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Magento CMS Block Loader: How It Hides From Scanners on 953 Stores

Magento CMS blocks hide a loader that dodges scanners. How to check your store, and what CISA's KEV listing of PolyShell (CVE-2026-48356) means.

By
Brandefense Research Team
Reviewed by
Brandefense Analyst Team
Published
27 October 2026
Updated
28 October 2026
Reading time
11 min read
Dark glass building block with a hidden red core and red neon lines, cover art for: Magento CMS Block Loader: How It Hides From Scanners on 953 Stores

Sansec reports that a criminal group has used Magento CMS block malware to infect 953 stores since July 2025. The malware is a small JavaScript loader hidden in the content of CMS blocks, and most of the stores run Magento. Its newest loader address, deepveindrilling[.]com, appeared in the blocks of 83 stores in October 2026.

On 23 October the operator rewrote those blocks again. The new loader fingerprints each visitor’s browser, so security scanners get an empty reply and only real shoppers get a payload. Sansec published the research on 24 October 2026 and does not name the group.

Last updated: 28 October 2026. On 27 October CISA added PolyShell (CVE-2026-48356), the flaw Sansec links to the March infections, to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. The section on the listing is below. We update this page if Sansec or Adobe publish new findings.

How Does a Loader in a CMS Block Reach Shoppers?

Magento keeps static page parts in the cms_block table. Sansec says the loader sits in the content field of that table. Its eComscan scanner found it there on 148 server installs over the campaign, and never in core_config_data or in theme files.

The first October version used two scripts. Sansec’s crawler found it on 74 stores by the end of 8 October.

The first script reads a localStorage key named fpCode. If the key is set, the script puts the stored code in the onclick attribute of an invisible div and clicks it. The browser then runs the code as an event handler, without eval().

Nothing in the block writes fpCode, so the script from the loader domain has to set it. A visitor who received the payload once runs it again on every later page view, even when the domain is offline or blocked. Sansec notes that the March version deleted its stored payload after one run.

What Changed in the Rewrite of 23 October?

The loader appeared on 9 more stores on 23 October, and all 71 stores that Sansec re-crawled by 24 October run the new version. It replaces the plain script tag with an inline loader. That loader sends a browser fingerprint to the operator’s server, and the server decides what comes back.

How the 23 October loader decides who gets a payload (per Sansec)
How the 23 October loader decides who gets a payload (per Sansec)Sequence diagram with 3 actors (Visitor browser, Infected store, Loader server) and 4 messages: 1, Visitor browser to Infected store: Opens a page; 2, Infected store to Visitor browser: Page with the inline loader from a CMS block; 3, Visitor browser to Loader server: Sends the browser fingerprint; 4, Loader server to Visitor browser: Payload for a likely shopper, no added content for a scanner.Visitor browserInfected storeLoader server1. Opens a page2. Page with the inlineloader from a CMS block3. Sends the browser fingerprint4. Payload for a likely shopper, no added content for ascanner
  1. 1Visitor browser Infected storeOpens a page
  2. 2Infected store Visitor browserPage with the inline loader from a CMS block
  3. 3Visitor browser Loader serverSends the browser fingerprint
  4. 4Loader server Visitor browserPayload for a likely shopper, no added content for a scanner

The fingerprint flags automated browsers through navigator.webdriver, Selenium globals and the cdc_ properties of ChromeDriver. It also adds the GPU name from WebGL, CPU cores, memory, screen size, time zone, languages and client hints.

When urlscan.io loaded an infected store with an automated Chrome browser, the server answered HTTP 200 and Sansec found no added content in the page. Sansec has not captured the final payload of this version yet, so we cannot say what it does to a shopper.

Earlier versions relied on Keitaro, a commercial ad tracker that doubles as a traffic distribution system. The second script sent the referrer, page title and query string to a Base64 encoded address. The system then decided per visitor whether to return a payload, a redirect or nothing. When Sansec asked as a Windows desktop visitor on 24 October, it got a statement that does nothing and a cookie that marks the visitor for 24 hours.

The new loader drops Keitaro and does the bot filtering itself. Older stages did deliver follow-up pages: on 12 December 2025 a logged-in customer of an infected store received a script that loaded two further addresses. One of them misspells the Ledger crypto wallet brand.

How Many Domains Has the Operator Used?

Sansec counts five loader domains in 15 months, plus two more that ran on a few stores. We leave the older addresses out of the table on purpose. They are in Sansec’s indicator list, and the dates and counts show the pattern.

Loader Registered First seen on stores Stores
First Before July 2025, re-registered 23 May 2026 9 July 2025 863
Second Before December 2025, re-registered 22 May 2026 12 December 2025 494
Third 25 March 2026 30 March 2026 355
Fourth 7 June 2026 8 June 2026 246
Fifth (deepveindrilling[.]com) 6 October 2026 7 October 2026 83

The counts add up to more than 953, so many stores carried more than one loader over time. That is our reading of Sansec’s numbers. Sansec says 60 of the 83 stores on the newest domain already ran an earlier loader, 34 of them since October 2025.

Two of the old domains expired and were registered again in May 2026, and both now use the nameservers of a domain parking service. Between August and October 2026 Sansec still found their loaders on 9 and 6 stores. Visitors of those stores send their referrer and page title to the new domain owner, and their browsers run any script it returns.

Sansec Watch, the company’s CSP monitoring service, received reports of visitors’ browsers loading all four earlier domains. For the domain first seen in June 2026 the reports reached about 52,000.

How Did the Attackers Get In?

Sansec says the October rewrites used no new vulnerability, because 60 of the 83 stores were already infected. Earlier waves point to Magento file upload flaws. In March the operator injected the loader into 471 stores in one hour, after uploading web shells through PolyShell (CVE-2026-48356).

The Sansec PolyShell advisory describes a flaw in the REST API that lets unauthenticated attackers upload executable files through cart item options. The files land in pub/media/custom_options/quote/. The NVD record lists it as an unrestricted upload of a file with a dangerous type, with a CVSS 3.1 score of 9.3.

The second flaw is SessionReaper (CVE-2025-54236). The NVD record calls it improper input validation that allows session takeover without user interaction, with a CVSS score of 9.1. It shows a CISA KEV addition date of 24 October 2025.

Across the campaign, eComscan found the loader on 169 Magento 2 installs that miss at least one core patch. Of these, 102 (60%) also have files uploaded through PolyShell or SessionReaper. On 3,024 comparable installs with a different skimmer the rate is 32%.

One store on Magento 2.4.7-p1 had PolyShell web shells disguised as PNG images in the upload folder, next to the loader in a CMS block. The block switched to the new domain on 7 October, and the store still lacks APSB26-73, Adobe’s PolyShell fix for supported release lines.

Patching alone did not keep the operator out. A store on Magento 2.4.7-p10 with no missing core patches got the new loader at 16:46 UTC on 23 October, one hour after a clean scan. eComscan had found a rogue admin account on it on 16 September and a GSocket backdoor on 24 September.

Public tooling exists for the first flaw. A GitHub search for Magento and PolyShell on 27 October 2026 returns 14 repositories. Most of them describe patches, checks or protection modules.

At least three others advertise exploit code. One, created on 8 April 2026, calls itself a Magento RCE exploitation toolkit in its README and describes an unauthenticated upload through the REST API cart. Another, created on 15 July 2026, calls itself an exploit. These are the authors’ claims, and we did not run any of the code.

A search for the CVE id itself on 28 October 2026 returns two repositories. One was created on 26 September, a month before CISA’s listing, by the researcher who posts as @abraxas_null. Our phpMyAdmin 2FA bypass post covers another claim by the same researcher.

The 26 September repository’s README describes a loopback lab on Magento 2.4.8-p5. In it, a PHP file with a GIF header goes through the guest cart REST API, and the stated proof is the written file name, not a shell. The other repository, created on 27 October, is described only as a “PoC / exploit archive”. We did not run either.

Did CISA Add PolyShell (CVE-2026-48356) to Its KEV Catalog?

Yes. CISA added CVE-2026-48356 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on 27 October 2026, with a due date of 10 November 2026. The catalog calls it an Adobe Commerce and Magento Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type Vulnerability (CWE-434). Its ransomware campaign use field reads Unknown.

What the sources say about exploitation of CVE-2026-48356
Exploit signals
  • CISA KEV catalogYesAdded on 27 October 2026.CISA
  • Ransomware campaign useUnknownCISA’s catalog field reads Unknown.CISA
  • Attacks seen by SansecYesSansec says first attacks came on 19 March 2026 and a mass wave on 30 March.Sansec
  • Public exploit codeYesSeveral GitHub repositories advertise exploit code. These are the authors’ claims, and we did not run any of it.27 Oct 2026
  • Adobe statementUnknownThe bulletin says Adobe is not aware of exploits in the wild.Adobe, 11 Aug 2026
Verdict Update Magento, then check for planted files

Does this match what Sansec described? CISA does not say. The KEV entry names no attacker, victim or method, and it links only Adobe’s bulletin, the two BOD 26-04 pages and the NVD record. A KEV listing shows that CISA has evidence of exploitation, nothing more.

CISA’s section of the CVE record (CISA-ADP), updated on 27 October, does list two Sansec pages as references. They are the PolyShell mass attack wave article and the indicators of compromise in the loader research. The same section carries CISA’s SSVC entry, which rates exploitation as active. We read this as CISA pointing to Sansec’s reporting, but CISA does not say which attacks it relied on.

The descriptions differ. Adobe’s CVE text says exploitation needs user interaction, such as a visit to a crafted URL, while Sansec describes unauthenticated uploads through the REST API. Adobe’s bulletin gives a CVSS 3.1 score of 9.6, and the CVE record gives 9.3. The sources do not explain the difference, so we follow Sansec for what attackers did and Adobe for versions and fixes.

Adobe’s bulletin APSB26-73 came out on 14 July 2026. For Magento Open Source it lists the fixed versions 2.4.9-2026-jul, 2.4.8-2026-jul, 2.4.7-2026-jul and 2.4.6-2026-jul. Adobe Commerce also has 2.4.5-2026-jul and 2.4.4-2026-jul. The bulletin offers no workaround, and when we read it on 28 October its last update was dated 11 August 2026.

US federal agencies covered by BOD 26-04 have until 10 November 2026. Other stores are not bound by that date, but we would move this update to the front of the queue. Sansec warns that blocking web access to the upload folder does not stop the uploads. After the update, run the checks below, because a patch closes the hole and does not remove files an attacker already planted.

How Can You Check a Store for the Loader?

Sansec advises searching CMS content for code patterns, because the domains are often Base64 encoded. Run this query, then repeat it on the cms_page table. Add your table prefix if the store uses one.

SELECT block_id, identifier, update_time FROM cms_block
WHERE content LIKE '%fpCode%' OR content LIKE '%se_referrer%'
   OR content LIKE '%localStorage.getItem%';

The update_time column shows the attacker’s most recent write. After you remove the scripts, nothing on the store reads fpCode any more. Sansec warns that deleting the script does not remove the attacker’s database write access, so the cleanup continues.

After you find the loader
  1. Look for the way inSearch pub/media/custom_options/ and pub/media/customer_address/ for files other than .htaccess, and search the whole store install for files named accesson.php.
  2. Check accounts and processesLook in the admin_user table for accounts you do not recognise, and for unfamiliar processes.
  3. Change the passwordsDatabase, admin and API integration passwords.
  4. Install the Adobe fixesAPSB26-73 for PolyShell and APSB25-88 for SessionReaper.

Why Do Scanners Keep Missing It?

The loader is built to look clean to the tools that check storefronts. An automated scan gets HTTP 200 and no added content, as the urlscan.io run showed. Our reading is that a clean scan is weak evidence for a store that was infected before. Check the database and the file system, not only the rendered page.

Sansec’s report carries the full list of indicators of compromise, and matching it against web and proxy logs is a quick extra check. The final payload is not known yet. Sansec files the research under its Magecart tag, the name for scripts that steal card data at checkout, which our post on Magecart e-skimmer attacks on restaurant ordering platforms explains.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the Magento CMS block loader?

It is a JavaScript loader that a criminal group writes into the content of Magento CMS blocks. Sansec says it sends a browser fingerprint to the operator's server, which returns a payload only to visitors who look like real shoppers.

Does deleting the script remove the attacker?

No. Sansec says a store that loads one of the campaign's domains lets the attacker write to its database, and deleting the script does not remove that access. Look for webshells, unknown admin accounts and unfamiliar processes, then change passwords.

Does patching Magento stop this campaign?

Sansec advises installing APSB26-73 for PolyShell and APSB25-88 for SessionReaper. It also found the loader on a store with no missing core patches, which had a rogue admin account and a backdoor before the loader arrived.

How do I check my store for the loader?

Search the cms_block and cms_page tables for fpCode, se_referrer and localStorage.getItem, and read the update_time column to see the latest write. The query is in the section above.

Is CVE-2026-48356 in the CISA KEV catalog?

Yes. CISA added it on 27 October 2026 with a due date of 10 November 2026, and its ransomware campaign use field reads Unknown. The entry names no attacker. CISA's section of the CVE record (CISA-ADP) does list Sansec's PolyShell research among its references.

Sources

  1. Sansec: deepveindrilling.com, Magento CMS block loader hits 953 stores
  2. Sansec: PolyShell, unrestricted file upload in Magento and Adobe Commerce
  3. NVD: CVE-2026-48356 (PolyShell)
  4. NVD: CVE-2025-54236 (SessionReaper)
  5. Adobe: security bulletin APSB26-73, Adobe Commerce and Magento Open Source
  6. CISA: Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog entry for CVE-2026-48356
  7. Sansec: PolyShell mass attack wave, 471 stores in one hour
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