Threat group profile

APT34

Also known as OilRig, COBALT GYPSY, IRN2

MITRE ATT&CK describes OilRig, also tracked as APT34, as a suspected Iranian group working on behalf of the Iranian government since at least 2014, and the UAE Cyber Security Council issued advisories on it in October and December 2024.

In short

MITRE ATT&CK describes OilRig, also tracked as APT34, as a suspected Iranian group working on behalf of the Iranian government since at least 2014, and the UAE Cyber Security Council issued advisories on it in October and December 2024. MITRE and the UAE council list government, energy, financial, chemical and telecoms targets mainly in the Middle East, reached through phishing emails and stolen logins.

Profile MapThreat Group
  1. Attributed OriginIran
  2. Names12names in public reportsOilRig · COBALT GYPSY · IRN2
  3. Sectors9named as targetsGovernment bodies · Oil and gas · Financial sector
  4. Techniques14in the attack chainResource Development · Initial Access · Execution
  5. Tools12tools and malware listedBONDUPDATER · Helminth · QUADAGENT

In one minute

Who they are
MITRE ATT&CK describes OilRig, also tracked as APT34 and by about ten other names, as a suspected Iranian group that works on behalf of the Iranian government and has been active since at least 2014. The UAE Cyber Security Council published advisories on it on 14 October and 26 December 2024, and the NCSC UK and CISA named it in 2019 in connection with Turla. None of the sources used here names a specific Iranian agency.
Who they target
MITRE lists financial, government, energy, chemical and telecommunications victims in the Middle East and elsewhere, and Israeli organizations in 2021 and 2022. The UAE Cyber Security Council says it targets energy, especially oil and gas, and other critical infrastructure in the UAE and the Gulf, plus technology providers.
How they usually get in
Phishing emails with malicious attachments or links, sometimes from compromised or spoofed accounts, fake VPN and job websites, and LinkedIn messages. MITRE also records stolen logins used on VPN, Citrix or Outlook Web Access, and use of the Windows flaw CVE-2024-30088 to gain higher rights.
What stands out
MITRE says it appears to attack through trusted organizations (supply chain attacks) and records command channels over DNS and Microsoft Exchange mailboxes. The UAE advisory describes a backdoor that abuses Exchange servers to steal logins and send them out by email.
What to do first
Require multi-factor authentication on VPN, Citrix, webmail and other remote logins, block risky email attachments, and patch Windows promptly, including CVE-2024-30088. Then check web servers for web shells and watch for odd PowerShell and DNS traffic.

Names

Public reports use several names for this activity.

Names used for APT34
NameWhere it appears
OilRig MITRE ATT&CK group page title; also UAE Cyber Security Council advisory of 26 December 2024[1, 3]
COBALT GYPSY MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups list[1]
IRN2 MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups list[1]
APT34 MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups list; also UAE Cyber Security Council advisories of 2024[1, 2, 3]
Helix Kitten MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups list; also UAE Cyber Security Council advisory of 26 December 2024 and the 2019 CISA alert (written HELIX KITTEN)[1, 3, 5]
Evasive Serpens MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups list[1]
Hazel Sandstorm MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups list[1]
EUROPIUM MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups list[1]
ITG13 MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups list[1]
Earth Simnavaz MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups list; also UAE Cyber Security Council advisory of 14 October 2024[1, 2]
Crambus MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups list; also the 2019 NCSC UK advisory (written OilRig/Crambus)[1, 4]
TA452 MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups list[1]

Who says so

Attribution is a judgment by the body named. It is shown here as attributed, not as proven fact.

  • MITRE ATT&CK Page version 5.0, last modified 31 July 2026

    Describes OilRig as a suspected Iranian threat group working on behalf of the Iranian government, judging by infrastructure details with references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure and targeting that fits nation-state interests.[1]

  • MITRE ATT&CK Page version 5.0, last modified 31 July 2026

    Says the groups once tracked separately as APT34 and OilRig were combined after further reporting raised confidence that the activity overlapped.[1]

  • UAE Cyber Security Council 14 October 2024

    Reported a recent campaign by Earth Simnavaz (APT34, OilRig) against critical infrastructure, mainly energy, in the UAE and the wider Gulf. It names no country behind the group.[2]

  • UAE Cyber Security Council 26 December 2024

    Said OilRig, also known as APT34 or Helix Kitten, is a threat actor that targets critical sectors in the Middle East and has been active since at least 2016. It names no country behind the group.[3]

  • MITRE ATT&CK January to December 2021

    Attributes the Outer Space campaign, with the Solar backdoor against Israeli organizations, to OilRig.[6]

  • MITRE ATT&CK January to December 2022

    Attributes the Juicy Mix campaign, with the Mango backdoor against Israeli organizations, to OilRig.[7]

  • MITRE ATT&CK Page for software S1173

    Says OilRig has used the PowerExchange backdoor since at least 2023, including against government targets in the Middle East.[10]

  • NCSC UK, with the US NSA 21 October 2019

    In the Turla advisory, said others in the security community attribute a Middle East victim's control panel to APT34 (also known as OilRig/Crambus). It names no agency behind the group.[4]

  • CISA Last revised 23 October 2019

    Its alert names APT 34, known as HELIX KITTEN or OilRig, as an Iranian APT group, and says activity that seems to come from it may be Turla.[5]

  • National Cyber Security Center, Bahrain 15 June 2022

    Says some activities of the Iranian actor Lyceum are related to APT34 aka OilRig. This is a link between two actors, not an attribution of OilRig itself.[23]

  • CERT-EU 2019 entry

    In its 10 Years Edition report, repeats the NCSC UK and NSA statement that Turla used the Iranian APT34's tools and infrastructure.[24]

Where sources differ

Sources differ on how long the group has been active. MITRE ATT&CK says OilRig has targeted victims since at least 2014. The UAE Cyber Security Council advisory of 26 December 2024 says at least 2016. Sources also differ on naming a state. MITRE says the group works on behalf of the Iranian government. The two UAE Cyber Security Council advisories name the group and its tools but do not name a country or agency, and no source used here names an Iranian agency. CISA and the NCSC UK name the group only inside a Turla advisory and say others in the security community made the link.

Who they target

Sectors

  • Government bodiesMITRE lists government among targeted sectors and says PowerExchange was used against government targets in the Middle East. The UAE Cyber Security Council lists government entities.[1, 3, 10]
  • Oil and gasThe UAE Cyber Security Council says the group targets energy, particularly oil and gas. MITRE lists energy.[1, 2, 3]
  • Financial sectorMITRE lists financial among the sectors it has targeted.[1]
  • Chemical sectorMITRE lists chemical among the sectors it has targeted.[1]
  • TelecomsMITRE lists telecommunications among the sectors it has targeted.[1]
  • Technology providersThe UAE Cyber Security Council lists technology providers and describes use of compromised accounts at technology providers. MITRE says it appears to carry out supply chain attacks.[1, 3]
  • UAE and Gulf regionThe UAE Cyber Security Council reported a recent campaign against critical infrastructure in the UAE and the wider Gulf in October 2024.[2]
  • Middle Eastern victimsMITRE says the group has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The UAE Cyber Security Council names the Middle East.[1, 3]
  • Israeli organizationsMITRE says the Outer Space campaign (2021) and the Juicy Mix campaign (2022) targeted Israeli organizations.[6, 7]

Regions

  • IsraelMITRE ATT&CK says OilRig compromised an Israeli job portal (Juicy Mix) and an Israeli human resources site (Outer Space) and used them as command servers.[1]

Operations timeline

Each entry is attributed to the group by the sources cited.

  1. At least 2014

    Earliest activity MITRE gives

    MITRE ATT&CK says OilRig has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014.[1]

  2. At least 2016

    Start year in the UAE advisory

    The UAE Cyber Security Council says the group has been active since at least 2016. Sources differ on the start year.[3]

  3. November 2017

    BONDUPDATER first seen

    MITRE says this PowerShell backdoor was first observed while targeting a Middle Eastern government organization.[8]

  4. 2018

    QUADAGENT campaign

    The UAE Cyber Security Council lists a QUADAGENT campaign in 2018.[3]

  5. August 2018

    Updated BONDUPDATER in phishing

    MITRE says an updated version was used against a government organization with spearphishing emails.[8]

  6. 21 October 2019

    NCSC UK and NSA advisory

    The advisory on Turla says others in the security community attribute a Middle East victim's control panel to APT34 (also known as OilRig/Crambus). CISA's alert names HELIX KITTEN or OilRig.[4, 5]

  7. January to December 2021

    Outer Space campaign

    MITRE attributes to OilRig a campaign using the SampleCheck5000 downloader and Solar backdoor against Israeli organizations.[6]

  8. January to December 2022

    Juicy Mix campaign

    MITRE attributes to OilRig a campaign using the Mango backdoor against Israeli organizations.[7]

  9. 15 June 2022

    Bahrain advisory

    The National Cyber Security Center of Bahrain says some activity of the Iranian actor Lyceum is related to APT34 aka OilRig.[23]

  10. Since at least 2022

    OilBooster downloader

    MITRE says OilRig has used the OilBooster downloader since at least 2022, including against organizations in Israel.[9]

  11. Since at least 2023

    PowerExchange backdoor

    MITRE says OilRig has used PowerExchange against government targets in the Middle East.[10]

  12. October 2024

    Gulf energy campaign

    The UAE Cyber Security Council reported a recent campaign using a new Exchange backdoor and the Windows flaw CVE-2024-30088.[2]

  13. 14 October 2024

    UAE advisory on Earth Simnavaz

    The UAE Cyber Security Council published an advisory naming Earth Simnavaz (APT34, OilRig).[2]

  14. 26 December 2024

    UAE advisory on OilRig

    The UAE Cyber Security Council published a second advisory on OilRig with tools and advice.[3]

  15. 31 July 2026

    MITRE page updated

    MITRE ATT&CK last modified its OilRig page, which lists use of CVE-2024-30088 without giving a date.[1]

Government actions

Indictments, sanctions and advisories that name the group or its alleged members.

Government actions about APT34
DateWhoWhat
21 October 2019 NCSC UK, with the US NSA Joint advisoryTurla advisory that says Turla used Iranian groups' control panels, and that others attribute one Middle East victim's panel to APT34 (also known as OilRig/Crambus).[4]
23 October 2019 (last revised) CISA AlertAlert on the same advisory names APT 34, known as HELIX KITTEN or OilRig, and warns that activity seeming to come from it may be Turla.[5]
2019 entry in the report CERT-EU Threat landscape reportThe 10 Years Edition repeats that Turla compromised APT34 and used its tools and infrastructure.[24]
15 June 2022 National Cyber Security Center, Bahrain AdvisoryAdvisory on the Iranian actor Lyceum in the Middle East energy and telecoms sectors says some of its activity is related to APT34 aka OilRig.[23]
14 October 2024 UAE Cyber Security Council AdvisoryEarth Simnavaz (APT34, OilRig) campaign against critical infrastructure and energy in the UAE and Gulf, with tools, a vulnerability and advice.[2]
26 December 2024 UAE Cyber Security Council AdvisoryOilRig profile with history, tools, techniques and recommendations.[3]

How they get in

Techniques reported for this group, by MITRE ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

  • Acquire Infrastructure: Domains T1583.001

    MITRE says it has set up fake VPN portals, conference sign-ups and job application websites to target victims.[1]

Initial Access

  • Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1566.001

    MITRE says it sends spearphishing emails with malicious attachments, using compromised or spoofed email accounts.[1]

  • Phishing: Spearphishing via Service T1566.003

    MITRE says it has used LinkedIn to send links, and the UAE advisory mentions LinkedIn lures to steal credentials.[1, 3]

  • Supply Chain Compromise T1195

    MITRE says it has used compromised organizations to run supply chain attacks on government entities.[1]

Execution

  • User Execution: Malicious File T1204.002

    MITRE says it sent macro documents that told users to click "enable content" to run the payload.[1]

  • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.001

    MITRE says it has used PowerShell scripts, including a macro that runs a PowerShell command.[1]

Persistence

  • External Remote Services T1133

    MITRE says it uses VPN, Citrix or Outlook Web Access to stay in an environment.[1]

  • Server Software Component: Web Shell T1505.003

    MITRE says it has used web shells, often to keep access to a victim network.[1]

  • Office Application Startup: Outlook Home Page T1137.004

    MITRE says it abused the Outlook Home Page feature to stay in a system.[1]

Privilege Escalation

  • Exploitation for Privilege Escalation T1068

    MITRE says it exploited the Windows kernel flaw CVE-2024-30088, and the UAE advisory of October 2024 names it too.[1, 2]

Credential Access

  • OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory T1003.001

    MITRE says it has used tools such as Mimikatz to steal logins, including for Outlook Web Access.[1]

Lateral Movement

  • Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol T1021.001

    MITRE says it has used Remote Desktop Protocol to move between systems.[1]

Command and Control

  • Application Layer Protocol: DNS T1071.004

    MITRE says it has used DNS for command and control, including a public tunnelling service.[1]

Exfiltration

  • Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol T1048.003

    MITRE says it sent data out through Microsoft Exchange and over FTP, apart from its main DNS channel.[1]

Tools and malware

  • BONDUPDATER PowerShell backdoor

    MITRE says it was first seen in November 2017 against a Middle Eastern government organization.[8]

  • Helminth Backdoor

    MITRE describes a backdoor with two variants, one delivered through Excel macros; the UAE advisory calls it an early tool.[11, 3]

  • QUADAGENT PowerShell backdoor

    MITRE lists it as a PowerShell backdoor used by OilRig; the UAE advisory lists a 2018 campaign.[12, 3]

  • OopsIE Trojan

    MITRE says it runs commands and uploads or downloads files on victims.[13]

  • RGDoor IIS backdoor

    MITRE says it was seen on web servers of Middle East government organizations.[14]

  • Solar Backdoor

    MITRE says it was used in the Outer Space campaign to download, run and steal files.[15]

  • Mango Backdoor

    MITRE calls it the successor to Solar, used in the Juicy Mix campaign.[16]

  • OilBooster Downloader

    MITRE says it has been used since at least 2022, including against organizations in Israel.[9]

  • PowerExchange PowerShell backdoor

    MITRE says it has been used since at least 2023 against Middle East government targets.[10]

  • STEALHOOK Credential theft tool

    The UAE advisory says it takes user credentials and sends them out as email attachments.[2]

  • Mimikatz and LaZagne Credential dumping tools

    MITRE says it has used Mimikatz, and credential dumping tools such as LaZagne, to steal logins; the UAE advisory of December 2024 also names both.[1, 3, 25]

  • ngrok Tunnelling tool

    MITRE lists ngrok among remote monitoring tools OilRig has used, and the October 2024 UAE advisory says it is used for tunnels for command traffic.[1, 2, 26]

Detection and defense

  1. Block risky attachments and fake mail

    Block unknown or unused attachment types by default, filter mail with SPF, DKIM and DMARC checks, and train staff to spot phishing, including lures sent through LinkedIn.

    Counters T1566.001 T1566.003 T1204.002

  2. Protect remote logins

    Require multi-factor authentication on VPN, Citrix and webmail, remove remote services nobody needs, and route access through managed gateways.

    Counters T1133

  3. Patch fast

    Patch Windows promptly, including the kernel flaw CVE-2024-30088 named by the UAE advisory.

    Counters T1068

  4. Guard stored credentials

    Turn on attack surface reduction rules that protect LSASS and use Credential Guard where hardware allows.

    Counters T1003.001

  5. Hunt for web shells

    Limit who can change web server folders, and alert when web server processes start command shells.

    Counters T1505.003

  6. Fix Outlook startup abuse

    Apply the Outlook patches MITRE lists and block Office programs from starting child processes.

    Counters T1137.004

  7. Watch scripts and DNS

    Monitor for odd PowerShell and scripting activity and filter DNS requests to untrusted domains.

    Counters T1059.001 T1071.004 T1048.003

  8. Segment the network

    Split the network so one breach, or a lateral move over Remote Desktop, reaches less.

    Counters T1021.001 T1195

What Brandefense can do

  • Phishing Monitoring & Domain Abuse

    Spot fake VPN portals, job sites and look-alike domains made to lure your staff, and get them taken down.

  • External Attack Surface Management

    See which VPN, Citrix, webmail and Exchange services your company exposes to the internet so you can fix them first.

  • Dark Web Monitoring

    Be alerted when staff logins appear on criminal marketplaces, before they are used on remote access.

  • Cyber Threat Intelligence

    Follow new government advisories that name OilRig, APT34 or Earth Simnavaz, the tools they list (such as STEALHOOK and PowerExchange), and targeting of energy, government and telecoms in the Gulf and Israel.

Questions

Are APT34 and OilRig the same group?

MITRE ATT&CK keeps one page for both and says they were combined after further reporting raised confidence that the activity overlapped.

Who is behind it?

MITRE says it is a suspected Iranian group working on behalf of the Iranian government. The UAE advisories name no country, and no source used here names an agency.

Who does it target?

MITRE lists financial, government, energy, chemical and telecommunications victims in the Middle East and elsewhere. The UAE Cyber Security Council names energy, critical infrastructure, government and technology providers.

How does it get in?

MITRE records phishing emails with malicious attachments or links, fake VPN and job sites, LinkedIn lures, stolen logins on VPN, Citrix or Outlook Web Access, and a Windows kernel flaw for higher rights.

Is it still active?

The UAE Cyber Security Council published advisories on 14 October and 26 December 2024, and MITRE updated its page on 31 July 2026. No source used here dates newer operations.

What should a company do first?

Turn on multi-factor authentication for remote logins, block risky attachments and patch Windows promptly, as the UAE advisories and MITRE mitigations advise.

In our research

  1. OilRig: Iran’s Persistent Espionage Arm in Cyberspace December 2025
  2. APT33 (Elfin / Refined Kitten): Iran’s Longstanding Cyber-Espionage Arm November 2025
  3. APT Groups in the MENA Region: Key Threat Actors in Cyber Espionage October 2025
  4. How Nation-State Cyber Threats Are Evolving – Part I August 2025
  5. APT34’s New Backdoor SideTwist Variant Technical Analysis June 2024
  6. OSINT Methodology for Cryptocurrency January 2024
  7. [Research Summary]: APT34’s New Backdoor – SideTwist Variant December 2023

Sources

  1. OilRig, Group G0049 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Names, attribution wording, targets, techniques, software, page date
  2. Earth Simnavaz Cyberattacks Targeting UAE and Gulf Regions (advisory, 14 October 2024) UAE Cyber Security Council Supports: Campaign on UAE and Gulf critical infrastructure and energy, tools, advice
  3. OilRig Cyber Espionage Threat (advisory, 26 December 2024) UAE Cyber Security Council Supports: Middle East targeting, active since at least 2016, tools, advice
  4. Advisory: Turla group exploits Iranian APT to expand coverage of victims (21 October 2019) NCSC UK, with the US NSA Supports: Names OilRig/Crambus; Turla use of Iranian control panels
  5. NSA and NCSC Release Joint Advisory on Turla Group Activity CISA Supports: Names HELIX KITTEN and OilRig; caution on misattribution
  6. Outer Space, Campaign C0042 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: 2021 campaign against Israeli organizations
  7. Juicy Mix, Campaign C0044 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: 2022 campaign against Israeli organizations
  8. BONDUPDATER, Software S0360 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Backdoor first seen November 2017
  9. OilBooster, Software S1172 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Downloader used since at least 2022
  10. PowerExchange, Software S1173 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Backdoor used since at least 2023
  11. Helminth, Software S0170 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Early backdoor
  12. QUADAGENT, Software S0269 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: PowerShell backdoor
  13. OopsIE, Software S0264 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Trojan for commands and file transfer
  14. RGDoor, Software S0258 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: IIS backdoor on Middle East government web servers
  15. Solar, Software S1166 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Backdoor of the Outer Space campaign
  16. Mango, Software S1169 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Backdoor of the Juicy Mix campaign
  17. Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment, T1566.001 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Mitigations for malicious attachments
  18. External Remote Services, T1133 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Mitigations for exposed remote services
  19. OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, T1003.001 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Mitigations for credential dumping
  20. Server Software Component: Web Shell, T1505.003 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Mitigations for web shells
  21. Office Application Startup: Outlook Home Page, T1137.004 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Mitigations for Outlook Home Page abuse
  22. Application Layer Protocol: DNS, T1071.004 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Mitigations for DNS command channels
  23. A new .NET-based DNS Backdoor Used by Lyceum (advisory NCSC-TAD-2206-003, 15 June 2022) National Cyber Security Center, Bahrain Supports: Says some Lyceum activity is related to APT34 aka OilRig; Middle East energy and telecoms
  24. Threat Landscape Report, The 10 Years Edition CERT-EU Supports: Repeats the NCSC UK and NSA finding that Turla used APT34 tools and infrastructure
  25. LaZagne, Software S0349 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Credential dumping tool listed for OilRig
  26. ngrok, Software S0508 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Tunnelling tool listed for OilRig