Ransomware group profile

Rhysida

Also known as Rhysida ransomware
  • Active

In short

Rhysida is a ransomware operation that CISA, the FBI and the MS-ISAC say has mainly been deployed against education, healthcare, manufacturing, IT and government organizations since May 2023. Open source reporting describes it as a ransomware-as-a-service model where any ransom is split with associates. Rhysida uses double extortion: victims pay to decrypt files and pay again to stop stolen data being published.

Profile MapRansomware Group
  1. StatusActiveas reported
  2. Other Names1names in public reportsRhysida ransomware
  3. Entry Routes4ways inVPN with stolen credentials · Gootloader malware · Remote services
  4. Techniques8mapped to MITRE ATT&CKValid Accounts · External Remote Services
  5. Defences7first steps listedRequire phishing-resistant MFA · Patch known exploited flaws

Overview

Rhysida is a ransomware family. CISA, the FBI and the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) say it has mainly been deployed against education, healthcare, manufacturing, information technology and government organizations since May 2023. They describe the actors as hitting “targets of opportunity”, meaning whoever is exposed, rather than a fixed list. The advisory is based on incident response work and analysis of samples found on victim networks.

How it is run

Open source reporting cited by the agencies describes Rhysida actors working as a ransomware-as-a-service operation, where tools and infrastructure are leased out and any ransom is split between the group and its associates. The same reporting notes similarities with the group known as Vice Society. CISA’s own 2022 advisory on Vice Society said that group was disproportionately targeting the education sector. The advisory states only that similarities exist, not that the two are the same group.

Getting in and moving around

The common way in is a VPN login using valid, stolen credentials, often where multifactor authentication (MFA) was not switched on by default. The April 2025 update adds that the actors have at times used Gootloader malware for the first foothold. After that they rely on built-in Windows tools: Remote Desktop, PowerShell, and commands to list users, groups and domains. They use PsExec heavily for lateral movement, PuTTY for secure shell connections, and AnyDesk for remote access.

Rhysida timeline
  1. May 2023First deploymentsThe agencies date the use of Rhysida ransomware against victims to this month.
  2. 10 November 2023Indicators publishedThe advisory notes that technical details and indicators were published on this date and used in its analysis.
  3. 15 November 2023Advisory publishedCISA, the FBI and the MS-ISAC published AA23-319A.
  4. December 2024Investigation cut-offThe update draws on investigations up to this month.
  5. 30 April 2025Advisory updatedNew indicators were added and outdated ones removed, along with newer tools such as AZCopy.

To take over the domain the actors dumped the NTDS.dit database, the file that holds password hashes for every Active Directory user, using secretsdump and the Windows ntdsutil tool. The agencies advise domain-wide password resets, plus a double reset of the Kerberos ticket account, if that file may have been taken. The actors also clear Windows event logs with wevtutil. In 2025 the agencies saw them use the Azure storage tools AZCopy and Storage Explorer. The advisory describes these as tools for copying files to and from Azure storage accounts.

Encryption and extortion

In one investigation the actors made folders named in and out on the C drive. The in folder held host names found by scanning, and scripts then copied the encryptor to each host and ran it. The encryptor uses a 4096-bit RSA key with the ChaCha20 cipher and adds a .rhysida extension. It then deletes itself using a hidden PowerShell command. Rhysida uses double extortion: pay to decrypt, and pay to stop the stolen data being published. Payment is requested in Bitcoin. The ransom note is a PDF named CriticalBreachDetected, with a unique code and a Tor portal to contact the group.

At a glance
Model
Ransomware as a service, with a profit-sharing split
Active since
May 2023 (as deployed)
Main targets
Education, healthcare, manufacturing, IT, government
Encryption
4096-bit RSA key with ChaCha20
Encrypted file extension
.rhysida
Advisory
AA23-319A, updated 30 April 2025

The sources opened for this page describe no law enforcement takedown of Rhysida.

Also known as

  • Rhysida ransomware

How they get in

  1. 01

    VPN with stolen credentials

    The common route is a login to the victim's VPN with valid but compromised credentials, helped by VPNs that lack MFA by default.

  2. 02

    Gootloader malware

    The April 2025 update says Rhysida actors have at times used Gootloader malware for initial access.

  3. 03

    Remote services

    Actors use external-facing remote services to get in and stay in, then move by Remote Desktop and SSH.

  4. 04

    Living off the land

    After the first foothold they use built-in tools such as PowerShell, net commands, nltest and PsExec to blend in.

How they extort

Double extortion. Victims are told to pay in Bitcoin both to decrypt files and to stop stolen data being published. A PDF ransom note points to a Tor portal.

Who they target

  1. 01

    Education

    See the industry page
  2. 02

    Healthcare

    See the industry page
  3. 03

    Manufacturing

    See the industry page
  4. 04

    Information technology

    See the industry page
  5. 05

    Government

    See the industry page

How to defend

  1. Require phishing-resistant MFA

    Turn on MFA for all services, especially webmail, VPN and accounts that reach critical systems. Lack of MFA on VPNs is how many intrusions began.

  2. Patch known exploited flaws

    Prioritize remediation of known exploited vulnerabilities.

  3. Segment the network

    Segment networks so ransomware cannot spread freely.

  4. Limit command line and PowerShell

    Disable command line and scripting where not needed, restrict PowerShell to specific users, and turn on enhanced logging kept for at least 180 days.

  5. Restrict Remote Desktop

    Allow RDP only for known accounts and groups, with MFA for privileged accounts, closed unused ports and account lockouts.

  6. Keep offline backups

    Keep offline backups and test restoring them, daily or weekly at minimum.

  7. Reset passwords after NTDS theft

    If NTDS.dit may have been taken, reset all domain passwords and reset the Kerberos ticket account twice.

Questions

What is Rhysida ransomware?

Rhysida is a ransomware family that CISA, the FBI and the MS-ISAC say has been deployed against victims since May 2023, mainly in education, healthcare, manufacturing, IT and government. Advisory AA23-319A covers it.

How does Rhysida get into networks?

The common route is a VPN login using valid, stolen credentials, often where multifactor authentication was not on by default. The April 2025 update adds that the actors have at times used Gootloader malware for the first foothold.

How does Rhysida extort victims?

It uses double extortion: pay to decrypt, and pay to stop the stolen data being published. Payment is requested in Bitcoin, and the ransom note is a PDF with a unique code and a Tor portal.

Is Rhysida related to Vice Society?

Open source reporting cited by the agencies notes similarities with Vice Society. The advisory states only that similarities exist, not that the two are the same group.

How can I defend against Rhysida?

Turn on phishing-resistant MFA, especially for VPN, patch known exploited flaws, segment the network, restrict Remote Desktop and PowerShell, and keep tested offline backups. Reset domain passwords if NTDS.dit may have been taken.

In our research

  1. Beyond the Ivory Tower: Darkweb Breach Trends in the Global Education Sector November 2025
  2. Ransomware Trends Report | Q3 2023 October 2023

Sources

  1. #StopRansomware: Rhysida Ransomware (AA23-319A) CISA, FBI and MS-ISAC
  2. #StopRansomware: Vice Society (AA22-249A) CISA, FBI and MS-ISAC
  3. #StopRansomware Guide CISA
  4. Stop Ransomware CISA