Threat group profile

ARMORY CASTLE

Also known as UNC5221

Google Threat Intelligence Group attributes the zero-day exploitation of BeyondTrust Remote Support (CVE-2026-102764), which it dates to late August 2026, to ARMORY CASTLE, a suspected China-linked spying group it formerly tracked as UNC5221.

In short

Google Threat Intelligence Group attributes the zero-day exploitation of BeyondTrust Remote Support (CVE-2026-102764), which it dates to late August 2026, to ARMORY CASTLE, a suspected China-linked spying group it formerly tracked as UNC5221. No government has named the group.

Profile MapThreat Group
  1. Attributed OriginChina (suspected)
  2. Names3names in public reportsARMORY CASTLE · UNC5221 · UNC5337
  3. Sectors7named as targetsMany countries and verticals · United States · VMware vCenter and ESXi
  4. Techniques12in the attack chainInitial Access · Persistence · Privilege Escalation
  5. Tools11tools and malware listedSAWFLY · BARECLAW · BRICKSTORM

In one minute

Who they are
Attributed by Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) as a suspected China-nexus espionage actor. GTIG formerly tracked it as UNC5221. No government body has named the group.
Who they target
GTIG says it hits a wide range of countries and sectors, with a focus on edge and remote access appliances. Its reports name legal services, SaaS providers, outsourcing firms and technology companies.
How they usually get in
Zero-day flaws in internet-facing appliances: Ivanti Connect Secure between 2023 and 2025, and BeyondTrust Remote Support in late August 2026, per GTIG.
What stands out
GTIG says the group knows appliance internals well. It abuses built-in tools, startup templates and the reverse proxy, and it deletes logs as it goes.
What to do first
Patch BeyondTrust Remote Support with BT26-05-RS, treat any appliance that was exposed while unpatched as possibly compromised, and rotate every credential it held.

Names

Public reports use several names for this activity.

Names used for ARMORY CASTLE
NameWhere it appears
ARMORY CASTLE Name used in the GTIG report of 15 October 2026[1]
UNC5221 Earlier GTIG and Mandiant name, used in the 2025 reports on Ivanti flaws and BRICKSTORM[1, 4, 5, 6]
UNC5337 Cluster that Mandiant says it merged into UNC5221[5]

Who says so

Attribution is a judgment by the body named. It is shown here as attributed, not as proven fact.

  • Google Threat Intelligence Group 15 October 2026

    Attributes the zero-day exploitation of CVE-2026-102764 and the use of SAWFLY and BARECLAW to ARMORY CASTLE, a suspected PRC-nexus espionage actor formerly tracked as UNC5221. It says the tools and methods match earlier ARMORY CASTLE activity.[1]

  • Google Threat Intelligence Group 15 October 2026

    Assesses with high confidence that the group will keep using zero-day flaws in edge devices to support espionage.[1]

  • Google Threat Intelligence Group (Mandiant) 24 September 2025

    Tracks BRICKSTORM backdoor activity in the United States since March 2025 and ties it to UNC5221 and closely related, suspected China-nexus clusters.[6]

  • Google Threat Intelligence Group (Mandiant) 3 April 2025

    Attributes the Ivanti Connect Secure zero-day exploitation of CVE-2025-22457 and the SPAWN malware to UNC5221, a suspected China-nexus espionage actor.[4]

  • Google Threat Intelligence Group (Mandiant) 8 January 2025

    Attributes the Ivanti Connect Secure zero-day exploitation of CVE-2025-0282 to UNC5221 and says it merged UNC5337 into UNC5221.[5]

  • CISA 16 October 2026

    Says "cyber threat actors" are exploiting CVE-2026-102764 and names no group in the alert text. The alert links to a BeyondTrust blog whose title uses the name ARMORY CASTLE.[2]

  • Canadian Centre for Cyber Security 16 October 2026

    Says open-source reporting indicates exploitation of CVE-2026-102764 and names no group in the alert text. One of its references is the GTIG report.[3]

Where sources differ

Only security company research ties the group to China. GTIG calls it suspected PRC-nexus. CISA and the Canadian Cyber Centre name no actor for the BeyondTrust flaw. CISA, the NSA and the Cyber Centre say in a BRICKSTORM report that PRC state-sponsored actors use that backdoor, but the text does not name UNC5221 or ARMORY CASTLE. GTIG also notes that UNC5221 has been used as a synonym for the actor publicly called Silk Typhoon, and says it does not currently consider the two the same.

Who they target

Sectors

  • Ivanti Connect Secure, BeyondTrust Remote SupportGTIG says the actor exploits zero-day flaws in these devices, which often cannot run endpoint security tools.[1, 4, 5, 6]
  • Many countries and verticalsGTIG says the group has targeted a wide range of countries and sectors.[1, 5]
  • United StatesGTIG says BRICKSTORM intrusions since March 2025 hit legal services, mainly to gather information on US national security and international trade.[6]
  • United StatesGTIG assesses with high confidence that the aim is access to downstream customer environments and the data providers host.[6]
  • United StatesGTIG lists these providers among the sectors affected by BRICKSTORM intrusions.[6]
  • United StatesGTIG says targeting technology firms may support theft of intellectual property to build zero-day exploits.[6]
  • VMware vCenter and ESXiGTIG says the group consistently targets vCenter and ESXi hosts, often after first holding an edge appliance.[6]

Operations timeline

Each entry is attributed to the group by the sources cited.

  1. October 2023

    Earliest activity

    GTIG says ARMORY CASTLE has been active as early as October 2023.[1]

  2. December 2023

    Ivanti Connect Secure flaws

    Mandiant says UNC5221 exploited CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 as early as December 2023.[5]

  3. 10 January 2024

    Ivanti disclosure, then wide exploitation

    After the two Ivanti flaws were disclosed, Mandiant observed widespread exploitation by UNC5221 across many countries and sectors.[5]

  4. Mid-December 2024

    CVE-2025-0282 zero-day

    Mandiant identified zero-day exploitation of CVE-2025-0282 in Ivanti Connect Secure from mid-December 2024. It reported this on 8 January 2025 and attributed it to UNC5221.[5]

  5. Mid-March 2025

    CVE-2025-22457 exploitation

    Mandiant dates the earliest exploitation of this Ivanti flaw to mid-March 2025. Ivanti disclosed it on 3 April 2025, and Mandiant attributed it to UNC5221.[4]

  6. March 2025

    BRICKSTORM intrusions begin

    GTIG says Mandiant has responded to BRICKSTORM intrusions in the United States since March 2025.[6]

  7. 24 September 2025

    BRICKSTORM report

    GTIG reports an average of 393 days of undetected access in these intrusions and ties the backdoor to UNC5221 and related clusters.[6]

  8. Late August 2026

    BeyondTrust zero-day

    GTIG says Mandiant found evidence in an incident response case that ARMORY CASTLE exploited CVE-2026-102764 as a zero-day.[1]

  9. 9 October 2026

    SaaS tenants patched

    The Canadian Cyber Centre says BeyondTrust patched all Remote Support SaaS customers by this date.[3]

  10. 15 October 2026

    Disclosure and GTIG report

    BeyondTrust disclosed CVE-2026-102764. GTIG attributed the zero-day use to ARMORY CASTLE and described the SAWFLY web shell and the BARECLAW tunneler.[1, 3]

  11. 16 October 2026

    Government alerts

    CISA added the flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog and the Canadian Cyber Centre issued alert AL26-025. Neither names a group.[2, 3]

Government actions

Indictments, sanctions and advisories that name the group or its alleged members.

Government actions about ARMORY CASTLE
DateWhoWhat
4 December 2025 CISA, NSA and Canadian Cyber Centre Malware analysis reportReport AR25-338A on the BRICKSTORM backdoor, which the agencies say PRC state-sponsored actors use for long-term access. Updated 11 February 2026. The text does not name UNC5221.[7]
16 October 2026 CISA Alert and KEV listingUrged patching of CVE-2026-102764 and added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.[2]
16 October 2026 Canadian Cyber Centre Alert AL26-025Urged upgrading and applying the BT26-05-RS patch.[3]

How they get in

Techniques reported for this group, by MITRE ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

  • Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190

    Exploits zero-day flaws in internet-facing appliances, such as CVE-2026-102764 in BeyondTrust Remote Support and flaws in Ivanti Connect Secure.[1, 4, 5, 8]

Persistence

  • Server Software Component: Web Shell T1505.003

    Drops the SAWFLY web shell in the appliance web root. In the Ivanti cases GTIG names the LIGHTWIRE web shell.[1, 5, 9]

  • Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts T1037

    Creates a script in the appliance startup directory so the sudo change survives reboots and configuration resets.[1, 13]

  • Account Manipulation T1098

    Raises the permissions of a compromised account from No Access to Administrator for Jump Items and Teams.[1, 15]

Privilege Escalation

  • Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Setuid and Setgid T1548.001

    Copies the system shell to a new file, makes root the owner and sets the SUID bit, giving a root backdoor.[1, 10]

  • Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching T1548.003

    Adds a passwordless sudo entry for the site service account to the appliance sudoers template.[1, 11]

Defense Evasion

  • Indicator Removal: File Deletion T1070.004

    Deletes system, web server and application logs, including the secrets utility log.[1, 14]

  • Obfuscated Files or Information T1027

    Uses an obfuscated web shell and an encoded, encrypted channel for its commands.[1]

Credential Access

  • Credentials from Password Stores T1555

    Runs the appliance's own secrets utility to try to dump the credential vault.[1, 12]

Lateral Movement

  • Remote Access Tools T1219

    Starts remote support sessions through the appliance to reach internal endpoints.[1, 16]

Collection

  • Data from Local System T1005

    Downloads files such as software inventories from the desktops of the people it connects to.[1]

Command and Control

  • Protocol Tunneling T1572

    Runs the BARECLAW tunneler, a SOCKS5 proxy carried over WebSocket, and routes it through the appliance reverse proxy.[1, 17]

Tools and malware

  • SAWFLY Web shell

    PHP web shell (mangoapi.php) with RC4 encrypted, Base32 encoded commands; one of the group's main footholds on the BeyondTrust appliance (2026).[1]

  • BARECLAW Tunneler

    C program that carries a SOCKS5 proxy over WebSocket and was exposed through a changed reverse proxy setting (2026).[1]

  • BRICKSTORM Backdoor

    Go backdoor with SOCKS proxy function, found on Linux and BSD based appliances and tied by GTIG to UNC5221 (2025).[6]

  • BRICKSTEAL Credential stealer

    Malicious servlet filter that captures vCenter logins, tracked by Mandiant in BRICKSTORM intrusions (2025).[6]

  • TRAILBLAZE Dropper

    In-memory dropper used with the Ivanti flaw CVE-2025-22457 (2025).[4]

  • BRUSHFIRE Backdoor

    Passive backdoor injected into a running web process on Ivanti Connect Secure (2025).[4]

  • SPAWN Malware family

    Ecosystem of SPAWNANT installer, SPAWNMOLE tunneler and SPAWNSNAIL SSH backdoor, now attributed to UNC5221 (2025).[4, 5]

  • ZIPLINE Backdoor

    Passive backdoor used after the first Ivanti flaws (2024).[5]

  • THINSPOOL Dropper

    Dropper used after the first Ivanti flaws (2024).[5]

  • LIGHTWIRE Web shell

    Web shell used after the first Ivanti flaws (2024).[5]

  • WARPWIRE Credential harvester

    Credential harvester used after the first Ivanti flaws (2024).[5]

Detection and defense

  1. Patch the appliance

    Apply BT26-05-RS to self-hosted Remote Support on versions 24.3.1 to 26.2.3. Older versions must be upgraded first. SaaS tenants are already patched.

  2. Shrink the exposure

    Allow outside access only to the services users need and keep the /login and /appliance admin pages on trusted networks.

  3. Keep logs off the box

    Forward appliance syslog and session events to your SIEM and keep web application firewall and proxy logs, because the group deletes local logs.

  4. Rebuild, do not clean

    Redeploy a suspect appliance from a clean, patched image. GTIG says host-level changes survive reboots and configuration resets.

    Counters T1505.003 T1548.001

  5. Rotate what the appliance held

    After the appliance is patched or rebuilt, revoke active support sessions and rotate every credential it stored or injected, starting with admin and vault credentials. GTIG warns that rotating earlier exposes the new credentials to an attacker who still controls the appliance.

    Counters T1555

  6. Check role changes

    Look for Jump Item roles raised to Administrator and other unauthorized account, permission or session policy changes.

  7. Hunt for the traces

    Look for unrecognized privileged sessions, unrecognized script files and unexpected gaps in logs or log forwarding.

    Counters T1505.003

  8. Inventory edge devices

    List every edge and remote access appliance and monitor traffic coming from them, since they often have no endpoint agent.

What Brandefense can do

Questions

Who is ARMORY CASTLE?

A suspected China-nexus espionage actor, according to Google Threat Intelligence Group. It is the new name for the cluster GTIG formerly tracked as UNC5221.

Did a government name ARMORY CASTLE?

Not in the sources we reviewed. CISA and the Canadian Cyber Centre alerts on the BeyondTrust flaw speak of cyber threat actors or open-source reporting and name no group.

Which BeyondTrust flaw did it use?

CVE-2026-102764 in Remote Support. GTIG says the group used it as a zero-day from late August 2026, before BeyondTrust disclosed it on 15 October 2026.

What tools did it use in that attack?

A web shell called SAWFLY and a tunneler called BARECLAW, both named by GTIG as new custom malware. It also used the appliance's own utilities.

Which other products did it use before?

Ivanti Connect Secure, per Mandiant, from December 2023 to 2025. GTIG also ties the BRICKSTORM backdoor to UNC5221.

What should I do first?

Patch with BT26-05-RS, treat any appliance that was exposed while unpatched as possibly compromised, rebuild it from a clean image and rotate the credentials it held.

Sources

  1. ARMORY CASTLE Exploits BeyondTrust Google Threat Intelligence Group (Mandiant) Supports: 15 October 2026 report: zero-day use of CVE-2026-102764, SAWFLY and BARECLAW, attribution to ARMORY CASTLE, former name UNC5221, activity since October 2023
  2. CISA Urges Patching Critical Vulnerability in BeyondTrust Remote Support CISA Supports: 16 October 2026 alert: active exploitation by "cyber threat actors", KEV listing, no group named
  3. AL26-025 Critical vulnerability impacting BeyondTrust Remote Support (CVE-2026-102764) Canadian Centre for Cyber Security Supports: 16 October 2026 alert: open-source reporting of exploitation, SaaS patched by 9 October 2026, no group named
  4. Suspected China-Nexus Threat Actor Actively Exploiting Critical Ivanti Connect Secure Vulnerability (CVE-2025-22457) Google Threat Intelligence Group (Mandiant) Supports: 3 April 2025: UNC5221 attribution, TRAILBLAZE, BRUSHFIRE, SPAWN, zero-day use of edge devices back to 2023
  5. Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Targeted in New Zero-Day Exploitation Google Threat Intelligence Group (Mandiant) Supports: 8 January 2025: CVE-2025-0282, UNC5221 attribution, earlier Ivanti flaws from December 2023, custom tools, UNC5337 merged into UNC5221
  6. Another BRICKSTORM: Stealthy Backdoor Enabling Espionage into Tech and Legal Sectors Google Threat Intelligence Group (Mandiant) Supports: 24 September 2025: BRICKSTORM backdoor, sectors hit, 393 day average dwell time, difference from Silk Typhoon
  7. BRICKSTORM Backdoor (AR25-338A) CISA, NSA and Canadian Centre for Cyber Security Supports: 4 December 2025 (updated 11 February 2026): PRC state-sponsored actors use BRICKSTORM; no group name in the text
  8. Exploit Public-Facing Application, Technique T1190 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Technique id and name
  9. Server Software Component: Web Shell, Sub-technique T1505.003 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Technique id and name
  10. Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Setuid and Setgid, Sub-technique T1548.001 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Technique id and name
  11. Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching, Sub-technique T1548.003 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Technique id and name
  12. Credentials from Password Stores, Technique T1555 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Technique id and name
  13. Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts, Technique T1037 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Technique id and name
  14. Indicator Removal: File Deletion, Sub-technique T1070.004 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Technique id and name
  15. Account Manipulation, Technique T1098 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Technique id and name
  16. Remote Access Tools, Technique T1219 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Technique id and name
  17. Protocol Tunneling, Technique T1572 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Technique id and name