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Full reportTLS interceptionMonograph 18 / 1917 min read

Exposed Root CA Keys: Rogue Proxies, Yakit Suites and PowerSploit Staging

How a leaked mitmproxy signing key, proxy auto-config scripts, GUI attack workbenches and a PowerSploit tree fit one defensive picture

By
Odin by Brandefense
Published
19 November 2026
Reading time
17 min read
Edition
Version 1.1 · TLP:CLEAR
Scope
Prepared November 2026

1. Executive Summary

In short

Odin by Brandefense found an open server exposing a mitmproxy root CA private key, a separate 314-file PowerSploit staging server, and 2,992 proxy, workbench and phishing endpoints. Nothing links these to one operator, so we group them in an analytical model, not a campaign. A leaked root key lets anyone sign certificates that every endpoint trusting that root will accept. Audit your root certificate stores for mitmproxy roots, and lock proxy auto-config settings to approved corporate hosts.

TLS interception tools such as mitmproxy are standard kit for developers and red teams. They become dangerous when their root certificate sits in an endpoint's trust store and the private key is no longer private. This report looks at two exposed servers and five tool fleets that cover reconnaissance, phishing, interception and post-exploitation staging.

1

An open server exposed a mitmproxy root CA private key.

Server A, on Scaleway in France, served 9 files (11.89 MB). They include the mitmproxy root CA in PEM and PKCS#12 form with the private key, a 300-byte proxy auto-config script and two 5.94 MB logs. Its address and port are withheld so nobody can fetch the key.

2

Five tool fleets cover recon, lures and TLS interception.

We counted 2,992 endpoints on 2,170 IPv4 addresses running mitmproxy, GoPhish, ScopeSentry, YakitSecurityTool and Nemo. Of 2,066 mitmproxy endpoints, 208 are confirmed or suspected interception listeners. Yakit has the densest high-signal share: 26 of 34 endpoints.

3

A 314-file staging server pairs lures with PowerSploit loaders.

Server B, on DigitalOcean in the United States, holds 314 files in 33 directories. They include OS-specific redirect pages, phishing templates and a 159-file PowerSploit tree with reflective loaders and raw NTFS parsers. Folder names suggest an authorized assessment, and no use against a target is shown.

Three Decisions for Leaders

  1. Audit root certificate stores and block unapproved imports. Compare endpoint root stores with your approved PKI thumbprints. Remove any mitmproxy root that nobody approved, and alert on command-line certificate imports.
  2. Lock proxy auto-config to approved gateways. Set the browser AutoConfigURL value through Group Policy or MDM. Watch browser egress to ports 8080, 18080, 31280 and 32300 when a PAC or certificate signal backs it up.
  3. Treat a leaked key differently from an assessment workspace. Use Server A's key material for root-store cleanup and historical hunting. Keep Server B and uncorroborated recon consoles on review watchlists, not automatic block lists.

The Study in Numbers

NumberWhat it is
9 filesRoot CA keys and certificates, a proxy auto-config script and two 5.94 MB logs on Server A (11.89 MB in total)
314Files in 33 directories on Server B, including 159 PowerSploit files
2,992Proxy, workbench and phishing endpoints on 2,170 unique IPv4 addresses, across five tool families
208Confirmed or suspected mitmproxy interception listeners, out of 2,066 mitmproxy endpoints
152Actionable GoPhish lure servers, out of 766 GoPhish endpoints
26 of 34Yakit (Yaklang) backends that are confirmed or suspected (76.5%)
9Published indicators: Server B file SHA-256 hashes (6 host entries and 9 file hashes withheld)

How to use this report.

Security leaders can read Chapter 1 and Chapter 7. PKI and endpoint teams should read Chapters 3 and 5, then the checklist in Chapter 7. Detection engineers should start with Chapters 8 and 9.

2. One Model, Four Roles

In short

The two servers and five fleets are not linked to one actor. We use a four-role analytical model to show how these capabilities could chain, and where a defender can break the chain.

What the model is and is not

No shared credential, TLS certificate or network flow links Server A, Server B and the five fleets. The four roles below are an analytical model. They describe capabilities, not an observed campaign. Lure delivery, trust-store installation and session interception are all unverified.

Figure 1: Hypothetical four-role model maps ASM recon, PAC lures, TLS MITM and PE staging
Figure 1: Hypothetical four-role model maps ASM recon, PAC lures, TLS MITM and PE staging

What we looked at

ClusterHostingSizeHow to treat itRole in the model
Server A: exposed root CAScaleway, France9 filesBlock list for root-store cleanup, after a fresh ownership checkmitmproxy root keys, proxy.pac and two logs
Server B: staged engagement treeDigitalOcean, United States314 filesWatchlist and hunt159 PowerSploit files, powercat.ps1, OS redirect pages and lures
mitmproxy fleet1,345 IPs2,066 endpointsHunt and watchProgrammable TLS interception proxies, led by 32300 (505), 8080 (192), 8081 (125) and 18080 (25)
GoPhish fleet672 IPs766 endpointsHunt and watchPhishing panels, led by 3333 (417) and 443 (127)
ScopeSentry fleet118 IPs120 endpointsWatchlistAttack surface consoles, led by 8082 (101)
Yakit (Yaklang) fleet31 IPs34 endpointsHunt and watchMITM, fuzzing, PoC scanning and reverse-listener backends on 443 and 8087
Nemo fleet6 IPs6 endpoints, all confirmedWatchlistAutomated asset discovery consoles on 5000

The four roles

RoleCapabilityWhat we sawWhat is not shown
1. Surface discoveryEnumerate subdomains, ports and admin pathsScopeSentry (120 endpoints, 101 on 8082), Nemo (6 on 5000), and admin.txt and sharepoint.txt wordlists on Server BAny link from these consoles to Server B
2. Lure and PAC deliveryHost lures that ask a user to import a root CA or set an external proxy.pac URLGoPhish panels on 3333; OS-specific redirect pages on Server B; proxy.pac and the public CA certificate on Server AAny delivery from these servers. No .pac or .cer page was seen on GoPhish endpoints
3. TLS interceptionDivert browser traffic and sign leaf certificates on the flymitmproxy listeners on 8080 and 18080; Yakit on 443 and 8087; the exposed root key on Server AAny intercepted session
4. Post-exploitation stagingHold in-memory loaders and relays for downloadReflective PE and DLL loaders, NTFS parsers and powercat.ps1 on Server BAny execution on a target

3. The Exposed Root CA on Server A

In short

Server A exposed a full mitmproxy root CA, with the private key, next to a proxy auto-config script and two large logs. Anyone holding that key can forge certificates for any domain on endpoints that trust the root.

Figure 2: Five tool families link TLS root keystores, Yaklang suites and PE loaders
Figure 2: Five tool families link TLS root keystores, Yaklang suites and PE loaders

What the server held

Server A sits on Scaleway SAS in France. Its open directory listed 9 files totaling 11,891,086 bytes. The server was first seen before this window. We could not confirm that it was still online in November, so check liveness and ownership before any network block.

The address and port are withheld because the directory may still be reachable. Private key material and the client addresses inside the two logs are also withheld. The file names below are mitmproxy defaults, so hunters can search for them on their own systems.

File nameSize (bytes)What it exposes
http_server.log5,940,980HTTP access log recording external fetches of proxy.pac and certificates
nohup.out5,940,468Output of a background HTTP or proxy process
mitmproxy-ca.pem2,851Unencrypted PEM bundle with the root CA private key and certificate
mitmproxy-ca.p122,338PKCS#12 keystore with the root CA private signing key
mitmproxy-ca-cert.cer1,172Public root CA certificate, in the format Windows uses for trust import
mitmproxy-ca-cert.pem1,172The same public certificate in PEM form (same file hash as the .cer)
mitmproxy-ca-cert.p121,035PKCS#12 wrapper of the public certificate, without the private key
mitmproxy-dhparam.pem770Diffie-Hellman parameters generated by mitmproxy
proxy.pac300JavaScript FindProxyForURL policy that steers browser traffic to an external proxy

Why a leaked root key matters

mitmproxy creates its own root CA. To intercept HTTPS, an endpoint must trust that root. This happens in red-team tests, developer setups and rogue proxy schemes alike.

Once the root sits in the Trusted Root Certification Authorities store, its key can sign a certificate for any domain. That includes *.microsoftonline[.]com, internal single sign-on portals and banking sites. The endpoint will accept those certificates without a warning.

The usual safeguard is that only the person who ran mitmproxy holds the key. On Server A, the key sat in an open directory. Any third party who fetched it gained the same signing power over every endpoint that trusts this root.

A note for hunters: Windows root-store queries use the SHA-1 thumbprint of the decoded certificate (X509Certificate2.Thumbprint), not a file hash. Search stores by the CN=mitmproxy subject, and search disks by the default mitmproxy file names.

How a PAC file steers only the traffic that matters

A proxy auto-config (PAC) file is a small script that tells a browser which proxy to use for each URL. Setting Windows AutoConfigURL to an external proxy.pac makes the browser call FindProxyForURL(url, host) for every request.

This is quieter than a VPN. The PAC script can send chosen domains to a high-port mitmproxy listener and let all other traffic go DIRECT. Across the mitmproxy fleet, the common listener ports are shown below.

Portmitmproxy endpoints
32300505
8080192
8081125
844364
888855
1808025
3128 and 312809

Of the 2,066 mitmproxy endpoints, 15 also serve an open HTTP directory on the same host. One of these is confirmed and 14 are candidates.

4. GUI Workbenches: Yakit, ScopeSentry, Nemo and GoPhish

In short

Graphical attack suites put reconnaissance, phishing and TLS interception behind one console. We counted 34 Yakit backends, 120 ScopeSentry consoles, 6 Nemo servers and 766 GoPhish endpoints.

Figure 3: Hypothetical PAC routing and root CA imports could enable silent TLS interception
Figure 3: Hypothetical PAC routing and root CA imports could enable silent TLS interception

Figure 3 shows a hypothetical six-step sequence. A PAC fetch and a root CA import could let a mitmproxy or Yakit listener read diverted HTTPS, followed by a PowerSploit download. Every step is a capability. None was seen on a target.

Yakit and the Yaklang engine

Yakit pairs a desktop Electron GUI with a remote yak engine that speaks gRPC over TLS. One Yaklang daemon runs interactive MITM, parameter fuzzing, Nuclei-compatible PoC templates and reverse-shell listeners.

DetailValue
Endpoints34 on 31 IPs
Confirmed / suspected / candidate11 / 15 / 8
Confirmed or suspected share26 of 34 (76.5%)
Ports443 (15), 8087 (6), 80 (2); 2800 also seen
Top countriesChina (17), Hong Kong (9), United States (3)
Main hostingTencent, Alibaba, AWS

One suspected Yakit backend on Alibaba Cloud in China, port 443, was seen on 18 November 2026. Its JARM value is 29d29d20d29d29d22c42d42d000000937221baefa0b90420c8e8e41903f1d5. Its address is withheld because it is suspected, not confirmed.

ScopeSentry and Nemo

Both platforms automate subdomain enumeration, port scanning, web spidering and vulnerability correlation across distributed worker nodes.

ScopeSentry clusters on its default port 8082, with 101 of 120 endpoints (84.2%). Only 10 rank as actionable, 109 are candidates and one sits on a dynamic-ISP watchlist. One uncorroborated candidate on Hetzner in Germany, port 8082, was seen on 18 November 2026. Its address is withheld.

All 6 Nemo instances are confirmed, and all listen on 5000.

GoPhish lure infrastructure

DetailValue
Endpoints766 on 672 IPs
Actionable lure servers152 (19.8%)
Watchlist or candidate614
Ports3333 admin (417, 54.4%), 443 listener (127, 16.6%), 80 (37)
Top countriesUnited States (151), Germany (109), France (70)
Main hostingAWS, OVH, DigitalOcean

The GoPhish fleet fits credential lures. No .pac routing page or .cer onboarding page was seen on these endpoints. Using GoPhish to deliver a root CA or a PAC URL remains a hypothesis.

5. Inside Server B: PowerSploit and Lure Staging

In short

Server B is an open HTTP server holding 314 files across 33 directories, including a full PowerSploit tree and phishing material. Folder names point to an assessment workspace, so we treat it as a watchlist entry and hunt its file hashes.

Figure 4: Two open servers exposed a TLS root keystore and a 314-file engagement tree
Figure 4: Two open servers exposed a TLS root keystore and a 314-file engagement tree

What the server is

Server B sits on DigitalOcean in the United States. Its address, port and folder names are withheld. Folder names suggest a contracted red-team or awareness assessment, and some folders are named after a target organization. No working script bodies are reproduced here.

The root listing of 314 files was first seen before this window. In our two-week observation window, two PowerSploit subfolders were seen again on 18 November 2026: CodeExecution (57 files) and AntivirusBypass (4 files). Whether the rest of the tree is still online is not confirmed.

FolderFilesWhat it holds
Root314PowerSploit, phishing kits, executables and files flagged as secrets
Assessment parent folder (name withheld)183Engagement tree with cloud credential files, lures and powercat
PowerSploit/ under a target-named folder159Full PowerSploit tree (mirrored under the assessment parent)
PowerSploit/Exfiltration/58Credential helpers and NTFSParser/ (26 files; 13 in NTFSParserDLL/)
PowerSploit/CodeExecution/57Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1, Invoke-DllInjection.ps1; seen again 18 November 2026
Phishing email templates (folder name withheld)2321 email templates, 18 of them in an archive subfolder
PowerSploit/Recon/11Web path wordlists generic.txt, admin.txt, sharepoint.txt
OS redirect test folder5Landing pages windows.html, mac.html, linux.html, android.html
PowerSploit/AntivirusBypass/4Find-AVSignature.ps1 (6,583 bytes) and module manifests; seen again 18 November 2026

A sample of 95 file records across 14 extension groups shows the mix: 18 .h, 15 .cpp, 10 .txt, 7 .asm, 6 .ps1, 6 .html, 6 .vcxproj and 27 project or image files.

In-memory PE and DLL loading

The CodeExecution folder holds the classic PowerSploit loaders. They are designed to map a PE file straight into powershell.exe or a remote process, without loading a DLL from disk.

FileSize (bytes)
Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1135,782
Invoke-Shellcode.ps123,817
Invoke-WmiCommand.ps114,479
Invoke-DllInjection.ps112,721

The folder also holds Visual Studio C++ test harnesses (DemoDLL_RemoteProcess, ExeToInjectInTo). It has x86 and x64 assembly stubs as well: LoadLibraryA.asm, GetProcAddress.asm and CallDllMain.asm. These scripts are usually pulled into memory with a PowerShell download cradle.

Raw NTFS access and relays

The NTFSParserDLL folder (13 files) holds C++ code that reads raw NTFS volumes directly. Key files are NTFS_Attribute.h (38,460 bytes), NTFS_FileRecord.h (24,011 bytes) and NTFSParserDLL.cpp (3,795 bytes). Reading the raw volume can bypass operating system file locks.

Next to it, the assessment folder holds powercat.ps1 (37,641 bytes), a PowerShell TCP and UDP relay. Find-AVSignature.ps1 (6,583 bytes) tests where antivirus signatures start and end in a file.

SharePoint and admin portal wordlists

Three wordlists target enterprise portals: generic.txt (33,792 bytes), admin.txt (3,072 bytes) and sharepoint.txt (2,662 bytes). The SharePoint list includes paths such as _layouts/mngsiteadmin.aspx, _layouts/aclinv.aspx and _catalogs/masterpage/Forms/AllItems.aspx.

The server pairs these lists with the OS-specific redirect pages and awareness lure templates. Together they look like an engagement kit: map the portal, send a lure, then stage tooling.

6. Fleet Comparison and How to Treat Each Finding

In short

mitmproxy and GoPhish produce large candidate volumes, while Yakit and Nemo are small but mostly confirmed. Block only on several signals that agree.

Figure 5: mitmproxy and GoPhish lead raw exposure while Yakit concentrates high-confidence endpoints
Figure 5: mitmproxy and GoPhish lead raw exposure while Yakit concentrates high-confidence endpoints

The five fleets side by side

FleetEndpoints (IPs)Actionable (share)Main portsTop countriesMain hosting
mitmproxy2,066 (1,345)208 (10.1%)32300 (505), 8080 (192), 8081 (125)NL (592), CN (584), US (314)ALFA TELECOM, Alibaba
GoPhish766 (672)152 (19.8%)3333 (417), 443 (127), 80 (37)US (151), DE (109), FR (70)AWS, OVH, DigitalOcean
ScopeSentry120 (118)10 (8.3%)8082 (101), 18082 (3), 8443 (3)CN (37), HK (22), US (17)Tencent, Alibaba
Yakit (Yaklang)34 (31)26 (76.5%)443 (15), 8087 (6), 80 (2)CN (17), HK (9), US (3)Tencent, Alibaba, AWS
Nemo6 (6)6 (100.0%)5000 (6)CN (5), US (1)Tencent, Alibaba, HostPapa

mitmproxy is mostly noise, with a hard core

Of the 2,066 mitmproxy endpoints, 208 (10.1%) are confirmed (161) or suspected (47). The other 1,858 (89.9%) are candidates.

Many candidates sit on port 32300 (505 endpoints) inside commercial proxy networks. ALFA TELECOM s.r.o. hosts 377 of them and Serverel Inc. hosts 128. Ports 32300 and 8080 carry a lot of commercial and dual-use proxy traffic. Do not block by port alone. Require a PAC, JARM or certificate-store signal first.

Three alternative explanations, and what to do with each

QuestionWhat the evidence showsWhat to do
Is Server B an authorized test or hostile staging?Folder names, a proofs folder and an awareness page point to a contracted assessment. No use against a target is shown.Watchlist pending review. Hunt its PowerSploit file hashes on endpoints.
Is Server A hostile?It exposed a working root CA signing key and a proxy.pac router, whoever runs it.Block list for root-store removal and historical egress hunting. Check liveness and ownership before a network block.
Are ScopeSentry and GoPhish candidates attacker C2?Internal security teams and bug-bounty researchers use both tools widely. Only 10 of 120 ScopeSentry and 152 of 766 GoPhish endpoints are actionable.Keep candidates, such as the Hetzner ScopeSentry console, on a dual-use scanner watchlist.
Is the suspected Yakit node an active workbench?One strong signal, no endpoint evidence.Watch and rate-limit. Contain a host only if endpoint signals agree: a root CA import, an AutoConfigURL change or a PowerShell loader.

7. What Defenders Should Do

Within 24 hours

  • Inventory Windows, macOS and browser root stores. Compare them with your approved SHA-1 thumbprints (X509Certificate2.Thumbprint). Remove or distrust any CN=mitmproxy root that nobody approved.
  • Search disks and certificate stores for the default mitmproxy file names and CN=mitmproxy roots.
  • Load the Suricata rules in alert mode and fill the approved PAC server list first.

Within 72 hours

  • Lock AutoConfigURL through Group Policy or MDM, and turn off unauthenticated WPAD fallback.
  • Alert on, or block, browser fetches of proxy.pac from external hosts.
  • Watch browser egress to 8080, 8081, 8087, 8888, 18080, 31280 and 32300 outside documented gateways. Block when a PAC or root CA signal agrees.

Within 7 to 30 days

  • Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging and AMSI. Alert on Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection, Invoke-DllInjection and powercat.ps1.
  • Audit raw volume reads (\.C:) by processes other than backup tools, to catch NTFS parser use.
  • Rate-limit bursts of SharePoint _layouts/ enumeration.
  • Keep Server B, the suspected Yakit node and the ScopeSentry candidate on review watchlists, not block lists.

8. Detection Rules

The full rules are in the Detection rules tab. Every rule needs local tuning before automated action.

Rule fileWhat it catches
odin_mitmproxy_yakit_scopesentry_powersploit.rulesSuricata 7: eight signatures for mitmproxy CA downloads, external PAC files, Yakit and ScopeSentry markers, and PowerSploit fetches
sentinel_rogue_root_ca_and_proxy_pac_tamper.kqlMicrosoft Sentinel and Defender XDR: root CA imports, external AutoConfigURL edits, PowerSploit strings, and proxy-port egress
sigma_windows_root_ca_install_and_proxy_pac_hijack.ymlSigma (2 rules): certificate imports of mitmproxy roots, and external PAC registry edits or PowerSploit loader strings
odin_mitmproxy_keystore_pac_and_powersploit.yarYARA (4 rules): PEM root CA bundles, external PAC routing scripts, PowerSploit reflective loaders, and SharePoint recon wordlists

How the Suricata signatures work

SIDLooks forWhy
9518001HTTP GET for mitmproxy-ca.p12, .pem, .cer or the -cert variantsCatches a root CA or keystore download
9518002Outbound request for a URI ending in /proxy.pac to a host not on the approved PAC listCatches a browser using an external PAC file
9518003Inbound response with FindProxyForURL and PROXY from a host not on the approved PAC listCatches the PAC script itself arriving
9518004HTTP host mitm.itCatches the mitmproxy certificate onboarding page
9518005yakit, Yaklang or grpc-yakit in HTTP headers to 443, 2800 or 8087Catches Yakit engine traffic
9518006/api/ request with a ScopeSentry header to 8082 or 18082Catches ScopeSentry console API use
9518007GET for Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection, Invoke-DllInjection, Invoke-Shellcode or Invoke-WmiCommand .ps1Catches a PowerSploit loader download
9518008GET under /PowerSploit/Exfiltration/NTFSParser/ or /PowerSploit/Recon/Dictionaries/Catches NTFS parser or recon wordlist downloads

SIDs 9518002 and 9518003 need an APPROVED_PAC_SERVERS address group in suricata.yaml. Suricata will not load them without it. Leave it empty and normal cloud PAC delivery will fire both rules. Exclude mobile and QA lab VLANs from SID 9518004, since developers there may onboard mitm.it on purpose.

How the other rules work

The KQL query looks back 14 days and has three branches. The first reads process events. It flags certutil.exe, powershell.exe or pwsh.exe running -addstore, Import-Certificate or Import-PfxCertificate with a root or mitmproxy file. It also flags PowerSploit names on a command line.

The second branch reads registry events for AutoConfigURL. It parses the host from the URL with parse_url and compares it with an approved PAC host list. This stops a subdomain or query string from slipping past the list.

The third branch reads network events. It flags contact with withheld staging addresses you add from your own feed. It also flags browsers or PowerShell reaching public addresses on 8080, 8081, 8087, 8888, 18080, 31280 or 32300. Fill the approved PAC host list and the PKI admin host list before alerting.

The first Sigma rule fires on certutil or a PowerShell import cmdlet aimed at the root store, together with a mitmproxy file name. The second fires on an AutoConfigURL change to an external .pac that fails an anchored hostname check, or on PowerSploit loader strings.

YARA ruleFires when
ODIN_Mitmproxy_Exposed_Root_CA_Keystore_BundlePEM private-key and certificate headers appear with one of the three Base64 forms of the string mitmproxy
ODIN_Rogue_Proxy_PAC_External_Listener_RoutingA file under 64 KB has function FindProxyForURL, a PROXY directive and one of the ports 8080, 18080, 31280 or 32300
ODIN_PowerSploit_ReflectivePE_And_Injection_StagingA file under 500 KB has two of four Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection loader strings
ODIN_PowerSploit_SharePoint_And_Admin_Recon_ListA file under 256 KB has all three listed SharePoint paths, or all three listed admin paths

Each YARA rule needs at least two strings, and all carry file-size limits. They have no allowlist, so tune them before automated action.

How to sort a host

The triage logic never contains a host on uncorroborated evidence.

What the host showsAction
A corroborated root-store implant or endpoint executionBlock and contain the host
An external PAC hijackIsolate the browser and reset the PAC setting
A single certificate hash, a CN=mitmproxy subject, PowerSploit staging or a suspected Yakit nodeWatchlist and rate-limit
An uncorroborated recon consoleDual-use scanner watchlist
An authorized assessmentAllowlist
An approved corporate proxyIgnore

9. Indicators

The Indicators tab holds the 9 published file hashes, all public-tool or wordlist files from Server B. The other 15 records in the selected set are withheld.

TypeCount
Root CA keystore host for root-store cleanup (address withheld)1
Review or watchlist hosts (addresses withheld)5
File hashes (SHA-256) for hunting, from Server B9
Withheld file hashes (8 distinct hashes for Server A's 9 files, 1 Server B landing page)9

The five watchlist entries are Server B, the suspected Yakit node, the ScopeSentry candidate, and one representative node each for the mitmproxy and GoPhish fleets. Supporting fingerprints are the subject CN=mitmproxy, the onboarding host mitm.it, and the Yakit JARM value in Chapter 4.

File hashes from Server A

All Server A file hashes are withheld, because the server's owner is not established. Hunt by the default mitmproxy file names and the certificate subject CN=mitmproxy instead.

File hashes from Server B

FileSize (bytes)SHA-256Where to hunt
Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1135,782c81d0073c92d0b4d0cc66a4c1d64d4ca2afbe56d78eb9d9611be8055919fd8baEndpoint, EDR
Invoke-Shellcode.ps123,817457cd41fbb528812aa51bc4b31fce042cdf736281b162181d91c47733d0e9e4bEndpoint, EDR
Invoke-WmiCommand.ps114,4792cdba7fab6f6fcec2e4f10fc1a45c13a6a9d26cca2ea8b8b4e15989a198618efEndpoint, EDR
Invoke-DllInjection.ps112,721788121850fe9095492f79af631d43e342cdcf7a09d1becf97356dc97e4ae869dEndpoint, EDR
powercat.ps137,641cb978873ed0877c8f2c9b4d9b4cfd1c3fc4eff223abb3afc24ec687cc77f93b8Endpoint, EDR
Find-AVSignature.ps16,583366f5b37821f4266697350847048d2df55f6de96ad1e578baf910b9da8eed742Endpoint, EDR
NTFSParserDLL.cpp3,795814a812279c600b707500322d4e1027795cd90ed09a69a2802078c075a0ac743Server and network
admin.txt3,072f2e72552cd62d3e9ecc82b80a6918706d752fcf24799dd6b2c1c09caa96307b3Server and network
sharepoint.txt2,662aafc643316b5486764cb99a655978860140dfdd2aa1a19f14e955ecf5683ef48Server and network

Withheld from Server A: all file hashes, the key material and client addresses. Withheld from Server B: the landing page hash. Also withheld: both server addresses and ports, Server B folder names that identify an organization, and every suspected or candidate fleet address.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

The rules map to three ATT&CK tactics.

TacticHow it applies hereDetection
Reconnaissance (TA0043)ScopeSentry and Nemo consoles; SharePoint and admin wordlistsSID 9518006, 9518008; YARA wordlist rule
Credential Access (TA0006)Root CA trust, external PAC routing and TLS interception that exposes session trafficSID 9518001 to 9518005; KQL; Sigma rules
Stealth (TA0005)Reflective in-memory loading with no DLL on diskSID 9518007; YARA loader rule; Sigma rule 2

10. Scope and Limits

  • Window. Fleet counts and the two Server B subfolders come from a two-week observation window ending 18 November 2026. Both servers were first seen before this window; no earlier dates are given.
  • Server A may be gone. We could not confirm Server A was still online in November. Its key material stays useful for root-store cleanup and historical hunting either way.
  • No links between clusters. Nothing ties Server A, Server B and the five fleets to one operator. The four-role model is analytical.
  • Staged is not used. Server B holds tooling and lures. We saw no execution, delivery or interception on any target.
  • Candidates are leads. Most mitmproxy, GoPhish and ScopeSentry endpoints are candidates, and these tools have wide legitimate use.
  • Rule testing. Every published rule file loads without errors in its engine (Suricata 7.0.12, YARA-X, pySigma and Microsoft's Kusto.Language analyzer, checked on 20 November 2026). The rules were not replayed against live traffic, so test and tune them in your own environment before production use.

11. Sources

  1. MITRE ATT&CK. Reconnaissance tactic (TA0043). https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0043/ (verified 19 November 2026)
  2. MITRE ATT&CK. Credential Access tactic (TA0006). https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/ (verified 19 November 2026)
  3. MITRE ATT&CK. Stealth tactic (TA0005). https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/ (verified 19 November 2026)
  4. mitmproxy project. About Certificates. https://docs.mitmproxy.org/stable/concepts-certificates/ (verified 19 November 2026)
  5. Yaklang project. Yakit and the Yaklang engine. https://www.yaklang.com/ (verified 19 November 2026)
  6. Autumn-27. ScopeSentry repository. https://github.com/Autumn-27/ScopeSentry (verified 19 November 2026)
  7. PowerShellMafia. PowerSploit repository. https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit (verified 19 November 2026)

What is…?

Short explanations of the tools and families named in this study.

All explanations

Frequently asked questions

Why does a leaked root key matter?

mitmproxy is a popular tool for reading HTTPS traffic. It creates its own root CA. To intercept a device's traffic, that device must trust the root. Developers, red teams and attackers all set this up.

How could traffic reach an interception proxy?

The server also held a 300-byte proxy.pac file. A proxy auto-config (PAC) file is a small script that tells a browser which proxy to use for each website. If a device's settings point to an external PAC file, that script decides where traffic goes.

What tools are out there?

Across five tool families, Odin by Brandefense counted 2,992 endpoints on 2,170 IPv4 addresses in a two-week observation window ending 18 November 2026. Most mitmproxy, GoPhish and ScopeSentry endpoints are uncorroborated candidates. Many mitmproxy listeners sit inside commercial proxy networks, and security teams use all three tools legitimately. Blocking them by port alone would cause real damage.

What was on the second server?

Server B, on DigitalOcean in the United States, held 314 files in 33 directories. It mixed phishing email templates, redirect pages for Windows, macOS, Linux and Android, and a 159-file copy of PowerSploit.

Defender kit

Indicators of compromise

Verified adversary infrastructure and tool hashes from this study. Every value below is also discussed in the report.

IDTypeIndicatorPortContextAction
R18-IOC-01 SHA-256 c81d0073c92d0b4d0cc66a4c1d64d4ca2afbe56d78eb9d9611be8055919fd8ba Endpoint Post-Exploit Hunt
R18-IOC-02 SHA-256 457cd41fbb528812aa51bc4b31fce042cdf736281b162181d91c47733d0e9e4b Endpoint Post-Exploit Hunt
R18-IOC-03 SHA-256 2cdba7fab6f6fcec2e4f10fc1a45c13a6a9d26cca2ea8b8b4e15989a198618ef Endpoint Post-Exploit Hunt
R18-IOC-04 SHA-256 788121850fe9095492f79af631d43e342cdcf7a09d1becf97356dc97e4ae869d Endpoint Post-Exploit Hunt
R18-IOC-05 SHA-256 cb978873ed0877c8f2c9b4d9b4cfd1c3fc4eff223abb3afc24ec687cc77f93b8 Endpoint Relay Script Hunt
R18-IOC-06 SHA-256 366f5b37821f4266697350847048d2df55f6de96ad1e578baf910b9da8eed742 AV Signature Probe Hunt
R18-IOC-07 SHA-256 814a812279c600b707500322d4e1027795cd90ed09a69a2802078c075a0ac743 NTFS Volume Parser Hunt
R18-IOC-08 SHA-256 f2e72552cd62d3e9ecc82b80a6918706d752fcf24799dd6b2c1c09caa96307b3 Admin Path Recon Hunt
R18-IOC-09 SHA-256 aafc643316b5486764cb99a655978860140dfdd2aa1a19f14e955ecf5683ef48 SharePoint Recon Hunt

15 records from this study are not published in this table: candidate, suspected and dual-use hosts, victim-related values, and hashes of exposed secrets or files.

Defender kit

Detection rules

The rule files exactly as printed in the report. Test them in your own engine before deployment.

YARA odin_mitmproxy_keystore_pac_and_powersploit.yar 81 lines
Download
Suricata odin_mitmproxy_yakit_scopesentry_powersploit.rules 33 lines
Download
Sentinel KQL sentinel_rogue_root_ca_and_proxy_pac_tamper.kql 58 lines
Download
Sigma sigma_windows_root_ca_install_and_proxy_pac_hijack.yml 78 lines
Download