Malware profile

HOOKEDGE Backdoor

HOOKEDGE is a lightweight Windows backdoor made of batch scripts, delivered through Word documents that carry a macro.

In short

HOOKEDGE is a lightweight Windows backdoor made of batch scripts, delivered through Word documents that carry a macro. It takes its commands from the webhook.site service and sends the results back to it. Recorded Future's Insikt Group attributes it with moderate confidence to BlueDelta, which overlaps with APT28. Symantec's researchers found it in attacks on organizations in two NATO countries.

Profile MapMalware
  1. Names4names in public reportsHOOKEDGE · HEADLACE · Operation MacroMaze
  2. Techniques13ATT&CK techniques listedInitial Access · Execution · Persistence
  3. Infection Steps6in the delivery chainLure arrives · Macro runs
  4. Linked Groups1groups that use itAPT28

In one minute

What it is
A Windows backdoor made of batch scripts that takes commands from, and sends results to, webhook.site. Recorded Future named it HOOKEDGE in August 2026.
What it does
It runs command files that its operators place on a webhook, and uploads the output to a second webhook. Microsoft Edge makes both connections.
Who uses it
Attributed by Recorded Future's Insikt Group, with moderate confidence, to BlueDelta (overlaps with APT28, Fancy Bear and Forest Blizzard). Symantec found it used by Swallowtail, its name for APT28, in two NATO countries.
How it gets in
A Word document with a macro, likely sent by email. The macro drops script files into the user profile and starts the chain.
What to do first
Block macros in documents from the internet, and block webhook.site unless your company uses it, as Recorded Future advises.

What it does

HOOKEDGE works as a loop. Recorded Future says a first stage scheduled task starts it every 30 minutes. Other samples used 20 minutes, and the group later raised the interval to 61 minutes. Each run fetches a command file from a staging webhook through Microsoft Edge, runs it, and posts the output to a second webhook, again through Edge. Because the browser makes the connection, the traffic looks like normal browsing. Symantec saw the browser started in a one pixel window placed off screen.

Recorded Future assesses HOOKEDGE as a likely successor to HEADLACE, an earlier BlueDelta backdoor. At a naval shipbuilder Symantec found more:

  • a second HOOKEDGE stage that talked to a dedicated IP address instead of webhook.site
  • an SSH tunnel
  • a script that captures NTLM logins
  • a reflective loader called ld.exe (see reflective code loading)

Recorded Future lists ATT&CK ids in an appendix to its report; Symantec gives none. The technique list on this page is our own mapping of the behavior both reports describe. The full story is in our analysis of the Swallowtail campaign.

Names

Public sources use several names for this malware.

Names
NameWhere it appears
HOOKEDGEName used by Recorded Future (August 2026) and Symantec, which writes Hookedge[1, 2]
HEADLACEEarlier BlueDelta backdoor that Recorded Future calls the likely predecessor[2]
Operation MacroMazeName Lab52 gave to similar activity, as Recorded Future reports it[2]
ld.exeFile name of the reflective loader Symantec found in the same intrusion[1]

What it can do

What MITRE ATT&CK lists this malware as doing, by tactic. Each id opens our technique page where one exists, otherwise MITRE.

Initial Access

  • Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1566.001

    Arrives as a macro-enabled Word document, likely sent as an email attachment.[1, 2]

Execution

  • User Execution: Malicious File T1204.002

    Needs the reader to open the document and enable macros.[2]

  • Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic T1059.005

    The macro and a VBScript launcher start the chain.[1, 2]

  • Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1059.003

    The backdoor and its tasks are batch and cmd files.[1, 2]

Persistence

  • Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task T1053.005

    A scheduled task starts the backdoor every 30 minutes in the first stage.[2]

Stealth

  • Obfuscated Files or Information T1027

    The macro source is split into short fragments that are joined at run time.[1]

  • Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window T1564.003

    Edge runs in a one pixel window placed off screen, or headless.[1, 2]

  • Reflective Code Loading T1620

    At one victim the loader ld.exe decrypted a file in memory and called an exported function named ExecuteLoader.[1]

Command and Control

  • Web Service: Bidirectional Communication T1102.002

    Tasks come from webhook.site and results go back to it.[1, 2]

  • Ingress Tool Transfer T1105

    Operators pushed an SSH key and the files ld.exe and Events.dat through the same fetch path.[1]

  • Protocol Tunneling T1572

    At one victim the operators used the backdoor to push an SSH key and open a background tunnel to their own server.[1]

Exfiltration

  • Exfiltration Over C2 Channel T1041

    Command output is posted to a separate exfiltration webhook.[2]

Credential Access

  • Forced Authentication T1187

    At one victim a PowerShell script made the host sign in to a listener on its own loopback address to capture an NTLM exchange.[1]

How it spreads

HOOKEDGE does not spread on its own. Both reports describe macro-enabled Word documents, likely sent as email attachments. Recorded Future saw lures that posed as a Spanish ministry document listing the topics of a meeting and later generic lures that asked the reader to click Enable Content. Symantec says the document at the shipbuilder was opened from the Outlook attachment cache on 24 July 2026, which shows it arrived by email.

How an infection runs

The order of steps in a typical infection, as the sources describe it.

  1. Lure arrives

    A Word document with a macro, likely sent as an email attachment. Symantec saw it opened from the Outlook cache on 24 July 2026.[1, 2]

  2. Macro runs

    The AutoOpen routine drops script files into the user profile: a VBScript launcher, an HTML and XHTML pair and a batch script. Recorded Future counts six files, Symantec four.[1, 2]

  3. Task fetched

    A hidden Edge window loads a webhook.site address and saves the reply to disk. The reply is turned into a cmd file and run.[1, 2]

  4. Result posted

    The output is wrapped in the HTML pair and sent to a separate webhook by an auto-submitted form.[2]

  5. Loop repeats

    A scheduled task repeats this, every 30 minutes in the first stage; Recorded Future also saw 20 and 61 minute intervals. Recorded Future says some victims later got a second stage that beacons as often as every five minutes.[2]

  6. Follow-on at one victim

    Symantec saw a second stage that used a dedicated IP address, an SSH tunnel, NTLM capture and the loader ld.exe.[1]

Timeline

  1. 26 September 2025

    First lure seen

    Recorded Future's earliest lure, posing as a Spanish ministry document listing the topics of a meeting.[2]

  2. 7 October 2025

    Generic lures begin

    Lures change to a generic Enable Content prompt, with a 20 minute beacon interval.[2]

  3. 4 December 2025

    Hidden window

    Edge now runs in a hidden window instead of headless mode.[2]

  4. 20 January 2026

    Email open canary

    Recorded Future sees a mailopened.jpg canary in network telemetry.[2]

  5. April 2026

    Türkiye

    Recorded Future identifies variants that, by network telemetry, targeted organizations in Türkiye.[2]

  6. 24 July 2026

    Shipbuilder compromised

    Symantec says a Word document was opened at a naval shipbuilder.[1]

  7. 27 July 2026

    Second stage

    A second HOOKEDGE stage fetches tasks from a dedicated IP address, and an SSH tunnel is opened.[1]

  8. 31 July 2026

    Loader run

    The operators run ld.exe with an encrypted file named Events.dat.[1]

  9. August 2026

    First public report

    Recorded Future's Insikt Group documents HOOKEDGE and links it to BlueDelta.[1, 2]

  10. 24 September 2026

    Latest activity

    Symantec saw the HOOKEDGE launcher on the shipbuilder host again.[1]

  11. 20 October 2026

    Symantec report

    Symantec publishes its findings on two NATO countries.[1]

Detection and defense

  1. Restrict macros

    Disable macros in documents that come from the internet where you can, and restrict unsigned VBA macros, as Recorded Future advises.[2]

    Counters: T1204.002 T1059.005

  2. Watch scheduled tasks

    Alert when a scheduled task runs a script or interpreter such as wscript, cscript, cmd or powershell from a user writable folder. Recorded Future says HOOKEDGE kept this persistence in every variant.[2]

    Counters: T1053.005

  3. Flag unusual Edge launches

    Investigate Edge started headless, with a data URL, with a local HTML file, or in a one pixel window placed off screen. Symantec shows the exact command line.[1, 2]

    Counters: T1564.003 T1102.002

  4. Review webhook traffic

    Review outbound connections to webhook.site and similar services, and block them if the company does not use them. Recorded Future expects a move to another service if one is blocked.[2]

    Counters: T1102.002 T1041

  5. Hunt the follow-on

    Symantec says to treat a HOOKEDGE find as possibly ongoing and to look for the SSH tunnel, the NTLM capture script and ld.exe.[1]

    Counters: T1572 T1187 T1620

  6. Use phishing-resistant MFA

    Recorded Future advises FIDO2 keys or certificate-based sign-in for email, VPN and other external services, because the group has relied on stolen credentials.[2]

    Counters: T1566.001

  7. Use the published indicators

    Symantec lists file hashes, one IP address and webhook.site addresses. Search your logs for them, but expect fresh webhook addresses in new variants.[1]

    Counters: T1102.002

Questions

What is HOOKEDGE?

A Windows backdoor made of batch scripts, delivered through Word documents with a macro. It runs commands from webhook.site and sends the results back.

Who uses HOOKEDGE?

Recorded Future attributes it with moderate confidence to BlueDelta, which overlaps with APT28. Symantec found it in attacks by Swallowtail, its name for APT28, on organizations in two NATO countries.

Is webhook.site malicious?

No. Recorded Future describes it as a legitimate service for receiving web requests. The group abuses it because its traffic blends with normal web use.

How can I check for HOOKEDGE?

Look for scheduled tasks that run scripts from user folders, Edge started with a data URL or off-screen window, and connections to webhook.site. Search for the hashes and IP address in the Symantec report.

Does a HOOKEDGE find mean the attack is over?

Not necessarily. Symantec says to treat it as potentially ongoing and to look for tunnels, credential theft and the ld.exe loader.

In our research

  1. Swallowtail (APT28) and HOOKEDGE: Attacks on Two NATO Countries and a Defender Checklist October 2026
  2. APT28: Russia’s Persistent Cyber Espionage Arm November 2025
  3. Fancy Bear APT Group August 2022
  4. APT28 Threat group

Sources

  1. Swallowtail: Russian Espionage Group Targets Defense Firms in Two NATO Countries Symantec (Broadcom)Supports: 20 October 2026: shipbuilder intrusion, attack chain, ld.exe, indicators
  2. BlueDelta Targets Defense and Diplomacy with HOOKEDGE Recorded Future Insikt GroupSupports: August 2026: first report, attribution, files, two webhook design, changes over time, mitigations
  3. APT28 (G0007) MITRE ATT&CKSupports: Swallowtail, Fancy Bear and Forest Blizzard as names of APT28
  4. T1102.002 Web Service: Bidirectional Communication MITRE ATT&CKSupports: Technique id and name
  5. T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File MITRE ATT&CKSupports: Technique id and name
  6. T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task MITRE ATT&CKSupports: Technique id and name
  7. T1620 Reflective Code Loading MITRE ATT&CKSupports: Technique id and name
  8. T1572 Protocol Tunneling MITRE ATT&CKSupports: Technique id and name
  9. T1187 Forced Authentication MITRE ATT&CKSupports: Technique id and name