Attributed by Japan's National Police Agency (NPA) and NISC (8 January 2025) as an organized group with suspected Chinese involvement, MirrorFace (also called Earth Kasha) is reported to target Japanese think tanks, government, politicians, media, academia, and semiconductor, manufacturing and aerospace firms.
Attributed by Japan's National Police Agency (NPA) and NISC (8 January 2025) as an organized group with suspected Chinese involvement, MirrorFace (also called Earth Kasha) is reported to target Japanese think tanks, government, politicians, media, academia, and semiconductor, manufacturing and aerospace firms. It uses phishing emails and flaws in internet-facing devices to steal information on national security and advanced technology.
Last updated 9 October 2026
Profile MapThreat Group
Names2names in public reportsMirrorFace · Earth Kasha
Sectors10named as targetsJapan · Region
Techniques14in the attack chainInitial Access · Execution · Persistence
Japan's NPA and NISC attribute campaigns since about 2019 to MirrorFace (also called Earth Kasha) and assess them as organized activity with suspected Chinese involvement (alert of 8 January 2025). MITRE describes it as PRC-aligned and believed to be a subgroup under the menuPass umbrella.
Who they target
The Japanese authorities name think tanks, government (including retirees), politicians, mass media, academia, and the semiconductor, manufacturing, telecommunications and aerospace sectors. MITRE adds that later operations included targets in Central Europe.
How they usually get in
Phishing emails with attachments or download links, and flaws in internet-facing VPN and gateway devices, as described by NPA, NISC and MITRE.
What stands out
NPA says the group ran malware inside Windows Sandbox, which makes the host's antivirus and EDR (endpoint monitoring) blind to it and makes later investigation hard, and used VS Code remote tunnels as a remote control tool.
What to do first
Patch and monitor VPN and gateway devices, check their logs for odd logins, treat unexpected attachments and "enable content" prompts as suspect, and report anything suspicious to the police or NISC.
Names
Public reports use several names for this activity.
Names used for MirrorFace
Name
Where it appears
MirrorFace
MITRE ATT&CK G1054 (group name); NPA and NISC alert of 8 January 2025[1, 3]
Earth Kasha
MITRE ATT&CK (Associated Groups); NPA and NISC alert ("also known as")[1, 3, 7]
Who says so
Attribution is a judgment by the body named. It is shown here as attributed, not as proven fact.
Japan National Police Agency (NPA) and NISC8 January 2025
Assessed that campaigns against organizations, businesses and individuals in Japan from about 2019 to the present were carried out by MirrorFace, also known as Earth Kasha.[2, 3, 4, 7]
Japan National Police Agency (NPA) and NISC8 January 2025
Assessed the campaigns as a series of organized cyberattack activities with suspected Chinese involvement, mainly aimed at stealing information on national security and advanced technology.[2, 3]
NPA Security Bureau (Focus report)2025
Restated that NPA and NISC assessed MirrorFace campaigns since around 2019 as organized cyberattacks with suspected Chinese involvement.[8]
NISC and the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters27 June 2025
Annual report 2025 lists MirrorFace, "suspected of Chinese involvement", among the main domestic incidents of fiscal 2024 and dates the campaign from December 2019.[9]
Japan Cybersecurity Strategy23 December 2025
Said that since 2019 the group MirrorFace, suspected of involvement by China, has been running campaigns aimed at theft of information on Japan's national security and advanced technologies.[10]
NPA Cyber Affairs BureauMarch 2026
Report on 2025 repeats that NPA and NISC assessed MirrorFace attacks as organized activity likely involving China.[11]
MITRE ATT&CKpage last modified 31 July 2026
Describes MirrorFace as a PRC-aligned cyberespionage actor, believed to be a subgroup under the menuPass umbrella based on targeting, tools and infrastructure overlaps, active since at least 2019.[1]
Where sources differ
Sources differ on how far attribution goes. NPA and NISC say "suspected Chinese involvement" and name no unit or people. MITRE calls the group PRC-aligned and believed to be a subgroup under the menuPass umbrella, which the NPA and NISC alert does not mention. On the start date, MITRE says active "since at least 2019", the NPA alert says "around 2019", and the NISC annual report says from about December 2019. On geography, MITRE lists Central Europe targets, while the NPA and NISC alert covers Japan only. MITRE's page also lists Operation AkaiRyu with 2004 dates, which do not fit the 2019 start and are not used here.
Who they target
Sectors
JapanTargeted in campaign A (2019 to 2023) and campaign C (from June 2024), per NPA and NISC.[3]
JapanGovernment organizations including retirees were targeted in campaign A, per NPA and NISC.[3]
JapanTargeted in campaigns A and C. MITRE says emails were aimed at members of particular political parties.[1, 3]
JapanTargeted in campaigns A and C, per NPA and NISC.[3]
JapanTargeted in campaigns B and C, per NPA and NISC.[3]
JapanMain targets of campaign B (from around 2023), per NPA and NISC.[3]
JapanMain target of campaign B, per NPA and NISC.[3]
JapanMain target of campaign B, per NPA and NISC.[3]
JapanMITRE says the group at first targeted only Japanese organizations in media, defense, diplomatic, financial, manufacturing and academic sectors.[1]
RegionMITRE says later operations included targets in Central Europe. No government source opened names the countries.[1]
Operations timeline
Each entry is attributed to the group by the sources cited.
2019
Start of activity
MITRE says the group has been active since at least 2019.[1]
December 2019
Earliest campaign A activity
NPA lists campaign A emails with malware attachments from around December 2019 to around July 2023. NISC dates the campaign from December 2019.[2, 9]
February to October 2023
Campaign B intrusions
NPA says intrusions probably came through VPN device flaws or stolen credentials, and a SQL injection flaw on public servers, mainly against Japan's semiconductor, manufacturing, telecom, academia and aerospace sectors.[2]
June 2023
Windows Sandbox technique
NPA says the Windows Sandbox technique was probably used from around June 2023 at the latest.[2]
2023
Campaign B described as running
NPA and NISC say they confirmed attacks exploiting internet-facing device flaws since around 2023.[3]
January and June 2024
Campaign B effects continue
NPA reports compromise linked to campaign B continuing until around January and June 2024.[2]
May 2024
Campaign A effects continue
NPA reports compromise linked to campaign A infections continuing until around May 2024.[2]
June 2024
Campaign C begins
NPA and NISC say emails with download links and the ANEL malware have been confirmed since around June 2024.[3]
June 2024
VS Code tunnel technique
NPA says the VS Code remote tunnel technique had been seen since June 2024 at the latest.[6]
8 January 2025
Joint alert
NPA and NISC publish the alert, with annexes on the Windows Sandbox and VS Code techniques.[2, 3, 5, 6]
27 June 2025
NISC annual report
Lists MirrorFace among the main domestic cyber incidents of fiscal 2024.[9]
23 December 2025
Cybersecurity Strategy
Japan's strategy describes MirrorFace as running campaigns since 2019, suspected of involvement by China.[10]
March 2026
NPA report
NPA's report on 2025 repeats the January 2025 alert.[11]
Government actions
Indictments, sanctions and advisories that name the group or its alleged members.
Government actions about MirrorFace
Date
Who
What
8 January 2025
NPA and NISC
Joint alertPublished the three campaigns, the malware used, vulnerable device types, and detection and mitigation advice.[2, 3, 4]
8 January 2025
NPA
Technical annexesPublished two annexes on the Windows Sandbox and VS Code techniques with traces and detection tips.[5, 6]
2025
NPA Security Bureau
Focus reportIncluded MirrorFace as a case study in the cyber situation chapter.[8]
27 June 2025
NISC
Annual reportListed the January 2025 alert among its actions for fiscal 2024.[9]
23 December 2025
Japan government
Cybersecurity StrategyCited the January 2025 advisory as the source on MirrorFace.[10]
March 2026
NPA Cyber Affairs Bureau
Annual threat reportCited the alert as an example of information sharing with partners.[11]
How they get in
Techniques reported for this group, by MITRE ATT&CK tactic.
Look for foreign logins, odd user agents, and loopback addresses recorded as the VPN source address. Watch for activity from the VPN device towards internal servers.
Follow what NPA, NISC and MITRE report about this group and compare it with your own controls.
Questions
Who is MirrorFace?
Japan's NPA and NISC attribute campaigns against Japanese organizations since about 2019 to MirrorFace, also known as Earth Kasha, and assess them as organized activity with suspected Chinese involvement. MITRE says it is believed to be a subgroup under the menuPass umbrella.
Are they still active?
The latest government items found are the NPA and NISC alert of 8 January 2025, which describes campaign C as running since around June 2024, and the December 2025 Cybersecurity Strategy, which describes the group in the present tense.
Who do they target?
NPA and NISC name think tanks, government, politicians, media, academia, and the semiconductor, manufacturing, telecommunications and aerospace sectors in Japan. MITRE adds Central Europe.
How do they get in?
Phishing emails with attachments or download links, and flaws in VPN and gateway devices, according to NPA, NISC and MITRE.
How can I tell if I am a target?
If you work in Japan's government, media, think tank, academia or technology sectors, or run the VPN and gateway devices NPA names, check your device patches and logs first.
What should I do first?
Patch and monitor VPN and gateway devices, keep logs in one place, treat enable-content prompts and unexpected links as suspect, and report anything odd to the police or NISC.
Attributed by the US, UK and South Korean governments to North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau, Andariel is described in a July 2024 joint advisory as stealing defense, aerospace and nuclear secrets and funding that work with ransomware against US healthcare. MITRE ATT&CK describes it as a sub-set of Lazarus Group; the advisory does not use that term.
Attributed by the US, UK and South Korean governments, and MITRE ATT&CK
APT-C-60 is the name JPCERT/CC uses for a threat group it says likely carried out spear-phishing attacks on organizations in Japan from August 2024, using fake job-applicant emails and a backdoor called SpyGlace. No government or MITRE source opened for this page says who is behind it.
Also known as Comment Crew · Comment Panda · Comment Group
Attributed by MITRE ATT&CK to PLA Unit 61398 in China, APT1 is the subject of a US indictment of 19 May 2014 charging five Unit 61398 officers with hacking six US organizations. The Department of Justice alleges the aim was commercial gain for China's state-owned firms.
Attributed by the US Department of Justice (indictment of 19 May 2014) and MITRE ATT&CK
Attributed by the US, UK and EU governments to a China-based group working with the Ministry of State Security, menuPass (APT10) is known for reaching companies through their managed service providers. The US charged two people in December 2018 and the EU listed two people and a company in July 2020.
On 8 January 2025 Japan's National Police Agency (NPA) and the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) said that cyberattack campaigns against Japanese organizations since about 2019 were run by an actor called MirrorFace.