Malware profile

SAWFLY web shell

Also known as mangoapi.php

SAWFLY is a small PHP web shell that Google Threat Intelligence Group says a suspected China-nexus espionage group used on BeyondTrust Remote Support appliances in 2026.

In short

SAWFLY is a small PHP web shell that Google Threat Intelligence Group says a suspected China-nexus espionage group used on BeyondTrust Remote Support appliances in 2026. It hides its commands in encrypted traffic and stays silent when a request lacks the right parameter.

Profile MapMalware
  1. Names2names in public reportsSAWFLY · mangoapi.php
  2. Techniques4ATT&CK techniques listedPersistence · Command and Control · Defense Evasion
  3. Infection Steps4in the delivery chainFlaw exploited · Web shell written

In one minute

What it is
A PHP web shell, mangoapi.php, that GTIG tracks as SAWFLY and describes as obfuscated and lightweight.
What it does
It reads a hidden POST parameter, decodes and decrypts the payload with RC4, runs the PHP code and sends back an encrypted result. Without the parameter it returns a 404 page.
Who uses it
Attributed by Google Threat Intelligence Group (15 October 2026) to ARMORY CASTLE, a suspected PRC-nexus espionage actor formerly tracked as UNC5221.
How it gets in
Placed in the web root of a BeyondTrust Remote Support appliance after exploitation of the zero-day flaw CVE-2026-102764.
What to do first
Patch with BT26-05-RS, rebuild any appliance that was exposed while unpatched, and rotate the credentials it held.

What it does

GTIG calls SAWFLY (file name mangoapi.php) an obfuscated, lightweight PHP web shell. It carries commands in a custom Base32 format and encrypts them with a 256-bit RC4 key. It runs the decoded PHP code and returns any result in the same encrypted form.

GTIG says the attackers used it as one of their main footholds and ran commands from it with elevated rights, for example to delete logs. It was found in the attack described on our page about CVE-2026-102764, attributed by GTIG to ARMORY CASTLE. The same attackers also used the BARECLAW tunneler to carry traffic through the appliance.

GTIG also ties this group to the BRICKSTORM backdoor, which it hides on VMware vCenter servers and network appliances.

Names

Public sources use several names for this malware.

Names
NameWhere it appears
SAWFLYName given by Google Threat Intelligence Group in October 2026[1]
mangoapi.phpFile name of the web shell on the appliance[1]

What it can do

What MITRE ATT&CK lists this malware as doing, by tactic. Each id opens our technique page where one exists, otherwise MITRE.

Persistence

  • Server Software Component: Web Shell T1505.003

    Sits in the web root of the appliance and runs attacker PHP code on request.[1, 4]

Command and Control

  • Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography T1573.001

    Encrypts replies and decrypts commands with a hard-coded 256-bit RC4 key.[1, 5]

  • Data Encoding: Non-Standard Encoding T1132.002

    Wraps the traffic in a custom Base32 layer.[1, 6]

Defense Evasion

  • Obfuscated Files or Information T1027

    The script itself is obfuscated, and it returns a 404 reply to any request that lacks its hidden parameter.[1, 7]

How it spreads

GTIG says the web shell appeared on the appliance about 11 minutes after the first POST requests that followed exploitation of CVE-2026-102764. It does not spread on its own.

How an infection runs

The order of steps in a typical infection, as the sources describe it.

  1. Flaw exploited

    The attacker abuses CVE-2026-102764 and sends POST requests to a PHP file on the appliance.[1]

  2. Web shell written

    About 11 minutes later the file system records SAWFLY in the web root.[1]

  3. Commands sent

    The attacker posts an encoded, RC4 encrypted payload in the hidden parameter and the shell runs it.[1]

  4. Next steps

    The attacker copies a shell binary with the SUID bit, tries to dump the appliance's stored secrets and, from the web shell, deletes logs with sudo rights.[1]

Timeline

  1. Late August 2026

    Zero-day use

    GTIG says Mandiant found evidence that ARMORY CASTLE exploited CVE-2026-102764 as a zero-day. SAWFLY was one of the tools used after that.[1]

  2. 15 October 2026

    Report published

    GTIG publishes its analysis of SAWFLY and names the BARECLAW tunneler used beside it. BeyondTrust discloses the flaw.[1]

  3. 16 October 2026

    Government alerts

    CISA adds CVE-2026-102764 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. CISA and the Canadian Cyber Centre name no malware.[2, 3]

Detection and defense

  1. Patch and rebuild

    Apply BT26-05-RS. Redeploy any appliance that was exposed while unpatched from a clean, patched image, because host-level changes survive reboots.[1, 2]

    Counters: T1505.003

  2. Look for unknown scripts

    Look for unrecognized script files on the appliance and unexpected gaps in logs.[2]

    Counters: T1505.003

  3. Keep logs off the appliance

    Forward syslog and keep proxy and firewall logs for the exposure window, since the attackers deleted local logs.[1, 2]

    Counters: T1027

  4. Rotate credentials

    After patching or rebuilding, rotate every credential the appliance stored or injected and revoke active support sessions.[2]

    Counters: T1505.003

Questions

What is SAWFLY?

A PHP web shell that Google Threat Intelligence Group tracks. It was used on BeyondTrust Remote Support appliances after the zero-day CVE-2026-102764.

Who used it?

GTIG attributes it to ARMORY CASTLE, a suspected China-nexus espionage actor. No government body has named the group.

How does SAWFLY hide?

It answers only requests with a hidden POST parameter, returns 404 otherwise, and encrypts its traffic with RC4.

How do I find it?

CISA advises looking for unrecognized script files and gaps in logs on affected appliances, and rebuilding from a known-good state.

In our research

  1. ARMORY CASTLE Threat group

Sources

  1. ARMORY CASTLE Exploits BeyondTrust Google Threat Intelligence Group (Mandiant)Supports: Description of SAWFLY, parameter, encryption, foothold, deleted logs, attribution
  2. CISA Urges Patching Critical Vulnerability in BeyondTrust Remote Support CISASupports: Active exploitation of CVE-2026-102764, patch and hunt guidance
  3. AL26-025 Critical vulnerability impacting BeyondTrust Remote Support (CVE-2026-102764) Canadian Centre for Cyber SecuritySupports: Affected versions and fixed version
  4. Server Software Component: Web Shell, Sub-technique T1505.003 MITRE ATT&CKSupports: Technique id and name
  5. Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography, Sub-technique T1573.001 MITRE ATT&CKSupports: Technique id and name
  6. Data Encoding: Non-Standard Encoding, Sub-technique T1132.002 MITRE ATT&CKSupports: Technique id and name
  7. Obfuscated Files or Information, Technique T1027 MITRE ATT&CKSupports: Technique id and name