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LiteLLM 1.107.0 Supply Chain Attack: Timeline, Stolen Data and a Response Checklist
LiteLLM 1.107.0 on PyPI and Docker carried a credential stealer on 21 October 2026. See the timeline, what it took and a checklist to…
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Attack technique
Credentials in Files means an attacker reads passwords, keys and tokens that sit in ordinary files on a disk or a file share.
In short
Credentials in Files means an attacker reads passwords, keys and tokens that sit in ordinary files on a disk or a file share. Config files, .env files and cloud credential files are common targets. The stolen secret is then used to sign in somewhere else. MITRE tracks it as T1552.001.
Credential Access · Step 9 Of 15 In The Attack Chain
MITRE says adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files with insecurely stored credentials. These can be files users made for their own passwords, shared credential stores, configuration files with passwords for a service, or source and binary files with embedded passwords.
MITRE adds that in cloud and container environments, user and service account credentials are often kept in local configuration and credential files. They may also appear as parameters to deployment commands in container logs. In some cases the file can be copied to another machine, or its contents read and used to authenticate without copying anything.
MITRE lists the TeamPCP Cloud Stealer, which can check more than 50 file paths for credentials across CI/CD, cloud and container environments. It also lists Mini Shai-Hulud, which collects credentials from configuration files. On 21 October 2026 Socket mapped the malicious LiteLLM 1.107.0 release to this technique: its stealer read cloud, developer and AI tool credential files and .env files. See the LiteLLM 1.107.0 incident profile and our LiteLLM 1.107.0 response checklist.
MITRE's strategy DET0307 looks for access to insecure credential files such as .env, .xml or .ps1 files. It then looks for suspicious process execution or logins that use the retrieved credentials.
MITRE says to flag reads of config files with password fields by non-root or unusual users, followed by SSH login attempts.
MITRE says to flag container processes that read mounted secrets or config paths such as /run/secrets, followed by network activity or credential use.
MITRE says to flag access to local credential files such as ~/.aws/credentials, followed by metadata API calls or cloud role assumptions.
MITRE mitigation M1047 (Audit) says to scan proactively for files that contain passwords and reduce exposure where they are found.
MITRE mitigation M1027 (Password Policies) suggests an organizational rule against storing passwords in files.
MITRE mitigation M1022 limits file shares to specific directories and gives access only to the users who need it.
MITRE mitigation M1017 (User Training) says to make people aware that plaintext passwords in config files can persist on endpoints and servers.
After the LiteLLM 1.107.0 compromise, LiteLLM tells users to rotate every secret the host could reach, because it says a marker file confirms exfiltration but its absence proves nothing.
MITRE names user-made password files, shared credential stores, configuration files with passwords and source or binary files with embedded passwords. In cloud and container setups it also names local credential and config files.
No. MITRE treats OS Credential Dumping as a separate technique, T1003. T1552.001 is about reading files that already hold secrets. MITRE notes that passwords can also be pulled from backups or saved virtual machines through dumping.
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