GALLIUM is a cyberespionage group that MITRE ATT&CK says has been active since at least 2012. It mainly targets telecommunications companies, and also financial institutions and government entities. This post sticks to what the MITRE group page states and says plainly where public sources go no further.
- Other name.
- Granite Typhoon (the only alias MITRE lists).
- Active since.
- At least 2012.
- Main targets.
- Telecommunications companies, financial institutions, government entities.
- Attribution.
- Security researchers call it likely Chinese state-sponsored (MITRE reports this, it does not assess it).
- Linked operation.
- Operation Soft Cell, a long-term campaign against telecom providers.
What does MITRE ATT&CK say about GALLIUM?
MITRE describes GALLIUM as a cyberespionage group active since at least 2012. It lists targets in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia and Vietnam. It links the group to Operation Soft Cell, a long-term campaign against telecommunications providers.
On attribution, MITRE writes that security researchers have identified GALLIUM as a likely Chinese state-sponsored group, based in part on tools used and techniques commonly associated with Chinese threat actors. That is the researchers’ view as reported by MITRE. We found no government advisory that names GALLIUM or Granite Typhoon.
Which techniques does MITRE list for GALLIUM?
MITRE lists the following behavior, each taken from its group page:
- Get inExploited public-facing servers, including Wildfly and JBoss servers, and used VPN services such as SoftEther VPN to access and keep a foothold.
- Run commandsUsed PowerShell and the Windows command shell, including for lateral movement.
- Keep accessCreated high-privileged domain accounts to maintain access.
- Take credentialsDumped credentials from LSASS memory and password hashes from the SAM registry hive.
- Move data outCompressed and encrypted stolen data with WinRAR, staged it in multi-part archives, and exfiltrated it over its command channel using web shells and HTRAN.
MITRE also lists PlugX and PoisonIvy among the software used. It does not describe how each tool was used here, so this post does not either.
What is not confirmed?
Many details found in earlier write-ups of this group rest on vendor reports that this post does not cite. We removed them because no MITRE page or government source supports them. That covers claimed 2023 to 2025 activity, motives beyond espionage, links to other groups, and further malware families and tools. If a government source later names the group, this page can be extended.
How can defenders reduce the risk?
- Patch exposed serversKeep internet-facing servers, such as application servers, patched and monitored.
- Watch for VPN softwareAlert on VPN clients and services, such as SoftEther, that nobody approved.
- Monitor scriptingLog PowerShell and command shell use, especially on servers.
- Protect credentialsWatch for access to LSASS memory and the SAM hive, and review new high-privileged domain accounts.
- Watch outbound dataLook for large archives staged on servers and unusual outbound transfers.

