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What Is Brute Ratel C4? How the Red-Team C2 Framework Works

A commercial adversary-simulation framework built to slip past endpoint tools: how it works, how attackers have used it, and why most internet hits are not what they seem.

By
Odin by Brandefense
Updated
21 Nov 2026
Reading time
8 min read
Type
C2 framework

In short

Brute Ratel C4 (BRc4) is a commercial command-and-control framework for red teams and adversary simulation, designed to avoid endpoint detection and antivirus tools. Its implant, called Badger, runs commands and moves laterally over HTTPS, DNS over HTTPS, SMB or TCP. A cracked copy leaked in September 2022, and threat actors have used it since.

Key takeaways

What it is
A commercial C2 framework sold for red-team and adversary-simulation work. Its server is called Ratel and its implant is called Badger.
How it works
Badgers check in over HTTPS, DNS over HTTPS, SMB or TCP. The vendor advertises switching between Windows API, native API and direct system calls to avoid user-mode hooks.
Why it matters
MITRE ATT&CK says a cracked version leaked in September 2022 and threat actors have used it since. Unit 42 described a 2022 sample packaged like known nation-state lures.
What Odin Research saw
690 Brute Ratel C4 endpoints in Monograph 19, but only 4 confirmed servers. 507 were commercial VPN exits that share a generic TLS fingerprint.
What to do first
Hunt on the endpoint for unbacked memory and DLL side-loading. Block only servers with a family certificate or fingerprint, never on a shared JARM alone.

What is Brute Ratel C4?

Brute Ratel C4 (BRc4) is a commercial command-and-control framework for red teams and adversary simulation. It deploys implants called badgers that run commands, move laterally and keep access, and it is built to avoid endpoint detection and response (EDR) and antivirus tools. Attackers have used leaked copies.

The product's own site calls it "a customized command and control center for red team and adversary simulation". MITRE ATT&CK tracks it as software S1063 and says it first appeared in December 2020.

Like other command-and-control frameworks, Brute Ratel C4 has two halves. An operator runs the server, and the implant runs on a machine inside the target network. What sets it apart is its focus on staying quiet on monitored Windows workstations, where EDR tools watch API calls.

That makes Brute Ratel C4 a dual-use tool. Licensed red teams use it to test defenses. The same features help intruders who obtain a copy.

How Brute Ratel C4 works

The server, called Ratel, holds the operator console and the listeners. Odin Research's Monograph 19 notes that it is written in Go. The implant, the Badger, is a position-independent payload that runs on the target and polls the server for tasks.

The vendor site lists these main features:

  • Several channels. HTTPS profiles, DNS over HTTPS, and SMB and TCP badgers for internal pivots. External C2 can also travel through services such as Slack, Discord and Microsoft Teams.
  • Hook avoidance. Process injection with a switch between the Windows API, the native API and direct system calls, plus a built-in debugger that looks for EDR user-mode hooks.
  • Pivoting. Lateral movement over SMB, TCP, WMI, WinRM and remote service management.
  • Extensibility. Running C#, Beacon Object Files (BOFs), PowerShell and reflective DLLs in memory.

MITRE ATT&CK maps Brute Ratel C4 to techniques that include web and DNS application-layer protocols (T1071.001, T1071.004), DLL hijacking (T1574.001), native API use (T1106) and masquerading (T1036.005). See our pages on DLL hijacking and process injection for the defensive side.

Monograph 19 also summarizes the evasion tricks documented for this class of implant. These include indirect system calls, patching of AMSI and ETW through CPU debug registers, and encrypting the implant's own memory while it sleeps.

Brute Ratel C4 origin, versions and leak

According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Brute Ratel C4 was written by Chetan Nayak, also known as Paranoid Ninja, a security engineer who had worked in red-team roles. The product site's footer names his company, Dark Vortex. The tool debuted in December 2020. Version 1.0, named "Sicilian Defense", came out on 17 May 2022.

Unit 42 reported a price of $2,500 per user and $2,250 per renewal. It also cited the developer's own announcement, on 16 May 2022, of 480 users across 350 customers.

The turning point came later that year. MITRE ATT&CK states that a cracked version leaked in September 2022 and that threat actors have used it since. A leaked copy removes the vendor's control over who runs the tool.

Is it legal? Buying and using a licensed copy for authorized testing is legal. Running any copy against systems you have no written permission to test is not, and a cracked copy is unlicensed on top of that.

How attackers use Brute Ratel C4

In July 2022, Unit 42 described a Brute Ratel C4 sample uploaded to VirusTotal on 19 May 2022 from Sri Lanka. It was an ISO disk image named as a CV. None of the 56 antivirus engines that checked it at upload flagged it as malicious.

The chain worked like this, according to Unit 42:

  1. The user opens a shortcut (LNK) file inside the ISO.
  2. The shortcut starts a legitimate, signed OneDriveUpdater.exe.
  3. That program loads a modified version.dll from the same folder, a DLL search-order hijack.
  4. The DLL decrypts the Badger payload and injects it into RuntimeBroker.exe, which then calls back over HTTPS.

Unit 42 noted that this packaging resembled a known APT29 lure. It also stated that packaging alone is not enough to attribute the sample to APT29. We repeat that caution here.

The case shows why Brute Ratel C4 worries defenders. A signed program, a side-loaded DLL and memory-only code give file scanners little to see. Detection has to come from behavior and from the network.

What Odin Research observed

Odin Research has tracked Brute Ratel C4 servers in three studies. The main lesson is that most internet hits are not Brute Ratel C4 at all.

  • 690 endpoints, 4 confirmed. In Monograph 19, Brute Ratel C4 led six evasive C2 frameworks with 690 endpoints on 434 hosts. Only four dedicated servers carried their own certificates or a family TLS fingerprint and were confirmed.
  • 507 were VPN exits. A threat feed marked 523 of those endpoints as confirmed. Of them, 507 turned out to be commercial VPN exits on 255 hosts. They shared one generic TLS fingerprint and a minimal HTTP 404 reply with Brute Ratel C4's default setup. Blocking them would cut off remote staff and customers.
  • A shared fingerprint. Monograph 02 found that one JARM covered 506 of 539 feed-labeled Brute Ratel C4 records. The same value also appeared on 90 records in a security vendor's demo lab. See our page on JARM.
  • Two web ports. Monograph 02 found the records split evenly between port 443 (256) and port 8080 (255). A TLS policy that covers only 443 misses half of them.
  • A port-80 cluster. Monograph 19 counted 155 plain-HTTP listeners in Singapore and Hong Kong that match redirector profiles. They stay suspected until there is protocol evidence.
  • Short-lived addresses. Monograph 13 lists a suspected Brute Ratel C4 listener on a Chinese subscriber network, where addresses rotate. It gets a 24-hour watch, not a permanent block.

Some dedicated servers kept a default certificate subject, CN=FQDN. Operator-set certificates and the family fingerprint, not the port or the hosting provider, separated real servers from look-alikes.

How to detect Brute Ratel C4

Combine endpoint and network signals:

  • Side-loading from disk images. Alert when a signed program started from a mounted ISO or a user folder loads an unsigned DLL, then makes an outbound connection.
  • Unbacked memory. Sysmon Event 10 with an UNKNOWN entry in the call trace, touching lsass.exe or a host process such as rundll32.exe or RuntimeBroker.exe, points to code running from memory without a file.
  • Badger check-ins. Monograph 19 documents JSON keys such as "b_arch", "c_name" and "d_name" in Badger traffic. You need TLS inspection to see them inside HTTPS.
  • Server certificates. A default CN=FQDN subject on a server your hosts reach is a strong lead. A JARM match on its own is not.

Monograph 19 publishes a Suricata rule set with signatures for Brute Ratel C4 certificates and Badger check-ins, a YARA rule for Badger configuration and system-call stubs, and a Sigma rule for unbacked call stacks. Monograph 02 adds TLS camouflage signatures. All rules are on the report pages and in the Defense Kit. Background on rule formats is in YARA and Sigma rules.

How to defend against Brute Ratel C4

  1. Cut the delivery path. Block or quarantine ISO, IMG and LNK attachments in email, and stop users mounting disk images from the internet where you can.
  2. Turn on memory protections. Monograph 19 recommends Credential Guard, LSA protection (RunAsPPL) and kernel ETW threat-intelligence telemetry, so injected code has fewer places to hide.
  3. Block precisely. Block servers that show a family certificate or fingerprint on every socket. Put VPN-exit look-alikes and shared-fingerprint hits on watchlists, as described in our page on false positives.
  4. Inspect more than port 443. Monograph 02 showed half of Brute Ratel C4 records on port 8080.
  5. Hunt, then respond. If you find a Badger, treat the host as a live intrusion. Follow your incident response plan and look for lateral movement over SMB and WMI.

Brute Ratel C4 compared with other C2 frameworks

FrameworkImplantPorts Odin often sawNotes
Brute Ratel C4Badger443, 8080, 80Commercial; leaked in 2022; generic TLS fingerprint collides with VPN exits
Cobalt StrikeBeacon50050 (teamserver), many high ports35 confirmed endpoints in Monograph 19, many sharing one certificate template
SliverSliver implant31337 (operators), 8888 (mTLS)TLS 1.3 hides its certificate from passive sensors
MythicApollo, Poseidon and others7443Check-ins carry checkin and get_tasking actions
HavocDemon443, 8443Demon uses Ekko and Foliage sleep obfuscation

Frequently asked questions about Brute Ratel C4

What is Brute Ratel C4?

Brute Ratel C4 is a commercial command-and-control framework for red teams and adversary simulation. Its Badger implant runs commands and moves laterally while trying to avoid EDR and antivirus detection.

Is Brute Ratel C4 malware?

Not by design. It is a commercial security testing product. But a cracked copy leaked in September 2022, according to MITRE ATT&CK, and threat actors have used it since, so a Badger found on your network should be treated as hostile until proven otherwise.

Is Brute Ratel C4 legal?

A licensed copy used for authorized testing is legal. Using any copy against systems without written permission is illegal in most countries, and cracked copies are unlicensed.

Who made Brute Ratel C4?

Unit 42 identified the developer as Chetan Nayak, also known as Paranoid Ninja. The product site's footer names his company, Dark Vortex. The tool debuted in December 2020.

What is a Brute Ratel Badger?

Badger is the name of the Brute Ratel C4 implant. It runs on the target machine, checks in over HTTPS, DNS over HTTPS, SMB or TCP, and runs tasks such as commands, Beacon Object Files and in-memory .NET code.

Brute Ratel C4 vs Cobalt Strike: what is the difference?

Both are C2 frameworks used for red-team work and abused by attackers. Brute Ratel C4's vendor puts EDR hook avoidance at the center of its feature list. In Monograph 19, Cobalt Strike had 35 confirmed endpoints against 4 for Brute Ratel C4.

How do I detect Brute Ratel C4?

Look for DLL side-loading from disk images, unbacked memory touching LSASS or host processes, Badger JSON keys in decrypted traffic and default CN=FQDN server certificates. Odin Research publishes Suricata, YARA and Sigma rules in its Defense Kit.

Why do VPN servers show up as Brute Ratel C4?

The default Brute Ratel C4 server gives the same generic TLS fingerprint and 404 reply as many other services. In Monograph 19, 507 feed-labeled Brute Ratel C4 hits were commercial VPN exits. Never block on that fingerprint alone.

Sources

  1. Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, "When Pentest Tools Go Brutal: Red-Teaming Tool Being Abused by Malicious Actors", 5 July 2022. unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/brute-ratel-c4-tool/ (checked 21 November 2026)
  2. MITRE ATT&CK, Brute Ratel C4 (S1063). attack.mitre.org/software/S1063/ (checked 21 November 2026)
  3. Brute Ratel C4 official site. bruteratel.com/ (checked 21 November 2026)

Related tools and terms

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