Version 1.2 · Public Research Edition · TLP:CLEAR · Brandefense Country Report · Azerbaijan 2026
About this editionPrepared by Odin by Brandefense from Brandefense Blackhole, Ransompedia and Atlas data. Analysis and first drafts by AI agents (Anthropic Claude); findings reviewed by Brandefense analysts before release. Method summary in Appendix A.
Chapter 1
Executive summary
This chapter answers
What happened in 2026, what matters most for Azerbaijani organisations, and what should leaders decide first?
In short
For the 250 leading Azerbaijani organisations we assessed, the main measured exposure is identity, not ransomware: infected-device and credential associations, and credentials listed for sale. The most visible incident was an officially reported DDoS attack on state domains that a group described in press reporting as pro-Iranian claimed. The most consequential documented intrusion was state-linked espionage against energy. Act in this order: confirm you receive your credential listings and validate each one; re-test internet-facing mail and edge servers; then pre-agree DDoS statements and harden account recovery.
This report combines three of Brandefense's own data sources with verified public reporting. Brandefense Blackhole supplied 49,097 posts tagged as concerning Azerbaijan and a further 36,495 distinct posts found by Azerbaijani keywords and organisation names. It also supplied infected-device and credential records for 250 selected organisations, and card material that appeared in clear text in posts. Ransompedia supplied ransomware leak-site listings for Azerbaijan and three regional comparators. Atlas exposure ratings were computed for the 250 organisations. These are separate populations and are never added together.
1. Ransomware is close to absent from the evidence; identity exposure is not. Ransompedia holds one accepted Azerbaijani listing in its entire history (2025) and none dated 1 January-18 November 2026. Georgia has five, Armenia two and Kazakhstan none in the same 2026 window.
By contrast, 190 of the 250 organisations we assessed have infected devices associated with their domains (38,554 in total), and 222 have historical credential records (168,031 records). These counts are all records held on 19 November 2026, whatever their capture date: they are cumulative, not 2026-only. They can involve staff, students or customers. These are association counts: whether any login or session is still usable, and who it belongs to, requires validation. [S1][S3][S6]
2. One market signal dominates the headline scores. Using Atlas's own scoring method, the 250-organisation headline is 48 out of 100 (adjusted; 49 unadjusted), with 80 organisations in grade D or F (81 unadjusted). Every one of those 80 had a credential linked to its domain listed for sale at the time of our check, on credential markets that Brandefense monitors. A current listing weighs very heavily in an Atlas rating (see How to read Atlas ratings, §3.2). A listing tells a defender to look for an active account; it does not say how many accounts or whose. [S4]
3. A hacktivist-claimed DDoS hit state domains; authorities reported disruption at several agencies. On 13 October 313 Team (self-styled Islamic Cyber Resistance in Iraq), a group described in press reporting as pro-Iranian, claimed a DDoS campaign against Azerbaijani government infrastructure. It cited what it described as a ban on the hijab in schools and universities. It claimed 47 IP ranges, more than 2.5 Tbps and 1,825 government websites offline. The State Service for Special Communication and Information Security reported a cyberattack by a foreign hacker group on more than 100 state domains from about 22:00 that evening. It said several agencies' online resources were disrupted and that measures were taken to limit the impact.
On 16 October the National Cybersecurity Agency described DDoS attacks on 13-15 October against government, media, diplomatic-mission and other resources. It said a commercial DDoS service sold on Telegram was used and noted that 313 Team had claimed responsibility. The actor's traffic and outage figures remain unverified claims. [S2][S10][S11][S23]
4. The most consequential documented intrusion was espionage, not crime. Bitdefender attributes, with moderate-to-high confidence, a three-wave intrusion into an Azerbaijani oil and gas company to the China-linked FamousSparrow group. It ran from late December 2025 to late February 2026. The attackers entered through a vulnerable (ProxyNotShell-exploitable) Microsoft Exchange server and returned through it after remediation attempts. An Azerbaijani parliamentary official attributed a February 2025 attack on media outlets to APT29, a group the official described as Russian-linked. Neither appeared in the 2026 leak-site and forum data we searched; the evidence for both came from vendor research and an official statement. [S12][S13]
5. Four notable Azerbaijan-specific offers advertised population datasets. They are an 817,241-row student file (January), a "1 million" citizen file (August), a "state register of individuals" of 4.58 million rows for 2,000 USD (August) and a claim against a state service platform (October). None is independently verified, and some government-themed threads recirculate 2013-era material. Each still matters for fraud and impersonation because identity data does not expire the way passwords do. In November a breach-forum seller also offered 800,000 passenger records attributed to an Azerbaijani transport company; neither the company nor the authorities had confirmed it by our cut-off (Case F in Chapter 4). [S1][S31]
Four decisions for leaders
- Treat current credential listings as an incident trigger, not a statistic. Route every current market listing tied to your domains to the identity team and record a disposition within 5 working days. Escalate to incident response if an active account without multi-factor authentication (MFA) is found. A current listing is the single factor that moves most organisations into Atlas's high band. To act on it, arrange monitoring of credential listings and infected devices for your domains from day 1, through an internal team or a provider (§12.1).
- Patch and isolate internet-facing mail and edge servers as an espionage control. The FamousSparrow case entered through ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082), Exchange flaws disclosed in 2022, and re-entered after remediation. Treat "still exploitable after remediation" as the test, including where a mitigation rule replaced the patch (§7.2).
- Prepare for hacktivist claims that outrun the facts. Agree in advance who confirms service status publicly during a hacktivist campaign, and pre-arrange upstream mitigation for citizen-facing portals. 313 Team published its claims hours before the first official statement we found.
- Join identity, fraud and security operations around citizen data. Population datasets do not reveal a breached system, but they power impersonation, SIM-swap and account-recovery fraud. Test recovery and payment-change processes with synthetic cases.
The year in numbers
Ransompedia accepted ransomware listings for Azerbaijan dated 1 Jan-18 Nov 2026 (1 all-time)
What it is notNot proof that no Azerbaijani organisation was extorted; unlisted and unpublished cases are invisible
Blackhole posts tagged as concerning Azerbaijan, 1 Jan-18 Nov 2026
What it is notNot a count of attacks; 69% fall in February-March and are dominated by one bulk-advertising bot family
posts left after removing bot templates, spam and news mirrors from the tagged set
What it is notNot unique incidents; a check of 30 posts by one reviewer found about 60% to be crime posts genuinely concerning Azerbaijan
state domains targeted on 13-14 October (official statement) / websites the attacker claimed to have taken offline
What it is notDifferent measures; neither independently verified, and not a ratio
leading public and private organisations assessed with Atlas methodology
What it is notNot a random sample; not a national prevalence estimate
infected devices associated with those 250 domains (2,764 classified as employee devices); cumulative, all records held on 19 Nov 2026
What it is notNot 2026-only, not unique people, not verified current infections; devices are not deduplicated across organisations
historical credential records for the same domains (breach databases, stealer logs, combolists); cumulative, regardless of capture date
What it is notNot 2026-only; not unique accounts or active passwords
organisations with a credential listed for sale at the time of the check
What it is notNot a count of accounts or of confirmed breaches
distinct Azerbaijan-associated payment cards seen in clear text in collected dark-web posts (529 attributed to a named Azerbaijani bank, 128 labelled only as Azerbaijani)
What it is notNot a fraud-loss figure; narrow scope (§8.2)
of the 250 organisations enforcing DMARC (164)
What it is notNot a measure of phishing success or delivery security
Report map
Twelve chapters, five reader paths. Start with the row that matches your role; each chapter opens with the question it answers, and chapters 2-12 close with three takeaways.
CISO and security leads
Which exposures are ours, which actors matter, and which controls come first?
SOC and threat intelligence
What did the actors post, how are they connected, and which techniques did espionage use?
Fraud and customer protection
How are Azerbaijani identities, accounts and cards traded, and where do banks see it?
- 01Executive summary
What happened in 2026 and what leaders should decide first
- 02Context
Why Azerbaijan attracts espionage, hacktivism and fraud at once
- 03National exposure
How 250 leading organisations score with the Atlas method
- 04Dark web
What criminals post about Azerbaijan once spam is removed
- 05Sectors
Which sectors are named and what response each needs
- 06Hacktivism
What was claimed, what was confirmed, how to prepare
- 07Threat actors
Who the actors are, how they connect, what reporting says
- 08Fraud economy
How identities and accounts are turned into money
- 09Banking
Where banks' visible exposure sits
- 10Regulation
What changed and what is due by 1 July 2027
- 11Outlook
What to plan for and what would change the plan
- 12Action plan
Who does what in 90 days
Chapter 2
Azerbaijan's digital and geopolitical context
This chapter answers
Why does Azerbaijan attract espionage, hacktivism and fraud at the same time, and which features of the country shape the evidence in the rest of this report?
In short
Three features shape Azerbaijan's threat picture: an energy and transit role that attracts state espionage; politically framed hacktivist claims, some of uncertain origin; and a highly digitised, centralised public-service model that concentrates citizen data. Plan for all three at once: patch edge systems, prepare DDoS statements and protect identity data.
2.1 A connected, mobile-first population
Azerbaijan had about 10.5 million inhabitants and 9.51 million internet users in October 2026, a penetration of 90.8%. It had 12.4 million cellular connections (118% of the population) and 8.44 million social-media user identities [S14]. Telegram is the dominant channel in the criminal data we hold for Azerbaijan, and Russian is its dominant language (Chapter 4). That combination matters. Most Azerbaijan-relevant underground trading happens in Russian-language Telegram communities that also serve Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Azerbaijan often appears as one country among many on a seller's price list, not as a target of choice.
2.2 Energy, transit and the espionage interest
Azerbaijan is an oil and gas exporter, a supplier to Europe through the Southern Gas Corridor and a link in east-west transit routes across the Caspian. Bitdefender noted that the South Caucasus had not previously been linked to the FamousSparrow activity cluster in public reporting; its case rests on one victim [S12]. For state-linked collectors, Azerbaijani energy companies hold commercially and politically valuable information about supply, pricing and partners. That interest is independent of criminal market activity and requires different evidence: incident telemetry and vendor research, not forum posts.
2.3 Politically framed hacktivist claims
In 2026, actors invoking regional and international political issues claimed cyber activity against Azerbaijani targets. In our 2026 data we observed:
- a group described in press reporting as pro-Iranian (313 Team) claiming attacks on government websites, citing what it described as a ban on the hijab in schools and universities;
- pro-Palestinian framing (Python Squad) justifying claims against two transport companies and an entertainment company by reference to Azerbaijan's relations with Israel;
- a self-styled Armenian-nationalist channel ("Armenian code") claiming attacks on Azerbaijani companies, universities, insurers, logistics firms and an industrial control system;
- a pro-India-framed channel ("F ~ INTELLIGENCE") claiming DDoS against a state portal, a bank site and a state security body's site in March-April under the tag #opazarbeijaan, citing what it called Azerbaijan's support for Pakistan;
- Russian-language channels commenting on Azerbaijan-Russia relations, which make up a large share of keyword hits but are not crime.
An Azerbaijani official attributed the February 2025 attack on Azerbaijani media to APT29 at a parliamentary hearing in May 2025, describing it as a Russian-linked group. The official also linked the timing to the closure of the Russian House in Baku [S13]. We report that as an official attribution, not an independently confirmed one.
2.4 Centralised digital government
Azerbaijan runs national e-government, e-ID, e-visa and one-stop public-service platforms. Centralised platforms also concentrate high-value identity data and create single points that attract both data-theft claims and DDoS. Among 2026 underground offers we observed claims naming state service platforms, a state security body and a "state register of individuals" (Chapters 4-5). None is verified, but the targeting pattern follows the architecture.
2.5 A changing national cyber authority
On 2 June 2026, a presidential decree established the National Cybersecurity Agency as a public legal entity [S15]. The decree creates it as the legal successor to the Electronic Security Service, which was subordinate to the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport [S22]. The ministry announced it in the same terms [S16]. Separately, the State Service for Special Communication and Information Security remains the voice on attacks against state infrastructure, as its October statement shows [S10]. Chapter 10 sets out what changed for organisations.
Official figures show continuing pressure on state systems (the counts are cumulative, not a trend). The State Service for Special Communication and Information Security counted 274 cyberattack indicators against state agencies in January-March 2026 [S35] and 518 in January-July [S36]. On 19 November a deputy minister of digital development reported more than 134,000 botnet infections detected, over 2,000 sites with malicious content and more than 300 defacement and DDoS cases in 2026 [S37]. In June the same official reported 160,000 botnet infections prevented in six months [S50]. The two figures use different wording and should not be compared as a trend.
Key takeaways
- 01
Energy and transit make Azerbaijan an espionage target independent of criminal markets.
- 02
Hacktivist claims in 2026 cited religious, regional and foreign-policy themes, from several directions at once.
- 03
Most 2026 data claims against state bodies name bodies that hold citizen data, including central state service platforms.
Chapter 3
National exposure: 250 leading organisations
This chapter answers
How exposed are the country's 250 leading public and private organisations when they are scored the way Brandefense Atlas scores a customer, and what moves an organisation into the high band?
In short
We assessed 250 leading Azerbaijani organisations using Brandefense Atlas exposure ratings. Three in four have infected devices associated with their domains, nine in ten have historical credential records, and almost one in three had a credential listed for sale when we checked. Email and web hygiene is uneven: two thirds enforce DMARC, but we observed DNSSEC delegation (DS) records for only 12 of 250 domains. Triage current listings first, then employee devices.
3.1 Universe card
| Item | Definition |
|---|---|
| Population | 250 organisations: 68 government bodies, 35 banking and finance, 26 retail and holding groups, 23 universities, 18 energy and utilities, 16 media and entertainment, 14 telecom, 14 manufacturing and industry, 11 hospitality and tourism, 10 transport, 8 insurance, 7 healthcare. 136 state-owned, 103 private, 11 foreign or joint |
| Selection | Purposive: state bodies and national portals, licensed banks and payment infrastructure, state-owned enterprises, market leaders. Selected for size or systemic role, not ranked by revenue; no published Azerbaijani top-250 ranking was used |
| Unit | One primary domain per organisation. All 250 resolve in DNS (19 November 2026). For the 155 domains that answered our request, the homepage title matched the organisation. The 95 that did not answer our web checks (mostly government sites) were provisionally assigned by the domain name matching the organisation's official name or acronym; their ownership is not independently confirmed. 13 candidates were dropped because the domain belonged to another party |
| Measurements | Infected devices and employee devices, breach-database, stealer-log and combolist records, dark-web chat and forum mentions, lookalike domains, exposed documents and current credential-market listings, using the same data Atlas uses; plus public DNS, TLS and HTTP header checks |
| Date | Counts read 19 November 2026. Device, credential and listing counts are all records held on that date, regardless of capture date (cumulative, not 2026-only). Mention counts cover 19 November 2025-18 November 2026; lookalike counts cover the last 30 days |
| Not deduplicated | Across sources, across organisations or across people. One person can appear in several sources; one device can hold logins for several organisations |
| Not representative | Results describe this list. They are not national prevalence rates |
3.2 Scores by sector
Atlas rates each organisation from 0 (no risk observed) to 100 from eight signals: infected devices, employee devices, third-party breach records, dark-chat mentions, dark-web mentions, lookalike domains, exposed documents and data sales. A single severe signal can lift a rating sharply. Sector headlines give weight to the most exposed organisations, so a sector with a severe tail is not presented as calm.
How to read Atlas ratings.
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Grade | A (low exposure) to F (high exposure); in this list almost every organisation is either A or D/F |
| Headline | A sector or national figure that gives extra weight to the most exposed organisations, so it sits above the mean |
| Current listing | A credential tied to the domain on sale at the time of the check; it weighs very heavily in a rating |
| Adjusted | Leaves out the lookalike signal where a brand root is too short to assess; a lower bound |
| High band | Grade D or F; score ranges per grade are not published here |
We report two versions. For 94 organisations with very short or hyphenated brand names, lookalike-domain counts pick up unrelated domains. The adjusted rating leaves that signal out for them and flags it, so it is a lower bound. The unadjusted rating keeps it and is an upper bound. The text uses the adjusted rating; the adjusted and unadjusted national headlines differ by one point (48 and 49).
Share of organisations in each sector with the signal. The current listing (coral) is what separates grade D or F from grade A.
Source: Brandefense Atlas method and Blackhole associations for 250 organisations, read 19 November 2026 [S3][S4]. Records are cumulative, not 2026-only.
| Sector | Orgs | Headline (adjusted) | Mean | Grade D or F | Orgs with a current credential listing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Insurance | 8 | 61 | 52.5 | 6 | 6 |
| Media and entertainment | 16 | 55 | 40.1 | 8 | 8 |
| Retail and holdings | 26 | 54 | 38.8 | 14 | 14 |
| Telecom | 14 | 54 | 37.2 | 7 | 7 |
| Banking and finance | 35 | 48 | 26.5 | 11 | 11 |
| Education | 23 | 48 | 26.5 | 7 | 7 |
| Transport and logistics | 10 | 48 | 25.0 | 3 | 3 |
| Government | 68 | 46 | 21.8 | 17 | 17 |
| Energy and utilities | 18 | 45 | 20.4 | 5 | 5 |
| Manufacturing and industry | 14 | 11 | 8.3 | 1 | 1 |
| Hospitality and tourism | 11 | 10 | 9.5 | 1 | 1 |
| Healthcare | 7 | 5 | 3.6 | 0 | 0 |
| All 250 | 250 | 48 | 25.9 | 80 | 80 |
The unadjusted headline is 49 (mean 28.4; 168 A, 1 B, 70 D, 11 F). The adjusted version moves nine organisations from F to D and one from D to A. It lowers the insurance and manufacturing headlines most (by 19 and 6 points); most F-to-D moves are in government (5) and insurance (3). In the adjusted version the 80 high-band organisations are exactly the 80 with a current credential listing.
Reading the table. The grade split is strongly bimodal: organisations are either low (A) or high (D/F), with almost none in between. The reason is that a current listing weighs very heavily (§3.4): in this list, every organisation in grade D or F had one. Sector differences therefore mostly reflect how many organisations in each sector had a current listing on the day of the check, and secondarily how many infected devices and credential records they carry. State-owned organisations average 23.1, private organisations 31.4.
3.3 Devices and credentials
- Employee-classified
- Other (not employee-classified)
Source: Brandefense Atlas method and Blackhole associations for 250 organisations, read 19 November 2026 [S3][S4]. Records are cumulative, not 2026-only.
| Sector | Orgs with infected devices | Devices (employee) | Credential records | Share held by two largest orgs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Banking and finance | 31 of 35 | 11,444 (195) | 15,739 | 32% |
| Government | 49 of 68 | 11,293 (191) | 8,772 | 22% |
| Education | 22 of 23 | 5,050 (1,863) | 81,719 | 48% |
| Telecom | 11 of 14 | 2,927 (82) | 19,310 | 55% |
| Retail and holdings | 19 of 26 | 2,116 (90) | 9,229 | 71% |
| Media and entertainment | 13 of 16 | 2,005 (36) | 2,742 | 35% |
| Energy and utilities | 11 of 18 | 1,603 (67) | 7,940 | 60% |
| Transport and logistics | 10 of 10 | 1,192 (56) | 2,976 | 71% |
| Manufacturing and industry | 9 of 14 | 365 (134) | 16,978 | 93% |
| Insurance | 7 of 8 | 355 (18) | 1,385 | 67% |
| Hospitality and tourism | 4 of 11 | 166 (5) | 349 | 69% |
| Healthcare | 4 of 7 | 38 (27) | 892 | 77% |
| All | 190 of 250 | 38,554 (2,764) | 168,031 | 23% |
Credential records split into 37,737 breach-database records, 52,041 stealer-log lines and 78,253 combolist entries. The infected devices hold 1.75 million captured credentials in total, for all services, not only the organisation's own.
What this means.
- Banking and government carry the device load, mostly outside the employee classification. 11,249 of 11,444 bank-associated devices are not employee-classified in this dataset. Their stealer logs include a login to the bank's site, so they are most plausibly customers' own computers, though ownership is not established. These associations are a fraud and account-hijacking signal and do not by themselves establish an intrusion into the bank. The 195 employee-classified devices are the intrusion-relevant subset; both groups require validation.
- Universities hold the employee-device problem. Education has 1,863 employee-classified devices, two thirds of the national total in our list, and the largest credential count. University staff and students share domains, so "employee" here may include students; the risk is credential reuse into research, finance and government systems that the same people access.
- Concentration varies. In manufacturing, two organisations hold 93% of credential records; in government the two largest hold 22%. A sector total is therefore a poor guide to a typical organisation.
- The median organisation is modest. The median organisation has 11 infected devices and 117 credential records. The heaviest single organisations carry thousands of devices or tens of thousands of credential records.
3.4 Current credential listings: the swing factor
80 of 250 organisations had at least one credential tied to their domain listed on a monitored credential market at the time of the check. Of those 80, 72 also have a listing history, and no organisation has a history without a current listing. A current listing weighs very heavily in an Atlas rating. In this list every organisation in grade D or F had one in the adjusted rating (80 of 81 in the unadjusted rating).
This is a deliberate design choice, and a sensible default for a defender: a current listing is the most direct market signal that a login tied to the domain is on offer. Whether that login still works is exactly what validation must establish. It should still be read precisely. The listing does not say how many accounts, whose accounts, or whether the account is active, protected by multi-factor authentication, or already reset. The decision it supports is "validate the account now", not "declare a breach".
3.5 Lookalike domains, exposed documents and mentions
- Lookalikes: 188 organisations had at least one newly observed lookalike domain in the last 30 days in the unadjusted count. For the 156 organisations with a distinctive brand root, counts are usable for triage. For the other 94 the Atlas lookalike signal could not be assessed reliably (Appendix A.4). Lookalikes are candidates, not confirmed phishing sites.
- Exposed documents: 39 organisations have at least one exposed document that references their domain (102 in total).
- Mentions: 77 organisations were mentioned in dark-chat sources in the last 365 days and 18 in dark-web (onion) sources. News sites dominate the largest counts because Telegram news channels link to them; one news site alone has 95,811 dark-chat mentions. Mention counts measure visibility, not hostility.
3.6 Email and web hygiene
- DMARC enforced (quarantine or reject)
- Not enforced (none, missing or invalid)
Source: Brandefense public DNS, TLS and homepage checks of 250 domains, 19 November 2026 [S5].
Results from our public DNS, TLS and homepage checks [S5]:
| Control | Result (of 250 unless stated) | Reading |
|---|---|---|
| DMARC reject | 92 | Spoofed mail from the domain should be refused |
| DMARC quarantine | 72 | Spoofed mail should go to spam |
| DMARC p=none, missing or invalid | 86 (33 none, 51 missing, 2 invalid) | No enforcement; spoofing the domain is easier |
| SPF ending -all / ~all / ?all / redirect / none | 131 / 58 / 1 / 43 / 17 | 17 domains publish no SPF policy; 43 delegate to another domain's policy by redirect |
| DKIM at a common selector | 169 | Absence at common selectors is not proof of no DKIM |
| DS record observed (DNSSEC delegation) | 12 | No DS record observed for 238 domains; a DS record alone does not prove a valid chain of trust |
| TLS certificate invalid | 13 of 202 checked | Expired, mismatched or untrusted certificates |
| HSTS on homepage | 64 of 155 reachable | Many sites do not force HTTPS for returning visitors |
| Mail provider | 63 Microsoft 365, 11 Google, 15 no MX | The rest run their own or regional mail |
Web checks were unavailable for 95 sites, mostly government sites. Their DNS checks are complete.
Banking leads, hospitality and manufacturing lag. 31 of 35 banking and payment organisations enforce DMARC, as do 55 of 68 government bodies. Universities (8 of 23), hospitality (3 of 11) and manufacturing (5 of 14) enforce least. On the passive hygiene index (Appendix A.5; 0-100, higher is weaker), tourism (58) and manufacturing (56) have the weakest sector headlines and transport (25) and banking (32) the strongest.
3.7 Two homepages serving gambling spam
The primary domains of two industrial organisations on our list serve online-gambling spam on their homepage. That is consistent with either unauthorised changes to a content-management system or a lapsed domain registration taken over by a spam operator. Both are fixable and both damage trust in the organisation's name; we include them because they are the kind of exposure an external scan finds immediately and an internal programme can miss. Both owners should check content-management integrity and domain-registration status.
Key takeaways
- 01
Infected-device and credential associations are widespread in the list; they call for validation, not alarm.
- 02
A current credential listing weighs very heavily in a rating, so it is the first item to triage.
- 03
One in three domains does not enforce DMARC and only 12 of 250 publish DNSSEC delegation.
Chapter 4
What we see on the dark web
This chapter answers
What do criminals actually post about Azerbaijan once bot spam is removed, and which offers matter to defenders?
In short
Most Azerbaijan-tagged underground traffic is bulk advertising in Russian-language Telegram chats. After cleaning, a few thousand posts remain, and the Azerbaijan-specific ones are dominated by bank-account trading, payment cards, citizen data and identity documents. Forums play a small role; leak sites play almost none. Read cleaned counts only, and triage each claim by provenance before comment.
4.1 Universe card
| Item | Definition |
|---|---|
| Source | Brandefense Blackhole: Telegram channels and groups, a set of cybercrime forums, paste sites and Discord, collected continuously |
| Country definition | A country tag ("this post is about, targets or mentions Azerbaijan"), cross-checked with keyword sets in four languages |
| Window | Post time 1 January-18 November 2026 (November partial). Collection time is never used |
| Tagged set | 49,097 posts counted; 49,096 distinct |
| Keyword sets | Country and city terms in four languages plus major organisation names; counts are near-complete, and a lower bound from July (§4.2) |
| Combined corpus | 85,591 distinct posts, of which 84,361 carry the tag or an Azerbaijani term |
| Cleaning | Spam, very short posts, stress-test logs, repeated template posts and news mirrors removed (Appendix A.2) |
| Not established | That a tagged post targets Azerbaijan, that a claim is true, or that two posts concern the same file |
4.2 Platforms, languages and volume
- Raw tagged posts
- Cleaned posts (low to high estimate)
Source: Brandefense Blackhole, posts tagged Azerbaijan, post dates 1 January-18 November 2026, November partial [S1]. Cleaned counts are an upper bound.
| Measure | Value |
|---|---|
| Telegram share of tagged posts | 99.86% (49,026) |
| Forum posts | 60 (plus 144 forum posts matching "Azerbaijan") |
| Paste, Discord, onion sites | 6, 5, 0 |
| Russian / Azerbaijani / English / Turkish | 80.5% / 7.4% / 6.7% / 3.7% of raw posts |
| After cleaning: Russian / English / Azerbaijani | 45% / 27% / 15% |
| Raw posts per month | 19,598 in February and 14,392 in March; 747-3,154 in other months |
- Share of raw tagged posts
- Share after cleaning
Telegram carries 99.86% of tagged posts. Source: Brandefense Blackhole, posts tagged Azerbaijan, post dates 1 January-18 November 2026, November partial [S1]. Cleaned counts are an upper bound.
The February-March spike is not an attack wave. 69% of the year's tagged posts fall in two months and are dominated by one family of bot templates. These are multi-country price lists for "personal bank-account access" posted to hundreds of Russian-language chats. Georgia and Armenia show the same spike. After template removal, volume is 336-1,380 cleaned posts in each complete month (January-October); the partial November window holds 218-224.
Collection appears lower from July onwards. Türkiye's tagged volume, which has no comparable bot spike, falls from 528,914 in May to 107,910 in July. From July every compared country is below its January-May average. We do not read declines from July as threat trends.
4.3 Crime families after cleaning
- Cleaned posts, low estimate
- High estimate
Source: Brandefense Blackhole, posts tagged Azerbaijan, post dates 1 January-18 November 2026, November partial [S1]. Cleaned counts are an upper bound.
| Family | Cleaned posts (low-high) | What it contains |
|---|---|---|
| Bank and payment-account trading | 2,368-2,719 | Offers to buy, rent or sell bank and wallet accounts, often with Azerbaijan as one entry on a multi-country list |
| Carding | 1,424-1,488 | Card-checker outputs, card-shop updates, buyers seeking Azerbaijani cards |
| Data leaks and databases | 1,230-1,292 | Citizen, student and customer databases; call-centre lead lists; lookup bots |
| KYC (know-your-customer) and identity documents | 903-993 | Verification services, document templates, SIM registration |
| Phishing and scams | 677-726 | Scam pages, SMS confirmation services, "traffic" for scams |
| Malware and exploits | 172-175 | Tool sales and exploit discussion, mostly global |
| Access sales | 154-160 | Remote access, panels, "hacked accounts/systems Azerbaijan" requests |
| Stealer logs | 90-92 | Log sales and buyers |
| Combolists | 60-61 | Country-labelled credential lists |
| DDoS and hacktivism (tagged) | 14 | Small within the tag; see Chapter 6 for keyword-based collection |
Families overlap and must not be added. A one-reviewer spot check of 30 cleaned posts found about 60% to be crime posts that genuinely concern Azerbaijan; the rest are multi-country lists, cargo chats and banking questions. Treat cleaned counts as an upper bound.
Prices quoted. In cleaned posts, the median quoted price was 2,500 USD for access offers (few values, wide spread) and 65 USD for KYC and document services. Bank-account offers had a median of 60 USD and carding posts 15 USD per card (Chapter 8). These are asking prices, not completed sales.
4.4 Four notable offers advertise Azerbaijani population data
Four offers stand out because they claim large Azerbaijani population datasets. None was independently verified, and we did not obtain any file.
| Date | Claimed dataset | Claimed fields | Claimed volume | Venue | Post |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 28-30 Jan | Student records | Name, surname, birth date, address | 817,241 rows (30 Jan offer); similar titles without a count on another forum, 28-30 Jan | Two leak forums, one via a leak-monitoring bot | B01 |
| 9 Aug | Citizen records | ID, name, birth year, city, phone | "1 million" | Turkish-language Telegram channel, sale via Signal | B02 |
| 15 Aug | "State register of individuals" | Name, address, birth year | 4,584,191 rows, 2,000 USD | Lead-trading Telegram channel | B03 |
| 29 Oct | "All citizen info" attributed to a breach of a state service platform | "Full PII" | Not stated | Telegram; a separate poster invoking the brand used in the January offer | B04 |
What this tells defenders. A large population file does not reveal which system it came from. The advertised field sets differ. The student file lists name, surname, birth date and address, and the "1 million" file lists ID, name, birth year, city and phone. The "state register" lists name, address and birth year; the state-platform claim lists no fields. Any of them could derive from older sources, aggregation or a new breach; the posts do not settle it.
What they do establish is a market in Azerbaijani identity data that fraud operations can use for impersonation, account recovery and social-engineering scripts. Organisations that verify customers by name, birth date or year, address or phone should assume those fields are not secret.
The four posts as they appeared, redacted:
- Held
- The offer, fields and row count; three earlier relays of similarly titled listings by another persona (28-30 Jan).
- Not established
- File identity across venues, origin, age, any sale.
- Held
- The offer and the claimed fields.
- Not established
- Volume, origin, authenticity.
Note. The field name "fio" is the Russian abbreviation for full name; the poster's English renders it as "full photos", a sign of machine translation.
- Held
- Offer, claimed fields (full name, registered address, birth year), count and price.
- Not established
- Any link to a state register; recency.
- Held
- The claim and the brand association.
- Not established
- Any intrusion at the platform; that the January seller made this post.
Smaller identity and customer-data offers. Beyond the four population-scale offers, the blind audit (Appendix A.8) found narrower offers that point the same way. None was verified, and we obtained no file.
| Date | Observed offer | Our reading |
|---|---|---|
| 9 Jan (re-posted Sep, Nov) | 400,000 "casino player" leads from 2024, with a sample, for 350 USD on a breach forum | Marketing-lead data; if genuine, could support gambling and loan-fraud targeting |
| 18 Jan; resale 11 Feb | A ZIP of 468 Azerbaijani ID-card images on a Telegram fraud channel, later offered on a forum; "1,000+ more" promised in March | If genuine, document images could support KYC fraud (§8.3) |
| Jan-Apr | Lookup results and "query panel" offers returning ID-card series, personal code, address and workplace | The data source behind the lookups is unknown |
| 14 Feb | Records of grade 5-9 pupils attributed to an education provider | Children's data; unverified |
| 21 Feb | 1,465,516 Azerbaijani email "leads", with a sample, on a breach forum | If genuine, could serve as a phishing distribution list; origin unknown |
| 24 Jul | 5,000 Azerbaijani passport records "current as of 12 May 2026" on a Turkish-language channel | Unverified; if genuine, passport data could support travel and KYC fraud |
4.5 Government-themed offers and recirculated material
| Date | Observed offer | Our reading | Post |
|---|---|---|---|
| 19 Feb | A small set of "cloud" credential lines for a state service platform, relayed by a leak-monitor bot from a forum's automated uploader | Consistent with stealer-log lines from users' own devices (an inference; origin not established); no evidence of a portal breach | B05 |
| 6 Mar | Re-posts of 2013-era leaks attributed to a ministry and a state security body, and a 458,000-record health SQL file, on a Turkish-language forum, with dead links | Reposts claiming 2013-era material; do not report as a 2026 breach | B06 |
| 21 Mar | A forum reply asking for a re-upload of a 1.4 GB ministry leak | Same theme; demand for old material | B06 |
| 18 Jul | A database said to come from a state security body offered for sale ("only two buyers"), relayed by a hacktivist-branded channel | Unverified; no sample assessed; the body named makes the claim likely to attract attention | B07 |
| Undated (reported 2026) | A vendor blog reports that a government case-management system was offered for sale [S32] | Single public source; not observed in our data; no seller, price or sample published | None |
| 18 Oct | A 400 GB "Azerbaijan DB" torrent dump advertised on a breach forum, with no description of its contents | Unverified; no source system named; no sample assessed | B22 |
| 17 Nov | The xploitleaks brand writes that it buys "active sessions" from Azerbaijani government entities, with escrow | Demand for access, not evidence of a breach | B21 |
What this tells defenders. Government-themed claims cluster around bodies that hold citizen data or carry symbolic value. One row is a repost that itself dates the material to 2013, and another is a request to re-upload old material. The state-platform credential case is most consistent with user-side malware. The state-security, case-management and 400 GB claims are unverified, and the case-management item rests on a single vendor report that our data does not corroborate.
The request for active government sessions is a demand signal: someone is seeking to buy access, which makes session and token monitoring on government systems more urgent. A government response team should be able to separate these quickly: provenance, age and sample comparison first, public comment second.
- Held
- A relayed title for a small credential file referencing a state service platform login page.
- Not established
- Any portal breach; the lines are consistent with stealer logs from users' devices.
Note. The poster named a state security body by its acronym.
- Held
- The sale claim and the venue.
- Not established
- Any sample, content or origin.
- Held
- A re-posted title the poster dates to 2013, a dead link, and a later request for a re-upload of a "1.4 GB" leak (21 Mar).
- Not established
- Any 2026 incident.
- Held
- A request to buy active sessions in government entities, with escrow.
- Not established
- That any session was sold or any system accessed.
- Held
- A thread titled "Database Azerbaijan DB" advertising a 400 GB torrent.
- Not established
- Contents, source system, age or any sample.
4.6 Case studies
Each case follows the same structure: claim, chronology, what we can establish, alternatives, limits and a proportionate response.
Case A
Similar student-data listings appear across venues
- Claim
- A seller brand offers "Azerbaijan Student Data", 817,241 rows with name, surname, birth date and address, pointing buyers to its Telegram shop.
- Chronology
- A leak-monitoring bot relayed listings titled "Azerbaijan student database" and "Azerbaijan citizen data" from one leak forum on 28, 29 and 30 January, posted by a persona we record as menpolisem. On 30 January the seller brand xploitleaks posted the 817,241-row offer on a second forum.
- What we can establish
- That matching-themed listings appeared on two venues within three days, under two different names. The posts do not establish that the files are identical, that either poster obtained the data first, or that any sale took place.
- Alternatives
- One seller using two names; one reseller copying another's listing; two unrelated datasets with similar titles.
- Limits
- No sample was assessed. Age is unknown.
- Response
- Education authorities and universities should check whether the claimed fields match any internal export and review recent bulk-export logs. Regardless of origin, apply the identity-verification advice in §4.4.
Case B
A separate poster invokes the same brand for a government claim
- Claim
- On 29 October a Telegram poster wrote that a state service platform had been "breached by xploitleaks", offering "all citizen info" for a price on request.
- What we can establish
- That a Telegram poster attributed a much larger government claim to the brand that advertised student data in January. This does not establish that the January seller made the October claim; brand reuse supports at most a persona association, not a common operator or a real breach.
- Alternatives
- Promotional exaggeration; relabelled older data; a genuine incident.
- Response
- For the platform operator, an inexpensive first step is to compare any sample with known export schemas and with the January student file. For banks and telecoms, the claim is a reason to rehearse customer-impersonation scenarios, not to reset credentials.
Case C
A "state register" priced like a lead list
- Claim
- A lead-trading channel advertised a "State Register of Individuals of the Republic of Azerbaijan, current cross-section 2026" with 4,584,191 rows of name, address and birth year for 2,000 USD.
- What we can establish
- The offer, the fields, the price and the venue. The venue mainly trades marketing and call-centre leads.
- Reading
- One possibility is an aggregated or older dataset rebranded as a national register; price and venue do not establish the file's origin, and a fresh exfiltration cannot be excluded. Its fields overlap with, but are not identical to, those of the student file (Case A).
- Response
- As for Case A. Call-centre fraud against bank and telecom customers is the most plausible use.
Case D
An infostealer demand signal
- Claim
- On 4 August a buyer in a Russian-language "drop" services chat posted: "BUYING INFOSTEALER BOTNETS FOR AZERBAIJAN AND CAUCASUS REGION".
- What we can establish
- Demand for infected-device access with Azerbaijani targeting, expressed in a venue that also trades bank accounts.
- Why it matters
- It connects the device counts in Chapter 3 with a buyer who wants them. Infostealer logs are the raw material for both account hijacking and corporate intrusion.
- Response
- Treat employee-device associations as the priority subset of the 38,554 devices; validate active sessions and tokens, not just passwords.
Case E
A gambling-related site in an automated dump bot
- Claim
- On 20 October a "dump" bot reported 130 lines extracted from the domain of a gambling-related site.
- What we can establish
- That the bot announced it. Automated dump bots often run SQL-injection tooling against public sites and publish small extracts to advertise paid services.
- Response
- For any organisation named by such a bot, the first step is a web-application log review for injection attempts on the announced date, not a breach announcement.
- Held
- Demand for infected-device access with regional targeting.
- Not established
- Whether a sale took place.
- Held
- The bot's announcement.
- Not established
- What the lines contain.
Case F
Passenger data attributed to an Azerbaijani transport company offered for sale
- Claim
- On 11 November a seller on a breach forum offered "800K Passengers' Data" and information on 10,000 passengers with upcoming trips, attributed to an Azerbaijani transport company, for 2,000 USD with samples.
- What we can establish
- The offer, the claimed fields (names, document and contact details, customer account data, and trip and route details), the price and the advertised samples. A public monitoring account reportedly flagged it the same day as alleged [S31]. Neither the company nor the authorities had confirmed a breach by our cut-off, and we did not obtain the samples. Our exposure data for the transport sector (Chapter 3) is a separate signal; it neither confirms nor rules out this sale.
- Alternatives
- Recycled or aggregated older data; data taken from a third-party booking, travel-agency or partner system rather than the company; a genuine compromise of a reservation system.
- Response
- If the offered data is genuine, expect phishing and passenger impersonation that quote real bookings, because upcoming-trip data would make them credible. Monitor customer accounts for hijacking, and review partner, agency and booking-system access and API credentials. Prepare a customer notice in case a sample is verified.
Note. The thread title names the company and its domain; both are redacted here.
- Held
- The offer, the claimed fields, the price and advertised samples; a public monitor reportedly flagged it as alleged.
- Not established
- Any sample, the source system, or a breach of the company's own systems.
4.7 What the forums add
Forums contributed only 60 tagged posts in the year, but they carry the most specific claims (Case A and the re-posts of government-themed material). Most forum hits are global phone-number and crypto-lead lists naming Azerbaijan among 100 or more countries. Forum buyers also posted requests. In August a forum user offered "a high price" for a ready-made "lookup" solution covering Azerbaijan and other former Soviet states. In March a forum user living in Azerbaijan asked others for Azerbaijani data shared in the past. Demand for Azerbaijani lookup and identity data is itself a finding.
Key takeaways
- 01
Raw volume is dominated by bot templates; read only cleaned counts, and treat them as an upper bound.
- 02
Four population-data offers matter for fraud whatever their origin (§4.4).
- 03
Government-themed claims mix 2013-era reposts, user-side stealer lines and unverified sales; triage provenance before comment.
Chapter 5
Targeting examples by sector
This chapter answers
Which Azerbaijani sectors are named in criminal and political posts, and what kind of response does each one need?
In short
The posts below show how criminal and political actors talk about Azerbaijani organisations. Most are offers of access, accounts or data with Azerbaijan as one market among several; a minority name a specific organisation. Post examples are claims; rows also cite separately attributed official reports (§8.5). Verify each claim with the named operator before escalating, and start with the sector's First response.
Victims are described by role under the policy in Appendix A.9. Examples are drawn from the cleaned corpus and the keyword sets; official reports are marked with §8.5.
Government
DDoS claimdata claimstealer linesPII exposurephishing
Example of observed activity (anonymised)
313 Team target lists naming national portals and ministries (Oct); claims against a state security body (Jul) and a state service platform (Oct); #opazarbeijaan DDoS claims (Mar-Apr); a buyer seeking government sessions (Nov); a vendor-reported sale of a government case-management system; state-platform credential lines (Feb); e-visa applicant lists from a visa agent (Apr-Aug); mass phishing of state mailboxes (Government CERT, Apr; §8.5)
What it means
Availability and citizen-data integrity are the two exposures, and staff mailboxes are a phishing target; the e-visa lists are a process risk in third-party agents, not a portal breach
First responsePre-agree status statements; monitor sessions and tokens on government systems
Banking
Cardingcash-outcredentialaccount tradingphishingbusiness-account intrusion
Example of observed activity (anonymised)
Card-checker outputs printing, in clear text, cards from 17 Azerbaijani issuers; "I will dump Georgian/Azerbaijani POS terminals" (Jun); cash-out offers listing Azerbaijan at a 30% cut (Aug); a combolist line containing a bank employee's mailbox (Oct); Russian-language chats on opening accounts at an Azerbaijani bank remotely; police-reported loan-page phishing and business-account intrusion (Feb-Aug; §8.5)
What it means
Posts are dominated by fraud tooling; the intrusion-relevant exposure is in the device data (167 employee-classified devices at issuers, Chapter 9) plus one employee mailbox in a combolist
First responseTriage current listings, then employee devices; alert on BIN checker declines
Energy and industry
APT intrusionDDoS claimOT claim
Example of observed activity (anonymised)
Espionage intrusion into an oil and gas company (vendor research, Dec 2025-Feb 2026); a mining company and a defence-sector company on an "Armenian code" DDoS list (Apr); water-reservoir and water-supply control claims (Feb) and a heating-control claim (Mar) in Baku
What it means
The material risk is espionage via edge servers; DDoS and OT (operational technology) claims need verification before escalation
First responseRe-test Exchange and edge servers; verify OT claims with the operator
Telecom
SIM fraud serviceslead dataDDoS testing
Example of observed activity (anonymised)
SIM registration, "number rental" and SMS-reception services listing Azerbaijani numbers; phone-number lead lists naming Azerbaijan; stresser-bot test logs against hosting ranges (Mar)
What it means
SIM-swap and number-rental services connect directly to bank account-recovery fraud
First responseTighten SIM-swap and number-port checks
Transport
Data sale claimDDoS claims
Example of observed activity (anonymised)
Passenger data attributed to an Azerbaijani transport company offered for sale (Nov, unverified; Case F); Armenian code DDoS claims against a transport operator, an airport site and a port (Feb); Python Squad claims against two transport companies (Mar), with availability-check links; DDoS claims against an airport site (DieNet relay, Mar; Armenian code, Apr), three logistics firms and a transport company (Armenian code, Apr)
What it means
Passenger and booking data is the material exposure; public-facing booking systems are the likely DDoS target
First responseWatch customer accounts and partner systems; review partner and booking-system credentials
Education
Data claimscredential exposure
Example of observed activity (anonymised)
817,241-row student database offer (Jan); Armenian code DDoS claims against several universities (Feb); "sensitive files of an Azerbaijani institute" leaked by a forum persona (Feb); highest employee-device count of any sector (Chapter 3)
What it means
Universities are a credential reservoir for people who also work in government and industry
First responseEnforce MFA and reset staff passwords found in stealer logs
Healthcare
Recirculated data
Example of observed activity (anonymised)
2013-era "458K health data" SQL re-posted (Mar)
What it means
Old data, but health identifiers do not expire
First responseCompare the 2013 schema with current systems before any notice
Insurance
Data sale claimDDoS claim
Example of observed activity (anonymised)
A Telegram seller advertising a "final database" it says leaked from an insurer in 2025 (Mar); whether it relates to the 2025 extortion listing is unknown; Armenian code DDoS list against three insurers (Mar)
What it means
If the offer is genuine, leaked insurance, medical and vehicle records keep circulating; plan for long-tail fraud
First responseAdd fraud checks on policy and claims changes
Retail and media (merged)
DDoSdefacement
Example of observed activity (anonymised)
DieNet DDoS claims against a news site, a payment-terminal provider and a travel company (Mar); 22 .az sites reported defaced in a day in a relayed notice attributed to the National Cybersecurity Agency (Sep); an entertainment company claimed by Python Squad (Mar)
What it means
Low-cost attacks on smaller web estates; reputational more than operational
First responsePatch the CMS and monitor for defacement
Reading across sectors. Organisation-specific claims fall into two groups. Politically motivated actors name symbolic targets (state portals, transport, defence and mining companies) and claim disruption. Financially motivated actors rarely name an organisation; they name Azerbaijan as a market for accounts, cards, SIMs and data. The second group is less visible and may create cumulative fraud risk; this report does not measure harm.
Key takeaways
- 01
Political actors name symbolic targets and claim disruption; criminal sellers name Azerbaijan as a market.
- 02
For banks and telecoms, fraud tooling dominates the posts; intrusion-relevant exposure sits in employee-device data (Chapter 9).
- 03
Energy faces espionage through edge systems; DDoS and OT claims there need verification first.
Chapter 6
Hacktivism and DDoS
This chapter answers
Who claimed attacks on Azerbaijan in 2026, what did the authorities confirm, and how should an organisation prepare for the next claim?
In short
Hacktivist claims against Azerbaijan in 2026 came from four directions: pro-Iranian, pro-Palestinian, self-styled Armenian-nationalist and, in March-April, a channel with pro-India framing; mostly DDoS and defacement. The most prominent was 313 Team's claimed campaign of 13-16 October, which coincided with an officially reported cyberattack on more than 100 state domains. Pre-agree who confirms service status, and contract upstream mitigation before the next claim.
6.1 Timeline
- 2 Feb 2026Armenian code
Claims tampering with a Baku water-reservoir control panel (2 Feb) and a water-supply SCADA system (5 Feb); unverified
- 10 Feb 2026Armenian code
DDoS claims against a transport operator, an airport site and a port
- 15 Feb 2026Seniman1337
Defacement of one .az site (defacement-feed relay)
- 18 Feb 2026Armenian code
DDoS claims against a state portal, a leasing firm and an investment firm
- 19 Feb 2026Armenian code
DDoS list against several universities
- 5 Mar 2026Armenian code
Claims a Baku heating-control system forced into failure
- 7 Mar 2026DieNet
Relayed claims of DDoS on a news site, a payment-terminal provider, a travel company and an airport site, with probe results
- 9 Mar 2026Armenian code
DDoS list against three insurers
- 17 Mar 2026Python Squad / Team Python
Two transport companies and an entertainment company claimed with check links
- 29 Mar 2026F ~ INTELLIGENCE
#opazarbeijaan DDoS claims from 29 Mar to 5 Apr: a capital-markets firm, a state portal, a bank investment site and a state security body's site
- 2 Apr 2026Armenian code
DDoS list against three logistics firms and a transport company
- 8 Apr 2026Armenian code
DDoS claims against an airport site, a hotel-booking service and a state agency's site
- 21 Apr 2026Armenian code
DDoS list: a mining company, a holding group, a travel agency and a defence-sector company
- 30 Apr 2026Armenian code
DDoS claims against three commercial banks (30 Apr-1 May) and a statement against Azerbaijan's economy and banks
- 25 Sep 2026Local security channel
Relays an agency monitoring notice: 22 .az websites defaced in one day, 19 on one hosting network, linked to the persona Xscyth3
- 13 Oct 2026313 Team
Announces action, citing what it called a hijab ban in schools; claims 47 IP ranges, >2.5 Tbps, 1,825 sites offline
- 14 Oct 2026State Service for Special Communication and Information Security
More than 100 state domains targeted from about 22:00 on 13 Oct; measures taken to limit impact
- 14 Oct 2026313 Team
Extends by 24 hours; 54 IP ranges, ">1,800 sites"
- 16 Oct 2026313 Team
Further 48-hour extension ("four consecutive days")
- 16 Oct 2026National Cybersecurity Agency
DDoS on 13-15 Oct against government, media and diplomatic-mission resources; commercial service Litterbox (Catbox) identified
Dark markers are actor posts, outlined markers are relays by third parties, coral markers are official statements. Dates are post dates in UTC; Baku time is UTC+4, so a post late on 13 October UTC falls on 14 October in Baku. Times and full wording are in the evidence cards and §6.2.
6.2 The 313 Team campaign: claim against measurement
Claim. The group announced at 21:41 Baku time on 13 October that it would "completely destroy" Azerbaijan's government digital infrastructure. It cited what it described as a ban on the hijab in schools and universities, and the size of the Shia community. Azernews noted that the claim of a general ban had not been substantiated [S49]. Within three hours it claimed 47 IP ranges attacked at more than 2.5 Tbps and 1,825 government websites offline, and published availability-check links for national portals and ministries. It extended the campaign twice. OC Media described the group as pro-Iranian and believed to operate from Iraq [S20].
- Held
- The announcement and its stated motive (17:41 UTC, 21:41 Baku time).
- Not established
- Any capability; this post is intent only.
- Held
- The claimed scale and the two services the group credits.
- Not established
- Traffic volume and outage count; compare the official statements in §6.2.
Official account. The State Service for Special Communication and Information Security said that malicious activity against more than 100 government domains began at about 22:00 on 13 October and disrupted the online resources of several agencies. It said technical measures were taken to limit the impact. It described the attacker as a foreign hacker group and did not name a country [S10][S11]. Local media initially named several ministries and a state agency as affected; the official statement did not confirm a list. A theory linking the attack to Türkiye circulated on social media; JAMnews found no evidence establishing it [S17].
What we can establish. The timing of the claim and the official start time match within minutes. The official statement counts domains targeted (more than 100) and reports disruption to several agencies; the actor counts websites it says were offline (1,825). These are different measures, and neither was independently verified, so we do not compute a ratio. No data theft was claimed or reported in the sources reviewed for this campaign.
| Point | 313 Team's claim | Official account | Press reporting |
|---|---|---|---|
| Start | Announcement at 21:41 Baku time on 13 Oct; attack claim at 00:25 on 14 Oct | Activity from about 22:00 on 13 Oct [S10] | Same timing reported [S20] |
| Scope | 47, then 54 government IP ranges | More than 100 state domains [S10] | Authorities' figure repeated [S20] |
| Effect | 1,825, then ">1,800" sites offline; "complete paralysis" | Disruption to several agencies; measures taken to limit the impact [S10] | Several ministry sites unreachable when reporters checked [S20] |
| Volume | More than 2.5 Tbps | Not stated | Not measured |
| Tooling | Credits Litterbox and a second DDoS-for-hire service | Commercial service Litterbox (Catbox), sold on Telegram [S23] | Not stated |
| Duration | 24 h, then +24 h and +48 h (four days) | Attacks on 13-15 Oct [S23] | Not stated |
| Attribution | Own claim | "Foreign hacker group"; the agency notes the group's claim [S10][S23] | Pro-Iranian, believed to operate from Iraq [S20]; no evidence for a Türkiye theory [S17] |
Later official account. On 16 October the National Cybersecurity Agency said DDoS attacks were carried out on 13-15 October against the information resources of government bodies, media organisations, Azerbaijan's diplomatic missions abroad and other organisations. The agency identified a commercial DDoS service called Litterbox (also known as Catbox), offered through Telegram and paid in cryptocurrency, as the service used.
It said the service can generate traffic over GRE, ICMP, UDP and TCP and route it through bots in selected countries; it did not specify which capabilities were used in these attacks. The agency noted that the hacktivist group 313 Team had taken responsibility; it gave no traffic volumes or outage counts [S23]. Litterbox is one of the two services 313 Team itself credited.
What it means. A DDoS campaign against state and other resources took place, and the authorities said they acted to limit its impact. The method and the commercial tooling are officially described; 313 Team's responsibility is stated as the group's own claim, and its traffic and outage figures remain unverified.
The group's claims were published hours before the first official statement we found. The episode shows that rented DDoS capacity, sold on Telegram for cryptocurrency, was used against state resources; the operator behind the attacks remains officially unresolved beyond the group's own claim. Five days earlier the national cybersecurity body had warned about attacks exploiting outdated database software and default credentials [S17]. JAMnews used the former name, Electronic Security Service; the National Cybersecurity Agency had succeeded it in June (§2.5). No link to the October attack was reported.
- Held
- The extension claim (21:17 UTC).
- Not established
- The claimed "more than 1,800" sites offline.
6.3 Other claims in their own words
The other 2026 claimants posted far less, and none of their claims was confirmed by an operator or an authority. Their profiles, with what public reporting says about each, are in §7.3.
- Held
- The claim, its motive and an availability-check link [removed].
- Not established
- Duration and real effect; an availability-check link can at most record a momentary probe result.
- Held
- The claim, posted in the same minute as the other transport-company and entertainment-company claims (B12).
- Not established
- Any outage beyond the group's own check link.
- Held
- A relayed claim with a probe result for one moment in time; three similar relays the same evening, one naming an airport site.
- Not established
- Sustained outage; which service carried the traffic.
- Held
- The target list and four availability-check links.
- Not established
- Effect on any target.
A fourth direction appeared in March and April. A Telegram channel calling itself "F ~ INTELLIGENCE" posted availability-check links for a capital-markets firm, a state portal, a bank investment site and a state security body's site under the tag #opazarbeijaan. It framed the campaign as retaliation for Azerbaijan's support for Pakistan. We found no public reporting that corroborates these claims or identifies the operators; we record them as claims.
Note. Leetspeak as posted.
- Held
- The claim, the stated motive and an availability-check link.
- Not established
- Any outage beyond a momentary probe; the operators' identity.
Not counted as hacktivism: the 15 November link redirects. The presidential press service said the President's social-media accounts were under cyberattack on 15 November. Links in old posts redirected to third-party videos for several hours. The press service did not state a method or actor [S34]. The same day, old short links on many prominent accounts worldwide redirected in the same way. Bitly said an issue had let malicious actors reuse some old, inactive links [S34]. No official source had linked the two by our cut-off. We do not count the episode as hacktivism because no source we found named an actor. The defensive lesson is to review and replace old short links on official accounts.
6.4 Lessons for defenders
- Pre-agree the public line. A hacktivist's numbers and an authority's numbers rarely measure the same thing. Decide in advance who confirms status, within what time and through which channel.
- Protect portals at the upstream. Volumetric attacks at the claimed scale are absorbed upstream or not at all. Contract mitigation for citizen-facing portals before an event.
- Watch the issues actors cite. In 2026, claimants cited a school dress-code issue, Azerbaijan's foreign relations and regional disputes in their announcements (§6.2-6.3). Treat new references of this kind in actor channels as a planning signal for DDoS readiness.
- Do not over-read OT claims. Verify with the operator and physical readings before escalation; treat a public claim as reconnaissance of interest.
Key takeaways
- 01
The October campaign was real by the authorities' account; the attacker's numbers were not confirmed.
- 02
A commercial DDoS service sold on Telegram was officially identified in the October attacks, and NETSCOUT assessed in 2025 that DieNet likely used rented infrastructure; upstream mitigation is the control either way.
- 03
Smaller claimants post availability-check links, which can at most record a moment of unreachability, not an outage.
Chapter 7
Threat actors
This chapter answers
Who is behind the activity, how are the actors connected, and what does public reporting say about each of them?
In short
Four actor types matter for Azerbaijan. Two intrusions are publicly attributed to state-linked groups: a vendor named one (entry through a vulnerable Exchange server), an official the other (entry route not published). The Freshdesk phishing campaign was not attributed; other reported cases name only a persona, a group or a suspect (§7.3, §7.6, §8.5). Hacktivists claim disruption, and a criminal market trades Azerbaijani identity and payment data. Ransomware groups are the least visible. Patch edge servers first, and verify every hacktivist claim before comment.
Each profile separates observed behaviour, the actor's own claim, what remains unresolved and what it means for organisations. Confidence applies to a specific proposition, not to the actor as a whole.
7.1 How the actors connect
The map links actors only where we hold evidence, and each line says what kind: the actor's own post, a third-party relay, an official statement or public reporting. A line is an association, not proof of a common operator.
- Own post
- Relay
- Official statement
- Public reporting
- Our observation
No evidenced link to other actors
Python Squad / Team PythonF ~ INTELLIGENCE7.2 State-linked espionage
FamousSparrow
overlaps Earth EstriesIn Azerbaijan, Dec 2025 - Feb 2026
- Dec 2025
Web shell on an oil and gas company's Exchange server
- Jan 2026
Second wave: Terndoor attempted via loader
- Feb 2026
Third wave: modified Deed RAT, new C2
Targeted sector
Energy (oil and gas)
Seen in public reporting
- [S12] Bitdefender (13 May 2026): moderate-to-high confidence attribution; the region had not previously been linked to this cluster in public reporting (one victim)
Our assessment
The most consequential documented intrusion of the year. Entry and re-entry through an internet-facing Exchange server still exploitable through ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082).
ConfidenceModerate-to-high (vendor)
The intrusion entered and re-entered through the same Exchange server after remediation attempts. Web-shell activity was first seen on 25 December 2025, and Deed RAT appeared in the first wave. The second wave attempted a Terndoor deployment through a loader, and the third used a modified Deed RAT with new command-and-control infrastructure [S12]. Selected techniques that Bitdefender names are shown below with the ATT&CK tactic labels Bitdefender used.
Techniques named in the vendor research, by tactic
Initial access
T1190Exploit public-facing application (ProxyNotShell on Exchange: CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082)Persistence
T1505.003Web shellT1543.003Windows serviceDefence evasion
T1574.002DLL side-loadingT1562Impair defences (API hooking)Execution
T1059.001PowerShellLateral movement
T1021.001Remote desktopT1021.002SMB / admin sharesImpact (Bitdefender's label)
T1014Rootkit: attempted kernel-driver serviceTechnique IDs and tactics as given in Bitdefender's report of 13 May 2026. As of ATT&CK v20.1 (checked 21 November 2026), T1574.002 redirects to T1574.001, T1562 redirects to T1685 (Disable or Modify Tools, under the Defense Impairment tactic, TA0112) and T1014 sits under the Stealth tactic. [S12]
Patch reference. ProxyNotShell is two Microsoft Exchange Server flaws: CVE-2022-41040 (server-side request forgery) and CVE-2022-41082 (remote code execution) [S51]. NVD lists Exchange Server 2013, 2016 and 2019 as affected and records that CISA lists both as known exploited [S51]. Microsoft's advisories give the security updates that fix them [S52]. Verify that neither can still be exploited, including where a mitigation rule was used instead of the patch. Bitdefender's report publishes indicators for this intrusion [S12]; load them into mail-server and EDR hunts.
Unresolved. The victim's identity, the data taken and whether other Azerbaijani energy firms were affected. Meaning. A 2022 vulnerability on an internet-facing mail server was enough for repeated access by a group Bitdefender links to a state from December 2025 into 2026. For energy, transit and government organisations, the decisive controls are edge-system patch verification, web-shell detection on mail servers and alerting on remote-desktop use with domain-admin credentials from internal hosts. Nothing in this case appeared in the 2026 leak-site and forum data we searched.
APT29
Midnight BlizzardIn Azerbaijan (2025, prior reporting)
- Feb 2025
Attack on Azerbaijani media outlets, attributed in May 2025
Targeted sector
Media platforms
Seen in public reporting
- [S13] Trend News Agency (2 May 2025): a parliamentary commission chair stated that forensic analysis matched the attack to APT29, with two to three years of access
Our assessment
Official attribution, not independently confirmed. Long dwell times favour identity and email telemetry over perimeter alerts.
ConfidenceAs stated by an official
Unresolved. No independent technical report on the case was available to us; we present the attribution as stated by an official, not as independently confirmed. (An earlier Brandefense report dated the attack to February 2024 [S9]; the official statement and contemporaneous reporting date it to February 2025.) Meaning. If the official account is accurate, media organisations face espionage and influence operations with long dwell times, which identity and email-system telemetry detect better than perimeter alerts.
7.3 Hacktivist and DDoS actors
313 Team
Islamic Cyber Resistance in IraqIn Azerbaijan, 2026
Claimed targets
Government portals, ministries and other state institutions
In their words
“we will completely destroy its government digital infrastructure” B10
Seen in public reporting
- [S20] OC Media: claimed the October attack; authorities counted more than 100 state domains
- [S27] Security Affairs: claimed a 24-hour DDoS on a social-media platform in April 2026; the platform confirmed a DDoS attack
- [S26] Graphika: claimed disruption of a global e-commerce platform in April 2026 and used media coverage to bolster credibility
- [S28] Unit 42: described as an active pro-Iranian hacktivist cell, with claims against Kuwaiti government and defence websites
Our assessment
A repeat claimant. Its October claim coincided with an officially reported attack that used a commercial DDoS service; the group's own role and capacity remain unverified, and its figures were not confirmed.
ConfidenceHigh that it claimed the campaign; role and capacity unverified
DieNet
DieNet v2In Azerbaijan, 2026
- 7 Mar
Four Azerbaijani sites, including an airport site, named in automated tracking relays (B14)
Claimed targets
A news site, a payment-terminal provider, a travel company, an airport site
Relay wording
“it may be down for you at the moment” B14
Seen in public reporting
- [S24] NETSCOUT: appeared on Telegram in March 2025; over 60 claims in two months; many appeared to have no impact
- [S24] NETSCOUT: found no owned botnet and assessed that DieNet likely used rented DDoS infrastructure shared with other groups (2025 observations)
- [S25] CIS: many claimed attacks hit minor web pages and likely caused no significant outage
Our assessment
An opportunistic brand whose Azerbaijani claims were one evening of relayed probe results. Treat as noise unless an availability monitor agrees.
ConfidenceClaims observed; impact unverified
Python Squad
Team PythonIn Azerbaijan, 2026
Claimed targets
Transport and entertainment booking sites
In their words
“resulting in a total shutdown of its digital infrastructure” B12
Seen in public reporting
- No reputable public reporting found on this group; its own channel is the only source
Our assessment
A low-profile channel posting in Azerbaijani and English. Claims arrived together with availability-check links, which can at most record a moment of unreachability.
ConfidenceLow; single-source claims
Armenian code
In Azerbaijan, 2026
- 2-5 Feb
Claims tampering with a Baku water-reservoir panel and a water-supply SCADA system
- 10 Feb
DDoS claims: a transport operator, an airport site, a port
- 18 Feb
DDoS claims: a state portal, two finance firms
- 19 Feb
DDoS list against several universities
- 5 Mar
Claims a Baku heating-control system was forced into failure (B13)
- 9 Mar
DDoS list against three insurers
- 2 Apr
DDoS list: three logistics firms, a transport company
- 8 Apr
DDoS: an airport site, hotel booking, a state agency's site
- 21 Apr
DDoS list: a mining company, a holding group, a travel agency, a defence-sector company (B16)
- 30 Apr-1 May
DDoS claims against three banks; "crushing the banks of Turkey and Azerbaijan" (B19)
Claimed targets
Universities, insurers, logistics, airport, transport, tourism, industry, defence, banks, a state portal, water and heating OT
In their words
“Azerbaijan suffers from our cyberattacks on their industry, tourism” B16
Seen in public reporting
- [S29] JAMnews (16 Apr 2026): an Armenian security expert assesses that Armenian Code and its supposed rival Wolves of Turan are run by one team, citing a shared administrator and identical proof links
- [S29] JAMnews: language markers suggest Russian-speaking operators; the expert sees a manufactured "cyber war" ahead of Armenia's June 2026 elections
Our assessment
One published expert analysis assesses that the channel and its supposed rival may be run by one team. Treat the nationalist label as unverified and check each claim, including any OT claim, with the operator.
ConfidenceMedium that the label is unreliable (one expert analysis)
F ~ INTELLIGENCE
#opazarbeijaanIn Azerbaijan, 2026
- 29 Mar
Capital-markets firm site with check link
- 30 Mar
A state portal
- 31 Mar
Bank investment site; claims the site was geo-blocked after 12 hours
- 5 Apr
A state security body's site (B23)
Claimed targets
State portal, a state security body, finance
In their words
“St4tus: D0wn, n0t R3sponding” B23
Seen in public reporting
- No public reporting found that corroborates these claims or names the operators
Our assessment
A short campaign from a direction not seen elsewhere in our 2026 data, framed in terms of India-Pakistan tensions. Check links record at most a moment of unreachability.
ConfidenceClaims observed; impact unverified
- Held
- The claim.
- Not established
- Any of it; no operator confirmation.
- Held
- The statement and two availability-check links, one of them for an Azerbaijani bank.
- Not established
- Any effect on the bank.
The September defacement wave, reported in a relayed notice that attributes it to Xscyth3, is the largest other 2026 hacktivist-style case in our data. A defacement feed also relayed a single defacement by Seniman1337 (15 February). A local channel relayed a monitoring notice attributed to the National Cybersecurity Agency (MKA in Azerbaijani). It reported 22 .az sites defaced in a day, 19 of them on one hosting network; the notice named the persona but no motive. Its recommendations (audits, CMS and plugin updates, password changes, MFA and log review) are general hygiene advice; how the sites were entered is not established (B18).
Note. MKA is the Azerbaijani acronym of the National Cybersecurity Agency (Milli Kibertəhlükəsizlik Agentliyi); we hold only the local channel's relay of the notice. The notice recommended audits, CMS and plugin updates, password changes, MFA and log review.
- Held
- The relayed notice and its recommendations.
- Not established
- The method; the attribution to Xscyth3 is the notice's own.
7.4 Ransomware and extortion
- 2025
- 1
- All time
- 1
Groups in 2026None listed
- 2025
- 4
- All time
- 17
Groups in 2026RansomHouse, Krybit, Thegentlemen, Nightspire, INC Ransom
- 2025
- 0
- All time
- 2
Groups in 2026APT73
- 2025
- 0
- All time
- 2
Groups in 2026None listed
Source: Brandefense Ransompedia accepted listings, all dates, to 18 November 2026 [S6]; ransomware.live as a cross-check [S7].
The single Azerbaijani listing (2025) is an extortion claim against an insurer. On 6 March 2026 a Telegram seller advertised, for 600 Telegram Stars, a "final database" of insurance, medical, vehicle and internal records. It said the data leaked from an insurer in 2025. Whether it relates to the 2025 listing is unknown; we did not obtain the files.
Relay labels we rejected. Two further 2026 claims labelled Azerbaijan appeared only in third-party relays in Blackhole. A DeadLock claim (26 July) names an IT and recruitment firm whose own description places it in the United Kingdom, so the label is doubtful. An INC Ransom relay (22 August) was wrongly labelled Azerbaijan; Ransompedia records the company as Spanish, so it is excluded. A public tracker lists one Azerbaijani victim in 2026 (the same DeadLock claim) and two in 2025 [S6][S7].
What this means. Very few public extortion claims name Azerbaijani organisations. That is a measurement of what extortion groups chose to publish, not proof that no Azerbaijani organisation was attacked; negotiated, unpublished and pre-publication incidents are invisible here. It does suggest what should drive ransomware readiness in Azerbaijan. One driver is the region's group mix (The Gentlemen, INC Ransom, Krybit and others in Georgia, and APT73 in Armenia). The other is the device and credential findings in Chapter 3, the usual entry routes.
7.5 Criminal personas seen in Blackhole
xploitleaks
In Azerbaijan, 2026
Claimed targets
Population and student data
In their words
“Azerbaijan Student Data [...] 817241 Row” B01
Seen in public reporting
- [S30] Dark Web Informer (13 Jan 2026): the same handle claimed a large Iranian chat-platform database, sold exclusively through Telegram; unverified
Our assessment
A regional data-seller brand that markets large population files and, in November, sought paid access to government systems. Brand reuse by another poster shows the name carries value; it does not establish a common operator.
ConfidenceHigh that offers were made; authenticity unverified
Other personas and brands, aliases only; no contacts, links or real identities.
| Persona or brand | Observed role in 2026 | Own claim | Unresolved |
|---|---|---|---|
| xploitleaks | Seller brand; student data (Jan); invoked by a separate poster in a state service platform claim (Oct) | 817,241 rows; "all citizen info" | Whether one operator; data origin |
| menpolisem | Leak-forum poster of student and citizen data titles (Jan) | Data leak | Relationship to xploitleaks |
| Simon111 | Leak-forum poster: "sensitive files" of an Azerbaijani institute (Feb) | Data leak | Content and origin |
| 0cx00iq | Breach-forum seller of a database attributed to a state security body (Jul) | Sale to "two buyers only" | Any verification |
| ComboPoster | Cracking-forum poster of an "Azerbaijan combolist" (Apr) | Combolist | Size, age |
| X FORUMS (bot) | Automated uploader of small credential files, including .az domains | None | Not a person; a distribution bot |
| databreach000 | Breach-forum seller of passenger data attributed to an Azerbaijani transport company (Nov) | 800K passengers, 10K upcoming trips | Origin; any verification (Case F) |
| iq313 | Breach-forum poster of a 400 GB "Azerbaijan DB" torrent (Oct) | Dump | Contents, origin |
| An Azerbaijani-flagged carding channel | 408 distinct Azerbaijan-associated cards in clear text in checker outputs, mostly Jan-Feb | Live cards | Operator; card source |
7.6 Unattributed intrusion campaigns
In June the National Cybersecurity Agency disclosed a large phishing campaign run through the legitimate Freshdesk support platform, Report.az reported [S33]. According to that report, it used the names of transport, oil and gas, trade and business-development organisations. It also used official mailboxes that attackers had earlier gained access to. An adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) page, which relays a real login, captured passwords and one-time MFA codes in real time. The agency did not attribute the campaign. For energy and transport organisations it is the most direct documented route from email to account hijacking.
Key takeaways
- 01
FamousSparrow is the most consequential documented intrusion; the APT29 case rests on an official attribution.
- 02
A commercial DDoS service was officially identified in the October attacks; one expert assesses a nationalist brand as a possible false flag.
- 03
Data-seller brands are reused by others; a brand name is not proof of a common operator or a breach.
Chapter 8
The fraud economy
This chapter answers
How do criminals turn Azerbaijani identities and accounts into money, and what does it cost them?
In short
Bank and payment-account trading is the largest category in our cleaned Blackhole corpus; carding and identity-document offers are also prominent, alongside SIM and cash-out services. Prices are low and Azerbaijan is usually one market among many on Russian-language price lists. Confirm payment instructions out of band, and assume identity data is known to criminals.
8.1 Bank and payment-account trading
Bank-account trading is the largest cleaned crime family (2,368-2,719 posts). Typical posts buy or sell access to bank and wallet accounts, recruit "drops" who open accounts for others, or ask for "drops in Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan". Azerbaijani wallets and payment services appear alongside banks; one post offered to buy a wallet account for 15 AZN. The risk these offers create for banks is not a hack of the bank but mule accounts: accounts opened or rented under real identities that could later carry fraud proceeds. The posts show the offers, not that such accounts were opened or used at any assessed bank.
8.2 Card material in posts: a narrow view
Scope of the card figures
The card figures in this report cover only payment cards that appeared in clear text inside the dark-web posts we collected for this report. Brandefense detects stolen cards through many other methods, which this report does not cover. These figures are not a measure of card theft or fraud loss in Azerbaijan.
Within that narrow scope, 657 distinct Azerbaijan-associated cards appeared in clear text in collected posts: 529 attributed to one of 17 named Azerbaijani banks and the other 128 labelled only as Azerbaijani, without an issuer. Most of them appeared in card-checker output in January and February; one Azerbaijani-flagged channel accounts for 408 of them. We stored no card numbers, expiry dates, security codes or names (Appendix A.6) [S8]. The useful signal for issuers is the checker pattern itself: batches of cards tested with small authorisations against merchant gateways (Chapter 9).
8.3 Identity, KYC and SIM services
KYC and document posts (903-993 cleaned) offer to pass verification at exchanges and casinos, register companies with nominee directors, provide document templates and "verification for money", and recruit people from Azerbaijan for paid verification. Telephony services list Azerbaijani numbers for rent and SMS reception. Combined with the population datasets in §4.4, these services lower the cost of opening accounts in someone else's name.
8.4 Prices in context
| Product (cleaned posts) | Median asking price | Spread |
|---|---|---|
| Card (per card) | 15 USD | 10-40 USD |
| Bank or wallet account | 60 USD | 60-90 USD (often local-currency quotes) |
| KYC or document service | 65 USD | 30-190 USD |
| Access offer | 2,500 USD | Wide, few values |
| "State register" dataset | 2,000 USD | Single offer |
| Small DDoS job | 3-50 AZN (about 2-30 USD) | Few values |
Prices are asking prices from a minority of posts that quote one; they do not measure market value or completed sales. Spread is the middle half of the quoted prices (25th to 75th percentile), so it is not the full range. Some individual quotes fall outside it, such as the 15 AZN (about 9 USD) wallet bid in §8.1. The DDoS quotes come from a local services chat. AZN amounts are converted at about 1.70 AZN per USD.
8.5 What police and cyber authorities reported
The posts show offers. The reports below describe attempted attacks and reported fraud cases; all were published in 2026. The blind audit in Appendix A.8 found them; none appeared in our Blackhole data.
| Date | Reported by | What happened |
|---|---|---|
| Feb-Aug | Interior Ministry cybercrime department | Fake bank and lender "low-interest loan" pages collected card details, including security and one-time codes. In one case the ministry reported about 500 victims and, citing the suspects' initial statements, about 400,000 AZN; the ministry also reported detentions in separate, similar cases in May and August [S40] |
| 6 Feb | Electronic Security Service | The service investigated an attempted attack on government and bank organisations using files hidden with steganography; opening them could download the Remcos remote-access tool [S41] |
| 27 Feb | Electronic Security Service | Emails from a group called Narketing163 imitated known brands and were sent to state and private institutions; part of the malicious code was spread through a .az resource, which the service identified, preventing further spread [S42] |
| 8 Apr | Government CERT (State Service for Special Communication and Information Security) | A mass phishing campaign targeted government email addresses on the AzStateNet network, using fake criminal-investigation notices and demands for payment [S43] |
| 10 Apr | Electronic Security Service | Acting on a tip from Hungary's national cybersecurity centre, the service found malicious files on a local organisation's server that was being used against foreign systems [S44] |
| 22 Jul | Interior Ministry | A suspect used software he had developed to obtain companies' business-banking credentials, then sent login-approval requests that were approved without their source being checked; losses exceeded 100,000 AZN [S45] |
| 10 Aug | State Security Service, as reported by APA | Foreign-run networks sent "urgent" WhatsApp messages to civil servants and company staff from fake accounts carrying their managers' photos, then referred them to fake law-enforcement accounts that instructed transfers to foreign accounts [S46] |
| 18 Aug | National Cybersecurity Agency | Attempts against organisations' Microsoft 365 and other email accounts, from foreign addresses and from VPN or proxy traffic exiting in Azerbaijan [S47] |
| 14 Sep | National Cybersecurity Agency | TikTok accounts advertised fake payment sites offering cheap mobile packages to harvest card details [S48] |
What this tells defenders. The police cases that state amounts describe fake loan pages and stolen credentials combined with unchecked login approvals, not the database sales that dominate dark-web headlines. Manager impersonation over messaging apps, reported without a loss figure, targets the same weak point: payment instructions that are not confirmed through a second channel. The controls are both procedural and technical: out-of-band confirmation of payment instructions, number-matching MFA, protection and monitoring of business-banking credentials, and customer warnings about loan advertising.
Key takeaways
- 01
Account trading, not card theft, is the largest fraud signal in the posts we collected; police cases with amounts describe fake loan pages and unchecked approval prompts.
- 02
Card figures cover only cards seen in clear text in collected posts (§8.2).
- 03
KYC, SIM and population-data services together lower the cost of opening accounts in someone else's name.
Chapter 9
Banking and finance deep dive
This chapter answers
Where does the visible exposure of Azerbaijani banks sit: in the bank, at its staff, or at its customers?
In short
Most visible exposure sits on the customer side: 7,520 non-employee device associations (most plausibly customers' devices), card-checker activity and account-trading chats. The bank- and staff-side signals are current listings at 5 of 22 issuers and 167 employee-classified devices. Three issuers carry most of the card and customer-device signals. Triage each current credential listing first (validate the account and record a disposition). Then validate employee devices, and monitor checker declines on your BIN ranges (a BIN is the issuer's card-number prefix).
This chapter covers the 22 card-issuing banks among the 35 banking-and-finance organisations in Chapter 3; the other 13 are not card-issuing banks. That is why 7,520 non-employee devices here differs from 11,249 there, 167 employee devices from 195, and 5 of the sector's 11 current listings sit at issuers. Aggregates only; individual banks are not named.
issuers with a current credential listing (5 of the sector's 11 current listings; the other 6 sit at organisations that do not issue cards)
Sector headline score (adjusted, all 35 organisations); 11 of 35 in grade D/F, each with a current credential listing
issuers with non-employee device associations (7,520 in total; ownership and current infection unverified)
issuers with employee-classified devices (167 in total)
banking and finance organisations enforcing DMARC
card-issuing banks on our list with cards in clear text in collected posts (529 of the 657 cards name one of them; narrow scope, §8.2)
The top three issuers account for 90% of the attributed cards and 75% of the non-employee device associations.
What it means for banks.
- Current listings come first. 5 of 22 issuers had one on the day of the check; apply Decision 1 (disposition within 5 working days).
- Employee exposure is small but real. 167 employee-classified devices across 19 banks, plus one employee mailbox in a combolist, are the intrusion-relevant subset. After current listings, these deserve priority validation over the much larger non-employee total.
- Non-employee device associations are the larger exposure. 7,520 device associations across 21 of 22 issuers are not employee-classified, and most plausibly they are customers' devices. Ownership, current infection and whether any stored session or password still works are unverified and require validation. Fraud teams should use device and session risk signals at login and at payee changes, not only password checks.
- Card checking is a detectable precursor. Checker bots test cards with small authorisations or card-add attempts on merchant gateways. Issuers can detect clusters of declined low-value attempts from foreign gateways on their BIN ranges, identify the cards involved, check their authorisation and fraud signals, and reissue the cards confirmed at risk under issuer policy.
- Mule accounts are the downstream risk. Account-trading posts target banks with remote onboarding; they do not show that accounts were opened or used at the assessed banks. Onboarding controls should assume that name, birth date and address are known to criminals (§4.4).
Key takeaways
- 01
Current credential listings at 5 of 22 issuers come first, then the 167 employee-classified devices; the 7,520 non-employee ones also need validation.
- 02
Banking and finance organisations enforce DMARC widely (31 of 35).
- 03
Card-checker declines on your BIN ranges are a detectable precursor.
Chapter 10
Regulatory and national response
This chapter answers
What changed in Azerbaijan's cyber governance in 2026, and what must an organisation have in place before the new fines apply?
In short
2026 reshaped Azerbaijan's cyber governance: a National Cybersecurity Agency, new duties in the information law, and new administrative fines effective 1 July 2027. Several rules are still being drafted. Use the applicability table to confirm which regime applies to you, and name your incident reporter now.
| Measure | What we could verify | Status and caution |
|---|---|---|
| National Cybersecurity Agency | Established by presidential decree on 2 June 2026 as a public legal entity on the basis of, and legal successor to, the Electronic Security Service, subordinate to the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport [S15][S22] | Its regulation and control cover cybersecurity and personal-data protection. For critical information infrastructure and state-body infrastructure its role is information exchange only, and its preventive measures exclude them. Its charter adds the national computer incident response centre, threat and incident analysis, a personal-data system register and audits, and measures against online gambling through telecom services and access to foreign betting operators [S22] |
| Cybersecurity amendments to the information law | A new chapter added to the Law on Information, Informatization and Protection of Information (10 August 2026, per legal commentary) [S18] | Specific rules for government bodies and critical public infrastructure were still being prepared in November 2026, according to the Deputy Speaker [S19] |
| Administrative offence Article 371-2 | Law signed 14 July 2026, published 2 September 2026; Article 371-2 enters into force on 1 July 2027 [S21]. Breaches of 371-2.1 (duties listed below) carry 500-1,000 AZN for officials and 1,000-2,000 AZN for legal entities. 371-2.2 covers operating an incident-response centre or SOC without registry entry: 1,000-1,500 and 1,500-2,500 AZN [S21] | Excludes critical information infrastructure; state bodies, including the Central Bank; intelligence and counter-intelligence bodies; supervised financial-market entities; protected or strategic facilities; and incident-response centres and SOCs set up by the designated body or the Central Bank [S21]. Legal commentary [S18] gives only the 371-2.2 fine band |
| Incident notification | Article 371-2.1.2 penalises information-infrastructure subjects that do not report cyber threats, attacks or incidents immediately to the designated body [S21] | Penalty enforceable from 1 July 2027; reporting channel and format to be set by implementing rules |
| Personal data protection | The 2010 law remains in force as far as we could verify; a replacement was in drafting | Adoption not confirmed |
Article 371-2.1 applies to incident-response centres, SOCs and information-infrastructure subjects, including internet and hosting providers and internet-resource owners, that:
- fail to follow the designated body's instructions;
- do not report cyber threats, attacks or incidents immediately;
- miss the designated body's deadlines (24 hours on cybersecurity status or proactive research, five working days for digital-investigation requests);
- lack continuous monitoring and initial response;
- breach cybersecurity requirements for public-importance infrastructure, or obstruct forensic research.
The law does not name the designated body; it refers to a body designated by the relevant executive authority [S21]. Article 371-2.1.5 speaks of infrastructure performing functions of public importance, a different term from the critical information infrastructure excluded in the Note.
Does Article 371-2 apply to you? The table reads the exclusions in the law [S21] for four common cases.
| Organisation | 371-2 applies? | Action now |
|---|---|---|
| Licensed bank, insurer, payment provider or other supervised financial-market entity | Excluded | Follow your financial-market supervisor's requirements (the law describes these entities as supervised but does not name the supervisor); ask counsel about other cyber duties |
| Critical-infrastructure operator | Excluded if designated as critical information infrastructure | Confirm your designation in writing; rules for such infrastructure were still being prepared [S19] |
| State body | Excluded | Track the state-body rules being prepared [S19]; name an incident reporter now |
| Any other organisation, including providers and internet-resource owners (many of the 250) | Applies, unless an exclusion covers you | Name an incident reporter; build monitoring and initial response before 1 July 2027 |
What CISOs should do now. Map whether your organisation is an information-infrastructure subject, an internet-resource owner or a provider under the new chapter, or falls under an exclusion. Name the person who would report an incident to the designated body. Build the monitoring and response capability that 371-2.1 expects before 1 July 2027. Keep a dated record of the controls you implement, because implementing rules are still arriving. This section is not legal advice.
Key takeaways
- 01
A National Cybersecurity Agency now succeeds the Electronic Security Service.
- 02
Fines for failing to report incidents or follow instructions apply from 1 July 2027, with important exclusions.
- 03
Map your status under the new chapter now; implementing rules are still arriving.
Chapter 11
Outlook
This chapter answers
What should Azerbaijani organisations plan for next, and what evidence would change that plan?
In short
Plan for the same evidence types, not a new threat. These are identity exposure that stays invisible until it is used, politically motivated DDoS, and espionage. Espionage reached energy through edge systems (one documented case) and media (one official attribution, entry route not published). We have no comparable time series to say whether any of them is growing. Change the plan when the evidence below changes, not on a calendar.
11.1 Key judgements
| Judgement | Confidence | Basis and limit |
|---|---|---|
| Identity exposure (devices, stealer logs, credential listings) is the most widespread measurable risk to Azerbaijan's leading organisations | High for the 250-organisation list | 190 with devices, 222 with credential records, 80 with current listings; not national prevalence |
| Accepted Azerbaijani leak-site listings are rare relative to neighbours | High for observed listings | 0 accepted Azerbaijani listings in 2026 vs 5 in Georgia; unpublished incidents invisible |
| If actor channels cite new political or religious themes about Azerbaijan, plan for hacktivist DDoS claims | Medium (planning assumption) | Four distinct actor sets in 2026 cited such themes; signal: target lists in actor channels |
| If known edge vulnerabilities remain exploitable, plan for state-linked espionage attempts against energy and media organisations | Medium (planning assumption) | One detailed 2026 vendor case (energy) and one official 2025 attribution (media); small sample; signal: vendor advisories and scanning |
| Plan for further citizen-data offers using government names | Medium (planning assumption) | Four large offers and several re-posts in 2026; authenticity unverified; signal: new offers in monitored channels |
11.2 What would change the assessment
| Current interpretation | Evidence that would change it | Decision affected |
|---|---|---|
| Accepted Azerbaijani leak-site listings were rare in this collection | Accepted leak-site listings naming Azerbaijani organisations, or a disclosed extortion incident | Raise ransomware readiness priority; run the restore test in §12.1 first |
| Citizen-data offers are unverified | A sample matched to a specific system's schema, or an official confirmation | Trigger notification and customer-protection actions for that dataset |
| Hacktivist figures exceed what authorities confirm | Official confirmation of sustained outage of critical services, or of attacker identity beyond the group's claim | Revisit upstream mitigation capacity and service-continuity plans |
| Current listings mean "validate", not "breached" | Validation shows active accounts without MFA among listed credentials | Escalate to incident response and enforce MFA for the affected population |
| Espionage evidence is one vendor case and one official attribution | Further vendor or official reports of Azerbaijani energy, transport or government intrusions | Fund edge-system and identity telemetry ahead of other projects |
11.3 Conditional scenarios
- If actor channels cite new political or religious themes about Azerbaijan, then plan for hacktivist DDoS claims against government and transport portals (a planning assumption, not a measured interval); signal: target lists in actor channels. Decision: activate the pre-agreed communication line and upstream mitigation.
- If a new critical edge vulnerability is disclosed, then plan for state-linked and criminal exploitation attempts at energy, government and telecom organisations; signal: vendor advisories and scanning activity. Decision: patch-and-verify within your patch deadline for internet-facing systems, then hunt for web shells.
- If card-checker activity on your BIN ranges rises and investigation confirms that specific cards are being tested, then plan for card-not-present fraud attempts on those cards; signal: clustered low-value declines from foreign gateways. Decision: investigate the attempts, check authorisation and fraud signals, and reissue the cards confirmed at risk.
Key takeaways
- 01
Plan for evidence types, not a new threat: identity exposure, political DDoS, espionage through edge systems and long-lived access.
- 02
Each judgement has a signal; change the plan when the signal changes.
- 03
No comparable time series exists yet to say whether any of these is growing.
Chapter 12
Action plan
This chapter answers
What should each team do in the next 90 days, and how will the board know it was done?
In short
Start by confirming you receive listing and device alerts, then act on the evidence that is specific to you: current credential listings, employee-device associations and internet-facing edge systems. Then close the phishing, payment-approval, email and web gaps, and rehearse hacktivist and identity-fraud scenarios. The board knows the work is done from each row's completion evidence and the scorecard below; report both by day 90.
12.1 30/60/90 days
This is a sequence, not a waiting period. A current material threat should enter your incident process immediately.
1Days 1-30
Confirm that you receive credential-listing and infected-device alerts for your primary domains; if not, arrange them, and record the listing-validation and employee-device rows as blocked until alerts arrive
- Owner
- CISO and threat intelligence
- Completion evidence
- Alert source named; first alert received
For every current credential listing tied to your domains, validate the account and its MFA status within 5 working days
- Owner
- Identity team
- Completion evidence
- Each listing has a disposition: reset, already remediated, or not ours, with a date
Validate employee-classified device associations; revoke sessions and tokens where active
- Owner
- Identity and endpoint teams
- Completion evidence
- Device list reconciled with asset inventory; revocations logged
Confirm every internet-facing mail and edge server is patched, including CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082 on Exchange
- Owner
- Infrastructure
- Completion evidence
- External re-test passes; web-shell hunt on mail servers completed
Name the spokesperson and channel for service-status statements during DDoS, and the person who reports incidents to the designated body (§10)
- Owner
- Communications, CISO and legal
- Completion evidence
- A one-page playbook naming both, approved
Review Microsoft 365 and other mail sign-ins from foreign addresses and VPN or proxy ranges; block legacy authentication (§8.5)
- Owner
- Messaging and SOC
- Completion evidence
- Sign-in review recorded; legacy authentication disabled
2Days 31-60
Where DMARC is p=none, missing or invalid, inventory senders and stage enforcement
- Owner
- Messaging
- Completion evidence
- Aligned senders; p=quarantine with a rollback route
Contract or test upstream DDoS mitigation for citizen- and customer-facing portals
- Owner
- Infrastructure and procurement
- Completion evidence
- Mitigation test record
Test account-recovery and payee-change processes against an attacker who knows name, birth date and address; warn customers about fake loan and card-payment pages (§8.5)
- Owner
- Fraud and customer operations
- Completion evidence
- Weaknesses recorded and fixed, retest passed; customer warning issued
Monitor session and token anomalies on government systems
- Owner
- SOC
- Completion evidence
- Alert live and tested
Move privileged and remote users first, then others, to phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2 security keys, passkeys or certificate-based sign-in) against the adversary-in-the-middle route (§7.6). Use number matching only as an interim step for push and approval prompts (§8.5); CISA calls it an interim mitigation, weaker than phishing-resistant MFA [S53]. Alert on adversary-in-the-middle-style sign-ins from any lure, and revoke the session when one is suspected
- Owner
- Identity team and SOC
- Completion evidence
- Phishing-resistant coverage recorded per user group; an authorised test AiTM sign-in is detected and its session revoked
Require out-of-band confirmation for payment-instruction and payee changes, including requests that cite a manager (§8.5)
- Owner
- Finance and fraud
- Completion evidence
- Procedure signed off; one simulated request caught
Reject any business-banking login approval you did not initiate, and register approval devices with your bank (§8.5)
- Owner
- Finance and treasury
- Completion evidence
- Procedure signed off
Banks: alert on new approval-device enrolment and unusual approval sources for business customers (§8.5)
- Owner
- Digital-banking fraud team
- Completion evidence
- Alert live and tested
Alert on clustered card-checker declines on your BIN ranges
- Owner
- Fraud
- Completion evidence
- Alert live; first review recorded
Run a timed restore test of one crown-jewel system
- Owner
- Infrastructure
- Completion evidence
- Restore time recorded against the recovery time objective (RTO: the longest outage your business-continuity plan allows)
3Days 61-90
Sign DNS for primary domains where your registrar supports it; fix invalid TLS certificates and add HSTS
- Owner
- Network and web teams
- Completion evidence
- DNSSEC validation succeeds from an external resolver; certificate checks pass
Check homepage content integrity and domain-registration status
- Owner
- Web team
- Completion evidence
- No unauthorised content on primary sites
Run a tabletop combining a hacktivist DDoS with a simultaneous data-leak claim
- Owner
- CISO, communications, legal
- Completion evidence
- Decision log and timings
Report the scorecard against targets (below)
- Owner
- CISO to board
- Completion evidence
- Board paper with remaining gaps and owners
Scorecard targets. These are suggested defaults; set your own where policy differs.
| Measure | Target |
|---|---|
| Current listings with a disposition within 5 working days | 100% by day 90 |
| Employee-classified devices reconciled with the asset inventory | 100% by day 90 |
| Internet-facing mail and edge servers passing an external re-test | 100% by day 90 |
| Primary domains with DMARC at quarantine or reject | 100%, or a dated plan, by day 90 |
| Privileged and remote users on phishing-resistant MFA (number matching does not count) | 100%, or a dated plan, by day 90 |
| Payee and payment-instruction changes confirmed out of band | 100% by day 90 |
| Restore test within RTO | Passed, or a dated fix, by day 90 |
| Credential-listing and infected-device monitoring for primary domains, internal or through a provider | In place by day 30 |
12.2 By role
| Role | First decision |
|---|---|
| Board | Ask for the current-listing and employee-device numbers for your organisation and for the date by which each is validated, and confirm the monitoring that produces them |
| CISO | Put listing and device monitoring in place first, then prioritise edge-system exploitability checks and identity validation |
| SOC | Add detections for web shells on mail servers, RDP from internal hosts with domain-admin credentials, AiTM sign-in patterns (for example, a sign-in from an unexpected hosting network right after a legitimate MFA prompt, then the same session reused from a new IP address or device) and mass token use from new devices |
| Fraud | Use device and session risk at login and payee changes; monitor clustered card-checker declines on your BINs; warn customers about fake loan and card-payment pages (§8.5) |
| Communications | Prepare status statements for DDoS and for unverified leak claims, separating claim, verified fact and action |
Key takeaways
- 01
Confirm monitoring, then validate current listings and employee devices in the first 30 days.
- 02
Stage DMARC enforcement, start phishing-resistant MFA for privileged and remote users and lock down payment changes by day 60; report the scorecard, including DMARC and MFA, by day 90.
- 03
Rehearse a combined hacktivist and data-leak scenario; DNS signing and TLS fixes follow by day 90.
12.3 How Brandefense can help
Brandefense combines Cyber Threat Intelligence, Digital Risk Protection and External Attack Surface Management. The analysis in this report used the same data and scoring that the platform applies to monitored organisations: infected-device and credential associations, current credential-market listings, lookalike domains, exposed documents and dark-web mentions. It does not promise that every claim can be verified or that a historical record remains usable.
Bring your domains, brands and security priorities to a 30-45 minute demo with Sales and Presales. The team can show how platform monitoring relates external signals to the assets you manage. A Brandefense team member or a partner in your region will follow up.
Appendix A. Method
A.1 Window, sources and priority
The research window is 1 January-18 November 2026 by the date a post was published, not the date it was collected. Own data comes first: Brandefense Blackhole (dark-web and messaging posts, infected-device and credential associations, card material in posts), Ransompedia (ransomware leak-site listings) and Brandefense Atlas exposure ratings. External sources give context and are cited only after the supporting passage was read. Data were extracted on 19 November 2026. Sources S1-S6 and S8 are Brandefense's own data and have no public address; every external source in Appendix C carries a link and the date we opened it.
A.2 Blackhole posts
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Posts with the Azerbaijan country tag | 49,097, all retrieved |
| Keyword sets | Country, city and organisation terms in Azerbaijani, Russian, English and Turkish spellings |
| Keyword counts | Near-complete; a lower bound from July |
| Posts after cleaning | 6,172-6,901, depending on how strictly repeated templates are removed |
Cleaning removed spam, very short posts, automated stress-test logs, repeated template posts and news mirrors. A manual check of 30 random cleaned posts found about 60% relevant, so cleaned counts are still an upper bound for criminal activity.
Two collection limits shape every trend in this report. Post categorisation changed mid-year, so we do not compare categories across the year. Collection appears lower from July onwards: Türkiye's tagged volume, which has no comparable bot spike, falls from 528,914 in May to 107,910 in July. From July every compared country is below its January-May average, so we do not read declines from July as threat trends.
A.3 The 250 organisations
Selection, verification and limits are in §3.1. For each primary domain we read the exposure signals that Atlas uses for its ratings. They are infected devices, employee devices, credential records, dark-chat and dark-web mentions, new lookalike domains, documents that reference the domain, and current and past credential-market listings. Data were read on 19 November 2026.
A.4 Atlas ratings
Each organisation received an Atlas exposure rating from these signals, and sector ratings give extra weight to the most exposed organisations. A current credential-market listing on its own raises a rating sharply, which explains most of the split between grades. Treat such a listing as a reason to validate accounts, not as proof of a breach.
For 94 organisations with very short or hyphenated brand names, lookalike-domain counts return unrelated domains. We show their ratings without the lookalike signal and flag them as lower bounds. The text uses these adjusted ratings; the unadjusted ratings are retained. The chart data also hold a separate 2026 lookalike measure, assessed for 150 organisations; it is not the Atlas 30-day lookalike signal (156 assessable).
A.5 DNS, TLS and web checks
We made public DNS queries for mail, SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DNSSEC and CAA records, plus a TLS and homepage check per domain. Missing, invalid and monitoring-only (p=none) DMARC policies count as no enforcement. No scanning went beyond these passive checks.
The passive hygiene index is an Odin analytical composite of these email, DNS, TLS and header checks, on a scale of 0-100. A higher value means weaker hygiene; it is a model, not an Atlas rating.
A.6 Card material in posts
Scope: only payment cards that appeared in clear text in the dark-web posts collected for this report. Brandefense detects stolen cards through many other methods, which are outside this report. These figures do not measure card theft or fraud loss.
We stored no card numbers, expiry dates, security codes or names; only issuer-level counts were kept. Generator output was excluded.
A.7 Ransomware
We used Ransompedia accepted listings for Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia and Kazakhstan, all dates, dated by publication. Rejected and duplicate listings are excluded. A public tracker and relayed Blackhole posts are used only as cross-checks.
A.8 Incident coverage
Before release we ran a per-organisation incident sweep. For all 250 organisations we searched the full Blackhole corpus (posts 1 January-18 November 2026) for their domains, names, short names and Azerbaijani and Russian aliases. We read every relevant forum or market hit and every post describing a specific data-leak, access or exploit event.
We also searched public reporting for the priority organisations and the country in English, Azerbaijani, Russian and Turkish, covering national press, CERT notices, vendor research and public monitoring accounts, on 20 November 2026. Twenty-three entries were reviewed. Azerbaijan incidents in the window are reflected in Chapters 2 and 4-8. Most remaining entries concerned other countries or were false matches. One unverified file listing on a public tracker could not be tied to any source and remains open, and one entry is official statistics used in Chapter 2.
Blind audit (20 November 2026). After the sweep we ran an independent "what did we miss" check. Two auditors worked without access to this report. One read the Blackhole corpus, including a fresh pull for 18-20 November, together with Ransompedia and Atlas exposure data. The other searched only open sources in English, Azerbaijani, Russian and Turkish. Of the 14 high-materiality items they listed, 8 were already covered; of 30 medium items, 8 were covered and 5 partly covered.
The following missing items were added: officially reported fraud and phishing cases (§8.5), narrower identity offers (§4.4), and further hacktivist claims (§6.1). Four items were withheld because they rest on official pages we could not retrieve. They are a card-phishing campaign using a national payment brand, a phishing-kit attempt against a holding, a database-server intrusion warning and postal-brand SMS phishing. Item-level counts are kept in an internal audit register. One ransomware-feed entry labelled Azerbaijan proved to concern a Spanish company. The 18-20 November pull added no new incident.
Remaining coverage limits. Our view is still partial:
- Tor ransomware leak sites are covered only through Ransompedia.
- Closed and invite-only forums, private Telegram groups and sales arranged in direct messages are outside our collection.
- Posts deleted before collection are missing.
- Machine translation can miss Azerbaijani slang.
- Some official websites could not be retrieved for checking.
- Incidents that organisations handle without disclosure stay invisible.
That an incident is absent from this report does not mean it did not happen.
A.9 Confidence and boundaries
High confidence applies to a reproducible measurement, not to a criminal's underlying assertion. Medium indicates an interpretation with a clear supporting line and stated limits. "Unverified" means not independently established; it is neither proof of fabrication nor proof of a breach. Victim organisations are described by role; a state body is named only where an official statement confirms the incident. Actor aliases are printed; links, contacts, indicators and personal data are withheld. Full provenance is held in an internal evidence register.
Appendix B. Evidence register
Every post quoted in this report appears as a redacted post card in the chapter shown. Excerpts are short; omissions are marked [...]; identifiers, contacts, links and victim organisations are replaced with labels in brackets, under the policy in A.9. Translations are ours unless the post carried the actor's own English. Posting dates are not intrusion dates. Post identifiers, links and full text are held in an internal evidence register.
| Card | Posted | Venue | Alias as shown | Language | Shown in |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| B01 | 2026-01-30 | Leak forum | xploitleaks | English | §4.4 |
| B02 | 2026-08-09 | Telegram channel | X Ticaret | Turkish | §4.4 |
| B03 | 2026-08-15 | Lead-trading Telegram channel | Lead-trading poster | English, apparently machine-translated from Russian | §4.4 |
| B04 | 2026-10-29 | Telegram group | Poster invoking xploitleaks | English | §4.4 |
| B05 | 2026-02-19 | Leak-monitor bot relaying a forum uploader | X FORUMS (bot) | English | §4.5 |
| B06 | 2026-03-06 | Turkish-language forum | arcturus (quoted) | Turkish | §4.5 |
| B07 | 2026-07-18 | Hacktivist-branded channel relaying a breach forum | 0cx00iq (relayed) | English | §4.5 |
| B08 | 2026-08-04 | Russian-language drop-services chat | Anonymous buyer | English | §4.6 |
| B09 | 2026-10-20 | Automated dump bot | Dump bot | English | §4.6 |
| B10 | 2026-10-13 | Actor channel | 313 Team | Arabic, with the group's own English | §6.2 |
| B11 | 2026-10-13 | Actor channel | 313 Team | Arabic, with the group's own English | §6.2 |
| B12 | 2026-03-17 | Actor channel | Python Squad | Azerbaijani, with the group's own English | §6.3 |
| B13 | 2026-03-05 | Actor channel | Armenian code | English, as posted | §7.3 |
| B14 | 2026-03-07 | Relay channel of an automated tracking bot | DieNet (relayed) | English | §6.3 |
| B15 | 2026-03-17 | Actor channel | Team Python | English and Azerbaijani, as posted | §6.3 |
| B16 | 2026-04-21 | Actor channel | Armenian code | English, as posted | §6.3 |
| B17 | 2026-10-14 | Actor channel | 313 Team | Arabic, with the group's own English | §6.2 |
| B18 | 2026-09-25 | Local relay of a notice attributed to the National Cybersecurity Agency | Local security channel | Azerbaijani | §7.3 |
| B19 | 2026-05-01 | Actor channel | Armenian code | English, as posted | §7.3 |
| B20 | 2026-11-11 | Breach forum | databreach000 | English | §4.6 |
| B21 | 2026-11-17 | Breach forum | xploitleaks | English | §4.5 |
| B22 | 2026-10-18 | Breach forum | iq313 | English | §4.5 |
| B23 | 2026-04-05 | Actor channel | F ~ INTELLIGENCE | English, as posted | §6.3 |
Appendix C. Sources
- S1Brandefense Blackhole post corpus, Azerbaijan country tag and keyword sets, post dates 1 January-18 November 2026, extracted 19 November 2026.
- S2Brandefense Blackhole posts of the 313 Team channel, 13-16 October 2026.
- S3Brandefense Blackhole infected-device, breach-database, stealer-log and combolist associations for 250 domains, read 19 November 2026.
- S4Brandefense Atlas domain-scoring method applied to the 250 domains, 19 November 2026, including credential-market listings, lookalike domains, exposed documents and mention statistics.
- S5Brandefense public DNS, TLS and homepage checks of the 250 domains, 19 November 2026.
- S6Brandefense Ransompedia, accepted listings for Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia and Kazakhstan, all dates, extracted 19 November 2026.
- S7ransomware.live, country victims for AZ, GE, AM, KZ, accessed 19 November 2026 (cross-check only). https://www.ransomware.live/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S8Brandefense Blackhole extraction of Azerbaijan-associated cards seen in clear text in collected posts, 19 November 2026.
- S9Brandefense, Azerbaijan Cybersecurity Threat Landscape Report 2024-25, published 3 June 2025. https://brandefense.io/reports/azerbaijan-threat-landscape-report. Verified on 21 November 2026. (landing page)
- S10APA, "Intensive cyberattacks targeting state information infrastructure reported in Azerbaijan", 14 October 2026 (since retitled), citing the State Service for Special Communication and Information Security. https://en.apa.az/ict/intensive-cyberattacks-targeting-state-information-infrastructure-reported-in-azerbaijan-529891. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S11Azernews, "Cyberattacks target more than 100 government domains in Azerbaijan", 14 October 2026. https://www.azernews.az/nation/265520.html. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S12Bitdefender, "FamousSparrow APT Targets Azerbaijani Oil and Gas Industry", 13 May 2026. https://www.bitdefender.com/en-gb/blog/businessinsights/famoussparrow-apt-targets-azerbaijani-oil-gas-industry. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S13Trend News Agency, "Russian-linked APT29 behind recent cyberattacks on Azerbaijani media - official", 2 May 2025. https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/4038980.html. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S14DataReportal (Kepios), Digital 2027: Azerbaijan, 5 November 2026 (data for October 2026). https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2027-azerbaijan. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S15APA, "Azerbaijan establishes National Cybersecurity Agency - DECREE", 2 June 2026. https://en.apa.az/official-news/azerbaijan-establishes-national-cybersecurity-agency-decree-509614. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S16Ministry of Digital Development and Transport, "National Cybersecurity Agency established on the basis of the Electronic Security Service", 2 June 2026. https://mincom.gov.az/en/media-en/news/national-cybersecurity-agency-established-on-the-basis-of-the-electronic-security-service. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S17JAMnews, "Azerbaijani government websites hit by cyberattack allegedly originating in Turkey", 14 October 2026. https://jam-news.net/azerbaijani-government-websites-hit-by-cyberattack-allegedly-originating-in-turkey/. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S18Caspian Legal Center, "Liability in the Field of Cybersecurity: Amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences", 18 September 2026. https://www.caspianlegalcenter.az/news/more/cybersecurity-azerbaijan-penalties. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S19APA, "Azerbaijan to introduce new cybersecurity rules for government institutions", 19 November 2026. https://en.apa.az/ict/azerbaijan-to-introduce-new-cybersecurity-rules-for-government-institutions-537090. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S20OC Media, "Pro-Iran hackers claim responsibility for cyberattack on Azerbaijan, citing hijab ban", October 2026 (no exact date shown). https://oc-media.org/breaking-pro-iran-hackers-claim-responsibility-for-cyberattack-on-azerbaijan-citing-hijab-ban/. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S21Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan amending the Code of Administrative Offences (Article 371-2), signed 14 July 2026, published 2 September 2026 (newspaper print 3 September). Official text as printed in the Azərbaycan newspaper: https://www.azerbaijan-news.az/az/posts/detail/azerbaycan-respublikasinin-inzibati-xetalar-mecellesinde-deyisiklik-edilmesi-haqqinda-1788397403/400592. Verified on 21 November 2026. The president.az copy was not reachable on 21 November 2026.
- S22President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, decree of 2 June 2026 establishing the National Cybersecurity Agency, and the agency's charter approved by the same decree. https://president.az/az/articles/view/72657 and https://president.az/az/articles/view/72658. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S23APA, "Azərbaycan informasiya resurslarına qarşı DDoS hücumlarında kommersiya xidmətindən istifadə edilib" (Commercial service used in DDoS attacks on Azerbaijani information resources), 16 October 2026, citing the National Cybersecurity Agency. https://apa.az/ict/azerbaycan-informasiya-resurslarina-qarsi-ddos-hucumlarinda-kommersiya-xidmetinden-istifade-edilib-1005789. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S24NETSCOUT ASERT, "Profiling DieNet: A New Hacktivist Threat", 5 May 2025 (data as of 28 April 2025). https://www.netscout.com/blog/asert/profiling-dienet-new-hacktivist-threat. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S25Center for Internet Security, "Hacktivist Group DieNet Claims DDoS Attacks Against U.S. CNI", 16 April 2025. https://www.cisecurity.org/insights/blog/hacktivist-group-dienet-claims-ddos-attacks-against-u-s-c-n-i. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S26Graphika, report on 313 Team's claimed disruption of a global e-commerce platform and its use of media attention (title names the platform), 30 April 2026. https://www.graphika.com/ (article URL withheld). Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S27Security Affairs, report on a 24-hour DDoS attack on a social-media platform claimed by a pro-Iran group (title names the platform), 21 April 2026. https://securityaffairs.com/191059/security/bluesky-hit-by-24-hour-ddos-attack-as-pro-iran-group-claims-responsibility.html. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S28Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, "Threat Brief: Escalation of Cyber Risk Related to Iran", updated 17 April 2026. https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/iranian-cyberattacks-2026/. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S29JAMnews, "Hybrid attacks on Armenia by two supposedly rival hacking groups", 16 April 2026. https://jam-news.net/hybrid-attacks-on-armenia-by-two-supposedly-rival-hacking-groups/. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S30Dark Web Informer, post on an alleged breach of an Iranian chat platform offered by the xploitleaks handle (title names the platform), 13 January 2026. https://darkwebinformer.com/ (article URL withheld). Not reachable on 21 November 2026; the claim was checked in a dated repost.
- S31VECERT Analyzer, "Preventive alert" on an alleged offer of passenger data (post names the company), X, 11 November 2026. https://x.com/ (article URL withheld). Not reachable on 21 November 2026 (X refused automated access); the same alleged sale was reported as a claim by Siber Güvenlik Haber the same day.
- S32BeamSec, "3 APT Intrusions, 2 Database Leaks, and 1 New Cyber Department: Inside Azerbaijan's 2026 Threat Landscape", 9 September 2026. https://beamsec.com/3-apt-intrusions-2-database-leaks-and-1-new-cyber-department-inside-azerbaijans-2026-threat-landscape/. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S33Report.az, "Azerbaijan's cybersecurity authority warns of large-scale Freshdesk phishing operation", 17 June 2026, citing the National Cybersecurity Agency. https://report.az/en/ict/azerbaijan-s-cybersecurity-authority-warns-of-large-scale-freshdesk-phishing-operation. Not reachable on 21 November 2026; worded as attributed reporting.
- S34JAMnews, report on the 15 November social-media link incident (title withheld), 17 November 2026. https://jam-news.net/?p=238581. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S35Report.az, "Azerbaijan records 274 cyber attack indicators in early 2026", 7 April 2026, citing the State Service for Special Communication and Information Security. https://report.az/en/ict/azerbaijan-records-274-cyber-attack-indicators-in-early-2026. Not reachable on 21 November 2026; worded as attributed reporting.
- S36Report.az, "Azerbaijan records 518 cyberattack indicators in seven months", 10 August 2026, citing the same service. https://report.az/en/ict/azerbaijan-records-518-cyberattack-indicators-in-seven-months. Not reachable on 21 November 2026; worded as attributed reporting.
- S37Trend, "В Азербайджане выявлено более 134 тысяч случаев заражения ботнетами - Самеддин Асадов", 19 November 2026. https://ru.trend.az/azerbaijan/society/4248212.html. Verified on 21 November 2026. Also reported by Media.az the same day (https://media.az/politika/sameddin-asadov-rasskazal-o-masshtabah-kiberugroz-v-azerbajdzhane; not reachable on 21 November 2026).
- S40Operativ Məlumat Mərkəzi (operativmm.az), Interior Ministry statements on loan-page phishing arrests, February, May and August 2026. https://operativmm.az/en/post/cyberpolice-dismantle-hacker-network-in-azerbaijan/66761. Not reachable on 21 November 2026; the May and August statements were not found; worded as attributed reporting.
- S41ABC.az, "Attack on banking sector investigated", 6 February 2026, citing the Electronic Security Service. https://abc.az/en/news/195749/attack-on-banking-sector-investigated. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S42Trend, "Azerbaijani authorities thwart cyberattack attempt", 27 February 2026, citing the Electronic Security Service. https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/society/4158466.html. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S43Government CERT (cert.gov.az), "Mass phishing attacks were conducted on behalf of government institutions", 8 April 2026. https://cert.gov.az/en/news/mass-phishing-attacks-were-conducted-on-behalf-of-government-institutions-9427. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S44AzerNews, "Azerbaijan identifies cyber attack with Hungary's assistance", 10 April 2026. https://www.azernews.az/nation/256851.html. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S45Trend, Interior Ministry statement on business-account intrusions, 22 July 2026 (first cited from Baku TV). https://az.trend.az/azerbaijan/society/4209083.html. Verified on 21 November 2026. The Baku TV item was not reachable on 21 November 2026.
- S46APA, "State Security Service: Illegal activities of international cybercriminal networks against Azerbaijan being prevented", 10 August 2026. https://en.apa.az/incident/state-security-service-illegal-activities-of-international-cybercriminal-networks-against-azerbaijan-being-prevented-519772. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S47APA, "NCA: Cyberattack attempts recorded against user accounts of some organizations in Azerbaijan", 18 August 2026. https://en.apa.az/ict/nca-cyberattack-attempts-recorded-against-user-accounts-of-some-organizations-in-azerbaijan-520797. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S48Caliber.Az, "Azerbaijan detects TikTok accounts impersonating payment systems", 14 September 2026. https://caliber.az/en/post/azerbaijan-detects-tiktok-accounts-impersonating-payment-systems. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S49Azernews, "Iran-linked group claims responsibility for large-scale cyberattacks on Azerbaijani government websites", 15 October 2026. https://www.azernews.az/events/265618.html. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S50Trend, "Azerbaijan blocks hundreds of major cyberattacks, official says", 4 June 2026. https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/society/4194332.html. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S51NIST National Vulnerability Database, CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-41040 and https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-41082. Verified on 21 November 2026.
- S52Microsoft Security Response Center, security update guides for CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082. https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-41040 and https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-41082. Listed as the vendor references in NVD on 21 November 2026.
- S53CISA, "Implementing Number Matching in MFA Applications" (fact sheet), October 2022. https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/fact-sheet-implement-number-matching-in-mfa-applications-508c.pdf. Verified on 21 November 2026.
Appendix D. Glossary
- Blackhole: Brandefense's cybercrime data source covering posts, infected devices, credentials and card material.
- Ransompedia: Brandefense's ransomware database; listings record criminal claims.
- Atlas: Brandefense's external exposure scoring; scores run from 0 (nothing observed) to 100.
- Infected device: a device whose stealer log contains a login to the organisation's domain; "employee" is a classification from usage, not verified employment.
- Credential-market listing: a credential tied to the domain offered on a monitored market at the time of the check.
- Combolist: a list of login and password pairs assembled from various sources; age and validity vary.
- Stealer log: data captured by information-stealing malware from a device.
- Checker bot: a bot that tests stolen cards against payment gateways and prints the result.
- Post card: a redacted reproduction of one dark-web post, with venue, date, alias, language and what it does and does not establish.
- Relay: a third-party channel or bot that reposts another actor's claim; a relay is weaker evidence than the actor's own post.
- DMARC / SPF / DKIM: email-authentication standards; DMARC tells receivers what to do with mail that fails.
- DNSSEC: signatures that let resolvers verify DNS answers.
- TLP:CLEAR: may be shared without restriction; other legal duties still apply.
- AiTM (adversary-in-the-middle): a phishing page that relays a real login and captures passwords, one-time codes and the session cookie, so the attacker can sign in without the second factor again.
- BIN: the issuer's card-number prefix (bank identification number).
- C2: command and control, the infrastructure an attacker uses to direct malware.
- DS record: the record in the parent zone that links a domain to its DNSSEC keys.
- EDR: endpoint detection and response, security software that records and flags activity on devices.
- Drops and mule accounts: people, and accounts opened in their names, used to receive and move fraud proceeds.
- Grade D/F: the high-exposure end of an Atlas rating (A is low).
- Headline score: a sector or national Atlas figure weighted toward the most exposed organisations.
- HSTS: a web header telling browsers to use HTTPS only.
- KYC: "know your customer" identity checks at banks, exchanges and other services.
- Legacy authentication: older mail sign-in protocols that cannot enforce MFA.
- Lookup bot: a Telegram bot that returns personal data for a name, number or ID.
- MFA (multi-factor authentication): a sign-in that needs a second factor beyond the password.
- Number matching: the user types a number shown on the sign-in screen into the authenticator app; it stops blind approvals but not an AiTM relay.
- OT / SCADA: operational technology and the supervisory control systems that run physical processes.
- p=none: a DMARC policy that only monitors and does not ask receivers to reject or quarantine.
- Passive hygiene index: an Odin analytical composite of email, DNS, TLS and header checks; 0-100, higher means weaker.
- Phishing-resistant MFA: sign-in tied to the real site (FIDO2 security keys, passkeys or certificates), so a relay page cannot reuse it.
- RAT: remote-access trojan, malware that gives an attacker remote control of a device.
- RDP: Remote Desktop Protocol, used to control a Windows computer over the network.
- Stresser: a DDoS-for-hire service, often sold as a "stress test".
- Telegram Stars: Telegram's in-app currency, used by some sellers as payment.
About this report
Prepared by Odin by Brandefense. Version 1.0 was completed on 19 November 2026. Version 1.1 (20 November 2026) redesigned the layout, added post and actor cards with public reporting, and narrowed the card section. Version 1.2 (21 November 2026) closes four independent review rounds. It describes victims generically, recounts the SPF results and links and dates every external source. It also adds a guide to Atlas ratings, decision targets and a legal applicability table.
Research cutoff: 18 November 2026 (primary data window); a blind audit on 20 November 2026 added officially reported and press-reported items (Appendix A.8). The report prioritises Brandefense's own data, keeps criminal claims separate from independently established incidents and does not claim a complete census of cybercrime affecting Azerbaijan. Recommendations describe what organisations could do; they do not state that any organisation has or has not done them. An Azerbaijani-language edition of version 1.2 is in preparation.
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