Threat group profile

MirrorFace

Also known as Earth Kasha

Attributed by Japan's National Police Agency (NPA) and NISC (8 January 2025) as an organized group with suspected Chinese involvement, MirrorFace (also called Earth Kasha) is reported to target Japanese think tanks, government, politicians, media, academia, and semiconductor, manufacturing and aerospace firms.

In short

Attributed by Japan's National Police Agency (NPA) and NISC (8 January 2025) as an organized group with suspected Chinese involvement, MirrorFace (also called Earth Kasha) is reported to target Japanese think tanks, government, politicians, media, academia, and semiconductor, manufacturing and aerospace firms. It uses phishing emails and flaws in internet-facing devices to steal information on national security and advanced technology.

Profile MapThreat Group
  1. Names2names in public reportsMirrorFace · Earth Kasha
  2. Sectors10named as targetsJapan · Region
  3. Techniques14in the attack chainInitial Access · Execution · Persistence
  4. Tools12tools and malware listedLODEINFO · HiddenFace (also NOOPDOOR) · UPPERCUT (ANEL)

In one minute

Who they are
Japan's NPA and NISC attribute campaigns since about 2019 to MirrorFace (also called Earth Kasha) and assess them as organized activity with suspected Chinese involvement (alert of 8 January 2025). MITRE describes it as PRC-aligned and believed to be a subgroup under the menuPass umbrella.
Who they target
The Japanese authorities name think tanks, government (including retirees), politicians, mass media, academia, and the semiconductor, manufacturing, telecommunications and aerospace sectors. MITRE adds that later operations included targets in Central Europe.
How they usually get in
Phishing emails with attachments or download links, and flaws in internet-facing VPN and gateway devices, as described by NPA, NISC and MITRE.
What stands out
NPA says the group ran malware inside Windows Sandbox, which makes the host's antivirus and EDR (endpoint monitoring) blind to it and makes later investigation hard, and used VS Code remote tunnels as a remote control tool.
What to do first
Patch and monitor VPN and gateway devices, check their logs for odd logins, treat unexpected attachments and "enable content" prompts as suspect, and report anything suspicious to the police or NISC.

Names

Public reports use several names for this activity.

Names used for MirrorFace
NameWhere it appears
MirrorFace MITRE ATT&CK G1054 (group name); NPA and NISC alert of 8 January 2025[1, 3]
Earth Kasha MITRE ATT&CK (Associated Groups); NPA and NISC alert ("also known as")[1, 3, 7]

Who says so

Attribution is a judgment by the body named. It is shown here as attributed, not as proven fact.

  • Japan National Police Agency (NPA) and NISC 8 January 2025

    Assessed that campaigns against organizations, businesses and individuals in Japan from about 2019 to the present were carried out by MirrorFace, also known as Earth Kasha.[2, 3, 4, 7]

  • Japan National Police Agency (NPA) and NISC 8 January 2025

    Assessed the campaigns as a series of organized cyberattack activities with suspected Chinese involvement, mainly aimed at stealing information on national security and advanced technology.[2, 3]

  • NPA Security Bureau (Focus report) 2025

    Restated that NPA and NISC assessed MirrorFace campaigns since around 2019 as organized cyberattacks with suspected Chinese involvement.[8]

  • NISC and the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters 27 June 2025

    Annual report 2025 lists MirrorFace, "suspected of Chinese involvement", among the main domestic incidents of fiscal 2024 and dates the campaign from December 2019.[9]

  • Japan Cybersecurity Strategy 23 December 2025

    Said that since 2019 the group MirrorFace, suspected of involvement by China, has been running campaigns aimed at theft of information on Japan's national security and advanced technologies.[10]

  • NPA Cyber Affairs Bureau March 2026

    Report on 2025 repeats that NPA and NISC assessed MirrorFace attacks as organized activity likely involving China.[11]

  • MITRE ATT&CK page last modified 31 July 2026

    Describes MirrorFace as a PRC-aligned cyberespionage actor, believed to be a subgroup under the menuPass umbrella based on targeting, tools and infrastructure overlaps, active since at least 2019.[1]

Where sources differ

Sources differ on how far attribution goes. NPA and NISC say "suspected Chinese involvement" and name no unit or people. MITRE calls the group PRC-aligned and believed to be a subgroup under the menuPass umbrella, which the NPA and NISC alert does not mention. On the start date, MITRE says active "since at least 2019", the NPA alert says "around 2019", and the NISC annual report says from about December 2019. On geography, MITRE lists Central Europe targets, while the NPA and NISC alert covers Japan only. MITRE's page also lists Operation AkaiRyu with 2004 dates, which do not fit the 2019 start and are not used here.

Who they target

Sectors

  • JapanTargeted in campaign A (2019 to 2023) and campaign C (from June 2024), per NPA and NISC.[3]
  • JapanGovernment organizations including retirees were targeted in campaign A, per NPA and NISC.[3]
  • JapanTargeted in campaigns A and C. MITRE says emails were aimed at members of particular political parties.[1, 3]
  • JapanTargeted in campaigns A and C, per NPA and NISC.[3]
  • JapanTargeted in campaigns B and C, per NPA and NISC.[3]
  • JapanMain targets of campaign B (from around 2023), per NPA and NISC.[3]
  • JapanMain target of campaign B, per NPA and NISC.[3]
  • JapanMain target of campaign B, per NPA and NISC.[3]
  • JapanMITRE says the group at first targeted only Japanese organizations in media, defense, diplomatic, financial, manufacturing and academic sectors.[1]
  • RegionMITRE says later operations included targets in Central Europe. No government source opened names the countries.[1]

Operations timeline

Each entry is attributed to the group by the sources cited.

  1. 2019

    Start of activity

    MITRE says the group has been active since at least 2019.[1]

  2. December 2019

    Earliest campaign A activity

    NPA lists campaign A emails with malware attachments from around December 2019 to around July 2023. NISC dates the campaign from December 2019.[2, 9]

  3. February to October 2023

    Campaign B intrusions

    NPA says intrusions probably came through VPN device flaws or stolen credentials, and a SQL injection flaw on public servers, mainly against Japan's semiconductor, manufacturing, telecom, academia and aerospace sectors.[2]

  4. June 2023

    Windows Sandbox technique

    NPA says the Windows Sandbox technique was probably used from around June 2023 at the latest.[2]

  5. 2023

    Campaign B described as running

    NPA and NISC say they confirmed attacks exploiting internet-facing device flaws since around 2023.[3]

  6. January and June 2024

    Campaign B effects continue

    NPA reports compromise linked to campaign B continuing until around January and June 2024.[2]

  7. May 2024

    Campaign A effects continue

    NPA reports compromise linked to campaign A infections continuing until around May 2024.[2]

  8. June 2024

    Campaign C begins

    NPA and NISC say emails with download links and the ANEL malware have been confirmed since around June 2024.[3]

  9. June 2024

    VS Code tunnel technique

    NPA says the VS Code remote tunnel technique had been seen since June 2024 at the latest.[6]

  10. 8 January 2025

    Joint alert

    NPA and NISC publish the alert, with annexes on the Windows Sandbox and VS Code techniques.[2, 3, 5, 6]

  11. 27 June 2025

    NISC annual report

    Lists MirrorFace among the main domestic cyber incidents of fiscal 2024.[9]

  12. 23 December 2025

    Cybersecurity Strategy

    Japan's strategy describes MirrorFace as running campaigns since 2019, suspected of involvement by China.[10]

  13. March 2026

    NPA report

    NPA's report on 2025 repeats the January 2025 alert.[11]

Government actions

Indictments, sanctions and advisories that name the group or its alleged members.

Government actions about MirrorFace
DateWhoWhat
8 January 2025 NPA and NISC Joint alertPublished the three campaigns, the malware used, vulnerable device types, and detection and mitigation advice.[2, 3, 4]
8 January 2025 NPA Technical annexesPublished two annexes on the Windows Sandbox and VS Code techniques with traces and detection tips.[5, 6]
2025 NPA Security Bureau Focus reportIncluded MirrorFace as a case study in the cyber situation chapter.[8]
27 June 2025 NISC Annual reportListed the January 2025 alert among its actions for fiscal 2024.[9]
23 December 2025 Japan government Cybersecurity StrategyCited the January 2025 advisory as the source on MirrorFace.[10]
March 2026 NPA Cyber Affairs Bureau Annual threat reportCited the alert as an example of information sharing with partners.[11]

How they get in

Techniques reported for this group, by MITRE ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

  • Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1566.001

    Emails with Word, Excel, VHD or ISO attachments that ask the reader to enable macros; senders pose as known experts or former executives.[1, 2]

  • Phishing: Spearphishing Link T1566.002

    Emails with links, including OneDrive links, to download malware, used in campaign C.[1, 2, 3]

  • Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190

    Exploited flaws in internet-facing devices such as Array AG, FortiOS and Citrix ADC in campaign B.[1, 2]

Execution

  • User Execution: Malicious File T1204.002

    Lured victims into opening crafted Word, Excel and self-extracting files.[1]

Persistence

  • Office Application Startup: Office Template Macros T1137.001

    Malicious Word templates with VBA code led to installation of UPPERCUT (MITRE, Operation AkaiRyu).[1]

Credential Access

  • OS Credential Dumping: NTDS T1003.003

    Dumped the Active Directory database file through volume shadow copies.[1]

Lateral Movement

  • Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol T1021.001

    Used RDP to exfiltrate files of interest.[1]

Collection

  • Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility T1560.001

    Archived files with rar.exe and Makecab before taking them out.[1]

Command and Control

  • Remote Access Tools: IDE Tunneling T1219.001

    Used VS Code tunnels to run commands on victim machines.[1, 2, 3]

Exfiltration

  • Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol T1048.002

    Used SFTP to move files out.[1]

Stealth

  • Hijack Execution Flow: DLL T1574.001

    Used legitimate executables to load malicious DLLs by sideloading.[1]

  • Masquerading: Masquerade File Type T1036.008

    Made malware payloads look like Privacy-Enhanced Mail (PEM) files.[1]

  • Indicator Removal: File Deletion T1070.004

    Deleted directories holding malware and archives of collected files.[1]

Defense Impairment

  • Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Windows Event Logs T1685.005

    Deleted Windows event logs on compromised hosts.[1]

Tools and malware

  • LODEINFO Backdoor

    Fileless backdoor first identified in 2020, used in campaign A and campaign B.[1, 2, 12]

  • HiddenFace (also NOOPDOOR) Modular backdoor

    MITRE says it is used exclusively by MirrorFace since at least 2021. NPA names NOOPDOOR in all three campaigns.[2, 13]

  • UPPERCUT (ANEL) Backdoor

    Backdoor also used by menuPass. NPA names ANEL as the malware of campaign C.[3, 14]

  • MirrorStealer Credential stealer

    Steals credentials from browsers and email clients, delivered into memory by LODEINFO.[15]

  • NOOPLDR Loader

    Shellcode loader used to load HiddenFace.[16]

  • DOWNIISSA Downloader

    Shellcode downloader used to deploy payloads including LODEINFO.[17]

  • ROAMINGHOUSE Dropper

    Extracts and runs embedded payloads including UPPERCUT components.[18]

  • ANELLDR Loader

    Loader designed to decrypt and run UPPERCUT in memory.[19]

  • Cobalt Strike Attack framework

    Named by MITRE for persistence and by NPA (as Cobalt Strike BEACON) in campaign B.[1, 2, 20]

  • LilimRAT Remote access tool

    NPA says some campaign A victims were also infected with LilimRAT and NOOPDOOR.[2]

  • Neo-reGeorg Tunnelling tool

    NPA says it was placed on compromised VPN devices together with open-source web shells.[2]

  • Windows Sandbox and VS Code (abused) Built-in tools

    NPA says malware ran inside Windows Sandbox to avoid host monitoring, and VS Code tunnels gave remote control.[2, 3, 5, 6]

Detection and defense

  1. Patch and track device flaws

    Follow alerts from NPA, IPA, JPCERT/CC and the CISA KEV list for VPN and gateway devices. Patch quickly.

    Counters T1190

  2. Replace a compromised device

    NPA says a device that was once compromised may keep its backdoor after patching, so replace it.

    Counters T1190

  3. Review VPN and device logs

    Look for foreign logins, odd user agents, and loopback addresses recorded as the VPN source address. Watch for activity from the VPN device towards internal servers.

    Counters T1190 T1021.001

  4. Treat attachments, links and macros with care

    Do not click "enable content". Be wary of password-protected Zip, VHD, ISO files and cloud download links, even from known senders.

    Counters T1566.001 T1566.002 T1204.002 T1137.001

  5. Check for misuse of built-in tools

    Consider turning off Windows Sandbox if not needed, and look for unexpected VS Code installs or dev tunnel traffic.

    Counters T1219.001

  6. Keep logs in one place for a long time

    Central logs help find the cause and scope of a breach. Attackers may delete local logs.

    Counters T1685.005 T1070.004

  7. Lock down admin accounts

    Limit source IP addresses for admin and maintenance accounts, and lock or secure unused accounts.

    Counters T1003.003 T1021.001

What Brandefense can do

Questions

Who is MirrorFace?

Japan's NPA and NISC attribute campaigns against Japanese organizations since about 2019 to MirrorFace, also known as Earth Kasha, and assess them as organized activity with suspected Chinese involvement. MITRE says it is believed to be a subgroup under the menuPass umbrella.

Are they still active?

The latest government items found are the NPA and NISC alert of 8 January 2025, which describes campaign C as running since around June 2024, and the December 2025 Cybersecurity Strategy, which describes the group in the present tense.

Who do they target?

NPA and NISC name think tanks, government, politicians, media, academia, and the semiconductor, manufacturing, telecommunications and aerospace sectors in Japan. MITRE adds Central Europe.

How do they get in?

Phishing emails with attachments or download links, and flaws in VPN and gateway devices, according to NPA, NISC and MITRE.

How can I tell if I am a target?

If you work in Japan's government, media, think tank, academia or technology sectors, or run the VPN and gateway devices NPA names, check your device patches and logs first.

What should I do first?

Patch and monitor VPN and gateway devices, keep logs in one place, treat enable-content prompts and unexpected links as suspect, and report anything odd to the police or NISC.

Sources

  1. MirrorFace, Earth Kasha (G1054) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Group description, aliases, techniques, software
  2. MirrorFaceによるサイバー攻撃について(注意喚起) (alert, Japanese PDF) National Police Agency and NISC Supports: Campaigns A, B, C, malware, CVEs, detection and mitigation
  3. Alert: Cyberattacks by MirrorFace (Provisional Translation) National Police Agency Supports: English summary of the alert and the Chinese-involvement assessment
  4. MirrorFaceによるサイバー攻撃について(注意喚起) (web page) National Police Agency Supports: Alert page, issuer and period 2019 to present
  5. Annex: Windows Sandbox technique, traces and detection National Police Agency Supports: Windows Sandbox abuse
  6. Annex: VS Code technique, traces and detection National Police Agency Supports: VS Code dev tunnel abuse from June 2024
  7. Alert: Cyberattacks by MirrorFace (Provisional Translation) NISC (Japan) Supports: NISC copy of the English alert
  8. Public security focus, chapter 5 cyber situation (R7) National Police Agency Supports: Restatement of the assessment
  9. Cybersecurity 2025 (annual report 2024 and plan 2025) Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters, NISC Supports: MirrorFace listed among main FY2024 incidents
  10. Cybersecurity Strategy, 23 December 2025 (tentative translation) Government of Japan, NISC Supports: MirrorFace since 2019, suspected Chinese involvement
  11. Threats in Cyberspace in 2025 and Police Efforts National Police Agency Supports: NPA restatement, March 2026
  12. LODEINFO (S9020) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: LODEINFO backdoor
  13. HiddenFace (S9023) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: HiddenFace and NOOPDOOR
  14. UPPERCUT (S0275) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: UPPERCUT and ANEL
  15. MirrorStealer (S9022) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Credential stealer
  16. NOOPLDR (S9025) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Loader for HiddenFace
  17. DOWNIISSA (S9021) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Downloader for LODEINFO
  18. ROAMINGHOUSE (S9026) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Dropper
  19. ANELLDR (S9027) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Loader for UPPERCUT
  20. Cobalt Strike (S0154) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Framework used by MirrorFace