Threat group profile

LAUNDRY BEAR

Also known as Void Blizzard, CL-STA-1114, TA488

Attributed by the Dutch AIVD and MIVD (2025) and by US, UK, Canadian and other allied agencies (July 2026) to Russian state-supported actors, LAUNDRY BEAR steals email from government, defense and technology bodies.

In short

Attributed by the Dutch AIVD and MIVD (2025) and by US, UK, Canadian and other allied agencies (July 2026) to Russian state-supported actors, LAUNDRY BEAR steals email from government, defense and technology bodies. The July 2026 joint advisory describes a view-based attack on Zimbra webmail that took 90 days of mail without a click.

Profile MapThreat Group
  1. Attributed OriginRussia
  2. Names5names in public reportsLAUNDRY BEAR · Void Blizzard · CL-STA-1114
  3. Sectors11named as targetsSectors in the Estonian table · Almost all member states · Other regions
  4. Techniques14in the attack chainReconnaissance · Resource Development · Initial Access
  5. Tools8tools and malware listedUlej · Flowerbed · Catcher

In one minute

Who they are
The Dutch AIVD and MIVD (May 2025) and the US, UK, Canadian and other agencies (July 2026) attribute LAUNDRY BEAR to Russian state-supported actors. CISA says the activity almost certainly serves espionage. No source names an agency.
Who they target
Defense bodies and contractors, government and EU institutions, technology firms, NGOs, media, education and energy, mainly in EU and NATO states. Ukraine was hit first, per CISA.
How they usually get in
Stolen passwords, bought cookies and password spraying, then from about July 2025 an email that runs a script when it is viewed in Zimbra webmail (CVE-2025-66376).
What stands out
The 2026 attack needs no click, and the AIVD and MIVD say the group works with simple tools and automation and is distinct from APT28. CISA also notes signs that AI helped write its collection code.
What to do first
Update Zimbra to 10.1.13 or 10.0.18, check for an Application Passcode named "ZimbraWeb", and move mail logins to phishing-resistant sign-in.

Names

Public reports use several names for this activity.

Names used for LAUNDRY BEAR
NameWhere it appears
LAUNDRY BEAR Name given by the Dutch AIVD and MIVD in their advisory of 27 May 2025; used as the main name in CISA advisory AA26-204A[1, 2]
Void Blizzard Listed in CISA advisory AA26-204A under "Cybersecurity industry tracking"; also printed in a footnote of the AIVD and MIVD advisory[1, 2]
CL-STA-1114 Listed in CISA advisory AA26-204A under "Cybersecurity industry tracking"[1]
TA488 Listed in CISA advisory AA26-204A under "Cybersecurity industry tracking", "formerly UNK_PitStop"[1]
UNK_PitStop Earlier name of TA488 as printed in CISA advisory AA26-204A[1]

Who says so

Attribution is a judgment by the body named. It is shown here as attributed, not as proven fact.

  • AIVD and MIVD (Netherlands) 27 May 2025

    Named the group LAUNDRY BEAR and called it a previously unknown, highly probably Russian state-supported actor. Its non-destructive attacks highly probably indicate an espionage motive.[2]

  • AIVD and MIVD (Netherlands) 27 May 2025

    Said LAUNDRY BEAR and APT28 are two distinct threat actors, despite similar target choice and password spraying.[2]

  • NCSC (Netherlands) 27 May 2025

    Told Dutch organizations about the AIVD and MIVD publication and said the actor took part in the September 2024 attack on the police.[5]

  • Estonian Information System Authority (RIA) Yearbook updated 11 February 2026

    Said the Dutch services assess Laundry Bear as very likely a state-sponsored Russian group, and listed its affiliation as "Unknown".[8]

  • CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies 23 July 2026

    Said Russian state-supported actors, primarily tracked as LAUNDRY BEAR, have targeted Western government and commercial bodies through Zimbra since at least July 2025.[1]

  • CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies 23 July 2026

    Said the covert, persistent activity and no known financial extortion almost certainly point to espionage with Russian government backing.[1]

  • NCSC-UK 23 July 2026

    Said LAUNDRY BEAR is an advanced persistent threat group whose ongoing campaign is almost certainly carried out with Russian state support.[3]

  • Canadian Centre for Cyber Security 23 July 2026

    Said Russia-sponsored actors tied to the advanced persistent threat group known as Laundry Bear are exploiting Zimbra webmail.[4]

  • CERT-EU 3 August 2026

    Described Laundry Bear as a Russia-linked threat actor that ran a zero-click phishing campaign against Zimbra webmail users.[7]

Where sources differ

No source names a specific Russian agency. The AIVD and MIVD (27 May 2025) call the actor "highly probably" Russian state-supported, while CISA and partners (23 July 2026) say the activity "almost certainly" involves espionage with Russian government backing. The Estonian RIA lists its affiliation as "Unknown". CISA also warns that industry names may not match the US government's view one for one.

Who they target

Sectors

  • Armed forces, NATO defense ministries, defense contractors, aerospace firms and high-tech makers of military goodsThe AIVD and MIVD say 2024 attacks aimed at information on military procurement, production and weapons deliveries to Ukraine. CISA lists the defense industrial base.[1, 2]
  • Foreign ministries, EU institutions, federal and local government, law enforcementThe AIVD and MIVD name foreign affairs ministries and EU institutions. CISA names government and law enforcement. The Dutch police lost staff contact details in September 2024.[1, 2]
  • IT and high-tech firms, digital service providersThe AIVD and MIVD say these give direct or indirect access to client networks, including government ones. CISA lists technology.[1, 2]
  • NGOs, political parties, media, educationNamed by the AIVD and MIVD in 2025 and listed again by CISA in 2026.[1, 2]
  • Energy and several critical sectorsCISA lists energy. The AIVD and MIVD say critical sectors were attacked, highly probably only for espionage.[1, 2]
  • Sectors in the Estonian tableRIA lists government in NATO states, telecommunications, healthcare, defense industry, media and transport.[8]
  • Almost all member statesThe AIVD and MIVD say the actor targets countries in the EU or NATO, with a high success rate compared to some other Russian actors.[2]
  • Other regionsThe AIVD and MIVD identified attacks on entities especially in East and Central Asia.[2]
  • Ukrainian usersCISA says Ukrainian targeting was extensive and came before use against the US and other NATO allies.[1]
  • US organizationsNCSC-UK says US organizations in defense, government, education, energy, law enforcement, media, NGOs and technology were targeted.[3]
  • Users of Zimbra Collaboration Suite webmailCISA says the group likely finds public-facing Zimbra servers by port scanning and picks victims by hand.[1]

Operations timeline

Each entry is attributed to the group by the sources cited.

  1. April 2024

    Earliest activity assessed

    CISA says the May 2025 advisories assessed that the group was active in cyber operations as early as April 2024.[1]

  2. 23 September 2024

    Dutch police attacked

    The AIVD and MIVD say the actor gained access to a police employee account and took the work contact details of all police staff. The cookie was likely bought on a criminal marketplace.[2]

  3. April 2025

    Fake event sign-in site

    CISA says a site resembling a European Defense & Security Summit registration portal collected Microsoft sign-ins, using a modified Evilginx toolkit.[1]

  4. 27 May 2025

    Dutch services name the group

    The AIVD and MIVD publish an advisory naming LAUNDRY BEAR and its methods.[2, 5]

  5. Around July 2025

    Shift to Zimbra

    CISA says the group moved to a more technical method using a custom capability, Ulej, against Zimbra Collaboration Suite webmail. The flaw was a zero-day when first used.[1]

  6. 8 July 2025

    First Flowerbed domain

    CISA's indicator table lists the first collection domain as first seen on this date.[1]

  7. November 2025

    Patch and new phishing route

    CISA says a patch came in November 2025. From at least November 2025, phishing mail was sent from victim accounts.[1]

  8. 5 January 2026

    CVE published

    NVD records CVE-2025-66376 as published on this date.[10]

  9. 18 March 2026

    Added to CISA's exploited list

    CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog added CVE-2025-66376.[11]

  10. 23 July 2026

    Joint advisory AA26-204A

    CISA, NSA, FBI, AIVD, MIVD and other agencies publish the advisory on the Zimbra campaign. Hub incident: "Zimbra webmail exploitation by Russian state actors".[1, 3, 4]

  11. 3 August 2026

    EU institutions' summary

    CERT-EU's July 2026 Cyber Brief covers the advisory.[7]

Government actions

Indictments, sanctions and advisories that name the group or its alleged members.

Government actions about LAUNDRY BEAR
DateWhoWhat
27 May 2025 AIVD and MIVD (Netherlands) Public advisoryNamed LAUNDRY BEAR, described its methods and listed resilience measures.[2]
27 May 2025 NCSC (Netherlands) Notice to organizationsPassed on the publication and set out key measures such as phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication.[5]
18 March 2026 CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogAdded CVE-2025-66376 with a due date of 1 April 2026.[11]
23 July 2026 CISA, NSA, FBI, AIVD, MIVD and partners Joint advisory AA26-204AWarned of the Zimbra campaign, gave mitigations, remediation steps and indicators.[1]
23 July 2026 NCSC-UK News alertCo-sealed the advisory and urged UK organizations to sign up to its Early Warning service.[3]
23 July 2026 Canadian Centre for Cyber Security News noticeJoined the advisory and urged patching and monitoring of Zimbra systems.[4]
3 August 2026 CERT-EU Cyber BriefSummarized the advisory in its July 2026 brief.[7]

How they get in

Techniques reported for this group, by MITRE ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

  • Active Scanning T1595

    CISA says the group likely finds public-facing Zimbra servers by port scanning.[1]

Resource Development

  • Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server T1583.003

    Buys rented servers, often under made-up identities, and uses each for only 7 to 60 days.[1]

  • Develop Capabilities: Exploits T1587.004

    CISA says the Zimbra exploit was a zero-day when first used.[1]

Initial Access

  • Phishing T1566

    Sends an email with a script that runs when the user views it in Zimbra webmail.[1]

  • Valid Accounts T1078

    Buys or reuses stolen credentials and cookies, including from criminal marketplaces.[1, 2]

  • Trusted Relationship T1199

    Since at least November 2025 sends phishing from compromised victim accounts.[1]

Execution

  • Exploitation for Client Execution T1203

    A cross-site scripting flaw (CVE-2025-66376) lets the script run on viewing.[1]

Persistence

  • Account Manipulation T1098

    Tries to switch on IMAP and add an Application Passcode for lasting access.[1]

Credential Access

  • Brute Force: Password Spraying T1110.003

    Tries a few common passwords across many accounts, using address lists stolen earlier.[2]

  • Steal Web Session Cookie T1539

    Uses cookies likely taken by infostealer malware and bought online (pass-the-cookie).[2]

  • Adversary-in-the-Middle T1557

    In earlier campaigns a modified Evilginx toolkit intercepted passwords and session tokens.[1, 9]

  • Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication T1556.006

    Creates an Application Passcode and tries to read two-factor scratch codes.[1]

Collection

  • Email Collection: Remote Email Collection T1114.002

    Takes the last 90 days of mail and the address book through the mail server's own requests.[1, 2]

Exfiltration

  • Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol T1048.003

    Sends smaller items out through DNS queries, larger ones over HTTPS.[1]

Tools and malware

  • Ulej Custom script (JavaScript)

    CISA describes a new data theft and collection capability, Russian for beehive, used against Zimbra webmail users through CVE-2025-66376.[1, 3]

  • Flowerbed Collection framework

    A Python project in Docker, run on rented servers, that receives and gathers the data Ulej steals.[1]

  • Catcher Flowerbed container

    Acts as a DNS and web server that receives the stolen data.[1]

  • Certbot Flowerbed container

    Based on an official image, makes free Let's Encrypt certificates automatically.[1]

  • Nginx Flowerbed container

    An HTTPS front end for Catcher that only passes traffic whose server name contains "*.i.*".[1]

  • Gardener Flowerbed container

    A simple script that checks Catcher is receiving and processing data.[1]

  • Evilginx (modified) Open source adversary-in-the-middle toolkit

    CISA says the group used a modified version to intercept sign-ins in 2025. MITRE lists evilginx2 as a reverse proxy that captures credentials and cookies.[1, 9]

  • Built-in system tools Living off the land

    The AIVD and MIVD say the group does not seem to use its own malware but uses tools already on victims' systems (2025).[2]

Detection and defense

  1. Patch Zimbra now

    Move to Zimbra 10.1.13 or 10.0.18. If you cannot, tell staff to use another mail client and avoid the Classic webmail client until patched.

    Counters T1203 T1566

  2. Watch and clear Application Passcodes

    Monitor Application Passcodes closely, look for one named "ZimbraWeb", and after a compromise revoke all of them and all 2FA scratch keys.

    Counters T1556.006 T1098

  3. Use phishing-resistant sign-in

    Use FIDO2 hardware tokens or passkeys, through a third-party sign-in service in front of Zimbra if needed, and change passwords after a compromise.

    Counters T1078 T1539 T1557

  4. Make stolen cookies less useful

    Expire session cookies quickly, tie a session to one IP address, use conditional access, and allow only managed devices into mail.

    Counters T1539 T1557

  5. Catch password spraying

    Watch logs for failed logins across many accounts, lock out after repeated failures, disable old accounts and use conditional access beyond IP location.

    Counters T1110.003 T1078

  6. Watch outbound traffic

    Look for large uploads to unfamiliar server hosts, DNS queries with random-looking subdomains, new domains and webmail logins from commercial VPNs.

    Counters T1048.003 T1583.003

  7. Search Zimbra logs for the script

    Look for bursts of address-book searches from one user, Application Passcode creation and scratch-code requests in the mailbox log.

    Counters T1114.002 T1098

  8. Audit mailbox permissions

    Review account privileges and email delegate rights regularly, with logging and alerts on unusual changes.

    Counters T1098 T1078

What Brandefense can do

Questions

Who is LAUNDRY BEAR?

The Dutch AIVD and MIVD named it on 27 May 2025 and attribute it, as highly probably Russian state-supported. CISA and partners (23 July 2026) say it is almost certainly espionage with Russian government backing. No source names a specific agency.

Is it the same as APT28?

No source says so. The AIVD and MIVD saw similarities in targets and password spraying but state that the two are distinct actors.

What did it do to Zimbra users?

CISA says a flaw (CVE-2025-66376) let a script run when a user merely viewed a malicious email. The script tried to take 90 days of mail, the address book and 2FA details, and to add an Application Passcode.

Is it still active?

CISA described the Zimbra campaign as ongoing on 23 July 2026 and expects the group to keep targeting Zimbra and other email systems even if this campaign stops.

How can I tell if I am affected?

CISA says to check Zimbra logs for address-book search bursts, an Application Passcode named "ZimbraWeb" and scratch-code requests, and to search browser storage for items named zd_comp followed by a date.

What should I do first?

Update Zimbra to 10.1.13 or 10.0.18, revoke Application Passcodes if you find signs of compromise, and use phishing-resistant multi-factor sign-in.

Sources

  1. Russian State-Supported Cyber Actors Conduct Phishing Campaign Targeting Users of Zimbra Collaboration Suite (AA26-204A) CISA with NSA, FBI, AIVD, MIVD, NCSC-UK and partner agencies Supports: Name, attribution, Zimbra campaign, Ulej, Flowerbed, techniques, mitigations, 2025 background
  2. AIVD and MIVD identify new Russian cyber threat actor (Advisory, 27 May 2025) AIVD and MIVD, Netherlands Supports: Name coined, Dutch police attack, targets, methods, APT28 comparison, resilience measures
  3. UK and partners expose Russian state-supported actors for new 'zero-click' phishing campaign targeting Western organisations NCSC-UK Supports: UK statement of 23 July 2026, targeted sectors, Ulej, co-sealing countries
  4. Joint cyber security advisory on Russian state-sponsored phishing campaign targeting Zimbra webmail Canadian Centre for Cyber Security Supports: Canadian statement of 23 July 2026
  5. Publicatie van AIVD en MIVD over Laundry Bear NCSC, Netherlands Supports: Dutch cyber centre notice of 27 May 2025 and its key measures
  6. Learn from Laundry Bear: tips for digital resilience Digital Government, Netherlands Supports: English summary of the Dutch publication and its tips
  7. Cyber Brief 26-08, July 2026 CERT-EU Supports: EU institutions' CERT summary of the 23 July 2026 advisory
  8. Russian bears in cyberspace (Cyber Security in Estonia 2026) Information System Authority (RIA), Estonia Supports: Estonian description of Laundry Bear, affiliation listed as unknown
  9. evilginx2 (S9003) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Open source adversary-in-the-middle framework
  10. CVE-2025-66376 NIST National Vulnerability Database Supports: Flaw description, publication date 5 January 2026
  11. Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog CISA Supports: CVE-2025-66376 added 18 March 2026