In short
RedJuliett is a suspected Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage group named by Recorded Future's Insikt Group. It mainly targets Taiwan, exploiting internet-facing firewalls, VPNs and load balancers, then using SoftEther VPN to hide its traffic. Insikt says it overlaps with groups reported as Flax Typhoon and Ethereal Panda, and it likely operates from Fuzhou, China.
Key takeaways
- Who it is
- A suspected Chinese state-sponsored espionage group, per Insikt Group, overlapping with Microsoft's Flax Typhoon and the name Ethereal Panda.
- How it works
- It exploits internet-facing perimeter devices, plants web shells and builds SoftEther VPN bridges inside victim networks to keep access over HTTPS.
- Why it matters
- Insikt reported 24 victim organizations from November 2023 to April 2024, plus probing of more than 70 Taiwanese organizations.
- What Odin Research saw
- 6 RedJuliett-labeled endpoints in Monograph 21, all suspected: 3 SoftEther bridges with the default certificate and 2 Azure staging machines.
- What to do first
- Patch edge devices fast, allow SoftEther only on named jump hosts, and alert on renamed vpnbridge binaries and SoftEther tunnel traffic.
Who is RedJuliett?
RedJuliett is a suspected Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage group tracked by Recorded Future's Insikt Group. It mainly targets organizations in Taiwan by exploiting internet-facing firewalls, VPNs and load balancers. It then uses SoftEther VPN software to tunnel traffic and keep access. Insikt assesses it likely operates from Fuzhou, China.
Insikt Group says RedJuliett closely overlaps with public reporting under two other names: Flax Typhoon, Microsoft's name, and Ethereal Panda. Different vendors see different slices of activity, so the names are not always perfect matches. See our glossary entry on attribution for why.
RedJuliett is an advanced persistent threat in the classic sense: it wants long-term, quiet access for intelligence collection, not quick money.
How RedJuliett operates
Insikt Group's report, which covers November 2023 to April 2024, and Microsoft's 2023 report on Flax Typhoon describe a consistent playbook:
- Edge exploitation. RedJuliett targets perimeter devices such as firewalls, VPNs and load balancers. Microsoft says Flax Typhoon exploits known flaws in public-facing VPN, web, Java and SQL applications. See Exploit Public-Facing Application.
- Web shells. Insikt reports open-source web shells. Microsoft names China Chopper as an example payload.
- Privilege escalation and credentials. Microsoft reports Juicy Potato and BadPotato for local system rights, and frequent use of Mimikatz to dump credentials.
- SoftEther tunnels. RedJuliett creates SoftEther VPN bridges or clients inside victim networks. Microsoft says the actor almost always renames
vpnbridge.exetoconhost.exeordllhost.exe, and uses SoftEther's VPN-over-HTTPS mode on port 443. - Living off the land. Microsoft describes heavy use of built-in tools such as PowerShell, certutil, bitsadmin, WMIC and WinRM.
Insikt adds that RedJuliett also used the Acunetix web scanner and attempted SQL injection and directory traversal. Its own operational infrastructure ran on SoftEther, using leased servers and infrastructure belonging to Taiwanese universities.
RedJuliett targets and activity
Insikt Group reported that between November 2023 and April 2024, RedJuliett gained access to 24 organizations. They were in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Laos, South Korea, the United States, Djibouti, Kenya and Rwanda. It also ran reconnaissance or attempted exploitation against more than 70 organizations in Taiwan, including several de facto embassies.
Targeted sectors were government, academic, technology, diplomatic and think tank organizations. Microsoft's Flax Typhoon report, from August 2023, listed Taiwanese government agencies and education, critical manufacturing and IT organizations, with some victims in Southeast Asia, North America and Africa.
In October 2026, a joint advisory, AA26-281A, said the actors it covers use tactics consistent with Flax Typhoon, Ethereal Panda and "Red Juliett". It describes SoftEther VPN clients installed for persistence, fetched with PowerShell, curl or wget and often disguised as Windows executables.
What Odin Research observed
Monograph 21 mapped 79 endpoints across eight clusters that threat feeds label with group names, including RedJuliett. These names are feed labels, not Odin's attribution.
- Six endpoints, all suspected. All six RedJuliett-labeled endpoints sat on six separate hosts, and none is confirmed C2.
- Three SoftEther bridges. Three hosts ran SoftEther VPN bridges on port 443, on Microsoft Azure in India, Hetzner in Germany and Alibaba in Hong Kong. All kept the default
CN=softethercertificate. The India and Hong Kong bridges shared a SoftEther JARM prefix. - Two staging machines. Two Microsoft Azure machines in the United States served Remote Desktop on port 3389 with the same self-signed certificate,
CN=testvm2. Matching names suggest one templated Windows image. - One relay. A sixth host on a regional telecom network in North Macedonia ran a relay on port 443.
The pattern fits the public reporting: VPN bridges on one set of providers, staging hosts on another. But SoftEther and Azure test machines have common legitimate uses. That is why Monograph 21 keeps all six hosts on a watchlist and publishes no addresses.
How to detect RedJuliett activity
- SoftEther where it should not be. Alert on
vpnclient_x64.exe,vpnbridge_x64.exe,vpncmd.exeor theSEVPNCLIENTservice outside named jump hosts. - Renamed Windows binaries. A
conhost.exeordllhost.exeoutsideSystem32, or one whose version data names SoftEther, is a strong lead. - SoftEther tunnel traffic. SoftEther sessions use HTTPS
POSTrequests to/vpnsvc/connect.cgiwith aVPNCONNECThandshake. You need TLS inspection to see them. - Default certificates. Outbound connections to servers presenting
CN=softetheron port 443. - Web shells on edge and web servers. Watch web server processes that start shells,
certutilorbitsadmin. See web shells.
Monograph 21 publishes Suricata signatures for the SoftEther default certificate and tunnel setup, a Sigma rule for SoftEther tools and a Sentinel KQL hunt with a SoftEther branch. Microsoft has also published hunting queries for SoftEther activity. Odin's rules are in the Defense Kit.
How to defend against RedJuliett
- Patch edge devices first. Insikt recommends prioritizing remote code execution flaws in VPN, mail, firewall and load-balancing appliances. Track items in the KEV catalog.
- Segment and isolate. Put internet-facing services in a DMZ and monitor them for web shells, backdoors and reverse shells, as Insikt advises.
- Control VPN software. Allow SoftEther only on named network jump hosts and block it elsewhere with application control.
- Protect credentials. Microsoft recommends strong MFA, LAPS for local administrator passwords and LSASS protections such as Credential Guard.
- Watch partners. Insikt also advises monitoring key vendors and partners for signs of intrusion.
RedJuliett compared with other feed-labeled clusters
Monograph 21 grouped eight feed-labeled clusters. These are labels on servers, not attributions.
| Cluster label | Role in Monograph 21 | Endpoints (hosts) | Confirmed C2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| RedJuliett | SoftEther relays, Azure staging | 6 (6) | 0 |
| ShadowPad | Modular backdoor | 3 (3) | 2 |
| PlugX | Side-loaded modular C2 | 7 (6) | 0 |
| Kimsuky | Staging and PHP gates | 12 (10) | 7 |
Frequently asked questions about RedJuliett
Who is RedJuliett?
RedJuliett is a suspected Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage group named by Recorded Future's Insikt Group. It mainly targets Taiwan and is assessed to likely operate from Fuzhou, China.
Is RedJuliett the same as Flax Typhoon?
Insikt Group says RedJuliett closely overlaps with public reporting on Flax Typhoon, Microsoft's name for the actor, and Ethereal Panda. Vendors track activity differently, so the overlap may not be exact.
What does RedJuliett target?
Government, academic, technology, diplomatic and think tank organizations, mainly in Taiwan. Insikt reported victims in nine countries and probing of more than 70 Taiwanese organizations.
How does RedJuliett get in?
It exploits internet-facing perimeter devices such as firewalls, VPNs and load balancers, then plants web shells. Microsoft says Flax Typhoon exploits known flaws in public-facing servers.
Why does RedJuliett use SoftEther VPN?
SoftEther is legitimate VPN software that can tunnel traffic over HTTPS on port 443. Renamed SoftEther bridges let the actor keep access and blend in with normal web traffic.
How do I detect RedJuliett?
Alert on SoftEther binaries or services outside approved hosts, renamed conhost.exe or dllhost.exe files, SoftEther tunnel requests and default CN=softether certificates. Odin Research publishes Suricata, Sigma and KQL rules for these signals.
Does Odin Research attribute servers to RedJuliett?
No. Monograph 21 uses RedJuliett as a threat-feed label on six suspected servers. It does not tie any address to the group.
Sources
- Recorded Future Insikt Group, "Chinese State-Sponsored RedJuliett Intensifies Taiwanese Cyber Espionage via Network Perimeter Exploitation". www.recordedfuture.com/research/redjuliett-intensifies-taiwanese-cyber-espionage-via-network-perimeter (checked 21 November 2026)
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence, "Flax Typhoon using legitimate software to quietly access Taiwanese organizations", 24 August 2023. www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/08/24/flax-typhoon-using-legitimate-software-to-quietly-access-taiwanese-organizations/ (checked 21 November 2026)
- CISA, Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA26-281A, 8 October 2026. www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-281a (checked 21 November 2026)
Related tools and terms
What is Overlord?
Overlord is a C2 family label used in threat feeds. Odin reports quote it as the feed's own label, not as an attribution.
Feed labelWhat is DarkSword?
DarkSword is a family label from an upstream threat feed for multi-port TLS and HTTP C2 servers. It names a fingerprint group, not an actor.
Detection heuristicWhat is Daybreak?
Daybreak is a public JA4X-based C2 heuristic. On port 3306 it also matches ordinary MySQL servers, which makes it a well-known source of false positives.
Feed labelWhat is HypeAgent?
HypeAgent is a C2 family label used in threat feeds. Many endpoints with this label present a default Kubernetes ingress certificate.
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