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Full reportC2 infrastructureMonograph 19 / 1921 min read

Evasive C2 and Dual-Use Cracking: Brute Ratel, Overlord and Hashtopolis

How six evasive command-and-control frameworks, 177-port hubs and Hashtopolis cracking servers look from the outside, and which of them to block

By
Odin by Brandefense
Published
19 November 2026
Reading time
21 min read
Edition
Version 1.1 · TLP:CLEAR
Scope
Prepared November 2026

1. Executive Summary

In short

In a two-week window ending 18 November 2026, Odin by Brandefense observed 1,613 command-and-control (C2) endpoints across six evasive frameworks, 32 Hashtopolis cracking servers and 618 infected IoT routers. Only 55 C2 endpoints are confirmed. Another 507 Brute Ratel C4 hits are commercial VPN exits sharing a Go TLS fingerprint. One Tencent Cloud host runs 177 listeners. Nothing links the three groups. Block the 55 confirmed C2s, watchlist Hashtopolis servers, and alert when one user requests five or more RC4 Kerberos tickets in five minutes.

Modern post-exploitation frameworks are built to stay quiet on monitored workstations. Their implants avoid hooked Windows APIs, hide in memory while they sleep, and talk over ordinary-looking HTTPS. On the other side, stolen password hashes can be cracked offline on rented GPU rigs, where no domain controller sees a failed login. This report maps the internet-facing side of both: the C2 servers, the hubs that stack many listeners on one address, and the Hashtopolis servers that coordinate GPU cracking.

1

Six evasive C2 frameworks run on 1,613 endpoints; 55 are confirmed.

Brute Ratel C4 leads with 690 endpoints on 434 hosts. Cobalt Strike (391), DarkSword (346), Overlord (107), Mythic (54) and Havoc (25) follow. Most Brute Ratel C4 hits are not C2 at all: 507 are commercial VPN exits with the same Go TLS fingerprint.

2

Thirty-five hubs pack up to 177 C2 listeners onto one cloud address.

The largest, Hub-01 on Shenzhen Tencent Cloud, mixes HypeAgent (161), Cobalt Strike (14) and PlugX (2) behind spoofed Chinese bank and security-vendor certificates. In Germany, 77.72.18[.]83 runs nine confirmed Cobalt Strike listeners with one shared certificate.

3

Thirty-two Hashtopolis servers show the GPU cracking side, but use stays unproven.

Hashtopolis splits password-cracking jobs across remote Hashcat GPU workers. It is open-source and widely used by auditors and red teams. No hostile cracking job was observed, so these servers belong on watchlists, not blocklists.

Three Decisions for Leaders

  1. Remove RC4 from Kerberos and watch for ticket bursts. Move service accounts to Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA) or random passwords of 28 or more characters, with AES-only encryption. Alert when one user requests five or more RC4 service tickets within five minutes.
  2. Pair memory telemetry on endpoints with precise network rules. Alert on unbacked memory threads touching LSASS or sacrificial Windows processes. Block the 55 confirmed C2 endpoints, not every Go TLS fingerprint hit or every password-auditing server.
  3. Control who can run Hashtopolis and Hashcat. Allow them only on named red-team audit hosts. Put the large hubs, unattributed Hashtopolis servers, infected routers and dynamic telecom addresses on short-lived watchlists.

The Study in Numbers

NumberWhat it is
2,263Endpoints observed on 1,759 distinct hosts, across 10 C2, cracking and IoT families
1,613Evasive C2 endpoints across six frameworks, on 1,191 hosts
55Confirmed hostile C2 endpoints (2.4% of all endpoints)
507Brute Ratel C4 hits that are commercial VPN exits, not C2
177Listeners on the single busiest hub (Hub-01, Tencent Cloud CN)
32Hashtopolis cracking endpoints on 26 hosts, all watchlisted
618Infected IoT router endpoints on 542 hosts (Mirai 353, Mozi 263, Moobot 2)

How to use this report.

Security leaders can read Chapter 1, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. Detection engineers and SOC teams should start with Chapters 7 to 9. CTI analysts and hunters will find the infrastructure detail in Chapters 2 to 5.

2. Three Populations and One Analytical Model

In short

The data holds three separate populations: evasive C2 servers, Hashtopolis cracking servers and infected IoT routers. No shared address, certificate or traffic connects them, so Figure 1 is an analytical model of their roles, not a map of one operation.

What was observed

PopulationEndpointsDistinct hostsConfirmed hostile
Evasive C2 (six frameworks)1,6131,19155
Hashtopolis cracking servers32260
Infected IoT routers (Mirai, Mozi, Moobot)6185420
Total2,2631,75955

Separately, 35 multi-listener hubs bind 391 sockets in total. Of the 35 hub addresses, 21 also appear in the main fleet. The 391 hub sockets happen to equal the 391 Cobalt Strike endpoints; the two numbers are unrelated.

The three populations share no address. We also observed no traffic, shared certificate or tasking log between them. They appear together in this report because they play complementary roles in documented intrusion tradecraft (MITRE T1558.003 Kerberoasting and T1110.002 Password Cracking).

Figure 1: Analytical model of evasive C2, multi-port hubs and dual-use hash-cracking tiers
Figure 1: Analytical model of evasive C2, multi-port hubs and dual-use hash-cracking tiers

The four roles in the model

This is an analytical model. It explains why each population needs a different response.

RoleWhat it isDefender response
Evasive implant fleetBrute Ratel C4, DarkSword, Overlord, Mythic and Havoc servers whose implants evade user-mode hooks and use flexible HTTPS or DNS-over-HTTPS profilesBlock confirmed listeners
Multi-implant hubsCloud servers that terminate dozens of Cobalt Strike, PlugX, HypeAgent and Sliver socketsWatchlist and correlate; block only confirmed hubs
Dual-use cracking tierHashtopolis servers (ports 8080, 8081, 8443, 4200) that hand out Hashcat jobs through /api/server.phpWatchlist, and harden Active Directory
Infected IoT routersConsumer routers showing CN=192.168.1.1, CN=router.asus[.]com or CN=ZXV10Victims; never block permanently

Neighbours on the same hosts

Beyond stacking ports within one family, 59 hosts run one of the ten families next to other offensive tooling. Examples include Mythic with HexStrikeAI on confirmed host 138.197.31[.]70. Other pairs, on hosts not published here, include Mythic with AdaptixC2, DarkSword with CyberStrikeAI or mitmproxy, Havoc with HexStrikeAI, Overlord with Sliver, and Cobalt Strike with PentAGI.

3. Evasive C2 Fleets

In short

Five frameworks other than Cobalt Strike account for 1,222 endpoints. Their implants rely on indirect syscalls, hardware-breakpoint patching and encrypted sleep, and 20 of their endpoints are confirmed after the VPN look-alikes are removed.

How these implants avoid detection

Endpoint detection tools often watch Windows API calls in user mode. The implants in this chapter are documented to step around that.

TechniqueWhat it means
Indirect syscallsThe implant finds system call numbers itself and jumps into a syscall; ret instruction inside the real ntdll.dll, so hooks never see the call
Hardware-breakpoint patchingIt disables AmsiScanBuffer and EtwEventWrite through CPU debug registers (Dr0 to Dr3) instead of writing to memory
Sleep maskingBetween check-ins, it encrypts its own memory and marks it non-executable, then restores it on wake-up
Flexible channelsCheck-ins travel over HTTPS, DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) or SMB named pipes, shaped to look like normal traffic

Figure 2 compares the ten families by volume, distinct hosts and port stacking, next to the top eight hubs.

Figure 2: Ten-family endpoint volume, socket density and top multi-listener hubs
Figure 2: Ten-family endpoint volume, socket density and top multi-listener hubs

Brute Ratel C4: 690 endpoints, three very different groups

Brute Ratel C4 (MITRE S1063) has a Go teamserver called Ratel and a position-independent implant called Badger. Its 690 endpoints sit on 434 hosts, an average of 1.59 sockets per host. An upstream feed labels 523 of them "confirmed". They split into three main groups, plus one endpoint on a dynamic ISP line.

GroupEndpointsWhat it showsStatus
Dedicated Ratel servers with custom TLS4 confirmed, plus 23 suspectedOperator-set certificates such as CN=brute[.]bzh[.]ovh or the default placeholder CN=FQDNBlock the 4 confirmed
CTG Server Limited port-80 cluster155Plain HTTP on 80 in Singapore and Hong Kong, matching HTTP redirector profilesSuspected
Commercial VPN exits507VPN city-rack certificates and the stock Go TLS fingerprintNot C2; watchlist only
Dynamic ISP line1A match on a dynamic telecom network72-hour watchlist

The four confirmed Ratel listeners all use custom TLS or custom ports. Two are published:

  • 161.35.73[.]220:443 on DigitalOcean (DE), with CN=brute[.]bzh[.]ovh and JARM 3fd3fd20d...99b095c.
  • 78.90.248[.]224:7000 on Net-Surf.net (BG), a high-port listener with the same JARM.

The other two sit on hosts that also carry unconfirmed sockets, so their addresses are withheld. A suspected listener on Vultr in Israel shows CN=FQDN and JARM 3fd21b20d...c2286f5e on port 8081. A suspected LUCIDACLOUD host in Hong Kong listens on 9090, 9091 and 9200.

Of the 155 CTG Server Limited listeners, 11 carry an upstream "confirmed" label. They show no certificate subject or JARM, so they stay suspected until there is protocol evidence.

Badger check-ins use JSON keys such as "b_arch", "c_name" and "d_name". Badger can also run Beacon Object Files (COFF) in memory.

DarkSword, Overlord, Mythic and Havoc

DarkSword is a feed label, not an actor.

In this report, DarkSword means an upstream threat-feed label for multi-port TLS and HTTP C2 servers. It does not point to one named threat actor or to a known exploit kit.

FrameworkEndpoints (hosts)ConfirmedMain hostingMain ports
DarkSword346 (292)10CNServer LLC (189, 54.6%), cognetcloud INC (21), CTG Server Limited (12), NetLab Global (12), Alibaba (11)443 (222), 8888 (62), 80 (23), 2000 (22)
Overlord107 (94)4DE (42) and US (25); Blatant Technologies (16), OVH SAS (13), EggyWall.org (8), AWS (8), Hetzner (7), Private Layer (6)5173 (51, 47.7%), 443 (26), 8443 (13), 1080 SOCKS (3)
Mythic54 (46)2DigitalOcean (13), AWS (8)80 (18), 443 (14), 7443 (13), 4443 (3), 8443 (3)
Havoc25 (23)0AWS, DigitalOcean, Oracle, Hostinger443 (13), 8443 (4)

DarkSword. Over half the fleet (183 endpoints, 52.9%) shares JARM 21d14d00021d21d00042d43d00000091f9827a8676a9d9f27d421962a09b5d. All 10 confirmed DarkSword rows sit on hosts that also carry unconfirmed sockets, so no DarkSword address is published. New candidates keep appearing on port 8888; one appeared on Alibaba Cloud Hong Kong on 18 November 2026.

Overlord. Confirmed single-socket hosts use hex-generated .invalid certificate subjects. Two are published:

EndpointHostingCertificate subject
194.26.192[.]57:90001337 Services GmbH (NL)CN=host-43c6ed77a39b7312.invalid
23.95.217[.]154:8443DataWagon LLC (US)CN=host-21ffa7a17fac9f9a.invalid

Two three-port Overlord hubs on Private Layer in Switzerland reuse a wildcard-DNS helper certificate. Each has two confirmed sockets on 80 and 8443 and one candidate on 443. Two OVH clusters share another third-party certificate pattern. Those certificate subjects are withheld.

Mythic. Mythic runs its admin and C2 service on port 7443 by default. Two confirmed listeners share JARM 1dd40d40d...9311926e:

EndpointHosting
5.188.86[.]227:7443Global Layer B.V. (NL)
138.197.31[.]70:7443DigitalOcean, LLC (US)

Documented Mythic agents include Apollo (.NET), Poseidon (Go) and Apfell (macOS JXA). They send base64-encoded UUID and JSON messages with actions such as "checkin" and "get_tasking".

Havoc. None of the 25 Havoc endpoints is confirmed (5 suspected, 19 candidates, 1 open directory). One suspected server on Adsota Corporation in Vietnam shows CN=0.0.0.0 on 8443. Havoc's Demon implant is documented to use Ekko and Foliage sleep obfuscation. It queues timer callbacks that switch its memory to read-write, encrypts it with SystemFunction032 (RC4) while asleep, and restores execute rights on wake-up.

4. Multi-Listener Hubs and the Kerberoast Model

In short

Thirty-five hubs bind 391 mixed-framework sockets; two Tencent Cloud hosts hold 272 of them. This chapter also models, without observed evidence, how stolen Kerberos tickets could feed offline GPU cracking.

The Cobalt Strike fleet

Cobalt Strike (MITRE S0154) has 391 endpoints on 302 hosts. Of these, 35 are confirmed, 143 suspected, 207 candidates, 4 candidate open directories and 2 on dynamic ISPs. The top JARM 2ad2ad16d...ed24a4da appears on 36 endpoints, and the default teamserver port 50050 on 36.

Of the 35 confirmed, 32 sit on hosts where every socket is confirmed. Chapter 9 publishes a selected subset, including 47.239.109[.]26:3389 with CN=Major Cobalt Strike and 163.172.45[.]158:8086 with CN=Murmur Autogenerated Certificate v2.

Six flagship hubs

The 35 hubs carry 3 to 177 ports each. They split into 7 Cobalt Strike hubs, 14 Sliver hubs, 9 DarkSword hubs, 4 Overlord hubs and 1 Mythic hub.

HubHostingSocketsFramework mixCertificates and status
Hub-01Shenzhen Tencent (CN)177HypeAgent 161, Cobalt Strike 14, PlugX 2Spoofed Chinese security-vendor, bank and cloud subjects; suspected
Hub-02Shenzhen Tencent (CN)95HypeAgent 91, Cobalt Strike 4Spoofed Chinese bank, payment and cloud subjects; suspected
77.72.18[.]83Melbikomas UAB (DE)9Cobalt Strike 9CN=Murmur Autogenerated Certificate v2; confirmed, block
Hub-03Tencent-hosted (HK)6Sliver 6No certificate subject; ports 17443, 25555, 31555, 34443, 34567, 44443; candidate
Hub-04Microsoft Corp (SG)5DarkSword 5Third-party subject withheld; 2 confirmed, 1 suspected, 2 candidates
Hub-05OVH SAS (DE)4Overlord 4Third-party subject withheld; ports 80, 443, 1080, 8443; suspected

Hub addresses other than 77.72.18[.]83 are withheld because their sockets are not all confirmed.

Hub-01: three families on one address

Hub-01 binds 161 suspected HypeAgent ports. Their certificates impersonate Chinese commercial banks and security vendors. It also binds 14 suspected Cobalt Strike ports on low ports such as 481, 490, 520, 571 and 749, with certificates that impersonate Chinese cloud and DNS providers.

The last two ports, 1033 and 8254, are suspected PlugX (Korplug, MITRE S0013). Both show a spoofed Chinese security-vendor certificate. In the hub data, PlugX appears only on Hub-01.

Hub-02 binds 95 sockets with the same spoofing template: 91 HypeAgent and 4 Cobalt Strike on 224, 672, 708 and 740. Together, Hub-01 and Hub-02 hold 272 of the 391 hub sockets (69.6%).

The Murmur certificate template

77.72.18[.]83 binds nine confirmed Cobalt Strike listeners on ports 2811, 3323, 4848, 5550, 7007, 8080, 9290, 50500 and 55555. All present CN=Murmur Autogenerated Certificate v2.

Across the data, 28 confirmed Cobalt Strike endpoints reuse this exact certificate. They include 15 listeners on 13 OVH France addresses in 92.222.152[.]0/24, on ports 10001 to 10025.

A workflow model: from Kerberos tickets to offline cracking

This section is a model, not an observation.

We saw no Kerberos tickets, hash lists, C2-to-Hashtopolis transfers, cracking results or service-account logons. Figure 3 is built from MITRE ATT&CK T1558.003 (Kerberoasting) and T1110.002 (Password Cracking).

Figure 3: Documented workflow model of how offline GPU cracking could target RC4 SPN tickets
Figure 3: Documented workflow model of how offline GPU cracking could target RC4 SPN tickets

In a well-monitored domain, touching lsass.exe trips Credential Guard, Protected Process Light (PPL) or kernel ETW callbacks. Online password spraying trips lockouts. Offline cracking avoids both.

StageWhat could happenWhere defenders can see it
01 Implant runsAn evasive implant runs with any normal domain user tokenUnbacked memory threads, sacrificial processes
02 Ticket requestIt requests service tickets for accounts with a Service Principal Name (SPN), asking for RC4-HMAC (etype 0x17)Event 4769 bursts with encryption type 0x17
03 ExfiltrationTicket blobs ($krb5tgs$23$) leave over the encrypted C2 channelC2 egress rules
04 Hashtopolis masterThe hashes are loaded into a Hashtopolis server through /api/server.php/api/server.php traffic from inside
05 GPU workersRemote Hashcat workers crack keyspace slices (-m 13100)Hashcat or Hashtopolis processes on endpoints
06 Account abuseWeak service passwords are recovered with no failed logins on the domain controllerNew logons (Event 4624) by service accounts

The same path works for AS-REP roasting ($krb5asrep$23$, Hashcat -m 18200), Net-NTLMv2 (-m 5600), NTLM (-m 1000) and Domain Cached Credentials (DCC2, -m 2100).

The chain breaks at stage 02. Set SPN accounts to AES only (msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes = 24, AES128 plus AES256, RC4 excluded) and move them to gMSAs.

5. Hashtopolis Servers and Infected IoT Routers

In short

The 32 Hashtopolis endpoints expose worker APIs and web consoles on predictable ports. Because the tool is dual-use and no hostile job was seen, every one of them is a watchlist entry, and every address is withheld.

Figure 4: Multi-listener Hub-01 (177 ports) and the dual-use Hashtopolis blueprint
Figure 4: Multi-listener Hub-01 (177 ports) and the dual-use Hashtopolis blueprint

What Hashtopolis is

Hashtopolis is an open-source server that splits Hashcat cracking work across many GPU machines. Auditors use it for authorised password audits. Attackers can use it the same way. From the outside, an auditor's server and an attacker's rig look the same without evidence of their jobs.

Where the 32 endpoints sit

The endpoints span at least 10 countries: Russia 5, Germany 5, Netherlands 5, China 3, United States 3, Finland 3, Australia 2, Singapore 2, Ukraine 1 and Taiwan 1.

PortRoleEndpoints
8080Worker API14
4200Hashtopolis v2 Angular web console12
80Web or API2
8081Worker API2
8181Worker API1
8443Worker API1

Six hosts expose two Hashtopolis ports at once: three with 8080 plus 4200, one with 8081 plus 4200, and two with 80 plus 8080. The hosts average 1.23 endpoints each.

Selected Hashtopolis servers (addresses withheld)

ServerPortsHostingNotesStatus
Australian master80, 8080An Australian ISPHashtopolis protocol confirmed on 80; API on 8080Watchlist (dual-use)
Alibaba candidate8443Hangzhou Alibaba Advertising (CN)Sits in a /16 with other offensive tooling (below)Watchlist (candidate)
Finnish console4200Hetzner Online GmbH (FI)Third-party Hashtopolis certificate (withheld), JARM 15d3fd...ccbc0b6bWatchlist (candidate)
US two-port8080, 4200HostPapa (US)CN=TRAEFIK DEFAULT CERTWatchlist (candidate)
Russian two-port8080, 4200JSC "TIMEWEB" (RU)Third-party certificate withheldWatchlist (candidate)
German two-port8081, 4200netcup GmbH (DE)Third-party certificate withheldWatchlist (candidate)
Chinese two-port80, 8080Hangzhou Alibaba Advertising (CN)Web console on 80, API on 8080Watchlist (candidate)
Taiwan listener8080Chunghwa Telecom (TW)Dynamic subscriber address72-hour watchlist

How the worker protocol looks on the wire

Remote GPU workers download the Python or C# agent (hashtopolis.zip). They enrol once with a voucher through POST /api/server.php, then log in. After that they keep polling with the actions getTask and getChunk.

The server cuts a mask or rule attack into fixed keyspace slices. Workers send results back with sendProgress and sendCrack. Supported hash modes include Kerberoast RC4 (-m 13100), AS-REP (-m 18200), Net-NTLMv2 (-m 5600), NTLM (-m 1000) and DCC2 (-m 2100).

Suricata SID 9519006 and the third Sigma rule catch internal machines or GPU workers calling /api/server.php. No rule in this report covers the Hashtopolis web console.

The Alibaba /16 neighbourhood

The Alibaba candidate on 8443 was observed on 16 and 17 November 2026. Its /16 allocation, 8.148.0.0/16, holds 19 endpoints across 9 other addresses. Two were MySQL 3306 certificate collisions and are excluded. The other tooling includes:

  • CyberStrikeAI (8080) and HexStrikeAI (5000)
  • Metasploit Meterpreter (4446 and 443), sharing a host with Sliver (8888)
  • VShell (443), mitmproxy, ARTEX (8787) and PentAGI
  • DNSLog out-of-band testing (8000, 8443)

Sharing a public cloud /16 is circumstantial. It does not show that one operator controls all of these, so the Hashtopolis candidate stays on a watchlist.

Infected IoT routers: victims, not attackers

The 618 Mirai, Mozi and Moobot endpoints on 542 hosts share no address with the C2 or Hashtopolis populations. We observed no traffic between them. These are third-party consumer routers, so every address is withheld.

FamilyEndpoints (hosts)WhereFingerprints
Mirai353 (279)CN 107 (China Unicom, Chinanet), TW 53 (Taiwan Fixed Network), ET 43 (EthioNet), PH 30 (Globe Telecom), AL 28CN=192.168.1.1 (16), CN=router.asus[.]com (3), CN=ZXV10 (2); 19 Taiwan routers share JARM 04b03b000...99e2262e
Mozi263 (261)Consumer gateways, including BSNL IndiaCN=192.168.1.1, JARM 04d02d000...99e2262e; peer-to-peer DHT mesh
Moobot2 (2)Bulgaria and LatviaCandidates only

In the Ethiopian group, 18 routers show a personal-name certificate subject, which is withheld. Of the Mirai endpoints, 63 are protocol-confirmed infections. They go on a watchlist for infected relays, never on a permanent block list. Infected routers are often reused as proxy or scanning hops in wider internet activity.

6. Telling Real C2 from Look-Alikes

In short

Internet-wide C2 hunting collides with VPN exits, password-auditing servers, home routers, database certificates and dynamic broadband. Removing those leaves 55 confirmed C2 endpoints, 2.4% of the 2,263 observed.

Figure 5: BruteRatel C4 Go TLS JARM collisions and the corpus-wide status split
Figure 5: BruteRatel C4 Go TLS JARM collisions and the corpus-wide status split

Five sources of false positives

1

Commercial VPN exits that look like Brute Ratel C4.

The Ratel teamserver is written in Go. Its default TLS stack gives the stock Go JARM 2ad2ad0002ad2ad00042d42d00000000f78d2dc0ce6e5bbc5b8149a4872356 and a minimal HTTP 404 reply. Commercial VPN exits give the same JARM and 404 profile.

The 507 VPN rows sit on 255 hosts: 252 with paired 443 and 8080 sockets, 3 with one port. Of the 507, 506 share the Go JARM; one has no JARM. Their certificates follow a VPN naming pattern: 322 use <city>-rack<NNN> names under a VPN domain, and 185 use labels such as sydney439.

Hosting networkVPN rows
Datacamp Limited277
M247 Europe SRL95
Cogent Communications75
Servers Australia20
GSL Networks10
GleSYS10

Blocking all 523 "confirmed" Brute Ratel C4 rows would cut off 255 VPN exits used by remote staff and customers. Only dedicated Ratel servers with a certificate subject or family JARM belong on a block list.

2

Dual-use servers and infected routers.

A Hashtopolis server is blocked only with separate evidence of hostile use. The Australian master lacks that evidence. The 63 confirmed Mirai routers are victims.

3

Large suspected hubs.

Every socket on Hub-01 and Hub-02 is suspected, while all nine on 77.72.18[.]83 are confirmed. The two Tencent hubs go on a hub watchlist, paired with the Cobalt Strike certificate rule (SID 9519007).

4

Dynamic telecom addresses.

Exactly 29 endpoints sit on subscriber telecom networks: 10 Mirai, 9 Mozi, 4 Mythic, 2 Cobalt Strike, 1 Brute Ratel C4, 1 DarkSword, 1 Overlord and the Taiwan Hashtopolis listener. Their addresses get reassigned, so they get 72-hour watchlists.

5

Internal audit rigs and port-only matches.

Internal red teams run Hashtopolis legitimately during password audits. Cloud MySQL servers with auto-generated certificates on 3306 can match port-based C2 rules. The rules exclude named internal audit hosts and ignore port-only matches.

The status split

The upstream feed marked 695 rows "confirmed", leaving out dynamic-ISP rows. Of these, 55 remain confirmed C2. Another 571 move to watchlists as VPN exits, infected routers or a dual-use server. The last 69 stay suspected because they lack a family JARM or known certificate subject (12 Brute Ratel C4, 29 Cobalt Strike, 18 DarkSword, 4 Overlord, 6 Mythic).

FamilyEndpointsUpstream "confirmed"Confirmed C2Watchlist (VPN, IoT, dual-use)SuspectedCandidate and open directoryDynamic ISP
Brute Ratel C46905234507 (VPN)17801
Cobalt Strike391643501432112
Mirai35363063 (IoT)4123910
DarkSword346281002301051
Mozi263000362189
Overlord10784031711
Mythic5482034144
Hashtopolis32101 (dual-use)16141
Havoc250005200
Moobot2000020
Total2,2636955557171489429

Two other explanations we weighed

Red teams and hobbyists.

Brute Ratel C4, Mythic, Havoc, Cobalt Strike and Hashtopolis are all used by contracted red teams as well as attackers. Some Hashtopolis consoles on 4200, and some Mythic servers with third-party training certificates, likely belong to trainers, consultants or hobbyists. Blocking only the 55 confirmed endpoints avoids breaking legitimate audit infrastructure.

Decoy or redirector on Hub-01.

A single address with 177 ports spoofing Chinese bank, cloud and security-vendor certificates could be an attacker redirector built with iptables or socat. It could also be a high-interaction honeypot built to attract scanners. A watchlist entry alerts on any internal connection without claiming who runs it.

7. What Defenders Should Do

Within 24 hours

  • Block the 11 published confirmed C2 addresses in the Indicators chapter. Recheck the certificate or JARM before keeping a cloud IP block longer than 30 days, because cloud addresses are reassigned after takedowns.
  • Put Hub-01, Hub-02, unattributed Hashtopolis servers, infected routers and dynamic telecom addresses on time-bound watchlists, not block lists.
  • Do not block on the Go TLS JARM 2ad2ad0002ad... alone. It matches commercial VPN exits.

Within 72 hours

  • Turn on the domain controller audit policy Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations (Event 4769).
  • Alert when one non-machine account requests five or more RC4 (0x17) tickets for different SPNs within five minutes.
  • Deploy the Suricata rules for Brute Ratel C4, DarkSword, Overlord and Cobalt Strike certificates, Mythic check-ins and Hashtopolis polling.

Within 7 to 30 days

  • Inventory every user account with a ServicePrincipalName. Move eligible services to gMSAs or random passwords of 28 or more characters, and set AES-only encryption (msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes = 24).
  • Turn on kernel ETW Threat Intelligence call-stack telemetry, Credential Guard and LSA RunAsPPL. Alert on Sysmon Event 10 with an UNKNOWN call trace touching lsass.exe, rundll32.exe, dllhost.exe or werfault.exe.
  • Use application control so Hashcat (-m 13100, -m 18200, -m 1000, -m 2100) and Hashtopolis agents run only on named, isolated password-audit hosts.
  • Add the six JARM values in the Indicators chapter to external attack surface hunting, always paired with a certificate subject check.

8. Detection Rules

The full rules are in the Detection rules tab. Every rule file loads without errors in its engine (Suricata 7.0.12, YARA-X, pySigma, Kusto.Language); the rules were not replayed against live traffic. Test each rule in a lab before production use.

Rule fileWhat it catches
odin_bruteratel_mythic_plugx_hashtopolis.rulesSuricata 7: seven signatures for C2 certificates, Badger and Mythic check-ins, and Hashtopolis worker polling
sentinel_evasive_c2_callstack_and_kerberoast_burst.kqlMicrosoft Sentinel and Defender XDR: contact with confirmed C2s, injection followed by C2 egress, RC4 ticket bursts, and unauthorised Hashcat or Hashtopolis runs
sigma_unbacked_memory_syscall_and_kerberoast_export.ymlSigma (3 rules): unbacked call stacks touching LSASS, RC4 service-ticket requests, and Hashtopolis or Hashcat execution
odin_brc4_havoc_mythic_and_hashtopolis_artifacts.yarYARA (4 rules): Badger configs and syscall stubs, Havoc sleep-mask code, Mythic agent stubs, and Hashtopolis agents

How the Suricata signatures work

SIDLooks forWhy
9519001Server certificate CN=brute[.]bzh[.]ovh or CN=FQDNDedicated or default Brute Ratel C4 teamservers (S1063)
9519002Outbound POST whose body holds "b_arch" plus c_name, d_name, p_id or b_verBadger check-ins; needs TLS inspection when wrapped in HTTPS
9519003Server certificate for one of three confirmed DarkSword domains on 443, 8443 or 8888Confirmed DarkSword listeners (T1071.001)
9519004Server certificate CN=host-<16 hex>.invalid on Overlord portsOverlord's generated certificates
9519005Outbound POST /agent_message with a base64 body longer than 47 bytesMythic agent check-ins; needs TLS inspection on 7443 and similar
9519006Outbound POST /api/server.php with actions register, login, getTask, getChunk, sendProgress or sendCrackHashtopolis workers (T1110.002); flagged as policy violation
9519007Server certificate CN=Murmur Autogenerated Certificate v2 or CN=Major Cobalt StrikeMulti-port Cobalt Strike templates (S0154)

The certificate rules need tls.cert_subject inspection on server handshakes. Suppress SID 9519006 only for named internal GPU audit hosts talking to an approved internal Hashtopolis server. If you run self-hosted Mumble voice servers (Murmur, default port 64738), exclude those exact internal IPs from SID 9519007 rather than disabling it.

How the KQL query works

The query looks back 14 days and has four branches.

BranchFires when
C2 egressA device connects to one of the 11 confirmed C2 addresses, or to a watchlist you add from your own CTI feed
Injection plus egressA process injects into rundll32.exe, dllhost.exe, werfault.exe or similar from a temp or profile folder, and the same process reaches a listed address within 10 minutes
Kerberoast burstEvent 4769 shows one account requesting RC4 (0x17) tickets for five or more distinct SPNs in five minutes, excluding krbtgt and machine accounts
Cracking toolshashcat or hashtopolis runs, or a command line holds /api/server.php, a Kerberos-related Hashcat mode or hashtopolis.zip

Fill the approved audit-host and scanner-account lists with your own verified assets. In older forests where legacy SPNs still use RC4, raise the burst threshold from 5 to 8, or exclude exact service accounts while you migrate them to AES.

How the Sigma and YARA rules work

RuleFires when
Sigma 1: unbacked memory call stackSysmon Event 10 shows a call trace containing UNKNOWN( while touching LSASS or a sacrificial host process
Sigma 2: Kerberoast RC4 requestEvent 4769 with ticket encryption 0x17, excluding machine accounts and krbtgt
Sigma 3: Hashtopolis or HashcatCommand lines with /api/server.php, hashtopolis.zip, --voucher, Kerberos-related Hashcat modes or $krb5tgs$23$, outside named audit hosts
YARA: Brute Ratel C4 BadgerAt least two Badger JSON keys ("b_arch", "c_name", "d_name") appear with two evasion strings such as NtAllocateVirtualMemory, EtwEventWrite, AmsiScanBuffer or coffee
YARA: Havoc Demon sleep maskSystemFunction032, CreateTimerQueueTimer and NtContinue appear together with a Havoc or Demon marker
YARA: Mythic agent stubMythic JSON actions (checkin, get_tasking, post_response) appear with Apollo, Poseidon or agent_message markers
YARA: Hashtopolis agent/api/server.php appears with two worker actions and a hashcat or clientSignature string

Each YARA rule has a strict file size bound.

How to sort a host

What the host showsAction
Dedicated C2 with a family certificate or JARM, every socket confirmedBlock
Multi-family hub with suspected sockets onlyHub watchlist
Hashtopolis server with no evidence of hostile useDual-use watchlist
Hashtopolis candidate inside an offensive cloud neighbourhoodCandidate watchlist
VPN city-rack certificate with the stock Go JARM on a VPN provider networkVPN watchlist, do not block
Any match on a dynamic telecom network72-hour watchlist
A named internal audit hostAllowlist
A MySQL or SSH port match with no family signalIgnore

9. Indicators

The Indicators tab holds 15 published indicators: 11 confirmed C2 addresses and the 4 JARM values tied to confirmed C2. The Brute Ratel 8081 and DarkSword JARM values, listed under JARM values for hunting in this chapter, are for hunting only.

TypeCount
Confirmed C2 addresses to block11
Watchlist hubs, Hashtopolis servers and cluster candidates (addresses withheld)11
JARM values for TLS hunting6 (4 in the Indicators tab)

No commercial VPN exit is in the set.

Confirmed C2 addresses to block

Address and portFrameworkHostingKey fingerprint
161.35.73[.]220:443Brute Ratel C4DigitalOcean (DE)CN=brute[.]bzh[.]ovh
191.96.31[.]13:443Cobalt StrikeHostinger (US)Dominant Cobalt Strike JARM
78.90.248[.]224:7000Brute Ratel C4Net-Surf (BG)JARM 3fd3fd20d...99b095c
163.172.45[.]158:8086Cobalt StrikeScaleway (FR)CN=Murmur Autogenerated Certificate v2
200.105.111[.]26:50000Cobalt StrikeARCN=Murmur Autogenerated Certificate v2
194.26.192[.]57:9000OverlordNLCN=host-43c6ed77a39b7312.invalid
23.95.217[.]154:8443OverlordUSCN=host-21ffa7a17fac9f9a.invalid
5.188.86[.]227:7443MythicGlobal Layer (NL)Default 7443 TLS
138.197.31[.]70:7443MythicDigitalOcean (US)Default 7443 TLS
77.72.18[.]83:50500Cobalt StrikeMelbikomas (DE)Nine ports 2811 to 55555, Murmur certificate
47.239.109[.]26:3389Cobalt StrikeAlibaba (HK)CN=Major Cobalt Strike

JARM values for hunting

Use these with a certificate subject or issuer check. Never block on a JARM value alone.

FamilyPortJARMSeen on
Brute Ratel C480813fd21b20d00000021c43d21b21b43de0a012c76cf078b8d06f4620c2286f5e12 suspected custom Ratel nodes
Brute Ratel C44433fd3fd20d00000021c43d43d00043d15e5079913504d6ff89229f1f99b095cBoth published Ratel C2s
DarkSword44321d14d00021d21d00042d43d00000091f9827a8676a9d9f27d421962a09b5d183 of 346 endpoints (52.9%)
Overlord844321d14d00021d21d00042d43d00041df8e4b7c874a766a0a2344c0afd98620711 Overlord endpoints on 8443 and 9000, including both published Overlord C2s
Mythic74431dd40d40d00040d00042d43d000000831b6af40378e2dd35eeac4e9311926eBoth published Mythic C2s
Cobalt Strike1001029d08d00029d0000000000000000001f93725095f606ed113a9a32b2392e62Confirmed Cobalt Strike cluster on 13 OVH addresses in 92.222.152[.]0/24

Withheld: all hub, Hashtopolis, cluster-candidate, suspected and candidate addresses; the 507 VPN exits and their VPN domain; all 618 router addresses; and every third-party or personal certificate subject. For watchlist entries, correlate outbound traffic with process lineage, the certificate rules or Kerberos anomalies over 72 to 168 hours.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

TacticTechnique or softwareHow it appears hereDetection
Command and ControlT1071.001 Web ProtocolsHTTPS and HTTP C2 on DarkSword, Overlord and MythicSIDs 9519003 to 9519005
Command and ControlS1063 Brute Ratel C4Ratel teamservers and Badger check-insSIDs 9519001, 9519002; YARA Badger rule
Command and ControlS0154 Cobalt Strike, S0013 PlugXMulti-port hubs and Murmur certificate templatesSID 9519007
Defense EvasionT1055 Process InjectionInjection into sacrificial host processes; indirect syscallsKQL injection branch; Sigma 1
Credential AccessT1558.003 KerberoastingModeled RC4 SPN ticket requestsKQL burst branch; Sigma 2
Credential AccessT1110.002 Password CrackingHashtopolis distributes offline Hashcat jobsSID 9519006; Sigma 3; KQL tool branch

10. Scope and Limits

  • Window. The findings cover a two-week observation window ending 18 November 2026. Most endpoints were last seen between 13 and 18 November. Some records carry earliest first-seen dates back to 2022 from other sources; those are not a tracking start.
  • Outside view only. The data shows internet-facing servers. It cannot show what happened inside any enterprise. No Kerberos ticket theft, cracked password or service-account logon was observed.
  • The Kerberoast chain is a model. Chapter 4 and Figure 3 describe documented tradecraft. They are not a reconstruction of a real intrusion.
  • No links between populations. The C2, Hashtopolis and IoT populations share no address, certificate or observed traffic. Nothing here ties them to one operator.
  • Confirmed is not the same as attributed. Several frameworks are dual-use. A confirmed listener runs the framework; it may still belong to an authorised red team.
  • Feed labels are labels. DarkSword is an upstream feed label. It does not attribute activity to a named actor.
  • Rule testing. Every published rule file loads without errors in its engine (Suricata 7.0.12, YARA-X, pySigma and Microsoft's Kusto.Language analyzer, checked on 20 November 2026). The rules were not replayed against live traffic, so test and tune them in your own environment before production use.

11. Sources

  1. Palo Alto Networks Unit 42. When Pentest Tools Go Brutal: Red-Teaming Tool Being Abused by Malicious Actors. https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/brute-ratel-c4-tool/ (verified 18 November 2026)
  2. MITRE ATT&CK. Brute Ratel C4, S1063. https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1063/ (verified 18 November 2026)
  3. Mythic documentation. https://docs.mythic-c2.net/ (verified 18 November 2026)
  4. Havoc Framework documentation. https://havocframework.com/docs/welcome (verified 18 November 2026)
  5. MITRE ATT&CK. PlugX, S0013. https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013/ (verified 19 November 2026)
  6. Hashtopolis project. Server repository. https://github.com/hashtopolis/server (verified 18 November 2026)
  7. MITRE ATT&CK. Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting, T1558.003. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/ (verified 18 November 2026)
  8. Salesforce Engineering. Easily Identify Malicious Servers on the Internet with JARM. https://engineering.salesforce.com/easily-identify-malicious-servers-on-the-internet-with-jarm-e095edac525a/ (verified 18 November 2026)

What is…?

Short explanations of the tools and families named in this study.

All explanations

Frequently asked questions

What are evasive C2 frameworks?

Post-exploitation frameworks give an intruder a remote control channel into a breached network. The newer ones are built to stay quiet on monitored workstations. Their implants avoid the Windows API hooks that many endpoint tools watch, and they encrypt themselves in memory while they sleep.

Why are so few of them confirmed?

Because many hits are not C2 at all. Brute Ratel C4's teamserver is written in Go, and its default TLS setup produces the same fingerprint as many ordinary Go services. An upstream feed marked 523 Brute Ratel C4 endpoints as "confirmed". Of those, 507 turned out to be commercial VPN exits on 255 hosts, with VPN city-rack certificates and the same Go fingerprint.

What does a 177-port hub look like?

Operators often stack many listeners on one rented server. We observed 35 such hubs with 391 sockets between them. The largest, on Tencent Cloud in China, runs 177 listeners: 161 HypeAgent, 14 Cobalt Strike and 2 PlugX. Its certificates impersonate Chinese banks, cloud providers and security vendors. A second Tencent host runs 95 listeners with the same template.

Where does Hashtopolis fit in?

Hashtopolis splits password-cracking jobs across many remote GPU machines running Hashcat. We observed 32 Hashtopolis endpoints on 26 hosts, mostly on worker API port 8080 and web console port 4200.

What about the infected routers?

The 618 Mirai, Mozi and Moobot endpoints are home and small-business routers on consumer broadband in China, Taiwan, Ethiopia, the Philippines and elsewhere. Their owners are victims. The routers share no address and no observed traffic with the C2 or Hashtopolis servers. Their addresses also change hands often, so a permanent block mostly hurts the next customer. Treat them as short-lived watchlist entries.

Defender kit

Indicators of compromise

Verified adversary infrastructure and tool hashes from this study. Every value below is also discussed in the report.

IDTypeIndicatorPortContextAction
R19-IOC-01 IPv4 161.35.73[.]220 443 bruteratelc4 Block
R19-IOC-02 IPv4 191.96.31[.]13 443 cobaltstrike Block
R19-IOC-03 IPv4 78.90.248[.]224 7000 bruteratelc4 Block
R19-IOC-04 IPv4 163.172.45[.]158 8086 cobaltstrike Block
R19-IOC-05 IPv4 200.105.111[.]26 50000 cobaltstrike Block
R19-IOC-06 IPv4 194.26.192[.]57 9000 overlord Block
R19-IOC-07 IPv4 23.95.217[.]154 8443 overlord Block
R19-IOC-08 IPv4 5.188.86[.]227 7443 mythic Block
R19-IOC-09 IPv4 138.197.31[.]70 7443 mythic Block
R19-IOC-10 IPv4 77.72.18[.]83 50500 cobaltstrike Block
R19-IOC-11 IPv4 47.239.109[.]26 3389 cobaltstrike Block
R19-IOC-12 JARM 3fd3fd20d00000021c43d43d00043d15e5079913504d6ff89229f1f99b095c 443 bruteratelc4 Hunt
R19-IOC-13 JARM 21d14d00021d21d00042d43d00041df8e4b7c874a766a0a2344c0afd986207 8443 overlord Hunt
R19-IOC-14 JARM 1dd40d40d00040d00042d43d000000831b6af40378e2dd35eeac4e9311926e 7443 mythic Hunt
R19-IOC-15 JARM 29d08d00029d0000000000000000001f93725095f606ed113a9a32b2392e62 10010 cobaltstrike Hunt

13 records from this study are not published in this table: candidate, suspected and dual-use hosts, victim-related values, and hashes of exposed secrets or files.

Defender kit

Detection rules

The rule files exactly as printed in the report. Test them in your own engine before deployment.

YARA odin_brc4_havoc_mythic_and_hashtopolis_artifacts.yar 96 lines
Download
Suricata odin_bruteratel_mythic_plugx_hashtopolis.rules 27 lines
Download
Sentinel KQL sentinel_evasive_c2_callstack_and_kerberoast_burst.kql 73 lines
Download
Sigma sigma_unbacked_memory_syscall_and_kerberoast_export.yml 107 lines
Download