Attributed by the Dutch AIVD and MIVD (2025) and by US, UK, Canadian and other allied agencies (July 2026) to Russian state-supported actors, LAUNDRY BEAR steals email from government, defense and technology bodies.
In short
Attributed by the Dutch AIVD and MIVD (2025) and by US, UK, Canadian and other allied agencies (July 2026) to Russian state-supported actors, LAUNDRY BEAR steals email from government, defense and technology bodies. The July 2026 joint advisory describes a view-based attack on Zimbra webmail that took 90 days of mail without a click.
Last updated 9 October 2026
Profile MapThreat Group
Attributed OriginRussia
Names5names in public reportsLAUNDRY BEAR · Void Blizzard · CL-STA-1114
Sectors11named as targetsSectors in the Estonian table · Almost all member states · Other regions
Techniques14in the attack chainReconnaissance · Resource Development · Initial Access
Tools8tools and malware listedUlej · Flowerbed · Catcher
In one minute
Who they are
The Dutch AIVD and MIVD (May 2025) and the US, UK, Canadian and other agencies (July 2026) attribute LAUNDRY BEAR to Russian state-supported actors. CISA says the activity almost certainly serves espionage. No source names an agency.
Who they target
Defense bodies and contractors, government and EU institutions, technology firms, NGOs, media, education and energy, mainly in EU and NATO states. Ukraine was hit first, per CISA.
How they usually get in
Stolen passwords, bought cookies and password spraying, then from about July 2025 an email that runs a script when it is viewed in Zimbra webmail (CVE-2025-66376).
What stands out
The 2026 attack needs no click, and the AIVD and MIVD say the group works with simple tools and automation and is distinct from APT28. CISA also notes signs that AI helped write its collection code.
What to do first
Update Zimbra to 10.1.13 or 10.0.18, check for an Application Passcode named "ZimbraWeb", and move mail logins to phishing-resistant sign-in.
Names
Public reports use several names for this activity.
Names used for LAUNDRY BEAR
Name
Where it appears
LAUNDRY BEAR
Name given by the Dutch AIVD and MIVD in their advisory of 27 May 2025; used as the main name in CISA advisory AA26-204A[1, 2]
Void Blizzard
Listed in CISA advisory AA26-204A under "Cybersecurity industry tracking"; also printed in a footnote of the AIVD and MIVD advisory[1, 2]
CL-STA-1114
Listed in CISA advisory AA26-204A under "Cybersecurity industry tracking"[1]
TA488
Listed in CISA advisory AA26-204A under "Cybersecurity industry tracking", "formerly UNK_PitStop"[1]
UNK_PitStop
Earlier name of TA488 as printed in CISA advisory AA26-204A[1]
Who says so
Attribution is a judgment by the body named. It is shown here as attributed, not as proven fact.
AIVD and MIVD (Netherlands)27 May 2025
Named the group LAUNDRY BEAR and called it a previously unknown, highly probably Russian state-supported actor. Its non-destructive attacks highly probably indicate an espionage motive.[2]
AIVD and MIVD (Netherlands)27 May 2025
Said LAUNDRY BEAR and APT28 are two distinct threat actors, despite similar target choice and password spraying.[2]
NCSC (Netherlands)27 May 2025
Told Dutch organizations about the AIVD and MIVD publication and said the actor took part in the September 2024 attack on the police.[5]
Estonian Information System Authority (RIA)Yearbook updated 11 February 2026
Said the Dutch services assess Laundry Bear as very likely a state-sponsored Russian group, and listed its affiliation as "Unknown".[8]
CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies23 July 2026
Said Russian state-supported actors, primarily tracked as LAUNDRY BEAR, have targeted Western government and commercial bodies through Zimbra since at least July 2025.[1]
CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies23 July 2026
Said the covert, persistent activity and no known financial extortion almost certainly point to espionage with Russian government backing.[1]
NCSC-UK23 July 2026
Said LAUNDRY BEAR is an advanced persistent threat group whose ongoing campaign is almost certainly carried out with Russian state support.[3]
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security23 July 2026
Said Russia-sponsored actors tied to the advanced persistent threat group known as Laundry Bear are exploiting Zimbra webmail.[4]
CERT-EU3 August 2026
Described Laundry Bear as a Russia-linked threat actor that ran a zero-click phishing campaign against Zimbra webmail users.[7]
Where sources differ
No source names a specific Russian agency. The AIVD and MIVD (27 May 2025) call the actor "highly probably" Russian state-supported, while CISA and partners (23 July 2026) say the activity "almost certainly" involves espionage with Russian government backing. The Estonian RIA lists its affiliation as "Unknown". CISA also warns that industry names may not match the US government's view one for one.
Who they target
Sectors
Armed forces, NATO defense ministries, defense contractors, aerospace firms and high-tech makers of military goodsThe AIVD and MIVD say 2024 attacks aimed at information on military procurement, production and weapons deliveries to Ukraine. CISA lists the defense industrial base.[1, 2]
Foreign ministries, EU institutions, federal and local government, law enforcementThe AIVD and MIVD name foreign affairs ministries and EU institutions. CISA names government and law enforcement. The Dutch police lost staff contact details in September 2024.[1, 2]
IT and high-tech firms, digital service providersThe AIVD and MIVD say these give direct or indirect access to client networks, including government ones. CISA lists technology.[1, 2]
NGOs, political parties, media, educationNamed by the AIVD and MIVD in 2025 and listed again by CISA in 2026.[1, 2]
Energy and several critical sectorsCISA lists energy. The AIVD and MIVD say critical sectors were attacked, highly probably only for espionage.[1, 2]
Sectors in the Estonian tableRIA lists government in NATO states, telecommunications, healthcare, defense industry, media and transport.[8]
Almost all member statesThe AIVD and MIVD say the actor targets countries in the EU or NATO, with a high success rate compared to some other Russian actors.[2]
Other regionsThe AIVD and MIVD identified attacks on entities especially in East and Central Asia.[2]
Ukrainian usersCISA says Ukrainian targeting was extensive and came before use against the US and other NATO allies.[1]
US organizationsNCSC-UK says US organizations in defense, government, education, energy, law enforcement, media, NGOs and technology were targeted.[3]
Users of Zimbra Collaboration Suite webmailCISA says the group likely finds public-facing Zimbra servers by port scanning and picks victims by hand.[1]
Operations timeline
Each entry is attributed to the group by the sources cited.
April 2024
Earliest activity assessed
CISA says the May 2025 advisories assessed that the group was active in cyber operations as early as April 2024.[1]
23 September 2024
Dutch police attacked
The AIVD and MIVD say the actor gained access to a police employee account and took the work contact details of all police staff. The cookie was likely bought on a criminal marketplace.[2]
April 2025
Fake event sign-in site
CISA says a site resembling a European Defense & Security Summit registration portal collected Microsoft sign-ins, using a modified Evilginx toolkit.[1]
27 May 2025
Dutch services name the group
The AIVD and MIVD publish an advisory naming LAUNDRY BEAR and its methods.[2, 5]
Around July 2025
Shift to Zimbra
CISA says the group moved to a more technical method using a custom capability, Ulej, against Zimbra Collaboration Suite webmail. The flaw was a zero-day when first used.[1]
8 July 2025
First Flowerbed domain
CISA's indicator table lists the first collection domain as first seen on this date.[1]
November 2025
Patch and new phishing route
CISA says a patch came in November 2025. From at least November 2025, phishing mail was sent from victim accounts.[1]
5 January 2026
CVE published
NVD records CVE-2025-66376 as published on this date.[10]
18 March 2026
Added to CISA's exploited list
CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog added CVE-2025-66376.[11]
23 July 2026
Joint advisory AA26-204A
CISA, NSA, FBI, AIVD, MIVD and other agencies publish the advisory on the Zimbra campaign. Hub incident: "Zimbra webmail exploitation by Russian state actors".[1, 3, 4]
3 August 2026
EU institutions' summary
CERT-EU's July 2026 Cyber Brief covers the advisory.[7]
Government actions
Indictments, sanctions and advisories that name the group or its alleged members.
Government actions about LAUNDRY BEAR
Date
Who
What
27 May 2025
AIVD and MIVD (Netherlands)
Public advisoryNamed LAUNDRY BEAR, described its methods and listed resilience measures.[2]
27 May 2025
NCSC (Netherlands)
Notice to organizationsPassed on the publication and set out key measures such as phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication.[5]
18 March 2026
CISA
Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogAdded CVE-2025-66376 with a due date of 1 April 2026.[11]
23 July 2026
CISA, NSA, FBI, AIVD, MIVD and partners
Joint advisory AA26-204AWarned of the Zimbra campaign, gave mitigations, remediation steps and indicators.[1]
23 July 2026
NCSC-UK
News alertCo-sealed the advisory and urged UK organizations to sign up to its Early Warning service.[3]
23 July 2026
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
News noticeJoined the advisory and urged patching and monitoring of Zimbra systems.[4]
3 August 2026
CERT-EU
Cyber BriefSummarized the advisory in its July 2026 brief.[7]
How they get in
Techniques reported for this group, by MITRE ATT&CK tactic.
CISA describes a new data theft and collection capability, Russian for beehive, used against Zimbra webmail users through CVE-2025-66376.[1, 3]
Flowerbed Collection framework
A Python project in Docker, run on rented servers, that receives and gathers the data Ulej steals.[1]
Catcher Flowerbed container
Acts as a DNS and web server that receives the stolen data.[1]
Certbot Flowerbed container
Based on an official image, makes free Let's Encrypt certificates automatically.[1]
Nginx Flowerbed container
An HTTPS front end for Catcher that only passes traffic whose server name contains "*.i.*".[1]
Gardener Flowerbed container
A simple script that checks Catcher is receiving and processing data.[1]
Evilginx (modified) Open source adversary-in-the-middle toolkit
CISA says the group used a modified version to intercept sign-ins in 2025. MITRE lists evilginx2 as a reverse proxy that captures credentials and cookies.[1, 9]
Built-in system tools Living off the land
The AIVD and MIVD say the group does not seem to use its own malware but uses tools already on victims' systems (2025).[2]
The AIVD and MIVD saw similarities in target choice and password spraying with APT28, which the MIVD attributes to GRU Unit 26165, but say the two are distinct actors.[2]
Detection and defense
Patch Zimbra now
Move to Zimbra 10.1.13 or 10.0.18. If you cannot, tell staff to use another mail client and avoid the Classic webmail client until patched.
Watch logs for failed logins across many accounts, lock out after repeated failures, disable old accounts and use conditional access beyond IP location.
Follow new government advisories, the names, tools and techniques they attribute to LAUNDRY BEAR, and whether your sector and region match the targets they list.
Find look-alike domains and fake sign-in pages, such as the fake event portal CISA describes.
Questions
Who is LAUNDRY BEAR?
The Dutch AIVD and MIVD named it on 27 May 2025 and attribute it, as highly probably Russian state-supported. CISA and partners (23 July 2026) say it is almost certainly espionage with Russian government backing. No source names a specific agency.
Is it the same as APT28?
No source says so. The AIVD and MIVD saw similarities in targets and password spraying but state that the two are distinct actors.
What did it do to Zimbra users?
CISA says a flaw (CVE-2025-66376) let a script run when a user merely viewed a malicious email. The script tried to take 90 days of mail, the address book and 2FA details, and to add an Application Passcode.
Is it still active?
CISA described the Zimbra campaign as ongoing on 23 July 2026 and expects the group to keep targeting Zimbra and other email systems even if this campaign stops.
How can I tell if I am affected?
CISA says to check Zimbra logs for address-book search bursts, an Application Passcode named "ZimbraWeb" and scratch-code requests, and to search browser storage for items named zd_comp followed by a date.
What should I do first?
Update Zimbra to 10.1.13 or 10.0.18, revoke Application Passcodes if you find signs of compromise, and use phishing-resistant multi-factor sign-in.
Attributed by the US, UK and South Korean governments to North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau, Andariel is described in a July 2024 joint advisory as stealing defense, aerospace and nuclear secrets and funding that work with ransomware against US healthcare. MITRE ATT&CK describes it as a sub-set of Lazarus Group; the advisory does not use that term.
Attributed by the US, UK and South Korean governments, and MITRE ATT&CK
APT-C-60 is the name JPCERT/CC uses for a threat group it says likely carried out spear-phishing attacks on organizations in Japan from August 2024, using fake job-applicant emails and a backdoor called SpyGlace. No government or MITRE source opened for this page says who is behind it.
Also known as Comment Crew · Comment Panda · Comment Group
Attributed by MITRE ATT&CK to PLA Unit 61398 in China, APT1 is the subject of a US indictment of 19 May 2014 charging five Unit 61398 officers with hacking six US organizations. The Department of Justice alleges the aim was commercial gain for China's state-owned firms.
Attributed by the US Department of Justice (indictment of 19 May 2014) and MITRE ATT&CK
Multi-factor authentication (MFA) is a way to log in that needs two or more different kinds of proof, such as a password and a code from an authentication app.
On 23 July 2026 the US CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies warned that Russian state-supported actors, tracked mainly as LAUNDRY BEAR, were breaking into Zimbra Collaboration Suite webmail.
The US, UK, EU and other governments attribute APT28 to Russia's military intelligence service, the GRU, specifically its 85th Main Special Service Center (military unit 26165). MITRE says the group has been active since at least 2004, and government advisories describe espionage against governments, militaries, political parties, media and logistics firms.
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