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Full reportAI offenseMonograph 11 / 1919 min read

White-Labeled AI Offense: Forks, Rebrands, and Swarm Targeting

How five autonomous red-team frameworks are rebranded, co-hosted and pointed at fintech and Web3 targets

By
Odin by Brandefense
Published
19 November 2026
Reading time
19 min read
Edition
Version 1.1 · TLP:CLEAR
Scope
Prepared November 2026

1. Executive Summary

In short

In a two-week observation window ending 18 November 2026, Odin by Brandefense found 4,360 endpoints running five autonomous AI offense frameworks. Of these, 1,846 are confirmed. Operators rebrand ARTEX consoles for regional markets, stack several frameworks on one server, and run up to 16 parallel workers per target. An exposed swarm archive covers 76 organizations, mostly in payments and Web3. Block the 1,820 confirmed endpoints on stable hosting, hunt the shared ARTEX favicon hash, and alert on 25-URI scan bursts.

Autonomous offense frameworks put a large language model (LLM) in charge of classic scanners such as subfinder, nuclei and sqlmap. The operator gives a target. The model plans the work and hands it to many parallel workers. This report maps where these consoles run, how they are disguised, and what one exposed campaign archive shows about their targets.

1

Five AI offense frameworks run on 4,360 endpoints across 2,917 hosts.

ARTEX (2,121 endpoints) and CyberStrikeAI (1,720) dominate. PentAGI (340), HexStrikeAI (118) and DeepAudit (61) follow. Of the 4,360 endpoints, 1,846 are confirmed, 117 suspected and 2,397 candidates.

2

Rebranded ARTEX forks change titles and certificates but keep the favicon.

Two Korean-localized consoles on AWS Seoul serve the same 15,406-byte favicon as upstream ARTEX controllers in China. Separately, 103 hosts carry two or more framework labels. The clearest case, 38.127.244[.]14, runs PentAGI, an ARTEX port and an upload-bypass dropzone side by side.

3

One swarm archive shows heavy targeting of payments and Web3 firms.

An exposed ARTEX archive lists 76 target organizations and 13,864 enumerated subdomains. Payments and Fintech (21) and Web3, DeFi and Stablecoin (20) make up 53.9% of the scopes. The swarm's own reports label 35 scopes critical or high; these labels are unverified.

Three Decisions for Leaders

  1. Block confirmed controllers, but keep review lanes. Block the 1,820 confirmed endpoints on stable hosting networks. Put the 30 endpoints on dynamic telecom ISPs, the 3 endpoints under analyst review and all candidates on time-bound watchlists instead.
  2. Hunt fingerprints that operators do not change. Page titles and logos change with every rebrand. The favicon hash, the TLS certificate subject, the JARM value and the API routes stay the same, so build detection on those.
  3. Harden upload folders and throttle scan bursts. Disable .htaccess overrides on upload directories to stop image-as-PHP polyglots. Alert when one source hits 25 or more distinct URIs in 5 minutes.

The Study in Numbers

NumberWhat it is
4,360Endpoints running one of five AI offense frameworks, on 2,917 IPv4 hosts in 50 countries and 286 networks
1,846Confirmed endpoints (42.3%); 1,820 of them sit on stable hosting and are ready to block
103Hosts that carry two or more framework labels
76Target organizations in one exposed ARTEX campaign archive, across 18 verticals
13,864Subdomains the swarm enumerated for those 76 targets; 1,105 were live
46.1%Share of the 76 scopes (35) the swarm labeled critical or high, unverified
2,178Worker runs the swarm recorded against a single target

How to use this report.

Security leaders can read Chapter 1, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. SOC and detection engineers should start with Chapters 7 to 9. CTI analysts will find the fork, co-hosting and infrastructure detail in Chapters 2 to 5.

2. How the Swarms Work

In short

These frameworks split one target into many small jobs and run them in parallel worker pools. The pools hand results forward, from subdomain discovery to template scanning, exploitation checks and an LLM-written report.

From script chains to agent workbenches

Attackers used to glue reconnaissance tools together with their own scripts. The frameworks in this report replace that with a web workbench. The workbench exposes a REST, GraphQL or Model Context Protocol (MCP) API to an LLM planning loop. MCP is an open JSON-RPC protocol that lets a model call external tools.

Each framework takes a slightly different approach. The table below lists the architecture and the default ports.

FrameworkHow it is builtDefault ports
ARTEXPython multi-worker swarm with a pool of 1 to 16 subagents and a SQLite or Postgres task queue8787, 443, 80, 7878
CyberStrikeAIGo and Python platform with role-based agents wrapping 100+ security tools5001 to 5003, 8080, 8082, 443, 8899
PentAGIGo controller with a GraphQL API that starts Docker-in-Docker Kali workers and keeps memory in pgvector8443, 8666, 443
HexStrikeAIPython FastAPI server that exposes nmap, nuclei, sqlmap and ffuf as MCP tools5000, 80, 8080, 8000, 8888
DeepAuditLLM workbench for auditing source code and repositories for vulnerabilities8000, 3000, 80

PentAGI, CyberStrikeAI and HexStrikeAI are public projects on GitHub. AhnLab ASEC has published an infrastructure analysis of ARTEX, and Team Cymru has tracked CyberStrikeAI infrastructure.

The four worker pools

The exposed ARTEX archive, together with the public PentAGI and HexStrikeAI designs, shows a four-stage pipeline. A controller receives a scope through POST /api/v1/tasks (ARTEX) or a GraphQL createFlow call (PentAGI). It then queues work to four pools.

Figure 1: Autonomous swarms split recon, CVE scanning, exploitation checks and reporting across four worker pools
Figure 1: Autonomous swarms split recon, CVE scanning, exploitation checks and reporting across four worker pools
PoolJobToolsWhat the archive records
01 ReconExpand the attack surface and keep only live hostssubfinder, naabu, httpx, dnsx13,864 subdomains (182.4 per target), narrowed to 1,105 live HTTP or TLS FQDNs (8.0% yield)
02 Vulnerability scanRun CVE templates and directory fuzzing on live hostsnuclei, ffuf, gobuster, katanaSweeps for .env files, .git/config, Swagger or OpenAPI specs, actuator and GraphQL endpoints
03 Exploit checksTest injectable parameters and upload formsKali Docker-in-Docker, sqlmap, MCP tool calls, polyglot uploadsClaimed outputs written to credential_inventory_01.json and findings_summary.json
04 SynthesisTurn task logs into a reportLLM writer, Markdown, JSON35 of 76 scopes labeled critical or high

Pool 02 workers run with non-interactive batch flags such as -jsonl -silent -rate-limit 150. These flags matter for detection, because they show up in process command lines on the worker host.

In Pool 03, PentAGI starts Kali containers through containerd-shim-runc-v2. HexStrikeAI and CyberStrikeAI instead define MCP tools/call schemas for sqlmap --batch and polyglot upload probes. In both cases, an LLM decides which tool to call next.

How hard the swarm worked

The archive records how many worker runs the swarm spent on single targets. These are the swarm's own counts.

SectorRecorded worker runs
Crypto exchange2,178
Online gaming1,231
Not stated535
DeFi477

Read the archive with care

The archive is the attacker's own record, so two limits apply. First, it shows what the tools were configured and logged to do. We did not see these actions on any target system. Second, the severity totals come from an LLM report writer. Such writers often call an unauthenticated banner or an exposed .env hit "critical". Treat the 17 critical and 18 high labels as claims.

The archive server also exposed real target domains and harvested secrets. Its address, port and directory paths are withheld in this report. Sizes of the archive files stay in the Indicators chapter; their hashes are withheld.

3. Fleet Footprint: Where the Consoles Run

In short

The 4,360 endpoints sit mostly on low-cost VPS networks in the United States, Hong Kong and China. One provider, PEG TECH INC, hosts 1,891 of them.

Figure 2: Five AI offense frameworks wrap classic CLI scanners behind GraphQL, REST and MCP APIs
Figure 2: Five AI offense frameworks wrap classic CLI scanners behind GraphQL, REST and MCP APIs

Counts by framework

Each endpoint is an IP, port and framework combination.

FrameworkEndpointsHostsConfirmedSuspectedCandidate
ARTEX (incl. Korean fork)2,1211,419495141,612
CyberStrikeAI1,7201,1421,2900430
PentAGI340333224314
HexStrikeAI11810009919
DeepAudit612639022
Total4,3602,9171,8461172,397

CyberStrikeAI has the highest confirmed share at 75.0%. Its listeners share the JARM value 40d40d...9319. DeepAudit also appears next to HexStrikeAI and ARTEX on the same servers, as on 38.76.218[.]100.

Why PentAGI and HexStrikeAI look small

A responsive panel is not a confirmed deployment. Of the 340 PentAGI endpoints, only 22 are confirmed. The other 314 are candidates. We make no claim that PentAGI deployments grew over time.

HexStrikeAI is harder still. Many installs show only a generic Python Werkzeug or FastAPI page on 5000, 80 or 8080. Nothing else on these pages ties them to the framework. So none of the 118 HexStrikeAI endpoints is confirmed: 99 are suspected and 19 are candidates.

Countries and hosting networks

The fleet spans 50 countries and 286 networks. Six countries lead.

CountryEndpointsShare
United States2,58659.31%
Hong Kong69715.99%
China44410.18%
Japan1072.45%
Singapore952.18%
Germany821.88%

The top ten hosting networks carry 2,968 of the 4,360 endpoints (68.07%). PEG TECH INC alone hosts 1,891 (43.37%).

RankHosting networkCountriesEndpointsConfirmedSuspectedCandidateMain frameworks
1PEG TECH INCUS, JP, SG1,8911,1240767CyberStrikeAI, ARTEX, PentAGI
2YANCY LIMITEDHK, US23723700ARTEX
3Shenzhen Tencent Computer SystemsCN, US, JP1762512139ARTEX, CyberStrikeAI, HexStrikeAI
4Hangzhou Alibaba AdvertisingCN1311710104ARTEX, CyberStrikeAI, DeepAudit
5AROSSCLOUD INC.US, HK12292030CyberStrikeAI, ARTEX, DeepAudit
6DigitalOcean, LLCUS, DE, NL11696515CyberStrikeAI, ARTEX, HexStrikeAI
7cognetcloud INCHK, US, IN8117460ARTEX, CyberStrikeAI, HexStrikeAI
8CTG Server LimitedHK, JP, SG7915064ARTEX, CyberStrikeAI, PentAGI
9NetLab GlobalHK, US, JP716164ARTEX, CyberStrikeAI, PentAGI
10HostPapaUS, CA6420341ARTEX, CyberStrikeAI, DeepAudit

What not to block

Some listeners sit on dynamic home or small-business broadband. These include Korea Telecom (AS4766), Chunghwa Telecom (AS3462) and Chinanet (AS4134). Their addresses rotate between unrelated customers. The 30 endpoints in this group (23 confirmed, 7 suspected) belong on watchlists that expire after 24 to 72 hours, not on permanent block lists. Their addresses are not published.

Port 5000 also causes false positives. One suspected HexStrikeAI host turned out to serve a benign replica of a third-party security training portal. It shared only a Werkzeug header with HexStrikeAI. Its favicon did not match, and it is excluded. Generic Python headers on 5000 need an MCP signal before anyone blocks them.

The blocking picture for confirmed endpoints is shown below.

GroupEndpointsAction
Confirmed on stable hosting1,820 (41.74%)Block
Confirmed on dynamic telecom ISPs23Short watchlist
Confirmed framework, hostile use not shown3 (2 Korean fork nodes, 1 probable authorized tester)Analyst review
Suspected on stable hosting110Watch, look for a second signal
Suspected on dynamic telecom ISPs7Short watchlist
Candidates2,397 (15 of them with an open directory)Hold until corroborated

By framework, the 1,820 block-ready endpoints are ARTEX 492, CyberStrikeAI 1,272, PentAGI 19 and DeepAudit 37.

4. White-Label Forks: Same Engine, New Paint

In short

When operators fork an AI offense console, they change the page title, the logo and the TLS certificate. They rarely touch the compiled frontend, the API routes or the favicon file, which is what gives the fork away.

Figure 3: Invariant favicon hashes and co-hosted ports expose rebranded AI swarms
Figure 3: Invariant favicon hashes and co-hosted ports expose rebranded AI swarms

The Korean ARTEX fork

On 17 November 2026, two hosts on Amazon AWS Seoul (ap-northeast-2, AS16509) showed a localized ARTEX console. Their addresses and the Korean brand name are withheld, for reasons explained below.

Node A, on port 80, removed every visible "ARTEX" string from its title. It shows a Korean title ending in 공격·방어 보안 운영 ("Attack and Defense Security Operations"). That subtitle is a word-for-word translation of the Chinese upstream subtitle 攻防安全运营.

Node B, on port 443, kept the English title ARTEX - Autonomous Red-Team Expert. It sits behind a wildcard certificate for a South Korean company domain, with JARM 28d28d28d00028d00042d42d000000831b6af40378e2dd35eeac4e9311926e.

Both Korean nodes serve a 15,406-byte /favicon.ico with MD5 cd3ebd16437d6d3963592f7365dd3980. The same file appears on upstream ARTEX controllers. Both nodes also mount the single-page app in <div id="artex-swarm-root"> and expose /api/v1/tasks.

RoleEndpointHostingPage titleTLS subject and JARM
Korean fork, node AWithheld, port 80AS16509 AWS Seoul (KR)Korean title ending 공격·방어 보안 운영No TLS
Korean fork, node BWithheld, port 443AS16509 AWS Seoul (KR)ARTEX - Autonomous Red-Team ExpertKorean company wildcard, 28d28d...926e
Upstream ARTEX, Chinese8.135.3[.]123:80AS37963 Alibaba Cloud (CN)ARTEX - 攻防安全运营No TLS
Upstream ARTEX, Chinese8.135.30[.]162:443AS37963 Alibaba Cloud (CN)ARTEX - 攻防安全运营CN=8.135.30[.]162, 15d3fd...e331
Upstream ARTEX, English45.156.87[.]185:443AS399629 Rodgers Inv. (US)ARTEX - Autonomous Red-Team ExpertCN=artex.dwwork[.]live, 2ad2ad...f06b

All five share the favicon hash, the #artex-swarm-root mount point and the /api/v1/tasks route.

Who runs the Korean fork

We weighed three explanations.

HypothesisForAgainstVerdict
H1: A threat actor rebranded ARTEXInternet-exposed console on default ports; shares the ARTEX fingerprint and JARMThe wildcard certificate belongs to a registered Korean company; no hostile traffic seen from these hostsPlausible, unproven
H2: A Korean security vendor white-labeled ARTEX for clientsLiteral translation of the product subtitle; AWS Seoul hosting under a company domainLeaving the console exposed without mutual TLS is poor practice for a vendorPlausible
H3: Unrelated web app that happens to matchNoneExact 15,406-byte favicon match and identical DOM and API layoutRejected

The 76-organization archive in Chapter 2 came from a separate server in Europe. Nothing in it points to the Korean nodes or their domain, so it does not argue against H2.

Because a legitimate vendor (H2) remains plausible, we withhold the brand, the certificate domain and both addresses. Treat this fingerprint as "send to analyst review", not "block", until hostile activity is documented.

A localized portal that does not qualify

Not every localized portal is a fork. A host on Alibaba Cloud (CN), port 8080, shows a Chinese login page titled 用户登录 - 智测工具 ("User Login - Smart Testing Tool"). It is listed as a suspected HexStrikeAI node.

It did not serve the ARTEX favicon, and nothing else ties it to the framework. We treat it as a suspected local testing workbench and withhold its address.

5. One Server, Many Tools: Co-Hosting

In short

Operators often put several AI offense consoles and a payload dropzone on one rented server. Of 2,917 hosts, 103 carry two or more framework labels, and one hub shows the full pattern.

The 103 multi-label hosts

Not every multi-label host is a confirmed multi-framework deployment. The breakdown below separates them by strength of evidence.

CategoryHostsShareExample
Two confirmed frameworks10.97%144.172.68[.]197: ARTEX on 80 and CyberStrikeAI on 8443
One confirmed framework plus a weaker companion7067.96%38.76.218[.]100: DeepAudit on 8000, suspected HexStrikeAI on 5000; 45.144.137[.]148: ARTEX on 80, workbench on 8080
Two or more suspected or candidate frameworks, none confirmed3130.10%VPS clusters on PEG TECH INC and Cloudie Limited (8787 with 8443 or 8666)
Flagship hub with confirmed PentAGI, a dropzone and a candidate ARTEX port10.97%38.127.244[.]14
Total103100.0%

Together they make up 3.53% of all hosts.

Case study: 38.127.244[.]14

This host sits on Cogent Communications / Tcloudnet in the United States (AS399077). It combines an AI orchestrator with an exploit test dropzone.

Figure 4: Host 38.127.244[.]14 co-locates PentAGI, ARTEX and a polyglot webshell dropzone
Figure 4: Host 38.127.244[.]14 co-locates PentAGI, ARTEX and a polyglot webshell dropzone
PortServiceFingerprintStatus
8443/tcpPentAGI orchestrator<title>PentAGI</title>, CN=localhost, JARM 28d28d28d00028d00042d42d000000831b6af40378e2dd35eeac4e9311926e, /api/v1/graphqlConfirmed
8787/tcpARTEX listenerARTEX default portCandidate, watched because it shares a host with confirmed PentAGI
8089/tcpOpen directory dropzoneSimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/3.10.12Open directory confirmed

The PentAGI certificate subject CN=localhost is common across the fleet. It appears on 61 of the 340 PentAGI endpoints (8 confirmed, 53 candidates). Upstream default deployments present CN=pentagi instead.

What the dropzone held

Port 8089 served an unauthenticated directory. It held four small test stubs: .htaccess, test_polyglot.png, avatar_loader.jpg and health.txt. It also held larger staged files from the subagents.

FileSize (bytes)SHA-256Purpose
/.htaccess161WithheldAdds AddType application/x-httpd-php .jpg .png .gif, so a permissive Apache server would run uploaded images as PHP (T1505.003)
/logo_avatar_probe.png2,480WithheldValid PNG header followed by a pentagi_upload_verify marker, used to check whether an upload landed
Recon output archive (name withheld)184,320WithheldCompressed nuclei JSONL logs and httpx live-host tables from Docker workers
/graphql_introspection_dump.json42,910WithheldGraphQL __schema introspection output from an API recon worker
/mcp_tools_manifest.json8,740WithheldMCP tool descriptor exposing nuclei_scan, sqlmap_audit and ffuf_dir_fuzz to the LLM planner

These are staged files. Their presence shows intent and tooling. It does not show that any upload worked against a real target.

6. Who the Swarm Targeted

In short

The exposed ARTEX archive covers 76 organizations in 18 verticals. Payment, Web3 and online gambling firms take most of the effort.

Figure 5: Fintech, Web3 and iGaming absorb most of the studied swarm targeting scopes
Figure 5: Fintech, Web3 and iGaming absorb most of the studied swarm targeting scopes

All 76 targets are anonymized. No names, domains or addresses of target organizations appear in this report.

Payments and Fintech (21 organizations, 27.63%) and Web3, DeFi and Stablecoin (20 organizations, 26.32%) together make up 53.95% of the targets. They also account for 52.87% of the enumerated subdomains (7,330 of 13,864).

SectorVerticalsOrgsShareSubdomainsLive FQDNsLabeled critical or highWorkersClaimed finding types
Payments and Fintech42127.63%3,910318108 to 16API auth bypass, exposed .env and payment keys, SQL injection
Web3, DeFi and Stablecoin42026.32%3,42028498 to 16RPC and GraphQL introspection, cloud secret leaks, exposed admin consoles
Enterprise Tech and Cloud SaaS31114.47%1,98015954 to 12CI/CD webhook and .git exposure, SSRF, multi-tenant API IDOR
iGaming and Online Casino21013.16%1,89414658 to 16High-volume sqlmap and nuclei sweeps (1,231 runs on one task)
Banking and Insurance3810.53%1,42011234 to 12Dangling subdomain candidates, legacy TLS and VPN portal enumeration
Crypto Exchanges267.89%1,24086316 (max 2,178 runs)Sustained 16-worker sweeps (2,178 runs on one task), key-leak claims
Total1876100.0%13,8641,10535 (46.05%)1 to 1617 critical, 18 high

The swarm's 17 critical labels split into 3 claimed remote code execution or full-access scopes and 14 claimed credential or data exposure scopes. Like the high labels, these are the LLM writer's own classification of scanner output. They are not confirmed breaches.

The finding types still help defenders. They show what a swarm looks for first: .env files, .git folders, GraphQL introspection, open admin consoles and payment API keys.

7. What Defenders Should Do

Within 24 hours

  • Block inbound and outbound traffic to the 1,820 confirmed endpoints on stable hosting, starting with the 14 block entries in the Indicators chapter.
  • Put the 30 dynamic-ISP endpoints on a watchlist that expires after 24 to 72 hours.
  • Send the Korean fork fingerprint and other unattributed forks to analyst review, not to the block list.

Within 72 hours

  • Set AllowOverride None on every user-writable upload directory, and turn off script execution there (php_flag engine off or RemoveHandler .php .phtml).
  • Turn off GraphQL __schema introspection in production.
  • Rate-limit /api/ and /graphql routes.

Within 7 to 30 days

  • Add the ARTEX favicon MD5 cd3ebd16437d6d3963592f7365dd3980 and the JARM values 28d28d...926e and 40d40d...9319 to external attack surface hunting.
  • Deploy the scan-burst query at the web edge: alert on 25 or more distinct URIs from one source in 5 minutes.
  • Watch container hosts for runtimes that spawn offensive scanners with batch flags.
  • Rotate any secret ever exposed in .env files or .git folders, since these are the first things a swarm collects.

8. Detection Rules

The full rules are in the Detection rules tab. Each file targets a signal that survives a rebrand.

Rule fileWhat it catches
odin_autonomous_ai_redteam_fleets.rulesSuricata 7: eight signatures for ARTEX, PentAGI, HexStrikeAI and DeepAudit consoles, task APIs and the .htaccess polyglot
sentinel_autonomous_swarm_scanner_correlation.kqlMicrosoft Sentinel and Defender XDR: contact with confirmed controllers, multi-tool container bursts, and web scan bursts
sigma_docker_subagent_offensive_tool_spawning.ymlSigma (3 rules): container runtimes spawning scanners, .htaccess or polyglot file creation, and swarm output files
odin_autonomous_offense_whitelabel_artifacts.yarYARA (4 rules): ARTEX and fork console bundles, PentAGI configs, HexStrikeAI MCP servers, and polyglot dropzone files

How the Suricata signatures work

SIDLooks forWhy
9511001Korean title bytes 공격·방어 보안 운영 plus artex-swarm-root, /api/v1/tasks or the favicon hash text in an HTTP responseCatches the Korean fork even without the word ARTEX
9511002ARTEX with the English or Chinese subtitle in an HTTP responseCatches upstream consoles
9511003Outbound POST /api/v1/tasks with subagent_concurrency and target_scope in the bodyCatches an internal host dispatching swarm tasks (T1595.002)
9511004Outbound POST /api/v1/graphql with subagents and createFlow, subagentLogs, pentagi_worker or spawnSubagentCatches PentAGI flow creation (T1609)
9511005TLS certificate subject CN=pentagi or CN=localhost from ports 8443, 8666 or 8444Low-confidence hunt only; pair with SID 9511004 or a JARM match before acting
9511006Outbound POST /mcp with jsonrpc, tools/call and a tool name such as nmap, nuclei or sqlmapCatches an MCP bridge driving offensive tools (T1059.006)
9511007DeepAudit with repository_audit, vulnerability_agent or llm_code_scanner from ports 8000 or 3000Catches DeepAudit consoles
9511008AddType application/x-httpd-php .jpg .png in an HTTP bodyCatches the polyglot .htaccess in transit (T1505.003)

Suricata cannot hash a favicon in transit. SID 9511001 therefore matches the page text, and the favicon MD5 check runs separately in any EASM tool. A simple fetch of /favicon.ico piped to md5sum is enough.

How the other rules work

The KQL query has three branches and a 7-day lookback. It carries the 13 confirmed controller addresses from the Indicators chapter. The first branch flags devices that contact those addresses, or use ports 8787, 8443, 8666, 8000 or 8899 from python3, curl, docker and similar processes. The second flags a container runtime or orchestrator that starts two or more scanners within 10 minutes.

The third branch reads IIS web logs. It counts distinct URIs per source IP in 5-minute bins before filtering. It alerts at 25 or more distinct URIs, or at 10 or more when the user agent names a tool such as nuclei, sqlmap or ffuf. Counting first means rotated user agents do not hide the burst.

The first Sigma rule needs three things together: a parent such as containerd-shim-runc-v2, dockerd or pentagi; a child such as nuclei, sqlmap or naabu; and a batch flag such as -jsonl, --batch or -rate-limit. Authorized breach-simulation runners are the main false positive.

The second Sigma rule flags a Python, PHP, Apache or PentAGI process that creates /.htaccess or /logo_avatar_probe.png. One such event alone is weak. Correlate events in the same directory within 5 minutes, or confirm the file content with YARA. The third Sigma rule flags files ending in _credential_inventory_01.json, _findings_summary.json, /graphql_introspection_dump.json or /mcp_tools_manifest.json.

Each YARA rule needs at least two independent strings, so a single word does not fire it.

YARA ruleFires when
ODIN_ARTEX_Whitelabel_ConsoleAn ARTEX title (English, Chinese or Korean) appears with /api/v1/tasks, artex-swarm-root or the favicon hash text, or the hash appears with either route marker
ODIN_PentAGI_Subagent_Orchestrator_ArtifactPentAGI appears with two of /api/v1/graphql, pgvector, /var/run/docker.sock, vxcontrol/kali and createFlow
ODIN_HexStrikeAI_MCP_Offensive_Tool_Serverhexstrike or the Chinese portal title appears with an MCP marker and at least three tool names
ODIN_Polyglot_Htaccess_PHP_Webshell_DropzoneAddType with application/x-httpd-php and an image extension, or an image header followed by PHP code

How to sort a host

The triage logic turns the signals above into an action. It never blocks on uncorroborated evidence. Its routing follows the logic of this report.

What the host showsAction
Several consoles plus a dropzone on one serverBlock
A confirmed framework controller on stable hostingBlock
A confirmed framework on a dynamic telecom ISPWatchlist for 24 hours
A rebranded fork with no documented hostile activityAnalyst review
A localized portal with only a title matchAnalyst review
A generic Werkzeug header with no favicon or MCP matchDo not block
An internal, authorized breach-simulation runnerAllowlist

9. Indicators

The Indicators tab holds the 14 confirmed controller endpoints. The other 14 records in the selected set appear in this report only, or are withheld.

TypeCount
Confirmed controller endpoints to block (IP and port)14
Watchlist or review endpoints6 (3 on confirmed hosts listed below, 3 withheld)
File hashes (withheld: values not verified against the acquisition record)8

Supporting fingerprints: one favicon MD5 (cd3ebd16437d6d3963592f7365dd3980), the JARM values named in this report, and the certificate subjects CN=localhost, CN=pentagi, CN=supershell, CN=artex.dwwork[.]live and CN=vps.notelab[.]cc.

Confirmed endpoints to block

EndpointFrameworkCountryKey fingerprintSeen
112.213.123[.]38:80ARTEXHKartex.112.213.123.38.sslip[.]io, ARTEX favicon13 Nov 2026
45.156.87[.]185:443ARTEXUSCN=artex.dwwork[.]live, JARM 2ad2ad...f06b16 Nov 2026
8.135.3[.]123:80ARTEXCNTitle ARTEX - 攻防安全运营, ARTEX favicon17 Nov 2026
8.135.30[.]162:443ARTEXCNTitle ARTEX - 攻防安全运营, JARM 15d3fd...e33117 Nov 2026
144.172.118[.]88:443CyberStrikeAIUSAlso 8899, open directory13 Nov 2026
38.76.218[.]100:8000DeepAuditHKShares host with HexStrikeAI on 500013 Nov 2026
205.186.67[.]47:8089CyberStrikeAIMYCN=supershell, JARM 40d40d...931913 Nov 2026
45.144.137[.]148:80ARTEXNLOpen HTTP workbench on 808017 Nov 2026
144.172.68[.]197:80ARTEXUSTwo confirmed frameworks on one host17 Nov 2026
144.172.68[.]197:8443CyberStrikeAIUSCN=144.172.68[.]19717 Nov 2026
38.127.244[.]14:8443PentAGIUS<title>PentAGI</title>, CN=localhost, dropzone on 808917 Nov 2026
47.120.40[.]104:8000DeepAuditCNLLM source-code audit workbench13 Nov 2026
82.208.23[.]183:8443PentAGIGBCN=vps.notelab[.]cc, JARM 40d40d...efa814 Nov 2026
134.122.200[.]96:8443PentAGISGCN=localhost, JARM 3fd3fd...99fb, GraphQL API14 Nov 2026

The three published watchlist entries sit on hosts listed above: 38.76.218[.]100:5000 (suspected HexStrikeAI), 38.127.244[.]14:8787 (candidate ARTEX) and 45.144.137[.]148:8080 (open workbench). All eight file hashes from the dropzone and the exposed archive are withheld, because their values could not be checked against the acquisition record.

FileSize (bytes)SHA-256
Credential inventory, part 1 (..._credential_inventory_01.json)19,340Withheld
Credential inventory, part 2 (..._credential_inventory_02.json)31,280Withheld
Findings summary (..._findings_summary.json)54,610Withheld

Withheld: the two Korean fork addresses and their domain, the archive server and its paths, the 30 dynamic-ISP addresses, the benign collision host, and all suspected or candidate addresses on hosts not listed above.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

TacticTechniqueHow the fleet uses itDetection
Resource DevelopmentT1583.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services4,360 endpoints on rented hosting; regional ARTEX forksSID 9511001, 9511002; YARA ARTEX console rule
Resource DevelopmentT1587.003 Develop Capabilities: Digital CertificatesDefault or self-chosen certificates: CN=localhost, CN=vps.notelab[.]cc, CN=artex.dwwork[.]live, CN=CyberStrikeAISID 9511005 (hunt), JARM 28d28d...926e and 3fd3fd...99fb
ReconnaissanceT1595.002 Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning1 to 16 worker pools; 13,864 subdomains and 1,105 live FQDNsSID 9511003, 9511007; KQL burst branch
ExecutionT1609 Container Administration CommandPentAGI starts Docker-in-Docker Kali workers through GraphQL createFlowSID 9511004; YARA PentAGI rule; Sigma rule 1
ExecutionT1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PythonMCP tools/call bridges to nmap, nuclei, sqlmap, gobusterSID 9511006; YARA HexStrikeAI rule
PersistenceT1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell.htaccess MIME override and PNG/PHP polyglot probes staged on 38.127.244[.]14:8089SID 9511008; YARA polyglot rule; Sigma rule 2
CollectionT1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via UtilityRecon logs and LLM-written credential inventories packed into JSON and archive filesSigma rule 3; file names above

10. Scope and Limits

  • Window. The findings cover a two-week observation window ending 18 November 2026. Some records carry earlier first-seen dates from public sources; we do not use those as a tracking start.
  • Confirmed is not the same as hostile. A confirmed endpoint runs the framework. For 3 confirmed endpoints, hostile use is not shown, and some operators may be authorized testers.
  • Candidates are leads. The 2,397 candidates are hunting leads. Do not block them without corroboration.
  • No growth claims. The data supports counts in the window, not trends over time for any framework.
  • The archive speaks for the attacker. Worker counts, severity labels and claimed findings come from the swarm's own logs and LLM reports. We did not confirm any of them on a target system.
  • One archive, one campaign. The 76 targets come from one exposed ARTEX archive. Nothing links it to the Korean fork, and it may not represent other operators.
  • Rule testing. Every published rule file loads without errors in its engine (Suricata 7.0.12, YARA-X, pySigma and Microsoft's Kusto.Language analyzer, checked on 20 November 2026). The rules were not replayed against live traffic, so test and tune them in your own environment before production use.

11. Sources

  1. VXControl. PentAGI repository. https://github.com/vxcontrol/pentagi (verified 18 November 2026)
  2. Ed1s0nZ. CyberStrikeAI repository. https://github.com/Ed1s0nZ/CyberStrikeAI (verified 18 November 2026)
  3. 0x4m4. HexStrikeAI MCP Agents repository. https://github.com/0x4m4/hexstrike-ai (verified 18 November 2026)
  4. Model Context Protocol. Specification. https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/ (verified 18 November 2026)
  5. MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Matrix. https://attack.mitre.org/ (verified 18 November 2026)
  6. Apache HTTP Server 2.4 documentation, .htaccess files. https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/howto/htaccess.html (verified 18 November 2026)
  7. Salesforce. JARM TLS server fingerprinting. https://github.com/salesforce/jarm (verified 18 November 2026)
  8. AhnLab ASEC. Analysis of the infrastructure of ARTEX, a Chinese AI penetration testing tool. https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/95875 (verified 18 November 2026)
  9. Team Cymru. Tracking CyberStrikeAI usage. https://www.team-cymru.com/post/tracking-cyberstrikeai-usage (verified 18 November 2026)

What is…?

Short explanations of the tools and families named in this study.

All explanations

Frequently asked questions

What are these frameworks?

All five frameworks put a large language model in charge of classic security tools such as subfinder, nuclei and sqlmap. The operator names a target. The model breaks it into jobs and sends them to worker pools: discovery, vulnerability scanning, exploit checks and a written report.

How do operators disguise them?

Operators fork the ARTEX console and rebrand it. They change the page title, swap the logo and add their own TLS certificate. They rarely change the small icon file the browser shows in the tab.

Why do they share servers?

Operators often stack several tools on one rented server. Of the 2,917 hosts, 103 carry labels for two or more frameworks. Only one has two fully confirmed frameworks, so most of these are leads, not proof.

Who were the targets?

An exposed ARTEX archive on a separate server lists 76 target organizations across 18 industry verticals. We anonymized all of them. The swarm enumerated 13,864 subdomains and found 1,105 of them live.

Defender kit

Indicators of compromise

Verified adversary infrastructure and tool hashes from this study. Every value below is also discussed in the report.

IDTypeIndicatorPortContextAction
R11-IOC-01 IPv4 112.213.123[.]38 80 ARTEX Block
R11-IOC-02 IPv4 45.156.87[.]185 443 ARTEX Block
R11-IOC-03 IPv4 8.135.3[.]123 80 ARTEX Block
R11-IOC-04 IPv4 8.135.30[.]162 443 ARTEX Block
R11-IOC-05 IPv4 144.172.118[.]88 443 CyberStrikeAI + Open Workbench Block
R11-IOC-06 IPv4 38.76.218[.]100 8000 DeepAudit (Co-hosted with HexStrikeAI) Block
R11-IOC-07 IPv4 205.186.67[.]47 8089 CyberStrikeAI + SuperShell Block
R11-IOC-08 IPv4 45.144.137[.]148 80 ARTEX + Open Workbench Block
R11-IOC-09 IPv4 144.172.68[.]197 80 ARTEX (Co-hosted with CyberStrikeAI) Block
R11-IOC-10 IPv4 144.172.68[.]197 8443 CyberStrikeAI (Co-hosted with ARTEX) Block
R11-IOC-11 IPv4 38.127.244[.]14 8443 PentAGI (Co-hosted with ARTEX & Dropzone) Block
R11-IOC-12 IPv4 47.120.40[.]104 8000 DeepAudit Block
R11-IOC-13 IPv4 82.208.23[.]183 8443 PentAGI Block
R11-IOC-14 IPv4 134.122.200[.]96 8443 PentAGI Block

14 records from this study are not published in this table: candidate, suspected and dual-use hosts, victim-related values, and hashes of exposed secrets or files.

Defender kit

Detection rules

The rule files exactly as printed in the report. Test them in your own engine before deployment.

Suricata odin_autonomous_ai_redteam_fleets.rules 30 lines
Download
YARA odin_autonomous_offense_whitelabel_artifacts.yar 96 lines
Download
Sentinel KQL sentinel_autonomous_swarm_scanner_correlation.kql 67 lines
Download
Sigma sigma_docker_subagent_offensive_tool_spawning.yml 124 lines
Download