Threat group profile

CyberAv3ngers

Also known as Shahid Kaveh Group, Soldiers of Solomon

CyberAv3ngers (also called Shahid Kaveh Group in a 2026 advisory) is attributed by US, Israeli, Canadian and UK agencies to the Iranian IRGC, and is tied to defacing internet-exposed industrial controllers at US water facilities from November 2023.

In short

CyberAv3ngers (also called Shahid Kaveh Group in a 2026 advisory) is attributed by US, Israeli, Canadian and UK agencies to the Iranian IRGC, and is tied to defacing internet-exposed industrial controllers at US water facilities from November 2023. A 2026 US advisory on Iranian-affiliated attacks on US industrial controllers refers to this group as earlier activity but does not say the two are the same.

Profile MapThreat Group
  1. Attributed OriginIran
  2. Names13names in public reportsCyberAv3ngers · CyberAveng3rs · Cyber Avengers
  3. Sectors8named as targetsDevices "made in Israel" · PLC devices · Unitronics PLC owners
  4. Techniques12in the attack chainInitial Access · Persistence, Lateral Movement · Credential Access
  5. Tools4tools and malware listedIOCONTROL · Custom ladder logic files · Defacement splash page

In one minute

Who they are
CISA, the FBI, NSA, EPA and partners attribute the CyberAv3ngers persona to IRGC-affiliated actors (2023, updated December 2024). The 2026 advisory AA26-097A ties the name CyberAv3ngers (aka Shahid Kaveh Group) to the IRGC Cyber Electronic Command. MITRE describes a suspected IRGC-affiliated group active since at least 2020.
Who they target
Water and wastewater facilities and other sectors using Unitronics PLCs in the US, plus Israel. The UK NCSC says it saw PLC targeting in the UK too.
How they usually get in
Internet-exposed Unitronics PLCs with default or no passwords, as the advisory describes.
What stands out
The group is known for defacing PLC screens with an anti-Israel message and replacing the program on at least 75 devices. A separate 2026 advisory on Iranian-affiliated attacks on US industrial controllers does not say it is the same group.
What to do first
Take PLCs and their screens off the open internet, replace default passwords, and put remote access behind a gateway with multifactor authentication.

Names

Public reports use several names for this activity.

Names used for CyberAv3ngers
NameWhere it appears
CyberAv3ngers MITRE ATT&CK G1027 (group name); AA23-335A; Rewards for Justice[1, 2, 4]
CyberAveng3rs AA23-335A (also known as)[2]
Cyber Avengers AA23-335A (also known as)[2]
Shahid Kaveh Group AA26-097A ("CyberAv3ngers (aka Shahid Kaveh Group)")[5]
Soldiers of Soloman MITRE ATT&CK Associated Groups; MITRE says CyberAv3ngers reportedly has connections to this IRGC-linked group[1]
Soldiers of Solomon AA23-335A and AA26-097A (spelling in the advisories; AA23-335A says "connections to", AA26-097A lists it as a name)[2, 5]
Hydro Kitten AA26-097A (listed as a name used by private industry and open sources)[5]
Storm-0784 AA26-097A (listed as a name used by private industry and open sources)[5]
APT Iran AA26-097A (listed as a name used by private industry and open sources)[5]
Bauxite AA26-097A (listed as a name used by private industry and open sources)[5]
UNC5691 AA26-097A (listed as a name used by private industry and open sources)[5]
Mr. Soul AA26-097A (listed as a name used by private industry and open sources); Rewards for Justice lists it as an associated organization[4, 5]
IRGC Cyber-Electronic Command (IRGC-CEC) Treasury: also known as the IRGC Electronic Warfare and Cyber Defense Organization. Rewards for Justice also lists the IRGC Jangal Organization. This is the unit the sources link to the name, not a name of the group.[3, 4]

Who says so

Attribution is a judgment by the body named. It is shown here as attributed, not as proven fact.

  • MITRE ATT&CK 31 July 2026

    Describes CyberAv3ngers as a suspected Iranian Government IRGC-affiliated APT group, known to be active since at least 2020, with disputed and false claims of critical infrastructure compromises in Israel. Group page created 25 March 2024, last modified 31 July 2026.[1]

  • CISA, FBI, NSA, EPA and Israel National Cyber Directorate 1 December 2023

    Said IRGC-affiliated cyber actors using the persona "CyberAv3ngers" were actively targeting and compromising Israeli-made Unitronics Vision Series PLCs exposed to the internet.[7]

  • CISA, FBI, NSA, EPA, Israel National Cyber Directorate, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security and UK NCSC 18 December 2024

    Updated advisory calls CyberAv3ngers an Iranian IRGC-affiliated cyber persona and says the agencies assess the observed TTPs are likely associated with this IRGC-affiliated APT.[2]

  • US Department of the Treasury 2 February 2024

    Sanctioned six officials of the IRGC Cyber-Electronic Command (IRGC-CEC) in response to IRGC-affiliated cyber actors' operations against Unitronics PLCs. The release does not use the name CyberAv3ngers.[3]

  • Rewards for Justice, US Department of State Date not shown on the page

    States that CyberAv3ngers is affiliated with the IRGC-CEC and with Mahdi Lashgarian, and used malware known as IOCONTROL. Offers up to 10 million US dollars for information on persons acting for a foreign government in malicious cyber activity against US critical infrastructure.[4]

  • UK NCSC (in the joint advisory) 18 December 2024

    Said it observed targeting of PLC devices, including in the United Kingdom, likely as part of a wider cyber campaign against Israel and Israeli-made technology.[2]

  • MITRE ATT&CK and the joint advisory 18 December 2024 and 31 July 2026

    Both say CyberAv3ngers reportedly has connections to another IRGC-linked group, Soldiers of Solomon (MITRE spells it Soloman).[1, 2]

  • FBI, CISA, NSA, EPA, DOE, US Cyber Command CNMF and Treasury (AA26-097A) 7 April 2026, updated 22 July 2026

    Refer to "CyberAv3ngers (aka Shahid Kaveh Group)" as a cyber threat actor affiliated with the IRGC Cyber Electronic Command (CEC) and say they previously reported on its similar PLC activity.[5]

Where sources differ

AA26-097A, published on 7 April 2026 and updated on 22 July 2026, attributes the 2026 attacks on US industrial controllers to "a group of Iranian-affiliated APT actors". It names CyberAv3ngers (aka Shahid Kaveh Group) only as earlier actor whose similar PLC activity the agencies "previously reported on". It does not say the 2026 group is CyberAv3ngers, and this page does not either. The 30 July 2026 CISA alert names no actor at all.

Wording also differs on the name itself: the 2023 and 2024 advisory calls CyberAv3ngers a "persona" of IRGC-affiliated actors, MITRE calls it a "suspected" IRGC-affiliated APT group, and the 2026 advisory calls it a threat actor. The name "Shahid Kaveh Group" appears in AA26-097A but not in the 2023 advisory or on the MITRE page. Treasury's 2 February 2024 sanctions describe IRGC-affiliated cyber actors without using the CyberAv3ngers name; Rewards for Justice links the name to the same IRGC-CEC.

Who they target

Sectors

  • Unitronics Vision Series PLCs with screensAA23-335A says that from 22 November 2023 IRGC cyber actors accessed multiple US water facilities, and that at least 34 of at least 75 compromised devices were in the US water sector.[2]
  • Energy, food and beverage, transport, healthcareAA23-335A says the same PLCs are common in water and used in energy, food and beverage manufacturing, transportation systems and healthcare. MITRE says the victims covered multiple sectors.[1, 2]
  • Water, energy, shipping and distributionAA23-335A says that from 13 September to 30 October 2023 the CyberAv3ngers Telegram channel showed legitimate and false claims of attacks on Israeli PLCs in these sectors.[2]
  • Devices "made in Israel"The defacement message read that every piece of equipment "made in Israel" is a CyberAv3ngers legal target.[2, 4]
  • PLC devicesThe UK NCSC says it observed PLC targeting, including in the UK, likely as part of a wider campaign against Israel and Israeli-made technology.[2]
  • Unitronics PLC ownersAA23-335A says victims spanned multiple US states and foreign countries.[2]
  • Routers, PLCs, HMIs, firewalls, IP cameras, IoT and SCADA platformsRewards for Justice says CyberAv3ngers used the IOCONTROL malware against these device types in several countries.[4]
  • Water and other sectorsTreasury describes the IRGC-CEC as responsible for malicious cyber activity against critical infrastructure in the US and other countries.[3]

Operations timeline

Each entry is attributed to the group by the sources cited.

  1. 2020

    Claims against Israel begin

    AA23-335A says CyberAv3ngers has claimed attacks in Israel since 2020, and that several of these claims were false. MITRE gives "at least 2020".[1, 2]

  2. 13 Sept to 30 Oct 2023

    Telegram claims against Israel

    The CyberAv3ngers Telegram channel showed legitimate and false claims of attacks on Israeli PLCs in water, energy, shipping and distribution.[2]

  3. October 2023

    Credit claimed for attacks on Israel-based PLCs

    AA23-335A says the PLCs were internet-facing, used default or no passwords and used default ports, which the actors likely exploited.[2]

  4. 22 Nov 2023

    US water facilities reached

    IRGC cyber actors accessed multiple US water facilities running Unitronics Vision PLCs, likely through internet-facing devices with default or no passwords. The screens showed a message against Israel.[2, 4]

  5. 28 Nov 2023

    First CISA alert

    CISA warned of active exploitation of Unitronics PLCs in water systems. One US water authority took the system offline and went to manual operation. The alert names no actor.[8]

  6. Nov 2023 to Jan 2024

    Four waves against US devices

    AA23-335A says CyberAv3ngers targeted US Unitronics PLCs in likely four waves and compromised at least 75 devices, at least 34 of them in the water sector.[2]

  7. 1 Dec 2023

    Joint advisory

    CISA, FBI, NSA, EPA and Israel's cyber directorate released the first advisory naming the CyberAv3ngers persona.[7]

  8. 2 Feb 2024

    Treasury sanctions

    Treasury sanctioned six IRGC-CEC officials in response to IRGC-affiliated actors' Unitronics operation.[3]

  9. 18 Dec 2024

    Advisory updated

    New details on the extent of the activity, including custom ladder logic for each device type and renamed devices, and new TTPs.[2]

  10. 7 Apr 2026

    Separate: advisory on Iranian-affiliated attacks on US industrial controllers

    AA26-097A says the agencies assess "a group of Iranian-affiliated APT actors" has disrupted US PLCs since at least March 2026. It says the agencies previously reported on similar PLC activity by CyberAv3ngers (aka Shahid Kaveh Group). It does not say the two are the same. See our incident page "Iranian-affiliated attacks on US industrial controllers".[5]

  11. 22 Jul 2026

    Separate: 2026 advisory updated

    AA26-097A was widened to cover Schneider Electric and Siemens PLCs and potentially other brands. The update does not name CyberAv3ngers as the actor.[5]

Government actions

Indictments, sanctions and advisories that name the group or its alleged members.

Government actions about CyberAv3ngers
DateWhoWhat
28 November 2023 CISA AlertWarned of active exploitation of Unitronics PLCs in water systems and urged changing default passwords, MFA and disconnecting PLCs from the open internet. Names no actor.[8]
1 December 2023 CISA, FBI, NSA, EPA and Israel National Cyber Directorate Joint advisoryReleased AA23-335A on IRGC-affiliated actors using the persona "CyberAv3ngers" and their exploitation of Unitronics PLCs.[7, 2]
2 February 2024 US Department of the Treasury SanctionsDesignated six IRGC-CEC officials (Hamid Reza Lashgarian, Mahdi Lashgarian, Hamid Homayunfal, Milad Mansuri, Mohammad Bagher Shirinkar and Reza Mohammad Amin Saberian) and made the IRGC-CEC the primary name on the sanctions list.[3]
Date not shown on the page Rewards for Justice, US Department of State Reward offerOffers up to 10 million US dollars for information on persons acting for a foreign government in malicious cyber activity against US critical infrastructure, and names CyberAv3ngers and the six IRGC-CEC officials.[4]
18 December 2024 CISA, FBI, NSA, EPA, Israel National Cyber Directorate, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security and UK NCSC Updated joint advisoryUpdated AA23-335A with new TTPs, ATT&CK mapping and mitigations.[2]
19 December 2024 UK NCSC Statement updateNoted that the updated advisory is co-sealed with international partners and urged organizations to follow its advice.[9]
7 April 2026 FBI, CISA, NSA, EPA, DOE, US Cyber Command CNMF and Treasury Joint advisory (AA26-097A)Warned of ongoing Iranian-affiliated targeting of internet-connected PLCs. Refers to CyberAv3ngers as earlier similar activity. Does not state that the 2026 group is CyberAv3ngers.[5]
22 July 2026 Same agencies Advisory updateAdded guidance on malicious changes in reusable code modules in Rockwell PLC programs and widened scope to Schneider Electric and Siemens.[5]
30 July 2026 CISA, with EPA and FBI AlertUrged water and wastewater operators to protect PLCs after a rise in actors targeting them. Names no actor or country.[6]

How they get in

Techniques reported for this group, by MITRE ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

  • Internet Accessible Device T0883

    MITRE says the group exploited devices connected to the public internet, such as Unitronics PLCs with screens and cellular modems found in OT environments.[1]

Credential Access

  • Brute Force T1110

    AA23-335A says the actors authenticated to internet-connected devices on default TCP port 20256 and used brute force to reach valid accounts.[2]

Lateral Movement

  • Valid Accounts: Default Accounts T1078.001

    AA23-335A says the actors compromised multiple devices through default credentials or no password.[2]

Impact

  • Data Manipulation: Stored Data Manipulation T1565.001

    AA23-335A says the actors erased the original ladder logic file, loaded their own and set its software version to an older one.[2]

  • Account Access Removal T1531

    AA23-335A says the actors renamed compromised devices and password-protected upload functions so operators could not reach or change them.[2]

  • Endpoint Denial of Service T1499

    AA23-335A says the actors disabled the PLC's upload and download functions and changed the default port from 20256 to 20257.[2]

  • Defacement: Internal Defacement T1491.001

    AA23-335A says the actors loaded a splash page with the defacement message onto the screen so operators could not read normal values.[2]

  • Loss of Availability T0826

    MITRE says multiple businesses halted operations because the PLC and screen were unavailable.[1]

  • Loss of View T0829

    MITRE says the group replaced the graphic on the screen, so owners could not see PLC information.[1]

  • Loss of Productivity and Revenue T0828

    MITRE says the stoppages hurt normal business operations in several sectors.[1]

Persistence, Lateral Movement

  • Insecure Credentials: Default Credentials T1694.001

    MITRE says the group found and used default credentials on many Unitronics PLCs; for many the default password was 1111.[1]

Inhibit Response Function

  • Denial of Service T0814

    MITRE says the defaced screens stopped multiple entities from operating their devices normally and that a remote pumping station lost communications.[1]

Tools and malware

  • IOCONTROL Malware

    Rewards for Justice says CyberAv3ngers, affiliated with the IRGC-CEC and Mahdi Lashgarian, used this malware against ICS and SCADA devices including routers, PLCs, screens, firewalls, IP cameras and Linux-based IoT platforms.[4]

  • Custom ladder logic files Malicious PLC program

    AA23-335A says the actors made a custom ladder logic file for each Unitronics device type and used it to replace the original program.[2]

  • Defacement splash page Message loaded on the PLC screen

    AA23-335A says the page, with an anti-Israel message, stopped operators reading normal values.[2]

  • Telegram channel Claims channel

    AA23-335A says the group claimed attacks on a Telegram channel from 13 September to 30 October 2023.[2]

Detection and defense

  1. Replace default passwords

    Change default passwords on PLCs and screens to strong ones. CISA's first alert named the Unitronics default password 1111 as one to remove.

    Counters T1694.001 T1078.001

  2. Take PLCs off the open internet

    Disconnect the PLC from the public internet, or disable remote programming and require a strong password.

    Counters T0883 T1110

  3. Put a gateway and MFA in front

    If remote access is needed, use a proxy, gateway, firewall or VPN, which can add multifactor authentication even when the PLC cannot.

    Counters T1110 T0883

  4. Change the default port and block guessing

    Change the default port and PLC device name, and use a firewall that spots repeated login attempts.

    Counters T1110 T1499

  5. Update firmware and engineering software

    Upgrade Unitronics engineering software to VisiLogic 9.9.00 and PLC firmware to the newest version for the model, as AA23-335A advises.

    Counters T1565.001 T1078.001

  6. Back up PLC logic and keep spares

    Create and test backups of PLC logic and configurations, and keep cold-standby hardware for quick recovery.

    Counters T1565.001 T1531 T0826

  7. Watch for changes and odd logins

    Monitor asset systems for configuration changes and traffic for unusual logins to internet-connected devices or program changes.

    Counters T1565.001 T1531 T0883

  8. Segment and allowlist

    Separate control networks with firewalls and allow connections only from known workstations.

    Counters T0883 T1078.001

What Brandefense can do

  • Cyber Threat Intelligence

    Follow new government advisories, the names and tools they attribute to CyberAv3ngers, and whether they mention water, energy and other sectors in your region.

  • External Attack Surface Management

    Check which of your internet-facing systems and remote access points are visible from outside, the exposure the advisories ask owners to close.

  • Platform

    Keep this actor's advisories next to your own exposure findings, so the advice from CISA and its partners can be checked against your own systems.

Questions

Who are the CyberAv3ngers?

CISA, FBI, NSA, EPA and partner agencies call CyberAv3ngers an IRGC-affiliated cyber persona (advisory updated 18 December 2024). MITRE ATT&CK describes it as a suspected IRGC-affiliated APT group, active since at least 2020.

Is Shahid Kaveh Group the same thing?

AA26-097A, published on 7 April 2026, writes "CyberAv3ngers (aka Shahid Kaveh Group)" and describes it as affiliated with the IRGC Cyber Electronic Command.

What did they do in 2023?

The 2023 advisory says that from 22 November 2023 actors accessed US water facilities that used Unitronics PLCs, likely through default or no passwords. Between November 2023 and January 2024 at least 75 devices were compromised, at least 34 in the US water sector.

Are the 2026 attacks on US industrial controllers the work of CyberAv3ngers?

The agencies in AA26-097A assess "a group of Iranian-affiliated APT actors" is behind the 2026 activity. They refer to CyberAv3ngers as earlier similar activity but do not say the two are the same, so this page does not either.

Has anyone been sanctioned?

The US Treasury sanctioned six IRGC Cyber-Electronic Command officials on 2 February 2024 over IRGC-affiliated actors' Unitronics operation. Rewards for Justice links the name CyberAv3ngers to the same unit and offers up to 10 million US dollars for information.

What should a water or factory operator do first?

Take PLCs off the open internet, replace default passwords, and put remote access behind a gateway with multifactor authentication, as the advisories advise.

In our research

  1. Exposed PLCs: lessons from the 2026 US advisory October 2026

Sources

  1. CyberAv3ngers, Group G1027 MITRE ATT&CK Supports: MITRE's description, associated group, 2020 start, Unitronics Defacement Campaign and technique list
  2. IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors, Including US Water and Wastewater Systems Facilities (AA23-335A) CISA with FBI, NSA, EPA, Israel National Cyber Directorate, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security and UK NCSC Supports: The persona, the 2023 to 2024 waves, at least 75 devices, techniques and mitigations
  3. Treasury Sanctions Actors Responsible for Malicious Cyber Activities on Critical Infrastructure US Department of the Treasury Supports: Sanctions of six IRGC-CEC officials on 2 February 2024
  4. CyberAv3ngers Rewards for Justice, US Department of State Supports: Reward offer, link to IRGC-CEC, IOCONTROL, associated names
  5. Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure (AA26-097A) CISA with FBI, NSA, EPA, DOE, US Cyber Command CNMF and Treasury Supports: 2026 advisory, its reference to CyberAv3ngers (aka Shahid Kaveh Group) and the names it lists
  6. CISA Urges Water and Wastewater Systems Sector to Protect OT Against Activity Targeting PLCs CISA Supports: 30 July 2026 alert, which names no actor
  7. CISA and Partners Release Joint Advisory on IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploiting PLCs CISA Supports: 1 December 2023 alert naming the CyberAv3ngers persona
  8. Exploitation of Unitronics PLCs used in Water and Wastewater Systems CISA Supports: 28 November 2023 alert on the first US case and the default password advice
  9. NCSC statement following exploitation of Unitronics programmable logic controllers UK National Cyber Security Centre Supports: UK advice to follow the advisory; December 2024 update