In short
Sliver C2 is an open-source, cross-platform command-and-control framework written in Go and maintained by Bishop Fox. Red teams use it to run implants on Windows, Linux and macOS over mutual TLS, HTTP(S), WireGuard or DNS. Ransomware affiliates and state-linked groups have also adopted it, often in place of Cobalt Strike.
Key takeaways
- What it is
- A free, GPLv3-licensed command-and-control (C2) framework from Bishop Fox, written in Go, with implants for Windows, Linux and macOS.
- How it works
- An operator builds an implant, runs it on a target, and controls it from a shared server over mutual TLS, HTTP(S), WireGuard or DNS.
- Why it matters
- MITRE ATT&CK lists APT29, TA551 and Cinnamon Tempest among its users. Microsoft reported ransomware affiliates adopting it in 2022.
- What Odin Research saw
- 600 Sliver-associated endpoints in one study, but only 36 confirmed listeners. Look-alike certificates cause most false alerts.
- What to do first
- Alert on outbound connections to ports 31337 and 8888, watch process injection chains, and block only on Sliver-specific evidence.
What is Sliver C2?
Sliver C2 is an open-source command-and-control framework, written in Go and maintained by the security firm Bishop Fox. It lets an operator build implants, run them on Windows, Linux or macOS hosts, and control them from a shared server. Red teams use it for authorized tests, and real intruders use it too.
MITRE ATT&CK tracks Sliver as software S0633 and describes it as a cross-platform framework for red team operations. It also ships a package manager called the armory, which downloads extra tools and payloads.
Sliver is free and published under the GPLv3 license. That matters for defenders. Microsoft has reported attackers using Sliver alongside or in place of Cobalt Strike, a commercial framework. Sliver gives them a modern alternative at no cost.
Like any command-and-control framework, Sliver is dual-use. Many installs belong to students, consultants and in-house red teams. A Sliver server on the internet is a lead, not a verdict.
How Sliver C2 works
A Sliver deployment has three parts:
- The server. It stores implant builds, certificates and session state, and runs the listeners that implants call back to.
- The operator client. Operators connect to the server through a "multiplayer" console. By default, this console listens on port 31337 and presents a certificate with the common name
multiplayer. - The implant. A compiled Go binary that runs on the target. Each implant gets its own keys.
Implants talk to the server over mutual TLS (mTLS), HTTP(S), WireGuard or DNS. With mTLS, both sides present certificates, which makes the traffic hard to intercept. Port 8888 is the default mTLS implant listener when operators leave it unchanged.
MITRE ATT&CK documents several Sliver capabilities that matter for detection:
- C2 over web protocols and DNS (T1071);
- AES and mTLS encrypted channels (T1573);
- migration into other processes (T1055);
- LSASS memory dumping (T1003.001) and SOCKS5 proxying through other implants (T1090.001).
Because the implant is a large Go binary, it is often delivered by a loader or stager rather than dropped directly.
Who uses Sliver C2?
Sliver began as a red team tool, and most installs still serve that purpose. Its use by criminals and state groups is also well documented.
- State-linked groups. MITRE ATT&CK lists APT29, TA551 and Cinnamon Tempest as groups that have used Sliver.
- Ransomware affiliates. In August 2022, Microsoft reported that DEV-0237, a prolific ransomware-as-a-service affiliate, had adopted Sliver.
- Loader-delivered intrusions. Microsoft also described cybercrime actors delivering Sliver through the Bumblebee loader, sometimes alongside or in place of Cobalt Strike.
Is Sliver legal? Yes. It is open-source software for authorized testing. Running it against systems you do not own or have written permission to test is illegal in most countries.
What Odin Research observed
Sliver appears in seven Odin Research reports. Addresses of unconfirmed or third-party hosts stay withheld.
- 600 endpoints, 36 confirmed. Monograph 07 studied 600 Sliver-associated endpoints on 452 IP addresses in 41 countries. Only 36 were confirmed listeners; 64 were suspected and 500 were candidates. Four ports carried 73.8% of them: 443, 8888, 31337 and 8443.
- Ordinary clouds. The same study found Sliver spread across mainstream providers such as DigitalOcean, The Constant Company, Tencent, Amazon and Alibaba, not one bulletproof host.
- Open operator folders. Four operators served their home folders over the web. One confirmed Sliver server also held cloned PHP2Shell exploit code for PHP flaws CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, a Linux PAM password backdoor and a disguised systemd loop. Another staged a PowerShell script that hides data in HTTP GET query strings. These were staged files; Odin saw no evidence they ran on a victim.
- TLS 1.3 on the operator port. Monograph 02 found 20
CN=multiplayerlisteners on port 31337. All 16 that answered a TLS fingerprint probe negotiated TLS 1.3 only, which hides the certificate from passive sensors. - Multi-implant hubs. Monograph 19 counted 14 Sliver hubs among 35 cloud servers that each carried 3 to 177 C2 ports. Monograph 17 found a Sliver listener on the same host as a Metasploit Meterpreter listener.
- Staged implants. Monograph 25 found a 23.08 MB
sliver.binimplant on an open workbench in Finland, and Monograph 04 recorded a staged Sliver C2 loader on an AI offense host.
Look-alikes are the main trap. In Monograph 07, 41 suspected endpoints showed only a generic CN=localhost certificate. A public C2 heuristic also matched the certificate that MySQL 8.x creates by default. Monograph 13 covers these threat-feed collisions in depth.
How to detect Sliver C2
No single signal is enough. Combine network, endpoint and memory evidence.
- Default ports and certificates. Outbound connections to ports 31337 and 8888 are worth an alert. A server certificate with the common name
multiplayeron port 31337 is a strong pivot. ACN=localhostcertificate alone is not. - Process injection chains. Microsoft notes that Sliver's migrate, sideload, spawndll and execute-assembly commands use the
VirtualAllocEx,WriteProcessMemory,VirtualProtectExandCreateRemoteThreadsequence. - Default command lines and services. Microsoft's hunting queries look for Sliver's default PowerShell shell command line, and for services named "Sliver" or described as "Sliver implant" when operators use its PsExec feature.
- Memory scanning. Sliver decrypts its configuration in memory when it needs it. Memory scans can recover the C2 address, though timing matters.
- Infrastructure hunting. Microsoft suggests scanning listeners for unusual HTTP header combinations and JARM values. Odin Research found that generic Go TLS stacks share many JARM values, so pair them with a second signal.
Odin Research publishes ready-to-use rules. Monograph 07 carries Suricata, Sentinel KQL, Sigma and YARA rules for Sliver operator certificates, exposed Sliver logs and its co-hosted tools. Monograph 02 adds a Suricata rule for TLS 1.3 sessions from external port 31337, and Monograph 25 a Sigma rule for Linux Sliver execution. All are in the Defense Kit.
How to defend against and respond to Sliver C2
- Restrict egress. Block direct outbound traffic from workstations to non-standard ports, and force web traffic through a proxy. This removes Sliver's easiest paths.
- Turn on PowerShell logging. Script block logging records the default shell and many loaders.
- Protect credentials. Sliver can dump LSASS. Enable LSA protection and watch for unusual handles to
lsass.exe. See credential theft. - Isolate, then hunt. If you confirm an implant, isolate the host and look for its siblings. Sliver supports SOCKS proxying through other implants, so check for lateral movement.
- Block carefully. Block confirmed Sliver addresses. Send suspected ones to threat hunting, because many look-alikes are harmless servers.
Sliver C2 compared with similar frameworks
| Framework | Type | What Odin Research or vendors report |
|---|---|---|
| Sliver C2 | Open source (GPLv3), Go | Defaults on ports 31337 and 8888 are useful hunting pivots; most look-alikes are harmless |
| Cobalt Strike | Commercial | Microsoft reported attackers using Sliver alongside or in place of it |
| Havoc | Open source | Seen on the same host as HexStrike AI in Monograph 19 |
| Mythic | Open source | Seen beside HexStrike AI and AdaptixC2 in Monograph 19 |
| Brute Ratel C4 | Commercial | Implants built to evade user-mode hooks; many hits in Monograph 19 were VPN look-alikes |
Frequently asked questions about Sliver C2
What is Sliver C2?
Sliver C2 is an open-source command-and-control framework from Bishop Fox, written in Go. It builds implants for Windows, Linux and macOS and controls them over mutual TLS, HTTP(S), WireGuard or DNS.
Is Sliver malware?
Sliver is a legitimate red team tool, not malware by design. Attackers abuse it, though, and security products often flag its implants. MITRE ATT&CK lists it as software S0633 and names groups that have used it.
Is Sliver legal to use?
Yes, on systems you own or are authorized to test. The software is GPLv3-licensed and free to download. Using it without written permission is illegal in most countries.
Who made Sliver?
Sliver is developed and maintained by Bishop Fox, a security consulting firm. The project is published on GitHub under the BishopFox organization.
Which threat actors use Sliver?
MITRE ATT&CK lists APT29, TA551 and Cinnamon Tempest. Microsoft reported in 2022 that the ransomware affiliate DEV-0237 adopted Sliver, and that other actors delivered it with the Bumblebee loader.
What ports does Sliver use?
By default, the multiplayer operator console uses port 31337 and the mTLS implant listener uses port 8888. Operators often move listeners to 443 or 8443 to blend in with web traffic.
How do I detect Sliver in my network?
Alert on outbound connections to ports 31337 and 8888, look for the CN=multiplayer certificate, watch for process injection chains and Sliver's default PowerShell command line, and scan memory on suspect hosts.
Sliver vs Cobalt Strike: what is the difference?
Both are post-exploitation C2 frameworks. Cobalt Strike is commercial. Sliver is free, open source and written in Go. Microsoft reported attackers using Sliver alongside or in place of Cobalt Strike.
Sources
- MITRE ATT&CK, Sliver (S0633). attack.mitre.org/software/S0633/ (checked 21 November 2026)
- Microsoft Security Blog, "Looking for the 'Sliver' lining: Hunting for emerging command-and-control frameworks", 24 August 2022. www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/08/24/looking-for-the-sliver-lining-hunting-for-emerging-command-and-control-frameworks/ (checked 21 November 2026)
- Bishop Fox, Sliver C2 documentation site. sliver.sh/docs (checked 21 November 2026)
- NVD, CVE-2026-109618. nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109618 (checked 21 November 2026)
- NVD, CVE-2026-109619. nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109619 (checked 21 November 2026)
Related tools and terms
What is Brute Ratel C4?
Brute Ratel C4 is a commercial red-team C2 framework built to evade endpoint detection. Leaked copies have been used by criminal operators.
C2 frameworkWhat is Havoc?
Havoc is an open-source post-exploitation C2 framework with a Windows implant called Demon.
C2 frameworkWhat is Mythic?
Mythic is an open-source, multi-user C2 platform with pluggable agents and transports, built for red-team operations.
Offensive frameworkWhat is Metasploit?
Metasploit is an open-source penetration testing framework maintained by Rapid7. It bundles exploits, payloads and the Meterpreter post-exploitation agent.
Offensive frameworkWhat is Viper?
Viper is an open-source browser front end for Metasploit. It adds a multi-operator web interface and a module runner on top of the Metasploit RPC service.
Adversary emulationWhat is Caldera?
Caldera is MITRE's open-source adversary emulation platform. It plans and runs ATT&CK techniques through agents such as Sandcat.
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