Threat group profile

APT29

Also known as Cozy Bear, Midnight Blizzard, NOBELIUM

The US, UK and other governments have attributed APT29 to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).

In short

The US, UK and other governments have attributed APT29 to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). In April 2021 the US and UK attributed the 2020 SolarWinds Orion compromise to the SVR, and MITRE says the group has operated since at least 2008.

Profile MapThreat Group
  1. Attributed OriginRussia
  2. Names15names in public reportsAPT29 · Cozy Bear · The Dukes
  3. Sectors6named as targetsGovernment · Technology and IT · Political organizations
  4. Techniques13in the attack chainInitial Access · Credential Access · Persistence
  5. Tools10tools and malware listedSUNBURST · WellMess · WellMail

In one minute

Who they are
APT29 is a cyber espionage group that the UK NCSC (16 July 2020) said is almost certainly part of the Russian intelligence services. US and UK governments (April 2021) attributed the SolarWinds compromise to the SVR.
Who they target
Government networks, think tanks, policy organizations and IT companies, per MITRE and a 2021 joint advisory. In 2020 the UK NCSC said it targeted COVID-19 vaccine work in Canada, the US and the UK.
How they usually get in
Governments describe stolen or guessed cloud logins, password spraying, MFA prompt flooding, exploited VPN appliances, and a poisoned software update (SolarWinds Orion).
What stands out
CISA and partners said in February 2024 that the group moved to cloud access, using dormant accounts and home-internet proxy addresses to blend in.
What to do first
Turn on strong MFA for every account, switch off unused and former-staff accounts, and review who can sign in to your cloud tenant and from where.

Names

Public reports use several names for this activity.

Names used for APT29
NameWhere it appears
APT29 MITRE ATT&CK group G0016; NCSC advisory "APT29 targets COVID-19 vaccine development"; CISA AA21-116A[1, 5, 12]
Cozy Bear MITRE ATT&CK; NCSC advisory 2020; AA24-057A[1, 5, 13]
The Dukes MITRE ATT&CK; NCSC advisory 2020; AA21-116A[1, 5, 12]
Midnight Blizzard MITRE ATT&CK; CISA ED 24-02; AA24-057A[1, 13, 14]
NOBELIUM MITRE ATT&CK associated groups[1]
YTTRIUM MITRE ATT&CK; AA21-116A[1, 12]
UNC2452 MITRE ATT&CK associated groups[1]
Dark Halo MITRE ATT&CK associated groups[1]
IRON RITUAL MITRE ATT&CK associated groups[1]
IRON HEMLOCK MITRE ATT&CK associated groups[1]
NobleBaron MITRE ATT&CK associated groups[1]
CozyDuke MITRE ATT&CK associated groups[1]
SolarStorm MITRE ATT&CK associated groups[1]
Blue Kitsune MITRE ATT&CK associated groups[1]
UNC3524 MITRE ATT&CK associated groups[1]

Who says so

Attribution is a judgment by the body named. It is shown here as attributed, not as proven fact.

  • UK NCSC 16 July 2020

    Assessed that APT29 (the Dukes, Cozy Bear) is a cyber espionage group almost certainly part of the Russian intelligence services. The NSA agreed.[5]

  • CISA, FBI, ODNI, NSA 5 January 2021

    Said an APT actor, likely Russian in origin, was responsible for most or all of the SolarWinds-related compromises.[7]

  • US Government (CISA AA20-352A) 15 April 2021

    Attributed the SolarWinds activity to the SVR. Page last revised 15 April 2021.[6]

  • US Treasury 15 April 2021

    Said the SVR is responsible for the 2020 exploit of SolarWinds Orion.[9]

  • UK NCSC and UK government 15 April 2021

    Assessed it highly likely the SVR was responsible for access to SolarWinds Orion.[10, 11]

  • FBI, DHS, CISA 26 April 2021

    Attributed the activity to the SVR, also known as APT 29, the Dukes, CozyBear and Yttrium.[12]

  • CISA, NSA, FBI, UK NCSC and partners 26 February 2024

    Said APT29 (Midnight Blizzard, Cozy Bear) is almost certainly part of the SVR.[13]

Where sources differ

Sources use different confidence words. On 5 January 2021 CISA, FBI, ODNI and NSA said "likely Russian in origin". The UK NCSC in July 2020 said "almost certainly part of the Russian intelligence services" and in April 2021 "highly likely" for SolarWinds. US documents of April 2021 and later name the SVR directly. Start dates also differ: MITRE dates the SolarWinds campaign from August 2019, CISA AA20-352A says compromises began at least as early as March 2020, and MITRE says SUNBURST was used since at least February 2020. Treasury calls it "the 2020 exploit".

Who they target

Sectors

  • GovernmentMITRE: government networks in Europe and NATO countries. AA24-057A and AA21-116A also describe government victims.[1, 12]
  • Think tanks and research institutesMITRE lists research institutes and think tanks. AA21-116A names think tanks and policy analysis organizations.[1, 12]
  • Technology and ITAA21-116A names IT companies. MITRE C0024 lists technology and telecom sectors.[2, 12]
  • Healthcare and vaccine researchNCSC said that in 2020 APT29 targeted COVID-19 vaccine development organizations.[5]
  • Telecommunications and consultingMITRE C0024 lists consulting and telecom among SolarWinds targets.[2]
  • Political organizationsMITRE says APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee from summer 2015.[1]

Regions

  • United StatesFederal agencies affected by SolarWinds; CISA ED 24-02 covers federal agency email.[7, 14]
  • United KingdomNCSC: 2020 vaccine targeting. UK government: a small number of public sector bodies affected by SolarWinds, with low impact.[5, 11]
  • CanadaNCSC named Canada as a vaccine research target in 2020.[5]
  • Europe and NATO membersUK government and MITRE both describe government targets in Europe and NATO countries.[1, 11]
  • AzerbaijanOn 2 May 2025 the chairman of the Parliamentary Commission on Foreign Interference and Hybrid Threats said the cyberattacks on Azerbaijani media outlets were attributed to APT29, a Russian-linked cyber espionage group, and that the attack took place on 20 February 2025.[15]

Operations timeline

Each entry is attributed to the group by the sources cited.

  1. 2008

    Earliest MITRE date

    MITRE says the group has operated since at least 2008.[1]

  2. September 2013

    Operation Ghost starts

    MITRE lists the campaign Operation Ghost from September 2013 to October 2019.[1]

  3. Summer 2015

    DNC intrusion

    MITRE says APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in summer 2015.[1]

  4. 2018

    WellMess in use

    MITRE says WellMess has been used by APT29 since at least 2018.[4]

  5. August 2019

    SolarWinds Compromise begins

    MITRE dates the campaign from August 2019.[2]

  6. February 2020

    SUNBURST in use

    MITRE says SUNBURST was used by APT29 since at least February 2020.[3]

  7. March 2020

    Compromises begin

    AA20-352A says compromises began at least as early as March 2020.[6]

  8. 2020

    Vaccine research targeted

    The NCSC said APT29 targeted COVID-19 vaccine work in Canada, the US and the UK during 2020.[5]

  9. 13 December 2020

    Emergency directive on Orion

    CISA issued ED 21-01 on SolarWinds Orion compromise.[8]

  10. 5 January 2021

    Joint statement

    CISA, FBI, ODNI and NSA said an APT actor, likely Russian in origin, was behind the compromises.[7]

  11. January 2021

    SolarWinds campaign ends in MITRE record

    MITRE gives January 2021 as the last seen date.[2]

  12. 15 April 2021

    SVR named

    Treasury, NCSC and the UK government attributed SolarWinds to the SVR.[9, 10, 11]

  13. 26 April 2021

    SVR advisory

    FBI, DHS and CISA published an advisory on SVR operations.[12]

  14. 26 February 2024

    Cloud advisory

    CISA, NSA, FBI and the UK NCSC published SVR cloud access tactics.[13]

  15. 2 April 2024

    Microsoft email directive

    CISA said Midnight Blizzard took email between federal agencies and Microsoft.[14]

Government actions

Indictments, sanctions and advisories that name the group or its alleged members.

Government actions about APT29
DateWhoWhat
16 July 2020 UK NCSC with Canada's CSE and NSA AdvisoryNamed APT29 as targeting COVID-19 vaccine development.[5]
13 December 2020 CISA Emergency Directive 21-01Agencies told to disconnect or power down affected SolarWinds Orion and reset credentials. Closed 8 January 2026.[8]
5 January 2021 CISA, FBI, ODNI, NSA Joint statementSaid an APT actor, likely Russian in origin, was behind the SolarWinds-related compromises.[7]
15 April 2021 US Treasury SanctionsDesignated five Russian technology companies and restricted dealings in Russian sovereign debt, in a release that names the SVR for SolarWinds.[9]
15 April 2021 UK NCSC, UK Foreign Office Public attributionSaid it was highly likely the SVR was responsible for SolarWinds Orion access.[10, 11]
26 April 2021 FBI, DHS, CISA Advisory AA21-116ADescribed SVR techniques and mitigations for network defenders.[12]
26 February 2024 CISA, NSA, FBI, UK NCSC and partners Advisory AA24-057ADescribed SVR moves to cloud access, with mitigations.[13]
2 April 2024 CISA Emergency Directive 24-02Required agencies to reset credentials exposed in email taken by Midnight Blizzard. Sunset 8 January 2026.[14]

How they get in

Techniques reported for this group, by MITRE ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

  • Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain T1195.002

    The SolarWinds Orion update was trojanized and sent to customers (SUNBURST).[2, 3, 6]

  • Phishing: Spearphishing Link T1566.002

    MITRE lists spearphishing links among the group's delivery methods.[1]

  • Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190

    NCSC and AA21-116A describe exploited VPN and remote access products.[1, 5, 12]

  • Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts T1078.004

    Cloud accounts, including dormant ones, are used for access.[1, 13]

Execution

  • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.001

    MITRE lists PowerShell use.[1]

Persistence

  • Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials T1098.001

    AA20-352A describes adding credentials to cloud service principals.[1, 6]

Defense Evasion

  • Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Trust Modification T1484.002

    AA20-352A describes unauthorized federation trusts.[1, 6]

Credential Access

  • Brute Force: Password Spraying T1110.003

    Low and slow password spraying against accounts.[1, 12, 14]

  • Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation T1621

    Sends repeated multi-factor authentication requests until a user approves one.[1, 13]

  • Forge Web Credentials: SAML Tokens T1606.002

    Forged SAML tokens from stolen signing certificates, per AA20-352A.[1, 6]

  • OS Credential Dumping: DCSync T1003.006

    MITRE lists DCSync for obtaining credentials from domain controllers.[1]

Collection

  • Email Collection: Remote Email Collection T1114.002

    MITRE lists remote mailbox collection; ED 24-02 describes stolen email.[1, 14]

Command and Control

  • Proxy: External Proxy T1090.002

    AA24-057A describes residential proxies hiding traffic.[1, 13]

Tools and malware

  • SUNBURST Malware

    Trojanized DLL built to fit the SolarWinds Orion update framework, used since at least February 2020.[3]

  • WellMess Malware

    Lightweight malware with .NET and Golang variants, used since at least 2018 and named in the NCSC 2020 advisory.[4, 5]

  • WellMail Malware

    Custom malware named with WellMess in the NCSC 2020 advisory.[5]

  • SUNSPOT Malware

    Listed by MITRE for the group and tied to the SolarWinds campaign.[1, 2]

  • TEARDROP Malware

    Listed by MITRE for the group and tied to the SolarWinds campaign.[1, 2]

  • Raindrop Malware

    Listed by MITRE for the group and tied to the SolarWinds campaign.[1, 2]

  • GoldMax Malware

    Listed by MITRE for the group and tied to the SolarWinds campaign.[1, 2]

  • Cobalt Strike Tool

    Named by MITRE and by AA21-116A.[1, 12]

  • Mimikatz Tool

    Credential dumping tool named by MITRE and by AA21-116A.[1, 12]

  • AdFind Tool

    Directory query tool listed by MITRE for the group.[1]

Detection and defense

  1. Enforce MFA everywhere

    Require multi-factor authentication for all users and review any exemptions. AA21-116A names misconfigured MFA exemptions as an entry point.

    Counters T1078.004 T1110.003

  2. Resist MFA fatigue

    Limit repeated approval prompts and train staff to report unexpected ones. AA24-057A describes MFA bombing.

    Counters T1621

  3. Disable dormant accounts

    Remove or disable inactive and former-staff accounts. AA24-057A names this.

    Counters T1078.004

  4. Shorten sessions and control devices

    Keep session lifetimes short and set strict device enrolment rules, as in AA24-057A.

    Counters T1078.004 T1621

  5. Patch exposed systems

    Patch VPN and remote access products, as the NCSC and AA21-116A advise.

    Counters T1190

  6. Audit cloud credentials and trusts

    Review service principals, added credentials and federation trusts, as AA20-352A advises.

    Counters T1098.001 T1484.002 T1606.002

  7. Audit mailbox permissions

    Regularly review mailbox settings and permissions, per AA21-116A.

    Counters T1114.002

  8. Watch for scripted activity

    Monitor endpoints for encoded PowerShell and lateral movement, per AA21-116A.

    Counters T1059.001

What Brandefense can do

  • Dark Web Monitoring

    See whether staff email addresses and passwords appear in leaks or stealer logs. The advisories above describe stolen and guessed cloud logins as a main way in.

  • External Attack Surface Management

    Find internet-facing VPN and remote access products and cloud sign-in pages that should be patched or closed.

  • Cyber Threat Intelligence

    Follow new government advisories on this group and match them to your sectors and regions.

Questions

Who is APT29?

The UK NCSC said in July 2020 that APT29 is almost certainly part of the Russian intelligence services. US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds compromise to the SVR in April 2021.

Are they still active?

The latest government documents I opened date from 2024: AA24-057A (February) and ED 24-02 (April). MITRE updated its page on 31 July 2026. I found no source stating current activity for 2026.

Who do they target?

MITRE and a 2021 advisory name government networks, think tanks, policy organizations and IT companies. In 2020 the NCSC added COVID-19 vaccine organizations in Canada, the US and the UK.

How do they get in?

Governments describe password spraying, MFA prompt flooding, stolen tokens, dormant accounts, exploited VPN products and the SolarWinds Orion update.

How can I tell if I am a target?

If you are a government body, think tank, IT provider or SolarWinds customer, review the advisories in the source list and check sign-in logs for unusual cloud logins.

What should I do first?

Require MFA for all accounts, disable unused accounts, and audit cloud credentials and mailbox permissions.

In our research

  1. Geopolitical Countdown: The Evolution of Cyberspace from Espionage to Destruction and New Strategies for Corporate Resilience November 2025
  2. Beyond the Ivory Tower: Darkweb Breach Trends in the Global Education Sector November 2025
  3. APT29 (Cozy Bear): Russia’s Stealth Espionage Powerhouse September 2025
  4. Azerbaijan Threat Landscape Report June 2025
  5. European Focused Threat Actors – APT Groups September 2022
  6. Initial Access Methods: How Malicious Actors Do Infiltrate Companies? September 2022
  7. Fancy Bear APT Group August 2022
  8. Analysis of Hybrid Warfare Through Russia-Ukraine Cyber War March 2022

Sources

  1. APT29 (G0016) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Names, techniques, software, start year 2008, SVR attribution
  2. SolarWinds Compromise (C0024) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Campaign dates and April 2021 attribution
  3. SUNBURST (S0559) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: SUNBURST description, use since February 2020
  4. WellMess (S0514) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: WellMess description, use since 2018
  5. Advisory: APT29 targets COVID-19 vaccine development UK National Cyber Security Centre Supports: July 2020 attribution, targets, malware
  6. Advanced Persistent Threat Compromise of Government Agencies, Critical Infrastructure, and Private Sector Organizations (AA20-352A) CISA Supports: SVR attribution, entry methods, persistence
  7. Joint Statement by the FBI, CISA, ODNI and NSA CISA Supports: 5 January 2021 "likely Russian in origin"
  8. ED 21-01: Mitigate SolarWinds Orion Code Compromise CISA Supports: December 2020 emergency directive
  9. Treasury Sanctions Russia with Sweeping New Sanctions Authority US Department of the Treasury Supports: 15 April 2021 SVR responsible for SolarWinds
  10. UK and US call out Russia for SolarWinds compromise UK National Cyber Security Centre Supports: 15 April 2021 "highly likely" attribution
  11. Russia: UK and US expose global campaign of malign activity by Russian intelligence services UK Government (gov.uk) Supports: Wider pattern of SVR intrusions
  12. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Cyber Operations: Trends and Best Practices for Network Defenders (AA21-116A) FBI, DHS, CISA Supports: SVR TTPs, aliases, mitigations
  13. SVR Cyber Actors Adapt Tactics for Initial Cloud Access (AA24-057A) CISA, NSA, FBI, UK NCSC and partners Supports: Cloud tactics, dormant accounts, mitigations
  14. ED 24-02: Mitigating the Significant Risk from Nation-State Compromise of Microsoft Corporate Email System CISA Supports: April 2024 Midnight Blizzard email exfiltration
  15. Russian-linked APT29 behind recent cyberattacks on Azerbaijani media Trend News Agency (reporting the Parliamentary Commission hearing) Supports: Names Azerbaijan as a target