An attacker may change a product or its delivery path before a customer receives it. The technique covers software dependencies, software distribution, and hardware supply chains.
How it works
MITRE says the change can happen during development, distribution, or delivery. T1195.001 covers software dependencies and development tools. Compromise Software Supply Chain (T1195.002) covers software and update channels. T1195.003 covers hardware. The supply chain attack glossary entry explains the broader concept.
T1195 Supply Chain Compromise: Check the Trusted Handoff
The useful boundary for an analyst is the trusted handoff. Record what package or device was expected, where it came from, and when it was installed. Then compare its first execution with the normal behavior of that product. MITRE’s DET0537 joins these stages because a changed installer may look ordinary until it runs.
Supplier oversight sits alongside endpoint checks. NIST SP 800-161 Rev. 1 Update 1 calls for risk assessments and plans for acquired products and services. Brandefense’s third party risk management software supports continuous supplier risk monitoring. The supply chain and vendor risk use case covers that management task.
A real example
CISA reported that malicious code was placed in certain SolarWinds Orion updates and delivered as legitimate updates in 2020. That case illustrates a software distribution path within T1195. The SolarWinds Orion incident profile covers the case; this page focuses on the parent technique and its detection pattern.
Who uses it
How to detect
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Check the source and integrity of a new install
MITRE DET0537 AN1480 flags software delivered from an unusual source or with a signature or hash mismatch. Compare the publisher and update source with approved records before judging the install.
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Join installer writes to the package event
DET0537 looks for an installer or updater that writes binaries to unexpected paths or replaces signed files. Link file creation and code integrity records to the software install time.
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Inspect the first run
MITRE says an abnormal module load or unexpected child process after installation can strengthen the signal. Review new outbound network flows from the same host as further context.
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Tune by platform and approved source
DET0537 provides Windows, Linux, and macOS analytics. It lists trusted publishers, approved repositories, known update hosts, and a tunable install-to-first-run window to reduce routine update noise.
How to defend
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Approve dependencies and pin versions
MITRE M1013 advises developers to choose third-party libraries carefully and lock dependencies to specific versions where possible. Review changes before a new version enters a build.
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Control installation sources
MITRE M1033 advises approved internal repositories for developer packages where possible. Keep a record of authorized publishers and update channels for the detection workflow.
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Limit execution privileges
MITRE M1018 recommends running software with only the permissions it needs. This can limit the reach of a changed package after it executes.
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Assess suppliers and acquired products
NIST SP 800-161 Rev. 1 Update 1 describes supply chain risk assessments, policies, and plans for products and services. Use them to prioritize suppliers and record the controls expected at each handoff.
Frequently Asked Questions
Which tactic contains T1195?
MITRE places Supply Chain Compromise under Initial Access. The attacker changes a product or delivery path before the final consumer receives it.
How does T1195 differ from T1195.002?
T1195 is the parent technique. T1195.002 is its software supply chain sub-technique. The other two sub-techniques cover dependencies and development tools, and hardware.
What sequence does DET0537 look for?
MITRE joins a suspicious package or update event to installer file changes and unusual first-run behavior. The analytics vary by Windows, Linux, and macOS.
Sources
- Supply Chain Compromise, Technique T1195MITRE ATT&CK
- Behavioral Detection for Supply Chain Compromise, DET0537MITRE ATT&CK
- Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Systems and Organizations, SP 800-161 Rev. 1 Update 1NIST
- What Every Leader Needs to Know About the Ongoing APT Cyber ActivityCISA
