Threat group profile

Star Blizzard

Also known as SEABORGIUM, COLDRIVER, Callisto Group

Attributed by the UK, US, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand governments to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 18, this group is linked to long phishing campaigns against politicians, researchers, journalists and government staff in the UK, US and other NATO countries.

In short

Attributed by the UK, US, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand governments to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 18, this group is linked to long phishing campaigns against politicians, researchers, journalists and government staff in the UK, US and other NATO countries. It steals email logins and reads the victims' mail.

Profile MapThreat Group
  1. Attributed OriginRussia
  2. Names11names in public reportsStar Blizzard · SEABORGIUM · Callisto Group
  3. Sectors8named as targetsAcademia · Defense · Government
  4. Techniques14in the attack chainReconnaissance · Resource Development · Initial Access
  5. Tools5tools and malware listedEvilGinx · Spica

In one minute

Who they are
The UK, US, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand cyber agencies assess that Star Blizzard is almost certainly subordinate to Russia's FSB Center 18 (advisory of 7 December 2023). The US and UK sanctioned two named men in December 2023, and the US charged them.
Who they target
Advisories name academia, defense, government bodies, NGOs, think tanks and politicians, most often in the UK and US. The US also names intelligence community staff, defense contractors and Department of Energy facilities.
How they usually get in
Spearphishing. The advisory describes a slow approach: research the target, pose as a known contact (often to a personal email address), build trust, then send a link to a fake sign-in page that steals the password and session cookie.
What stands out
The UK says the group has selectively leaked and amplified stolen information, and links it to leaked UK-US trade documents before the 2019 General Election. Governments describe it mainly as a credential and email theft operation.
What to do first
Protect email accounts, including personal ones used for work. Use multi-factor authentication, but treat it as one layer because stolen session cookies have bypassed it. Turn off or monitor mail forwarding rules and check unexpected contact through another channel.

Names

Public reports use several names for this activity.

Names used for Star Blizzard
NameWhere it appears
Star Blizzard MITRE ATT&CK G1033 (group name); CISA and partner advisory AA23-341A; UK Foreign Office; US Treasury; US Department of Justice[1, 2, 4, 7, 8]
SEABORGIUM MITRE Associated Groups; the advisory says Star Blizzard was "formerly known as" this name[1, 2]
Callisto Group MITRE Associated Groups; the advisory; UK sanctions notice; US Treasury; US Department of Justice; Rewards for Justice[1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9]
TA446 MITRE Associated Groups; the advisory[1, 2]
COLDRIVER MITRE Associated Groups; the advisory; UK Foreign Office; US Treasury[1, 2, 4, 7]
TAG-53 The advisory and the UK Foreign Office press release (not in MITRE's list)[2, 4]
BlueCharlie The advisory and the UK Foreign Office press release (not in MITRE's list)[2, 4]
Cold River Spelling used in the UK sanctions notice[6]
Gossamer Bear US Treasury press release only[7]
ReUse Team US Treasury press release only[7]
Dancing Salome US Treasury press release and US Department of Justice[7, 8]

Who says so

Attribution is a judgment by the body named. It is shown here as attributed, not as proven fact.

  • MITRE ATT&CK Entry last modified 31 July 2026

    Describes Star Blizzard as a cyber espionage and influence group originating in Russia whose campaigns align closely with Russian state interests. It names no agency.[1]

  • UK NCSC, US CISA, FBI, NSA and Cyber National Mission Force, Australia ACSC, Canada Cyber Centre, New Zealand NCSC 7 December 2023

    Assess that Star Blizzard is almost certainly subordinate to the Russian FSB Center 18.[2, 3]

  • UK Foreign Office 7 December 2023

    Said the FSB is behind sustained attempts to interfere in UK political processes. Said FSB Center 18 was identified as accountable for cyber espionage against the UK and that Star Blizzard is operated by FSB officers.[4]

  • UK National Crime Agency 7 December 2023

    Said its investigation led to sanctions on two members of the Callisto Group, which the NCSC assesses is almost certainly subordinate to FSB Center 18.[5]

  • UK sanctions notice (OFSI) 7 December 2023

    Listed Korinets and Peretyatko. The statement of reasons calls the Callisto Group a cyber program operated by officers of the Russian FSB.[6]

  • US Department of the Treasury 7 December 2023

    Designated two individuals tied to an APT group it says is sponsored by the FSB, and described Peretyatko as an FSB officer.[7]

  • US Department of Justice 7 December 2023

    Unsealed an indictment of Peretyatko, an officer in FSB Center 18, and Korinets, charging a hacking campaign carried out on behalf of the Russian government.[8]

  • US Department of State (Rewards for Justice) Announced 7 December 2023

    Describes the Callisto Group as an entity managed by the FSB and offers up to $10 million for information on Korinets and Peretyatko.[7, 9, 10]

  • US Department of Justice 3 October 2024

    Affidavit says the seized domains were used by hackers belonging to, or criminal proxies working for, the Callisto Group, an operational unit within FSB Center 18.[11]

Where sources differ

Sources differ on confidence. The advisory of 7 December 2023 and the UK Foreign Office press release say "almost certainly subordinate" to FSB Center 18, but the Background note on the same UK press release says "highly likely subordinate". Sources also differ on when the activity began. MITRE and the advisory give 2019, the UK says spearphishing of parliamentarians from at least 2015, the US Treasury says as early as 2016, and the US indictment covers at least October 2016 to October 2022. Sources also describe the group differently: the US Department of Justice in October 2024 calls the Callisto Group an operational unit within Center 18 and also refers to criminal proxies, while the UK describes a group operated by FSB officers. MITRE does not name the agency.

Who they target

Sectors

  • AcademiaThe advisory says Star Blizzard has targeted academia since 2019. The UK names universities.[2, 4]
  • DefenseThe advisory lists defense and, from 2022, defense-industrial targets. The US names Department of Defense staff and defense contractors.[2, 8]
  • GovernmentThe advisory lists governmental organizations. The US names the Department of State. The UK names the public sector.[2, 4, 8]
  • PoliticiansThe UK says parliamentarians from multiple parties were targeted from at least 2015. The advisory lists politicians.[2, 4]
  • NGOs and think tanksThe advisory lists NGOs and think tanks. The UK names the Institute for Statecraft, a UK think tank, hacked in 2018.[2, 4]
  • Journalists and mediaThe UK and the US indictment name journalists. Treasury says news media accounts were targeted.[4, 7, 8]
  • EnergyThe advisory names US Department of Energy facilities in 2022. The US also names Department of Energy staff and national laboratories, and nuclear energy research.[2, 8, 9]
  • Intelligence communityThe US indictment names current and former employees of the US Intelligence Community.[8]

Regions

  • United KingdomThe advisory says targets in the UK and US appear to have been most affected.[2]
  • United StatesThe advisory says targets in the UK and US appear to have been most affected. The US indictment covers US government and contractor targets.[2, 8]
  • Other NATO countries and neighbors of RussiaThe advisory reports activity against other NATO countries and countries neighboring Russia. The indictment also names Ukraine.[2, 8]

Operations timeline

Each entry is attributed to the group by the sources cited.

  1. At least 2015

    Earliest date given

    The UK says spearphishing of parliamentarians from multiple parties ran from at least 2015.[4]

  2. October 2016

    Start of the US charge period

    The US indictment says the hacking conspiracy ran from at least October 2016 to October 2022.[8]

  3. 2016 to 2020

    Domain set-up

    Treasury says Korinets created and registered malicious domains for spearphishing campaigns, at least 39 domains through 5 domain registrars. Rewards for Justice gives October 2016 to September 2020.[7, 9]

  4. 2017

    Fake password-reset emails

    Treasury says Peretyatko used a fraudulent email account to send emails purporting to be from a major software company, asking victims to change their password.[7]

  5. 2018

    Institute for Statecraft hack

    The UK says Star Blizzard hacked this UK think tank and documents were later leaked.[4, 6]

  6. 2019

    UK-US trade documents

    The UK links Star Blizzard to the hack of UK-US trade documents leaked ahead of the 2019 General Election. The US indictment says information from targeted accounts was leaked before UK elections in 2019.[4, 8]

  7. 2019

    Date MITRE and the advisory give

    MITRE says the group has been active since at least 2019. The advisory says it has targeted sectors since 2019.[1, 2]

  8. December 2021

    Hack of Christopher Donnelly

    The UK says the account of the Institute for Statecraft founder was compromised from December 2021 and documents were leaked.[4]

  9. 2022

    Wider targeting

    The advisory says activity appeared to expand to defense-industrial targets and US Department of Energy facilities. Treasury says FSB actors impersonated agency employees against a US government agency.[2, 7]

  10. 2023

    Spica backdoor

    MITRE says the custom backdoor Spica has been used by Star Blizzard since at least 2023.[12]

  11. 7 December 2023

    Joint advisory, sanctions and charges

    The UK and allies published advisory AA23-341A. The UK and US sanctioned two men and the US unsealed an indictment.[2, 4, 7, 8]

  12. 3 October 2024

    Domain seizure

    The US Department of Justice announced a warrant to seize 41 internet domains used by the Callisto Group.[11]

Government actions

Indictments, sanctions and advisories that name the group or its alleged members.

Government actions about Star Blizzard
DateWhoWhat
7 December 2023 UK NCSC with CISA, FBI, NSA, CNMF, ACSC, Canadian Cyber Centre, NCSC-NZ Joint advisoryPublished AA23-341A on Star Blizzard spearphishing, with techniques and mitigations.[2, 3]
7 December 2023 UK Foreign Office Sanctions and summonsSanctioned Peretyatko and Korinets with the US, and summoned the Russian Ambassador.[4, 6]
7 December 2023 UK National Crime Agency InvestigationSaid its investigation led to the sanctions on two Callisto Group members.[5]
7 December 2023 US Department of the Treasury (OFAC) SanctionsDesignated Peretyatko and Korinets under E.O. 13694, as amended by E.O. 13757.[7]
7 December 2023 US Department of Justice Indictment unsealedCharged both men with one count of conspiracy to commit computer fraud. The release says the grand jury returned the indictment on the Tuesday before.[8]
7 December 2023 US Department of State (Rewards for Justice) Reward offerOffered up to $10 million for information on the two men.[7, 9, 10]
3 October 2024 US Department of Justice Domain seizureUnsealed a warrant to seize 41 internet domains, in step with a separate civil action by a private company on 66 more domains.[11]

How they get in

Techniques reported for this group, by MITRE ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

  • Search Open Websites/Domains T1593

    Uses open-source research and social media to find information on victims.[1, 2]

  • Gather Victim Identity Information T1589

    Researches targets' interests and real-world social or professional contacts.[1, 2]

Resource Development

  • Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts T1585.001

    Creates fake profiles on professional networking sites and impersonates respected experts.[1, 2]

  • Establish Accounts: Email Accounts T1585.002

    Registers consumer webmail accounts that match the names of people it impersonates.[1, 2]

  • Acquire Infrastructure: Domains T1583.001

    Registers domains that resemble legitimate organizations to host its phishing framework.[1, 2]

  • Compromise Accounts: Email Accounts T1586.002

    Uses compromised email accounts to phish contacts of the original victim.[1, 2]

Initial Access

  • Phishing: Spearphishing Link T1566.002

    Sends links to credential-stealing sites, directly or through documents on file-sharing sites.[2, 13]

  • Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1566.001

    The advisory says malicious links are embedded in attachments. MITRE also lists emails with malicious .pdf files.[1, 2]

  • Valid Accounts T1078

    Signs in to victim email accounts with stolen credentials.[1, 2, 15]

Credential Access

  • Steal Web Session Cookie T1539

    Uses EvilGinx to steal the session cookies of victims sent to fake sign-in domains.[1, 2]

Lateral Movement

  • Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie T1550.004

    Bypasses multi-factor authentication on email accounts with stolen session cookies.[1, 2, 14]

Collection

  • Email Collection: Remote Email Collection T1114.002

    Accesses email through externally facing mail services using stolen credentials or access tokens.[1, 2]

  • Email Collection: Email Forwarding Rule T1114.003

    Sets mail forwarding rules to watch victims and keep access after passwords are reset.[1, 2]

  • Linked Devices T1676

    MITRE says it has used the linked devices feature to connect WhatsApp accounts to its own infrastructure and steal messages.[1, 16]

Tools and malware

  • EvilGinx Open-source phishing framework

    Harvests credentials and session cookies to get around two-factor authentication.[1, 2]

  • Spica Custom backdoor

    MITRE says it is written in Rust, used since at least 2023, and creates a scheduled task named CalendarChecker for persistence.[12]

  • Malware to evade two-factor authentication (not named) Malware

    Treasury says Star Blizzard officers researched malware that allows evasion of two-factor authentication.[7]

  • Remote-control malware (not named) Malware

    Treasury says officers researched malware that allows control of a device with limited risk of detection.[7]

  • Webmail access tool (not named) Tool

    Treasury says officers researched a third tool that allows access to webmail inboxes.[7]

Detection and defense

  1. Use multi-factor authentication, as one layer

    The advisory says it reduces the impact of password compromises. It also says stolen session cookies have bypassed it, so watch for unusual sign-ins.

    Counters T1078 T1539 T1550.004

  2. Use strong, separate email passwords

    The advisory says to use a separate password for email accounts and not reuse passwords across services.

    Counters T1078 T1566.002

  3. Check unexpected contact

    The advisory says to check that the sender's address is one you recognize, to question contact from a personal webmail address, and to verify the message by another means.

    Counters T1566.002 T1585.002

  4. Turn off mail forwarding or monitor it

    The advisory says to disable mail forwarding, or check regularly that no forwarding rule was set up by an outsider.

    Counters T1114.003

  5. Turn on email scanning

    The advisory says to enable the automated email scanning features of email providers.

    Counters T1566.001 T1566.002

  6. Keep devices and software up to date

    The advisory says to use supported versions, apply security updates promptly and run anti-virus.

    Counters T1566.001

  7. Warn people who are likely targets

    The advisory says the group researches interests and contacts. The UK said the NCSC would publish guidance for high-risk individuals.

    Counters T1589 T1593 T1585.001

  8. Report suspicious activity

    The advisory says UK organizations and individuals can report related suspicious activity to the NCSC.

    Counters T1566.002

What Brandefense can do

  • Cyber Threat Intelligence

    Follow what governments and MITRE report about this group and compare its listed techniques with your email and sign-in controls.

  • Phishing Monitoring & Domain Abuse

    Find look-alike domains and fake sign-in pages that imitate your organization, since the advisory says the group registers domains resembling legitimate organizations.

  • Executive Protection

    Spot fake profiles and impersonation of your senior people and experts, since the advisory describes fake profiles and spoofed contacts.

  • Dark Web Monitoring

    Watch for leaked or sold company and personal email credentials, since the group's method is to harvest logins.

Questions

Who is Star Blizzard?

The UK, US, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand cyber agencies assess that it is almost certainly subordinate to Russia's FSB Center 18 (7 December 2023). MITRE says it has been active since at least 2019 and lists SEABORGIUM, Callisto Group, TA446 and COLDRIVER as associated names.

What does it want?

MITRE describes a cyber espionage and influence group. The UK says it gathered information and has selectively leaked and amplified stolen material in line with Russian confrontation goals.

How do they get in?

The advisory describes spearphishing: fake contacts, a slow build of trust, then a link to a fake sign-in page. Stolen logins and session cookies give access to email, and forwarding rules keep that access.

Has anyone been charged?

Yes. On 7 December 2023 the US Department of Justice unsealed an indictment of Ruslan Aleksandrovich Peretyatko and Andrey Stanislavovich Korinets. The UK and US sanctioned both, and Rewards for Justice offers up to $10 million. An indictment is an allegation.

Are they still active?

MITRE's entry was last modified on 31 July 2026 and lists the use of a WhatsApp linked devices feature. The latest government items opened for this page are the 3 October 2024 domain seizure and the December 2023 advisory, which says the activity was continuing through 2023.

What should we do first?

Protect email accounts with multi-factor authentication and strong separate passwords, disable or monitor mail forwarding, and verify unexpected contact through another channel.

In our research

  1. Callisto APT: Russia’s Persistent Espionage Operator December 2025

Sources

  1. Star Blizzard (G1033) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Description, associated names, active since 2019, techniques, Spica
  2. Russian FSB Cyber Actor Star Blizzard Continues Worldwide Spearphishing Campaigns (AA23-341A) CISA with FBI, NSA, CNMF, UK NCSC, ACSC, Canadian Cyber Centre, NCSC-NZ Supports: Attribution to FSB Centre 18, targets, method, techniques, mitigations, 7 December 2023
  3. Russian FSB cyber actor Star Blizzard continues worldwide spear-phishing campaigns UK National Cyber Security Centre Supports: UK copy of the joint advisory
  4. UK exposes attempted Russian cyber interference in politics and democratic processes UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, NCSC, NCA Supports: UK attribution, sanctions, names, Institute for Statecraft, trade documents, 7 December 2023
  5. NCA cyber investigation leads to sanctions for hostile actors linked to Russia's FSB UK National Crime Agency Supports: NCA investigation and sanctions, 7 December 2023
  6. Financial Sanctions Notice, Cyber, 07/12/2023 UK Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, HM Treasury Supports: Asset freeze entries and statement of reasons for Korinets and Peretyatko
  7. United States and the United Kingdom Sanction Members of Russian State Intelligence-Sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat Group US Department of the Treasury Supports: OFAC designations, roles of the two men, names, tools, reward
  8. Two Russian Nationals Working with Russia's Federal Security Service Charged with Global Computer Intrusion Campaign US Department of Justice Supports: Indictment, charges, charge period, victims, 7 December 2023
  9. Andrey Stanislavovich Korinets US Department of State, Rewards for Justice Supports: Reward up to $10 million, Korinets role, domains
  10. Ruslan Aleksandrovich Peretyatko US Department of State, Rewards for Justice Supports: Reward up to $10 million, Peretyatko role
  11. Justice Department Disrupts Russian Intelligence Spear-Phishing Efforts US Department of Justice Supports: Seizure of 41 domains, Center 18 attribution, 3 October 2024
  12. Spica (S1140) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Spica backdoor description
  13. Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Technique id, name and tactic
  14. Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie (T1550.004) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Technique id, name and tactic
  15. Valid Accounts (T1078) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Technique id and name
  16. Linked Devices (T1676) MITRE ATT&CK Supports: Technique id, name and tactic