CISA describes it as a backdoor that lets a remote operator run functions on the system, deploy more payloads and exfiltrate data. In April 2021 the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds compromise to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).
What it does
SUNBURST hid inside a real SolarWinds Orion component. CISA explains that network administrators often give Orion wide privileges, which makes it a valuable target.
Not every organization that received the backdoor was targeted next. CISA says some had no follow-on actions from the attacker.
Names
Public sources use several names for this malware.
What it can do
The ATT&CK techniques the cited sources map to this tool, by tactic. Each id opens our technique page where one exists, otherwise MITRE.
Command And Control
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols T1071.001
It sent its command traffic to third party servers using HTTP GET or POST requests.[1]
Application Layer Protocol: DNS T1071.004
It used DNS for command traffic that was made to look like normal SolarWinds API communications.[1]
Dynamic Resolution T1568
It looked up its command servers through randomly generated subdomains under one parent domain.[1]
Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography T1573.001
It hid its command traffic with a single-byte XOR cipher.[1]
Data Encoding: Standard Encoding T1132.001
It used Base64 encoding in its command traffic.[1]
Data Obfuscation: Protocol or Service Impersonation T1001.003
It made its network traffic look like the Orion Improvement Program protocol.[1]
Data Obfuscation: Steganography T1001.002
It tried to make its command data look like harmless XML about .NET assemblies or a fake JSON blob.[1]
Ingress Tool Transfer T1105
It delivered other payloads, and MITRE names TEARDROP in at least one case.[1]
Execution
Discovery
Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery T1518.001
It checked for several antivirus and endpoint detection agents before it ran.[1]
Process Discovery T1057
It listed process names, hashed them and compared them to hashed blocklists.[1]
System Information Discovery T1082
It collected the host name and the operating system version.[1]
Stealth
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Checks T1497.003
It stayed dormant after the first access for up to two weeks.[1]
Obfuscated Files or Information T1027
It hid the system information it collected with an FNV-1a and XOR scheme.[1]
Indicator Removal: File Deletion T1070.004
It had a command to delete files.[1]
Defense Impairment
How it spreads
CISA says a malicious version of an Orion DLL was added into the SolarWinds software lifecycle and signed with the real SolarWinds code signing certificate. CISA's analysis report says it was delivered as part of certain SolarWinds updates and installed by the legitimate installer. Emergency Directive 21-01 gives the affected Orion versions as 2019.4 through 2020.2.1 HF1. CISA also says the same actor had other ways in that did not use Orion, such as password guessing and password spraying.
How an infection runs
The order of steps in a typical infection, as the sources describe it.
Build compromise
A malicious version of an Orion DLL was added into the SolarWinds software lifecycle and signed with the legitimate SolarWinds code signing certificate.[2]
Delivery
The trojanized DLL was delivered as part of certain SolarWinds updates and installed by the legitimate installer.[3]
Quiet period
MITRE says SUNBURST stayed dormant for up to two weeks. CISA's report says it will not run if it detects certain security software.[1, 3]
First check-in
Once installed, the DLL calls out to a victim-specific domain, using a protocol designed to look like real SolarWinds traffic.[2]
Selective follow-on
After the check-in, the actor can use the DNS response to send back new domains or IP addresses for interactive command traffic. Not every victim got follow-on actions.[2]
Timeline
- February 2020
Earliest use MITRE gives
MITRE says APT29 used SUNBURST since at least February 2020.[1]
- March 2020
Compromises begin
CISA says compromises of US agencies, critical infrastructure and private organizations began at least as early as March 2020.[2]
- December 2020
Compromise discovered
The UK government says a compromise of SolarWinds was discovered in December 2020.[8]
- December 13, 2020
CISA Emergency Directive 21-01
CISA ordered federal civilian agencies to disconnect or power down affected Orion versions.[4]
- December 16, 2020
FBI, CISA and ODNI statement
The three agencies formed a Cyber Unified Coordination Group to coordinate the government response.[5]
- 5 January 2021
Joint statement adds NSA
The Unified Coordination Group said an APT actor, likely Russian in origin, was responsible for most or all of the compromises, and called it an intelligence gathering effort.[6]
- 5 February 2021
CISA malware analysis report
CISA published malware analysis report AR21-039A on SUNBURST.[3]
- April 15, 2021
Who uses it
Detection and defense
Use MFA and strong service accounts
Enable multi-factor authentication where possible. Where it is not possible, use long random passwords of more than 25 characters with a 90-day rotation.[2]
Check network devices Orion managed
Audit device configurations, change device credentials and validate firmware against known good hashes.[2]
What Brandefense can do
- Scan your domain in Brandefense Atlas, free
Atlas checks public sources for leaked credentials, phishing domains, dark web mentions and data sales, then gives your domain a risk grade. Free, no sign-up.
- Cyber Threat Intelligence
Brandefense Cyber Threat Intelligence tracks malware families and the infrastructure they use, and shares indicators your team can check against its own systems.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is SUNBURST?
MITRE ATT&CK calls it a trojanized DLL designed to fit within the SolarWinds Orion software update framework. CISA's analysis report describes it as an obfuscated backdoor.
Who is behind SUNBURST?
The US Government, in a CISA advisory update and a Treasury statement of 15 April 2021, attributes the SolarWinds compromise to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), also known as APT29. The UK NCSC assesses it as highly likely. MITRE lists APT29 as a user of SUNBURST.
How did SUNBURST get onto networks?
CISA says a malicious Orion DLL was added into the SolarWinds software lifecycle and signed with the real SolarWinds certificate, then delivered through updates. CISA also found other access routes that did not use Orion.
How many organizations were affected?
The US Unified Coordination Group said in January 2021 that about 18,000 public and private sector customers were affected, and fewer than ten US government agencies had follow-on compromise. The UK government also cites 18,000.
How can I check for it?
Use the detection rules and indicator file in CISA report AR21-039A and the indicator list linked from advisory AA20-352A. Check whether affected Orion versions 2019.4 through 2020.2.1 HF1 were installed.
Sources
- SUNBURST, Software S0559MITRE ATT&CK · Supports: Description, alias Solorigate, platform, techniques and APT29 link.
- Advanced Persistent Threat Compromise of Government Agencies, Critical Infrastructure, and Private Sector Organizations, AA20-352ACISA · Supports: Supply chain compromise, order of events, mitigations, detection tools, SVR attribution update.
- MAR-10318845-1.v1 - SUNBURST, AR21-039ACISA · Supports: Malware analysis, backdoor functions, detection rules and indicators.
- ED 21-01: Mitigate SolarWinds Orion Code CompromiseCISA · Supports: Emergency directive, affected versions, required actions.
- Joint Statement by the FBI, CISA and ODNI, 16 December 2020CISA · Supports: Formation of the Cyber Unified Coordination Group.
- Joint Statement by the FBI, CISA, ODNI and NSA, 5 January 2021CISA · Supports: Likely Russian origin, intelligence gathering, 18,000 customers, Sparrow tool.
- Treasury Sanctions Russia with Sweeping New Sanctions AuthorityUS Department of the Treasury · Supports: Treasury says the SVR is responsible for the 2020 SolarWinds Orion exploit.
- Russia: UK exposes Russian involvement in SolarWinds cyber compromiseUK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office · Supports: Discovery in December 2020, 18,000 organisations, SVR names.
