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GRU targeting of logistics firms: advisory AA25-141A
CISA, NSA, FBI and partners describe a GRU campaign against Western logistics and technology firms: targets, phases, CVEs and the fixes they list.
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Attack technique
Indicator Removal is a technique where an attacker deletes or changes the traces that their activity leaves behind.
In short
Indicator Removal is a technique where an attacker deletes or changes the traces that their activity leaves behind. These traces include logs, command histories and file details. The aim is to blend in with normal activity and make the intrusion harder to spot.
Stealth · Step 7 Of 15 In The Attack Chain
Systems record what happens on them. Logs, command histories and file details can all show that something unusual took place. Attackers remove or edit selected records so that their actions are less visible.
They often do not wipe everything. They pick the records that look odd or are likely to draw attention, and leave enough data in place that the system still looks normal.
Where these records live, and what they look like, depends on the platform, so attackers adjust their approach for each one.
This may not stop detection completely, but it can delay it, lower the quality of alerts and make it harder to rebuild a timeline. Removed or changed records may still be recoverable through deeper forensic work. MITRE lists eight sub-techniques: T1070.003 Clear Command History, T1070.004 File Deletion, T1070.005 Network Share Connection Removal, T1070.006 Timestomp, T1070.007 Clear Network Connection History and Configurations, T1070.008 Clear Mailbox Data, T1070.009 Clear Persistence and T1070.010 Relocate Malware.
Look for deleted or overwritten logs, shell histories and audit records, especially after a privilege change or a suspicious process starting.
Monitor sequences where registry entries, scheduled tasks or similar items are deleted or modified after suspicious activity.
Check for log clearing on endpoints, containers, virtualization hosts and mail systems, including hidden or removed mail rules and audit mailboxes.
Application Log Content, File Deletion, File Metadata, File Modification, Scheduled Job Modification, Windows Registry Key Modification
Forward events automatically to a log server or data repository so an attacker cannot easily find and alter them on the local system. Keep the delay short.
Use proper permissions and authentication on locally stored event files, and prevent privilege escalation that would let attackers get around them.
Encrypt event files on the system and in transit so that they give an attacker less feedback.
Indicator Removal is a Stealth technique where an attacker deletes or changes the traces their activity leaves behind, such as logs, command histories and file details. The aim is to blend in with normal activity and make the intrusion harder to spot.
Systems record what happens on them, and those records can show that something unusual took place. Attackers remove selected records that look odd, which can delay detection, lower the quality of alerts and make it harder to rebuild a timeline.
Sometimes. MITRE notes that removed or changed records may still be recoverable through deeper forensic work. This is one reason to forward logs to a remote store, so a copy exists outside the compromised system.
Look for deleted or overwritten logs, shell histories and audit records, especially after a privilege change or a suspicious process starting. Also watch for registry entries or scheduled tasks being deleted or modified after suspicious activity, across endpoints, containers, virtualization hosts and mail systems.
Forward events automatically to a log server or data repository so an attacker cannot easily alter them locally, and keep the delay short. Protect local event files with proper permissions and authentication, and prevent privilege escalation that would let attackers get around them.
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