These traces include logs, command histories and file details. The aim is to blend in with normal activity and make the intrusion harder to spot.
How it works
Systems record what happens on them. Logs, command histories and file details can all show that something unusual took place. Attackers remove or edit selected records so that their actions are less visible.
They often do not wipe everything. They pick the records that look odd or are likely to draw attention, and leave enough data in place that the system still looks normal.
Where these records live, and what they look like, depends on the platform, so attackers adjust their approach for each one.
This may not stop detection completely, but it can delay it, lower the quality of alerts and make it harder to rebuild a timeline. Removed or changed records may still be recoverable through deeper forensic work. MITRE lists eight sub-techniques: T1070.003 Clear Command History, T1070.004 File Deletion, T1070.005 Network Share Connection Removal, T1070.006 Timestomp, T1070.007 Clear Network Connection History and Configurations, T1070.008 Clear Mailbox Data, T1070.009 Clear Persistence and T1070.010 Relocate Malware.
A real example
- MITRE ATT&CK lists APT42 as clearing browser history.
- MITRE ATT&CK lists APT5 as using the THINBLOOD utility to clear SSL VPN log files.
- MITRE ATT&CK lists BPFDoor as clearing the environment variables of a process by emptying its /proc//environ file.
- MITRE ATT&CK lists DarkWatchman as able to remove its components from the Registry, stop processes and clear browser history.
- MITRE ATT&CK lists EVILNUM as having a function called DeleteLeftovers that removes certain traces of the attack.
Who uses it
- Ransomware group Hive Hive was a ransomware as a service operation active from June 2021. Disrupted · Since 2021 · Ransomware as a service
- Ransomware group RansomHub RansomHub is a ransomware as a service operation, formerly known as Cyclops and Knight, according to a joint advisory (AA24-242A) from the FBI, CISA, MS-ISAC and HHS released on August 29, 2024. Since 2024 · Ransomware as a service
- Ransomware group Rhysida Rhysida is a ransomware operation that CISA, the FBI and the MS-ISAC say has mainly been deployed against education, healthcare, manufacturing, IT and government organizations since May 2023. Active · Since 2023 · Ransomware as a service (profit-sharing with associates)
- Ransomware group SafePay Ransomware Group SafePay is a ransomware group that the FBI, CISA and partners say has been highly active since August 2024. Active · Since 2024 · Data theft and encryption, then a threat to publish the data on a leak site (per advisory AA26-293A)
- Ransomware group The Gentlemen Ransomware Group The Gentlemen is a ransomware-as-a-service operation. Active · Since 2025 · Ransomware as a service with double extortion; affiliates keep 90% of each ransom (per Unit 42, Sophos and Check Point)
Seen in incidents
- Incident Bankshot implant attacks on the Turkish financial sector In March 2018, McAfee Advanced Threat Research reported the Bankshot implant, linked to North Korean Hidden Cobra activity, at five Turkish financial and government-finance organizations. March 2018 · Financial services
- Incident Salt Typhoon telecom intrusions From at least 2021, state-sponsored hackers linked to China broke into the networks of telecom companies in many countries. October 2024 · Telecommunications
How to detect
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Watch for log and history tampering
Look for deleted or overwritten logs, shell histories and audit records, especially after a privilege change or a suspicious process starting.
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Track changes to persistence and system artifacts
Monitor sequences where registry entries, scheduled tasks or similar items are deleted or modified after suspicious activity.
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Cover each platform and service
Check for log clearing on endpoints, containers, virtualization hosts and mail systems, including hidden or removed mail rules and audit mailboxes.
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Data sources MITRE lists
Application Log Content, File Deletion, File Metadata, File Modification, Scheduled Job Modification, Windows Registry Key Modification
How to defend
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Send logs to a remote store
Forward events automatically to a log server or data repository so an attacker cannot easily find and alter them on the local system. Keep the delay short.
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Protect local event files
Use proper permissions and authentication on locally stored event files, and prevent privilege escalation that would let attackers get around them.
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Obfuscate or encrypt event files
Encrypt event files on the system and in transit so that they give an attacker less feedback.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Indicator Removal (T1070)?
Indicator Removal is a Stealth technique where an attacker deletes or changes the traces their activity leaves behind, such as logs, command histories and file details. The aim is to blend in with normal activity and make the intrusion harder to spot.
Why do attackers delete or change logs?
Systems record what happens on them, and those records can show that something unusual took place. Attackers remove selected records that look odd, which can delay detection, lower the quality of alerts and make it harder to rebuild a timeline.
Can deleted logs be recovered after Indicator Removal?
Sometimes. MITRE notes that removed or changed records may still be recoverable through deeper forensic work. This is one reason to forward logs to a remote store, so a copy exists outside the compromised system.
How can I detect Indicator Removal?
Look for deleted or overwritten logs, shell histories and audit records, especially after a privilege change or a suspicious process starting. Also watch for registry entries or scheduled tasks being deleted or modified after suspicious activity, across endpoints, containers, virtualization hosts and mail systems.
How do I defend against Indicator Removal?
Forward events automatically to a log server or data repository so an attacker cannot easily alter them locally, and keep the delay short. Protect local event files with proper permissions and authentication, and prevent privilege escalation that would let attackers get around them.
