and the attacker’s operational objectives. The following table maps the most commonly harvested data types to their downstream use in the criminal ecosystem:
| Data Type Stolen | Collection Mechanism | Criminal Use |
| Login credentials | Fake login overlay replicated over legitimate app. | Account takeover (ATO), credential stuffing, dark web sale. |
| OTP / 2FA codes | READ_SMS permission intercepts authentication SMS. | MFA bypass, real-time account takeover. |
| Banking session tokens | Overlay attack captures post-authentication session. | Unauthorized transfers, fraud transactions. |
| Cryptocurrency seed phrases | OCR scanning of photo library for mnemonic sequences. | Immediate wallet drain — irreversible loss. |
| Contact lists | READ_CONTACTS harvests entire address book. | Targeted smishing, social engineering of victim’s network. |
| Corporate SSO tokens | Session capture after legitimate authentication completes. | Enterprise access, data exfiltration, ransomware staging. |
| Device identifiers (IMEI) | READ_PHONE_STATE permission captures device fingerprint. | SIM swap attacks, account takeover using device identity. |
| Screen content | MediaProjection API or Accessibility Service screen reader. | Real-time credential capture, OTP interception, surveillance. |
What Is the Business Impact? Beyond the Stolen Data
Organizations often underestimate the collateral damage from mobile app impersonation, focusing exclusively on the direct financial fraud rather than the longer-term business consequences.
Reputational Damage — The Brand Carries the Cost
A user may download a fake version of your app and lose their credentials or see their bank account drained. They do not immediately conclude that an attacker built a clone. They conclude that your app compromised their data. In practice, many users blame the impersonated brand for the fraud, not the attacker or the app store.
This translates directly into customer churn, negative reviews that affect organic app store discovery, and increased customer acquisition costs as former customers are reluctant to re-engage. For financial services organizations and regulated industries, it also triggers regulatory scrutiny and potential compliance exposure.
Platform Trust Erosion — The App Store Rating Effect
Fake apps that successfully impersonate your brand in official app stores accumulate reviews and ratings alongside your legitimate listing. Victims who experienced fraud leave negative reviews — on your genuine app. When the fake app is eventually removed, the review trail it generated continues to surface in search results, damaging the perception of your legitimate product. This effect is particularly pronounced when the fake app achieves significant download volume before detection.
Downstream Attack Surface — Your Users Become Attack Vectors
Contact lists harvested from compromised devices are used for smishing. The messages go to the victim’s friends, colleagues and family, and the victim’s real identity acts as a trust signal. A single fake app infection does not affect only the direct victim; it expands the attacker’s targeting surface to everyone in that user’s contact network. For enterprise users, this creates a pathway from a personal device compromise to a corporate network intrusion.
| 📊 The Attribution Problem When a fake app impersonates a brand, users may hold the brand, not the attacker, responsible for the fraud. This can create real cost for organizations that do not monitor for rogue apps. Lost customer value, higher fraud investigation costs and regulatory exposure all follow from a failure the organization may not even know about. |
Why Fake Apps Still Appear on Official Stores
Google Play and the App Store both ban impersonation. Google’s policy says not to impersonate other apps or brands, and Apple’s guideline 4.1 bars apps that pass themselves off as another service. A policy is not a filter, though. Review cannot catch every copy before it goes live.
Attackers also work around review. A common trick is to submit a clean version first and add the malicious code in an update. Others register new developer accounts with a clean history. A listing can stay live until someone reports it, so brands need to watch the stores themselves.
How to Detect If Your Brand Is Being Impersonated in App Stores
Most organizations discover fake mobile app attacks reactively — a customer complaint, a news article, a social media post from a victim. By that point, the app may have been live for weeks or months, generating thousands of installs. Proactive detection requires systematic monitoring across multiple surfaces.
App Store Monitoring — The Obvious Starting Point
Search your brand name, product name, and common misspellings in both the Google Play Store and the Apple App Store on a regular basis. Filter results by developer identity — any listing that uses your brand name or app icon but is not published under your registered developer account is a potential rogue app. Pay particular attention to listings with recent publication dates, zero reviews, or suspiciously large claimed download numbers.
Third-Party Marketplace Coverage — The Critical Gap
Official app store monitoring alone is insufficient. The majority of malicious fake app distribution occurs through third-party marketplaces, regional stores, and direct APK hosting sites. Good coverage has to include regional Android stores and APK file hosting sites. Malicious apps spread there fast, with little oversight.
Certificate and Hash Monitoring — Technical Identity Verification
Every legitimate app binary is signed with a specific developer certificate. A repackaged app, by definition, carries a different certificate. Watch for APKs that share your package name, interface assets or code structure but carry a different signing certificate. That is one of the most reliable signs of repackaging. This requires access to binary analysis tools or a threat intelligence platform with mobile threat feeds.
Phishing Infrastructure and Domain Monitoring
Fake app distribution campaigns are supported by phishing infrastructure: deceptive download pages, SMS campaign domains, and fraudulent social media advertisements. Watch for newly registered domains that contain your brand name or trademark. Watch for social media accounts that pose as your brand and promote app downloads. Both give early warning before a campaign reaches scale.
Dark Web and Underground Forum Intelligence
Malicious APKs are frequently advertised, distributed, and traded in underground forums before or alongside their public distribution. Threat intelligence from dark web marketplaces and criminal communities can show campaigns against your brand before they reach app stores or phishing pages. That allows takedown action before the first user is compromised.
Detection Methods Compared
No single check finds every fake. The table shows what each method catches and where it falls short, so you can see why teams combine them.
| Method | What It Catches | What It Misses |
| Name and icon match | Listings that copy your app name, close misspellings or your icon. | Fakes that use a different name or a redrawn icon. |
| Publisher check | Apps that use your brand but are not published by your developer account. | Fakes that use a convincing developer name, and brands with several legitimate accounts. |
| Certificate and hash check | Repackaged APKs that share your package name but carry a different signing certificate. | Fully rebuilt clones with a new package name. It also needs the APK file, not just the listing. |
| Behavior analysis | Suspicious permissions, overlay code and connections to unknown servers. | Apps that stay clean until an update. It needs the file and takes more effort per app. |
| Third-party store and APK site coverage | Copies on regional stores and file hosts that official-store searches never see. | Links sent only by SMS or messaging apps, and QR codes in the physical world. |
🔍 Detection Is Not Removal Detecting a fake app is only the first step. Takedown is the formal request to remove an app from a store or host. It needs documented evidence of trademark infringement, impersonation or a policy violation. Each platform has its own route, covered below. The gap between detection and takedown is when most victims are compromised. Prepared takedown workflows keep that gap short.
How to Remove a Fake App Impersonating Your Brand
Removal works best when you file a complete report the first time. Start with the evidence, then use the route that fits each store. Our fake app monitoring and takedown page shows how the two fit together.
Step 1: Build the Evidence Pack
- The listing URL, app name and developer name, with dated screenshots of the listing.
- The package name on Android or the app ID on iOS, and the signing certificate or file hash if you have the APK.
- Your trademark registration numbers and the link to your official listing.
- A short note on how the app misleads users, such as your icon, your name or your screenshots.
Step 2: Report It on Each Store
On Google Play, the route depends on your claim. Google’s help page separates impersonation reports from trademark, copyright and other legal reports. It warns that a wrong form may delay or prevent processing. If you assert trademark rights, use the trademark form for Google Play. If the app misleads users about its link to your company, flag it through the impersonation process.
On the App Store, Apple takes intellectual property claims through its App Store Content Dispute form. Apple forwards the claim to the app’s provider and asks them to resolve it with you. A separate App Name Dispute form covers cases where another app blocks your trademark as an app name. The form asks you to state under penalty of perjury that you are, or act for, the rights holder.
Step 3: Go After the Download Pages and Third-Party Stores
Third-party stores have no shared process, so each one needs its own report. Also report the hosting provider and domain registrar of any fake download page. Pulling the page can cut off the SMS and ad campaigns that point to the app.
Step 4: Watch for the Return
Removed apps can come back under a new name or a new developer account. Keep monitoring the same package name patterns, icons and publisher names. Add each repeat offender to your evidence file, so the next report is faster. If you want to see where your brand is exposed today, run a free Atlas scan or read how Digital Risk Protection handles takedown.
How to Defend Against Fake Mobile App Attacks — A 12-Point Security Checklist
Defending against mobile app impersonation requires action at three layers: your own application’s technical hardening, your organization’s external monitoring posture, and your users’ awareness. The following checklist covers all three:
| FOR YOUR APP | |
| ✓ | Implement code obfuscation and anti-tampering controls in your app binary — make reverse engineering and repackaging significantly more time-consuming and technically demanding for attackers. |
| ✓ | Implement runtime application self-protection (RASP) to detect modified or repackaged versions of your app at runtime and refuse to execute. |
| ✓ | Use certificate pinning for all API communications — a repackaged app cannot replicate your original certificate, making its network traffic immediately distinguishable. |
| ✓ | Publish your app’s official SHA-256 hash and certificate fingerprint in your security documentation — enabling technically sophisticated users to verify authenticity. |
| FOR YOUR MONITORING POSTURE | |
| ✓ | Establish continuous monitoring coverage across official and third-party app stores, not just the Google Play Store and Apple App Store. |
| ✓ | Monitor newly registered domains incorporating your brand name or trademark terms as early-warning indicators for upcoming phishing campaigns. |
| ✓ | Include mobile threat intelligence in your CTI program — underground forum monitoring for APK sales or distribution campaigns targeting your brand. |
| ✓ | Establish pre-approved takedown workflows with app stores and hosting providers to minimize the response window once a fake app is detected. |
| FOR YOUR USERS | |
| ✓ | Publish a clear ‘Download Our App’ page on your official website with direct links to your verified store listings — give users a trusted reference point. |
| ✓ | Include app security guidance in customer communications: how to identify your official app, what developer name to expect, and how to report suspicious apps. |
| ✓ | Alert users immediately when a fake app targeting your brand is detected — proactive communication reduces victim count and preserves customer trust. |
| ✓ | Implement anomaly detection for your platform’s authentication layer to identify credential stuffing patterns that indicate stolen credentials from fake apps are being weaponized. |
How Brandefense Detects and Removes Fake Mobile Apps
Brandefense’s Digital Risk Protection platform is built around one premise. Threats outside your own infrastructure are among the most dangerous and the least visible. Fake mobile apps are a textbook example. They live entirely in the attacker’s environment and use your brand as a weapon, so your internal security tools cannot see them.
Brandefense addresses this blind spot through a multi-layer detection and response capability spanning 36+ analysis mechanisms and 13,000+ active security controls.
| Brandefense Capability | What It Detects / What It Does |
| App Store Monitoring | Continuous scanning of official and third-party app stores for listings that use your brand name, logo or package name variants. |
| Rogue APK Detection | Binary-level analysis of APKs that share your app’s UI assets, package name structure, or code signatures without matching your official certificate. |
| Phishing Infrastructure Intelligence | Detection of newly registered domains used to distribute fake app download pages impersonating your brand. |
| Dark Web App Listing Alerts | Monitoring of underground forums and marketplaces where malicious APKs are sold, traded, or advertised targeting your brand. |
| Social Media Impersonation | Identification of fake social accounts promoting unauthorized app downloads using your brand identity. |
| Takedown Support | Brandefense collects the evidence itself and contacts registrars and hosts to request removal; you can also export the evidence to pursue your own case. |
| 24/7 Continuous Monitoring | All capabilities operate around the clock, with analyst escalation for high-severity detections requiring immediate response. |
Fake mobile app attacks do not wait. The gap between launch and detection is when your users are most at risk. Continuous, automated monitoring is the only defense that works at the same speed as the attack.
