Names
Public reports use several names for this activity.
Who says so
Attribution is a judgment by the body named. It is shown here as attributed, not as proven fact.
-
FireEye April 2015
Said the group's planned development effort and regional targets lead it to believe the activity is state sponsored, most likely by the Chinese government.[1]
-
MITRE ATT&CK Version 1.1, 31 July 2026
Describes APT30 as a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government.[2]
-
Mandiant (Google Cloud) Current page, read 10 November 2026
Lists APT30 with suspected attribution China and members of ASEAN as its target sector.[3]
-
Belgium FPS Foreign Affairs 18 July 2022
Said activity against the FPS Interior can be linked to APT27, APT30 and APT31, and assessed the activity as the work of Chinese APTs.[4]
-
CERT-EU and ENISA 15 February 2023
Listed APT30 among APTs recently conducting malicious cyber activities against businesses and governments in the EU.[5]
Where sources differ
Sources differ on how APT30 relates to Naikon. MITRE ATT&CK says Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, but the two groups do not appear to be exact matches, so we keep Naikon out of the names list. Belgium and CERT-EU with ENISA name APT30, but neither says which Chinese state body runs it. FireEye's attribution rests on the group's targets and development effort, not on a named unit or person.
Who they target
Sectors
- ASEAN and its membersFireEye linked BACKSPACE compile dates to ASEAN meetings in 2011 and 2012 and to ASEAN summits in January and April 2013.[1]
- Journalists and mediaFireEye says APT30 targets media organizations and journalists who report on China and on the government's legitimacy.[1]
- Government, finance and defenseA 2014 spearphishing email reached over thirty recipients in one country's financial services, government and defense sectors, per FireEye.[1]
Regions
- Southeast AsiaFireEye says the vast majority of APT30's victims are in Southeast Asia, and Mandiant lists members of ASEAN as its target sector.[1, 3]
- IndiaDecoys covered India-China military relations and India's aircraft carrier, and FireEye saw APT30 malware at an Indian aerospace and defense company and an Indian telecom firm.[1]
- Nepal and BhutanFireEye found recurring decoys about these contested border areas between China and India.[1]
- BelgiumActivity against the Belgian FPS Interior was linked to APT27, APT30 and APT31 in 2022.[4]
Operations timeline
Each entry is attributed to the group by the sources cited.
- 2004
First domains
The earliest-known registration dates for domains attributed to APT30 go back to 2004, per FireEye.[1]
- 2005
- 2008
NETEAGLE backdoor
NETEAGLE samples have compile dates as early as 2008, per MITRE ATT&CK.[7]
- March 2010
ASEAN-lookalike domain
A domain designed to mimic ASEAN's own site was first registered in March 2010, per FireEye.[1]
- 2011 to 2012
ASEAN meetings
FireEye matched compile dates of over 100 BACKSPACE samples to ASEAN events, such as the 18th ASEAN Summit of 7 to 8 May 2011.[1]
- January and April 2013
ASEAN summits
Customised samples were compiled around the start of a new ASEAN Secretary-General's term on 1 January 2013 and the 22nd ASEAN Summit of 24 to 25 April 2013.[1]
- May 2014
Same domains, new samples
Samples compiled on 11 May 2014 still used domains first registered in 2004 and 2007, per FireEye.[1]
- Late summer 2014
Political transition lure
FireEye detected a spearphishing campaign whose decoy covered a major political transition in Southeast Asia.[1]
- April 2015
FireEye report
FireEye published its report on APT30, describing a long-running operation across Southeast Asia and India.[1]
- 31 May 2017
MITRE ATT&CK entry
MITRE created group G0013 for APT30.[2]
- 18 July 2022
Belgian statement
Belgium linked activity against its FPS Interior to APT27, APT30 and APT31.[4]
- 15 February 2023
CERT-EU and ENISA
Their joint publication JP-23-01 named APT30 among APTs active against EU businesses and governments.[5]
Government actions
Indictments, sanctions and advisories that name the group or its alleged members.
| Date | Who | What |
|---|---|---|
| 18 July 2022 | Belgium FPS Foreign Affairs | Public statementLinked activity against the FPS Interior to APT27, APT30 and APT31 and urged Chinese authorities to act.[4] |
| 15 February 2023 | CERT-EU and ENISA | Joint publicationJP-23-01 named APT30 among the groups active against EU organisations and gave recommendations.[5] |
How they get in
Techniques reported for this group, by MITRE ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
-
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Shortcut Modification T1547.009
BACKSPACE and the MILKMAID dropper create shortcuts in the Startup folder.[1, 6]
-
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1547.001
FLASHFLOOD, NETEAGLE and GEMCUTTER add themselves to the HKLM Run key under names such as msinm.exe and msmsgr.[1, 7]
Lateral Movement
Collection
Command and Control
Exfiltration
-
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium: Exfiltration over USB T1052.001
SPACESHIP copies the staged, encoded files to a removable drive when one is inserted.[1]
-
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel T1041
BACKSPACE uploads files to its server, often after sending file lists first so the operator can choose.[1, 6]
Tools and malware
-
BACKSPACE Backdoor
The main backdoor since at least 2005, also called Lecna, with ZJ and ZR variants and a central controller.[1, 6]
-
NETEAGLE Backdoor
Backdoor with Scout and Norton variants and compile dates as early as 2008; it needs its own controller.[1, 7]
-
SHIPSHAPE USB spreader
Copies itself to removable drives and hides the real files, so a user who opens a document runs the malware.[1, 2]
-
SPACESHIP USB data stealer
Collects files by extension or date and copies them to removable drives, likely to carry data off air-gapped computers.[1, 2]
-
FLASHFLOOD USB data stealer
Copies files from inserted drives to the infected computer and logs Windows Address Book data.[1, 2]
-
MILKMAID Dropper
Dropped by a malicious Word document; installs the CREAMSICLE downloader and a Startup shortcut.[1]
-
ORANGEADE Dropper
An older dropper that installs a DLL version of CREAMSICLE.[1]
-
CREAMSICLE Downloader
Fetches an encoded second-stage program for the backdoors.[1]
-
BACKBEND Downloader
A backup downloader, with a sample compiled in 2007, meant to restore access if the main BACKSPACE backdoor is removed.[1]
-
GEMCUTTER Downloader
Works like BACKBEND but keeps itself running through a Run key, under the name CTFM0N.exe.[1]
Detection and defense
-
Block programs on USB drives
On Windows, turn on the attack surface reduction rule that blocks untrusted and unsigned programs run from USB drives.
Counters T1091
-
Use data loss prevention
Detect and block sensitive files being copied to USB devices, especially on separated networks.
Counters T1052.001
-
Find hidden files on drives
Check removable drives for hidden documents next to executables with the same names.
Counters T1091
What Brandefense can do
- Scan your domain in Brandefense Atlas, free
Atlas checks public sources for leaked credentials, phishing domains, dark web mentions and data sales, then gives your domain a risk grade. Free, no sign-up.
- Cyber Threat Intelligence
Follow reporting on APT30 and other China-nexus groups that target Southeast Asia and India, and get an alert when your sector is named.
- Phishing Monitoring & Domain Abuse
Spot lookalike domains of your organisation and of bodies you work with, like the ASEAN-lookalike domain APT30 registered.
- Executive Protection
Watch for exposure of senior, diplomatic and press-facing staff, the people APT30's decoys were written for.
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is APT30?
APT30 is an espionage group that FireEye described in April 2015 and attributed to a state sponsor, most likely the Chinese government. It has targeted Southeast Asia and India since at least 2005.
Is APT30 the same as Naikon?
Not exactly. MITRE ATT&CK says Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, but the two groups do not appear to be exact matches. We list them separately.
Is APT30 the same as APT31?
No. They are different groups. Belgium named both, with APT27, in one statement in 2022, but did not say they are one group.
How does APT30 reach air-gapped networks?
SHIPSHAPE spreads to USB drives, SPACESHIP copies chosen files onto a drive, and FLASHFLOOD moves files from drives back to an internet-connected computer, per FireEye.
Is APT30 still active?
FireEye's detailed report covers activity up to 2015. The latest government mentions in the sources here are Belgium's statement of July 2022 and the CERT-EU and ENISA publication of February 2023.
Sources
- APT30 and the Mechanics of a Long-Running Cyber Espionage OperationFireEye Labs · Supports: April 2015 report: attribution, targets, timeline, tools, decoys (copy cited by MITRE ATT&CK)
- APT30, Group G0013MITRE ATT&CK · Supports: Description, Naikon note, techniques, software, version 1.1
- Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs)Mandiant (Google Cloud) · Supports: Suspected attribution China, ASEAN target sector, associated malware
- China: Declaration by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of the Belgian GovernmentFPS Foreign Affairs, Belgium · Supports: 18 July 2022: FPS Interior activity linked to APT27, APT30 and APT31
- JP-23-01 Sustained activity by specific threat actorsCERT-EU and ENISA · Supports: 15 February 2023: APT30 among APTs active in the EU, recommendations
- BACKSPACE, Software S0031MITRE ATT&CK · Supports: BACKSPACE since at least 2005, Lecna, techniques
- NETEAGLE, Software S0034MITRE ATT&CK · Supports: NETEAGLE compile dates from 2008, Scout and Norton variants, Run key