Threat group profile

APT40 threat group profile

Also known as Leviathan, Kryptonite Panda, Gingham Typhoon

APT40 (tracked by MITRE as Leviathan) is attributed by the US and UK governments (2021) and by agencies in eight countries (2024) to China's Ministry of State Security.

In short

APT40 (tracked by MITRE as Leviathan) is attributed by the US and UK governments (2021) and by agencies in eight countries (2024) to China's Ministry of State Security. The US charged four people in 2021, three of them named as officers of its Hainan State Security Department.

Profile MapThreat Group
  1. Attributed OriginChina
  2. Names13names in public reportsAPT40 · Leviathan · MUDCARP
  3. Sectors6named as targetsMaritime and naval · Government · Transport and manufacturing
  4. Techniques14in the attack chainReconnaissance · Resource Development · Initial Access
  5. Tools9tools and malware listedChina Chopper · Derusbi · BADFLICK

In one minute

Who they are
Attributed by the US (2021 indictment and advisory), the UK (2021) and agencies in Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the UK and the US (2024 joint advisory) to China's Ministry of State Security. MITRE tracks the group as Leviathan and links it to the Hainan State Security Department.
Who they target
MITRE lists academia, aerospace, biomedical, defense, government, healthcare, manufacturing, maritime and transportation in North America, Europe, Australia, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. The UK names maritime and naval defense targets.
How they usually get in
The 2024 advisory says the group appears to prefer exploiting public-facing systems over phishing, and values valid credentials. MITRE also lists spearphishing, VPN access and watering holes.
What stands out
The 2021 US indictment alleges the activity ran through a named front company, Hainan Xiandun, which the provincial office (HSSD) created in 2011. The 2024 advisory says the group can adapt public exploit code within hours or days of a flaw going public.
What to do first
Patch internet-facing systems quickly, turn on multi-factor authentication for all remote access, and check web servers for web shells.

Names

Public reports use several names for this activity.

Names used for APT40 threat group profile
NameWhere it appears
APT40 MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups; CISA and FBI advisory AA21-200A; 2021 US indictment; UK government statement of 19 July 2021; 2024 joint advisory[1, 11, 12, 14, 15]
Leviathan MITRE ATT&CK group name; AA21-200A; 2021 US indictment; UK government table; 2024 joint advisory[1, 11, 12, 14, 15]
MUDCARP MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups; AA21-200A; 2021 US indictment[1, 11, 12]
Kryptonite Panda MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups; AA21-200A; 2021 US indictment; 2024 joint advisory[1, 11, 12, 15]
Gadolinium MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups; AA21-200A; 2021 US indictment[1, 11, 12]
BRONZE MOHAWK MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups; AA21-200A; 2021 US indictment; 2024 joint advisory (as Bronze Mohawk)[1, 11, 12, 15]
TEMP.Jumper MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups; AA21-200A; 2021 US indictment; UK government table[1, 11, 12, 14]
TEMP.Periscope MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups; AA21-200A; 2021 US indictment; UK government table[1, 11, 12, 14]
Gingham Typhoon MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups; 2024 joint advisory (as GINGHAM TYPHOON)[1, 15]
Periscope AA21-200A and the 2021 US indictment list it as a label; it is not on the MITRE Associated Groups list[11, 12]
FEVERDREAM AA21-200A and the 2021 US indictment list it as a label; it is not on the MITRE Associated Groups list[11, 12]
GreenCrash AA21-200A and the 2021 US indictment list it as a label; the indictment also uses it as another name for the BADFLICK malware[11, 12]
Hellsing AA21-200A and the 2021 US indictment list it as a label; it is not on the MITRE Associated Groups list[11, 12]

Who says so

Attribution is a judgment by the body named. It is shown here as attributed, not as proven fact.

  • MITRE ATT&CK page created 18 April 2018, version 4.1 modified 31 July 2026

    Describes Leviathan as a Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been attributed to the MSS Hainan State Security Department and an affiliated front company. Lists it as active since at least 2009.[1]

  • US District Court, Southern District of California (grand jury) filed 28 May 2021

    Indictment charges three HSSD officers and a hacker with conspiracy to damage protected computers and conspiracy to commit economic espionage. It alleges the HSSD created Hainan Xiandun in 2011 as a front company and that the conspiracy ran from no later than July 2009 to September 2018.[12]

  • US Department of Justice 19 July 2021

    Unsealed the indictment against four people described by CISA and the FBI as APT40 cyber actors, working through the front company Hainan Xiandun.[11]

  • CISA and FBI 19 July 2021 (page last revised 20 July 2021)

    Joint advisory on a Chinese group known in open-source reporting as APT40. It says the group is located in Haikou, Hainan Province, and has been active since at least 2009.[11]

  • UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and NCSC 19 July 2021

    Attributed the Chinese Ministry of State Security as being behind activity known as APT40 and APT31.[13, 14]

  • UK National Cyber Security Centre 19 July 2021

    Judged it highly likely that APT40 is linked to the Ministry of State Security and highly likely sponsored by the MSS Hainan State Security Department.[14]

  • Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia 19 July 2021

    Stated that the EU and its Member States have been targeted by hacker groups APT40 and APT31, which are involved in intellectual property theft and espionage.[17]

  • Authors of the 2024 joint advisory (agencies of Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the UK and the US) 8 July 2024

    Assessed that the group conducts malicious cyber operations for the Ministry of State Security, with activity and techniques that overlap with groups tracked as APT40. Said it was previously reported as based in Haikou and tasked by the HSSD.[15, 16]

Where sources differ

Sources differ in wording and in the dates they give. MITRE says Leviathan "has been attributed to" the MSS Hainan State Security Department and a front company. The UK NCSC (19 July 2021) used "highly likely" for both the MSS link and HSSD sponsorship. The 2024 joint advisory says the activity "overlap[s]" with groups tracked as APT40 and repeats the Haikou and HSSD point as "previously reported". On dates, MITRE and the 2021 CISA and FBI advisory say active since at least 2009; the US indictment alleges a conspiracy from no later than July 2009 to September 2018 and Hainan Xiandun hacking from 2011 to at least 2018. The label lists also differ: MITRE lists nine names, while AA21-200A and the indictment list thirteen.

Who they target

Sectors

  • Maritime and navalThe UK government table lists maritime industries and naval defense contractors in the US and Europe. The indictment lists universities with maritime research and a US defense contractor involved in maritime research.[12, 14]
  • Research, universities and healthThe indictment lists a research facility working on virus treatments and vaccines and several universities. MITRE lists academia, biomedical and healthcare.[1, 12]
  • Aerospace, aviation and defenseMITRE lists aerospace/aviation and the defense industrial base. The indictment lists an American airline and a US defense contractor.[1, 12]
  • GovernmentMITRE and AA21-200A list government. The indictment lists a Cambodian ministry and two Saudi Arabian ministries.[1, 11, 12]
  • Transport and manufacturingAA21-200A lists transportation (rail and shipping) and manufacturing. The indictment lists a Malaysian high-speed rail corporation and a Swiss chemicals company.[11, 12]
  • Politics and electionsThe UK table lists multiple Cambodian electoral entities before the 2018 election. The indictment lists a Malaysian political party.[12, 14]

Regions

  • United States, Canada and EuropeMITRE lists the US, Canada and Europe. The indictment names victims in the US, Austria, Canada, Germany, Norway, Switzerland and the UK, among others.[1, 12]
  • Middle East and Southeast AsiaMITRE lists the Middle East and Southeast Asia. AA21-200A lists the South China Sea area and Belt and Road industries. The indictment names Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia.[1, 11, 12]
  • AustraliaThe 2024 joint advisory says the group has repeatedly targeted Australian networks. MITRE campaign C0049 covers two intrusions in Australia.[2, 15]
  • AfricaThe indictment names victims in South Africa, among others.[12]
  • TaiwanThe Investigation Bureau of Taiwan's Ministry of Justice said on 19 August 2020 that APT40 was one of four main groups, with Blacktech, Taidoor and MustangPanda, that attacked at least 10 government agencies and about 6,000 official e-mail accounts.[18]

Operations timeline

Each entry is attributed to the group by the sources cited.

  1. No later than July 2009

    Alleged start of the conspiracy

    The 2021 US indictment alleges the conspiracy began on a date unknown but no later than July 2009. MITRE and AA21-200A say the group has been active since at least 2009.[1, 11, 12]

  2. July 2009

    Hainan Kehua front company

    The indictment alleges the HSSD established a front company called Hainan Kehua to recruit hackers and linguists.[12]

  3. 2011

    Hainan Xiandun created

    The indictment alleges the HSSD created Hainan Xiandun, a front company.[12]

  4. 2011 to at least 2018

    Theft from companies and universities

    The indictment alleges Hainan Xiandun employed hackers who stole data from companies and universities, including in virus and maritime research.[12]

  5. 2014 and August 2017

    Orz backdoor seen

    MITRE says the Orz backdoor was observed in 2014 and in August 2017.[9]

  6. 2018

    BADFLICK campaigns reported

    MITRE says spearphishing campaigns with the BADFLICK backdoor, first reported in 2018, targeted US engineering and maritime industries.[3]

  7. 2018

    Cambodian election targeting

    The UK table lists targeting of multiple Cambodian electoral entities in the run up to the 2018 election.[14]

  8. September 2018

    End of alleged conspiracy

    The indictment's conspiracy period runs up to and including September 2018.[12]

  9. 28 May 2021

    Indictment filed

    A grand jury in the Southern District of California indicts Ding Xiaoyang, Cheng Qingmin, Zhu Yunmin and Wu Shurong.[12]

  10. 19 July 2021

    Indictment unsealed, UK attribution

    The US unseals the indictment. CISA and the FBI publish AA21-200A. The UK attributes APT40 activity to the Ministry of State Security.[11, 13, 14]

  11. April 2022 to September 2022

    Intrusions in Australia

    MITRE campaign C0049 covers at least two long-term intrusions in Australia. The 2024 advisory dates its two case studies to April 2022 and to July to September 2022.[2, 15]

  12. 8 July 2024

    Joint advisory

    Agencies from eight countries publish AA24-190A, assessing that the group works for the Ministry of State Security.[15, 16]

Government actions

Indictments, sanctions and advisories that name the group or its alleged members.

Government actions about APT40 threat group profile
DateWhoWhat
28 May 2021 US District Court, Southern District of California (grand jury) Indictment filedDing Xiaoyang, Cheng Qingmin, Zhu Yunmin and Wu Shurong charged; the heading lists conspiracy to damage protected computers and conspiracy to commit economic espionage.[12]
19 July 2021 US Department of Justice Indictment unsealedDescribed by CISA and the FBI as an indictment against four APT40 cyber actors working through Hainan Xiandun.[11]
19 July 2021 CISA and FBI Joint cybersecurity advisory AA21-200AGives the group's tactics, techniques and indicators of compromise, with mitigations.[11]
19 July 2021 UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and NCSC Public attributionAttributed the Chinese Ministry of State Security as being behind activity known as APT40 and APT31.[13, 14]
19 July 2021 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia National statementSaid the EU and its Member States have been targeted by hacker groups APT40 and APT31.[17]
8 July 2024 Agencies of Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the UK and the US Joint advisory AA24-190AAssesses the group works for the Ministry of State Security and describes two Australian case studies with mitigations.[15, 16]

How they get in

Techniques reported for this group, by MITRE ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

  • Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning T1595.002

    Scans networks of interest for vulnerable or end-of-life devices so it can deploy exploits quickly.[1, 15]

Resource Development

  • Acquire Infrastructure: Domains T1583.001

    Sets up domains that impersonate legitimate entities. The indictment calls them doppelganger domains.[1, 11, 12]

  • Compromise Infrastructure: Network Devices T1584.008

    Uses compromised small office and home office devices as command and control infrastructure.[1, 15]

Initial Access

  • Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190

    The 2024 advisory says it prefers exploiting public-facing systems over phishing and adapts public exploit code within hours or days.[1, 15]

  • Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1566.001

    Sends emails with malicious attachments such as .rtf, .doc and .xls files.[1, 11, 12]

  • Phishing: Spearphishing Link T1566.002

    Sends emails with links, often using a lookalike domain and stolen branding.[1, 11]

  • External Remote Services T1133

    Uses services such as VPNs to gain initial access.[1, 11]

  • Valid Accounts T1078

    Obtains valid accounts. The 2024 advisory says it puts a high priority on obtaining valid credentials.[1, 15]

Persistence

  • Server Software Component: Web Shell T1505.003

    Relies on web shells for a foothold and for persistence, particularly early in an intrusion.[1, 15]

Credential Access

  • Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting T1558.003

    Used Kerberoasting to obtain network credentials in the Australian intrusions.[1, 15]

  • Multi-Factor Authentication Interception T1111

    Collected multi-factor authentication token values from a compromised appliance in the Australian intrusions.[1, 15]

Lateral Movement

  • Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares T1021.002

    Used remote shares to move through victim networks.[1, 15]

Exfiltration

  • Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage T1567.002

    MITRE lists an uploader that can send files to Dropbox.[1]

Stealth

  • Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography T1027.003

    Hides stolen data inside other files stored on GitHub.[1, 11, 12]

Tools and malware

  • China Chopper Web shell

    MITRE says it gives access back into a network without needing a callback to a remote server. AA21-200A lists it among the group's tools.[4, 11]

  • Derusbi Malware

    MITRE says multiple Chinese groups use it. The indictment names it (as PHOTO) among the malware the conspirators used.[5, 11, 12]

  • BADFLICK Backdoor

    MITRE says it was used in spearphishing campaigns first reported in 2018. The indictment also gives it the name GreenCrash.[3, 12]

  • MURKYTOP Reconnaissance tool

    MITRE describes it as a reconnaissance tool used by Leviathan. The indictment also lists it as mt.exe.[6, 12]

  • HOMEFRY Password dumper

    MITRE describes a 64-bit Windows password dumper and cracker used with other Leviathan backdoors.[7]

  • NanHaiShu Remote access tool and backdoor

    MITRE says it was used against organizations linked to the South China Sea dispute.[8, 11]

  • Orz JavaScript backdoor

    MITRE says it was seen in 2014 and in August 2017.[9, 11]

  • gh0st RAT Remote access tool

    MITRE says its source code is public and that multiple groups use it. AA21-200A lists Gh0stRAT among the group's tools.[10, 11]

  • Secure Socket Funnelling Open-source tunnelling tool

    The 2024 advisory says it was used in one Australian case to connect out to the group's infrastructure.[15]

Detection and defense

  1. Patch internet-facing systems fast

    Patch web servers, web applications and remote access gateways. The 2024 advisory says to apply patches to internet-facing systems within 48 hours and notes that most exploits used were publicly known.

    Counters T1190 T1595.002

  2. Use multi-factor authentication on all remote access

    Apply multi-factor authentication to email, collaboration tools, VPNs and remote desktop, and use managed service accounts. Also patch the appliances themselves, since tokens were collected from a compromised one.

    Counters T1133 T1078 T1111

  3. Hunt for web shells

    Monitor internet-accessible applications and server disk use for unexpected changes, and put a well-tuned web application firewall in front of web servers.

    Counters T1505.003 T1190

  4. Make stolen credentials less useful

    Do not reuse passwords, audit remote logins, and compare credentials seen inside the network with those used on external systems. Managed service accounts make them harder to crack.

    Counters T1078 T1558.003

  5. Segment the network and limit privileges

    Deny traffic between computers unless needed, administer Active Directory only through a few monitored jump servers, and enforce least privilege.

    Counters T1021.002 T1078

  6. Keep and centralize logs

    Collect web server, Windows event and proxy logs in one place and keep them long enough. The 2024 advisory says missing logs slowed investigations.

    Counters T1190 T1505.003

  7. Harden edge devices

    Turn off management interfaces such as Telnet, SSH, Winbox and HTTP on internet-facing interfaces, and replace end-of-life equipment.

    Counters T1584.008 T1133

  8. Look for programs run from writable folders

    The 2024 advisory shares Sigma detection rules for programs started from folders such as C:\Windows\Temp and C:\Users\Public. Investigate before concluding the activity is malicious.

    Counters T1059 T1505.003

What Brandefense can do

  • External Attack Surface Management

    See which web applications, VPN and remote access gateways and old devices your organization exposes to the internet, the places advisories say this group looks first.

  • Cyber Threat Intelligence

    Follow government and MITRE reporting on this group and compare its listed techniques with your own detection and controls.

  • Phishing Monitoring & Domain Abuse

    Find lookalike domains that copy your brand, a method the indictment and MITRE describe for this group.

  • Dark Web Monitoring

    Watch for leaked or sold company credentials, since MITRE and the 2024 advisory describe valid accounts as a main way in.

Questions

Who is APT40?

APT40 is a label used by CISA, the FBI and the UK government. MITRE tracks the same activity as Leviathan (G0065). It is attributed to China's Ministry of State Security by the UK and US (2021) and by the authors of the 2024 joint advisory.

Who has the US charged?

A grand jury indicted four people, filed on 28 May 2021 and unsealed on 19 July 2021. Three are named as officers of the MSS Hainan State Security Department and one as a hacker at the front company Hainan Xiandun. These are charges. The sources opened for this page do not report a court outcome.

How do they get in?

The 2024 joint advisory says the group appears to prefer exploiting public-facing systems over phishing and puts a high priority on valid credentials. MITRE and the 2021 advisory also list spearphishing, VPN access and watering holes.

Who do they target?

MITRE lists academia, aerospace/aviation, biomedical, defense industrial base, government, healthcare, manufacturing, maritime and transportation, in the US, Canada, Australia, Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. The 2024 advisory says Australian networks have been targeted repeatedly.

Are they still active?

The most recent government source opened is the July 2024 joint advisory, with case studies from 2022. No source opened for this page dates activity in the last two years, so Brandefense lists the status as dormant.

What should I do first?

Patch internet-facing systems quickly, turn on multi-factor authentication for remote access, and check web servers for web shells.

In our research

  1. APT40 January 2026

Sources

  1. Leviathan, Group G0065 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Group description, associated names, techniques, software list, page version and dates
  2. Leviathan Australian Intrusions, Campaign C0049 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Two long-term intrusions in Australia, April 2022 to September 2022
  3. BADFLICK, Software S0642 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Backdoor used in spearphishing campaigns first reported in 2018
  4. China Chopper, Software S0020 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Web shell used by several threat groups
  5. Derusbi, Software S0021 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Malware used by multiple Chinese groups
  6. MURKYTOP, Software S0233 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Reconnaissance tool
  7. HOMEFRY, Software S0232 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Windows password dumper and cracker
  8. NanHaiShu, Software S0228 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Remote access tool and JScript backdoor
  9. Orz, Software S0229 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Custom JavaScript backdoor
  10. gh0st RAT, Software S0032 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Public-source remote access tool used by multiple groups
  11. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China's MSS Hainan State Security Department (AA21-200A) CISA and FBI Supports: Names, location, targets, tactics, tools and mitigations; unsealing of the indictment on 19 July 2021
  12. Indictment, United States v. Ding Xiaoyang, Cheng Qingmin, Zhu Yunmin and Wu Shurong (Southern District of California, filed 28 May 2021) US Department of Justice Supports: Charges, Hainan Xiandun front company, named officers, victims, methods, malware
  13. UK and allies hold Chinese state responsible for pervasive pattern of hacking National Cyber Security Centre (UK) Supports: UK attribution to the Ministry of State Security, 19 July 2021
  14. UK and allies hold Chinese state responsible for a pervasive pattern of hacking Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and NCSC (GOV.UK) Supports: NCSC assessment table for APT40: names, targeting, MSS and HSSD judgements
  15. Latvia raises its concern about irresponsible behavior in cyberspace Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia Supports: National statement of 19 July 2021 on EU and Member States targeted by APT40 and APT31
  16. People's Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of State Security APT40 Tradecraft in Action (AA24-190A) ASD's ACSC, CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies of Canada, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and the UK Supports: July 2024 joint advisory: assessment, tradecraft, two case studies, mitigations
  17. APT40 Advisory, PRC MSS tradecraft in action (PDF) NCSC New Zealand Supports: Same joint advisory as published by NCSC-NZ
  18. Taiwan accuses China of hacking government data (Reuters) Taipei Times Supports: Names Taiwan as a target