Significant cyber incident

Dutch police contact data breach, September 2024

On 26 September 2024 the Dutch police told the Justice Minister that a police account had been hacked and that work contact details of all police staff, more than 62,000 people, were taken.

In short

On 26 September 2024 the Dutch police told the Justice Minister that a police account had been hacked and that work contact details of all police staff, more than 62,000 people, were taken. The AIVD and MIVD judged a state actor very likely responsible. In May 2025 they named a previously unknown Russian state-supported actor LAUNDRY BEAR and said other Dutch organizations were also hit.

What happened

On 26 September 2024 the chief of the Dutch police told the Minister of Justice and Security that the police had been hacked. A police account had been used to take the global address list, which holds the Outlook business cards of all police staff. The Tweede Kamer page says this covered the work contact details and some private details of all police staff, more than 62,000 people. The minister told parliament on 27 September.

The AIVD and MIVD had told the police about the incident. They judged it very likely that another country, formally a state actor, was responsible. The 9 October letter said some cards held private details, such as private phone numbers, that staff had entered themselves. The services and the police could not establish that other data had been taken.

On 27 May 2025 the two services published a report on a Russian state-supported actor they named LAUNDRY BEAR. They said their investigation into this actor began because of the police attack, dated 23 September 2024 in their report. They also said it is highly probable that other Dutch organizations were victims.

Timeline

  1. 23 September 2024

    The police are hit by the cyber attack, according to the AIVD and MIVD report of May 2025.

  2. 26 September 2024

    The police chief tells the Minister of Justice and Security that the police were hacked.

  3. 27 September 2024

    The minister informs the Tweede Kamer by letter.

  4. 2 October 2024

    A second letter gives parliament further information.

  5. 9 October 2024

    A third letter says a police account was hacked and the global address list was taken; some private details were included.

  6. By 9 October 2024

    The Public Prosecution Service has started a criminal investigation, carried out by Team High Tech Crime of the police.

  7. 27 November 2024

    The parliamentary committee for Justice and Security discusses the breach.

  8. 27 May 2025

    The AIVD and MIVD publish a report on LAUNDRY BEAR, a Russian state-supported actor behind the police attack.

How the attack worked

The government letters give little technical detail. The AIVD and MIVD report of 27 May 2025 describes how the actor works in general. It does not say which of these methods were used at the police, so the steps below are the actor’s usual pattern, not a confirmed account of this case.

What the letters confirm

A police account was hacked. Through it the attacker took the global address list, with the Outlook business cards of all police staff. The services and the police could not establish that other information was obtained.

How the services say LAUNDRY BEAR works

The services say the actor tries phishing, or authentication tokens and cookies bought on criminal marketplaces, to get in (Valid Accounts, T1078; Steal Web Session Cookie, T1539). It also uses password spraying, which tries a few common passwords across many accounts (Password Spraying, T1110.003). Once in, it downloads the global address list and uses it for more spraying against other accounts. It steals email at scale (Remote Email Collection, T1114.002). The services say it does not appear to use its own malware and relies on tools already on the victim’s systems.

What the data can be used for

The services say the stolen address list information may be used in later attacks, including spearphishing.

How the attack ran
  1. Account accessAn attacker gained access to a police accountTechnique T1078 (MITRE ATT&CK, opens in a new tab)
  2. Address list takenThe global address list with Outlook business cards of all police staff was taken
  3. Follow-up riskThe services warn the data could be used for spearphishing and further attacks
  4. AttributionIn May 2025 the Dutch services tied the attack to LAUNDRY BEAR, a Russian state-supported actor

Impact

Work contact details of all police staff, more than 62,000 people, were taken, probably including photos or images (Tweede Kamer page) and, in some cases, private phone numbers and profile photos staff had placed in their cards (minister's letter of 9 October 2024). Email addresses of some chain partners were also taken.
The Dutch services and the police could not establish that other information was obtained. The Tweede Kamer page notes that officers were very worried about the stolen contact details.

Government and regulator response

  • 27 September, 2 and 9 October 2024: the Minister of Justice and Security informed the Tweede Kamer by three letters.
  • By 27 November 2024: the police took ICT and awareness measures with national security partners, including calls for extra care with phishing, and monitored whether the stolen data appeared elsewhere.
  • By 27 November 2024: the breach was reported to the Dutch Data Protection Authority, which asked the police for more information. By 9 October 2024 the Public Prosecution Service had started a criminal investigation, carried out by Team High Tech Crime.
  • 27 November 2024: parliament’s Justice and Security committee discussed the breach with the minister.
  • 27 May 2025: the AIVD and MIVD published their report on LAUNDRY BEAR to raise awareness and help others take resilience measures.

Lessons

  1. An address list is a target list

    The services warn the stolen address list can feed spearphishing and further password spraying. Treat contact data as sensitive.

  2. Simple methods work

    The services say LAUNDRY BEAR uses simple techniques and tools already on victims' systems and stayed unseen for a long time.

  3. MFA matters

    The advisory recommends multifactor authentication so a password alone cannot open an account.

  4. Intelligence services may see it first

    The police learned of the incident from the AIVD and MIVD. Keep a route open for such warnings.

  5. One incident can start a bigger case

    The police attack led the services to a wider actor that, they say, probably hit other Dutch organizations too.

What to check in your own organization

  1. Who can read the address list

    Check who can download the global address list and whether it can be fetched in bulk from outside.

  2. MFA on mail

    Check that every mail account, including shared and delegated ones, needs more than a password.

  3. Password spraying alerts

    Check that many failed logins spread across many accounts raise an alert.

  4. Session cookies

    Check that stolen session cookies or tokens cannot be reused from new devices without a new check.

  5. Delegated access

    Audit accounts that manage other accounts or have delegate permissions, as the advisory suggests.

  6. Staff privacy plan

    Have a plan for staff whose private details are exposed: warnings, a contact point and phishing alerts.

Questions

What was taken?

Work contact details from the global address list for all police staff, over 62,000 people, and in some cases private details staff had put in their business cards.

Was investigation data taken?

The Dutch services and police could not establish that other information was obtained (AIVD and MIVD report, 27 May 2025).

Who was behind it?

In September 2024 the services said a state actor was very likely responsible. In May 2025 they named LAUNDRY BEAR, a previously unknown, highly probably Russian state-supported actor.

Did the police find this themselves?

No. The police were informed of the cyber incident by the AIVD and MIVD (Tweede Kamer page).

Was it linked to APT28?

The services see similarities in methods and targets but say LAUNDRY BEAR and APT28 are two distinct actors.

Sources

  1. Kamerbrief over datalek politie (27 September 2024) Rijksoverheid
  2. Kamerbrief over nadere informatie hack bij de politie (2 October 2024) Rijksoverheid
  3. Kamerbrief update hack bij politie (9 October 2024) Rijksoverheid
  4. Kamerbrief update hack bij de politie (letter text, 9 October 2024) Ministry of Justice and Security
  5. Debat over datalek bij politie (27 November 2024) Tweede Kamer
  6. AIVD and MIVD identify new Russian cyber threat actor (27 May 2025) AIVD and MIVD
  7. Valid Accounts, Technique T1078 - Enterprise MITRE ATT&CK
  8. Email Collection, Technique T1114 - Enterprise MITRE ATT&CK